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Religion and Science

The relationship between religion and science is the subject of continued debate in philosophy and theology. To what extent are religion and science compatible? Are religious beliefs sometimes conducive to science, or do they inevitably pose obstacles to scientific inquiry? The interdisciplinary field of “science and religion”, also called “theology and science”, aims to answer these and other questions. It studies historical and contemporary interactions between these fields, and provides philosophical analyses of how they interrelate.

This entry provides an overview of the topics and discussions in science and religion. Section 1 outlines the scope of both fields, and how they are related. Section 2 looks at the relationship between science and religion in five religious traditions, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism. Section 3 discusses contemporary topics of scientific inquiry in which science and religion intersect, focusing on divine action, creation, and human origins.

1.1 A brief history

1.2 what is science, and what is religion, 1.3 taxonomies of the interaction between science and religion, 1.4 the scientific study of religion, 2.1 christianity, 2.3 hinduism, 2.4 buddhism, 2.5 judaism, 3.1 divine action and creation, 3.2 human origins, works cited, other important works, other internet resources, related entries, 1. science, religion, and how they interrelate.

Since the 1960s, scholars in theology, philosophy, history, and the sciences have studied the relationship between science and religion. Science and religion is a recognized field of study with dedicated journals (e.g., Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science ), academic chairs (e.g., the Andreas Idreos Professor of Science and Religion at Oxford University), scholarly societies (e.g., the Science and Religion Forum), and recurring conferences (e.g., the European Society for the Study of Science and Theology’s biennial meetings). Most of its authors are theologians (e.g., John Haught, Sarah Coakley), philosophers with an interest in science (e.g., Nancey Murphy), or (former) scientists with long-standing interests in religion, some of whom are also ordained clergy (e.g., the physicist John Polkinghorne, the molecular biophysicist Alister McGrath, and the atmospheric scientist Katharine Hayhoe). Recently, authors in science and religion also have degrees in that interdisciplinary field (e.g., Sarah Lane Ritchie).

The systematic study of science and religion started in the 1960s, with authors such as Ian Barbour (1966) and Thomas F. Torrance (1969) who challenged the prevailing view that science and religion were either at war or indifferent to each other. Barbour’s Issues in Science and Religion (1966) set out several enduring themes of the field, including a comparison of methodology and theory in both fields. Zygon, the first specialist journal on science and religion, was also founded in 1966. While the early study of science and religion focused on methodological issues, authors from the late 1980s to the 2000s developed contextual approaches, including detailed historical examinations of the relationship between science and religion (e.g., Brooke 1991). Peter Harrison (1998) challenged the warfare model by arguing that Protestant theological conceptions of nature and humanity helped to give rise to science in the seventeenth century. Peter Bowler (2001, 2009) drew attention to a broad movement of liberal Christians and evolutionists in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries who aimed to reconcile evolutionary theory with religious belief. In the 1990s, the Vatican Observatory (Castel Gandolfo, Italy) and the Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences (Berkeley, California) co-sponsored a series of conferences on divine action and how it can be understood in the light of various contemporary sciences. This resulted in six edited volumes (see Russell, Murphy, & Stoeger 2008 for a book-length summary of the findings of this project).

The field has presently diversified so much that contemporary discussions on religion and science tend to focus on specific disciplines and questions. Rather than ask if religion and science (broadly speaking) are compatible, productive questions focus on specific topics. For example, Buddhist modernists (see section 2.4 ) have argued that Buddhist theories about the self (the no-self) and Buddhist practices, such as mindfulness meditation, are compatible and are corroborated by neuroscience.

In the contemporary public sphere, a prominent interaction between science and religion concerns evolutionary theory and creationism/Intelligent Design. The legal battles (e.g., the Kitzmiller versus Dover trial in 2005) and lobbying surrounding the teaching of evolution and creationism in American schools suggest there’s a conflict between religion and science. However, even if one were to focus on the reception of evolutionary theory, the relationship between religion and science is complex. For instance, in the United Kingdom, scientists, clergy, and popular writers (the so-called Modernists), sought to reconcile science and religion during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, whereas the US saw the rise of a fundamentalist opposition to evolutionary thinking, exemplified by the Scopes trial in 1925 (Bowler 2001, 2009).

Another prominent offshoot of the discussion on science and religion is the New Atheist movement, with authors such as Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, Daniel Dennett, and Christopher Hitchens. They argue that public life, including government, education, and policy should be guided by rational argument and scientific evidence, and that any form of supernaturalism (especially religion, but also, e.g., astrology) has no place in public life. They treat religious claims, such as the existence of God, as testable scientific hypotheses (see, e.g., Dawkins 2006).

In recent decades, the leaders of some Christian churches have issued conciliatory public statements on evolutionary theory. Pope John Paul II (1996) affirmed evolutionary theory in his message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, but rejected it for the human soul, which he saw as the result of a separate, special creation. The Church of England publicly endorsed evolutionary theory (e.g., C. M. Brown 2008), including an apology to Charles Darwin for its initial rejection of his theory.

This entry will focus on the relationship between religious and scientific ideas as rather abstract philosophical positions, rather than as practices. However, this relationship has a large practical impact on the lives of religious people and scientists (including those who are both scientists and religious believers). A rich sociological literature indicates the complexity of these interactions, among others, how religious scientists conceive of this relationship (for recent reviews, see Ecklund 2010, 2021; Ecklund & Scheitle 2007; Gross & Simmons 2009).

For the past fifty years, the discussion on science and religion has de facto been on Western science and Christianity: to what extent can the findings of Western sciences be reconciled with Christian beliefs? The field of science and religion has only recently turned to an examination of non-Christian traditions, providing a richer picture of interaction.

In order to understand the scope of science and religion and their interactions, we must at least get a rough sense of what science and religion are. After all, “science” and “religion” are not eternally unchanging terms with unambiguous meanings. Indeed, they are terms that were coined recently, with meanings that vary across contexts. Before the nineteenth century, the term “religion” was rarely used. For a medieval author such as Aquinas, the term religio meant piety or worship, and was not applied to religious systems outside of what he considered orthodoxy (Harrison 2015). The term “religion” obtained its considerably broader current meaning through the works of early anthropologists, such as E.B. Tylor (1871), who systematically used the term for religions across the world. As a result, “religion” became a comparative concept, referring to traits that could be compared and scientifically studied, such as rituals, dietary restrictions, and belief systems (Jonathan Smith 1998).

The term “science” as it is currently used also became common in the nineteenth century. Prior to this, what we call “science” fell under the terminology of “natural philosophy” or, if the experimental part was emphasized, “experimental philosophy”. William Whewell (1834) standardized the term “scientist” to refer to practitioners of diverse natural philosophies. Philosophers of science have attempted to demarcate science from other knowledge-seeking endeavors, in particular religion. For instance, Karl Popper (1959) claimed that scientific hypotheses (unlike religious and philosophical ones) are in principle falsifiable. Many authors (e.g., Taylor 1996) affirm a disparity between science and religion, even if the meanings of both terms are historically contingent. They disagree, however, on how to precisely (and across times and cultures) demarcate the two domains.

One way to distinguish between science and religion is the claim that science concerns the natural world, whereas religion concerns the supernatural world and its relationship to the natural. Scientific explanations do not appeal to supernatural entities such as gods or angels (fallen or not), or to non-natural forces (such as miracles, karma, or qi ). For example, neuroscientists typically explain our thoughts in terms of brain states, not by reference to an immaterial soul or spirit, and legal scholars do not invoke karmic load when discussing why people commit crimes.

Naturalists draw a distinction between methodological naturalism , an epistemological principle that limits scientific inquiry to natural entities and laws, and ontological or philosophical naturalism , a metaphysical principle that rejects the supernatural (Forrest 2000). Since methodological naturalism is concerned with the practice of science (in particular, with the kinds of entities and processes that are invoked), it does not make any statements about whether or not supernatural entities exist. They might exist, but lie outside of the scope of scientific investigation. Some authors (e.g., Rosenberg 2014) hold that taking the results of science seriously entails negative answers to such persistent questions into the existence of free will or moral knowledge. However, these stronger conclusions are controversial.

The view that science can be demarcated from religion in its methodological naturalism is more commonly accepted. For instance, in the Kitzmiller versus Dover trial, the philosopher of science Robert Pennock was called to testify by the plaintiffs on whether Intelligent Design was a form of creationism, and therefore religion. If it were, the Dover school board policy would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Building on earlier work (e.g., Pennock 1998), Pennock argued that Intelligent Design, in its appeal to supernatural mechanisms, was not methodologically naturalistic, and that methodological naturalism is an essential component of science.

Methodological naturalism is a recent development in the history of science, though we can see precursors of it in medieval authors such as Aquinas who attempted to draw a theological distinction between miracles, such as the working of relics, and unusual natural phenomena, such as magnetism and the tides (see Perry & Ritchie 2018). Natural and experimental philosophers such as Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, Robert Hooke, and Robert Boyle regularly appealed to supernatural agents in their natural philosophy (which we now call “science”). Still, overall there was a tendency to favor naturalistic explanations in natural philosophy. The X-club was a lobby group for the professionalization of science founded in 1864 by Thomas Huxley and friends. While the X-club may have been in part motivated by the desire to remove competition by amateur-clergymen scientists in the field of science, and thus to open up the field to full-time professionals, its explicit aim was to promote a science that would be free from religious dogma (Garwood 2008, Barton 2018). This preference for naturalistic causes may have been encouraged by past successes of naturalistic explanations, leading authors such as Paul Draper (2005) to argue that the success of methodological naturalism could be evidence for ontological naturalism.

Several typologies probe the interaction between science and religion. For example, Mikael Stenmark (2004) distinguishes between three views: the independence view (no overlap between science and religion), the contact view (some overlap between the fields), and a union of the domains of science and religion; within these views he recognizes further subdivisions, e.g., contact can be in the form of conflict or harmony. The most influential taxonomy of the relationship between science and religion remains Barbour’s (2000): conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration. Subsequent authors, as well as Barbour himself, have refined and amended this taxonomy. However, others (e.g., Cantor & Kenny 2001) have argued that this taxonomy is not useful to understand past interactions between both fields. Nevertheless, because of its enduring influence, it is still worthwhile to discuss it in detail.

The conflict model holds that science and religion are in perpetual and principal conflict. It relies heavily on two historical narratives: the trial of Galileo (see Dawes 2016) and the reception of Darwinism (see Bowler 2001). Contrary to common conception, the conflict model did not originate in two seminal publications, namely John Draper’s (1874) History of the Conflict between Religion and Science and Andrew Dickson White’s (1896) two-volume opus A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom . Rather, as James Ungureanu (2019) argues, the project of these early architects of the conflict thesis needs to be contextualized in a liberal Protestant tradition of attempting to separate religion from theology, and thus salvage religion. Their work was later appropriated by skeptics and atheists who used their arguments about the incompatibility of traditional theological views with science to argue for secularization, something Draper and White did not envisage.

The vast majority of authors in the science and religion field is critical of the conflict model and believes it is based on a shallow and partisan reading of the historical record. While the conflict model is at present a minority position, some have used philosophical argumentation (e.g., Philipse 2012) or have carefully re-examined historical evidence such as the Galileo trial (e.g., Dawes 2016) to argue for this model. Alvin Plantinga (2011) has argued that the conflict is not between science and religion, but between science and naturalism. In his Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism (first formulated in 1993), Plantinga argues that naturalism is epistemically self-defeating: if both naturalism and evolution are true, then it’s unlikely we would have reliable cognitive faculties.

The independence model holds that science and religion explore separate domains that ask distinct questions. Stephen Jay Gould developed an influential independence model with his NOMA principle (“Non-Overlapping Magisteria”):

The lack of conflict between science and religion arises from a lack of overlap between their respective domains of professional expertise. (2001: 739)

He identified science’s areas of expertise as empirical questions about the constitution of the universe, and religion’s domain of expertise as ethical values and spiritual meaning. NOMA is both descriptive and normative: religious leaders should refrain from making factual claims about, for instance, evolutionary theory, just as scientists should not claim insight on moral matters. Gould held that there might be interactions at the borders of each magisterium, such as our responsibility toward other living things. One obvious problem with the independence model is that if religion were barred from making any statement of fact, it would be difficult to justify its claims of value and ethics. For example, one could not argue that one should love one’s neighbor because it pleases the creator (Worrall 2004). Moreover, religions do seem to make empirical claims, for example, that Jesus appeared after his death or that the early Hebrews passed through the parted waters of the Red Sea.

The dialogue model proposes a mutualistic relationship between religion and science. Unlike independence, it assumes a common ground between both fields, perhaps in their presuppositions, methods, and concepts. For example, the Christian doctrine of creation may have encouraged science by assuming that creation (being the product of a designer) is both intelligible and orderly, so one can expect there are laws that can be discovered. Creation, as a product of God’s free actions, is also contingent, so the laws of nature cannot be learned through a priori thinking which prompts the need for empirical investigation. According to Barbour (2000), both scientific and theological inquiry are theory-dependent, or at least model-dependent. For example, the doctrine of the Trinity colors how Christian theologians interpret the first chapters of Genesis. Next to this, both rely on metaphors and models. Both fields remain separate but they talk to each other, using common methods, concepts, and presuppositions. Wentzel van Huyssteen (1998) has argued for a dialogue position, proposing that science and religion can be in a graceful duet, based on their epistemological overlaps. The Partially Overlapping Magisteria (POMA) model defended by Alister McGrath (e.g., McGrath and Collicutt McGrath 2007) is also worth mentioning. According to McGrath, science and religion each draw on several different methodologies and approaches. These methods and approaches are different ways of knowing that have been shaped through historical factors. It is beneficial for scientists and theologians to be in dialogue with each other.

The integration model is more extensive in its unification of science and theology. Barbour (2000) identifies three forms of integration. First, natural theology, which formulates arguments for the existence and attributes of God. It uses interpretations of results from the natural sciences as premises in its arguments. For instance, the supposition that the universe has a temporal origin features in contemporary cosmological arguments for the existence of God. Likewise, the fact that the cosmological constants and laws of nature are life-permitting (whereas many other combinations of constants and laws would not permit life) is used in contemporary fine-tuning arguments (see the entry to fine-tuning arguments ). Second, theology of nature starts not from science but from a religious framework, and examines how this can enrich or even revise findings of the sciences. For example, McGrath (2016) developed a Christian theology of nature, examining how nature and scientific findings can be interpreted through a Christian lens. Thirdly, Barbour believed that Whitehead’s process philosophy was a promising way to integrate science and religion.

While integration seems attractive (especially to theologians), it is difficult to do justice to both the scientific and religious aspects of a given domain, especially given their complexities. For example, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1971), who was both knowledgeable in paleoanthropology and theology, ended up with an unconventional view of evolution as teleological (which put him at odds with the scientific establishment) and with an unorthodox theology (which denied original sin and led to a series of condemnations by the Roman Catholic Church). Theological heterodoxy, by itself, is no reason to doubt a model. However, it shows obstacles for the integration model to become a live option in the broader community of theologians and philosophers who want to remain affiliate to a specific religious community without transgressing its boundaries. Moreover, integration seems skewed towards theism: Barbour described arguments based on scientific results that support (but do not demonstrate) theism, but failed to discuss arguments based on scientific results that support (but do not demonstrate) the denial of theism. Hybrid positions like McGrath’s POMA indicate some difficulty for Barbour’s taxonomy: the scope of conflict, independence, dialogue, and integration is not clearly defined and they are not mutually exclusive. For example, if conflict is defined broadly then it is compatible with integration. Take the case of Frederick Tennant (1902), who sought to explain sin as the result of evolutionary pressures on human ancestors. This view led him to reject the Fall as a historical event, as it was not compatible with evolutionary biology. His view has conflict (as he saw Christian doctrine in conflict with evolutionary biology) but also integration (he sought to integrate the theological concept of sin in an evolutionary picture). It is clear that many positions defined by authors in the religion and science literature do not clearly fall within one of Barbour’s four domains.

Science and religion are closely interconnected in the scientific study of religion, which can be traced back to seventeenth-century natural histories of religion. Natural historians attempted to provide naturalistic explanations for human behavior and culture, including religion and morality. For example, Bernard Le Bovier de Fontenelle’s De l’Origine des Fables (1724) offered a causal account of belief in the supernatural. People often assert supernatural explanations when they lack an understanding of the natural causes underlying extraordinary events: “To the extent that one is more ignorant, or one has less experience, one sees more miracles” (1724 [1824: 295], my translation). Hume’s Natural History of Religion (1757) is perhaps the best-known philosophical example of a natural historical explanation of religious belief. It traces the origins of polytheism—which Hume thought was the earliest form of religious belief—to ignorance about natural causes combined with fear and apprehension about the environment. By deifying aspects of the environment, early humans tried to persuade or bribe the gods, thereby gaining a sense of control.

In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, authors from newly emerging scientific disciplines, such as anthropology, sociology, and psychology examined the purported naturalistic roots of religious beliefs. They did so with a broad brush, trying to explain what unifies diverse religious beliefs across cultures. Auguste Comte (1841) proposed that all societies, in their attempts to make sense of the world, go through the same stages of development: the theological (religious) stage is the earliest phase, where religious explanations predominate, followed by the metaphysical stage (a non-intervening God), and culminating in the positive or scientific stage, marked by scientific explanations and empirical observations.

In anthropology, this positivist idea influenced cultural evolutionism, a theoretical framework that sought to explain cultural change using universal patterns. The underlying supposition was that all cultures evolve and progress along the same trajectory. Cultures with differing religious views were explained as being in different stages of their development. For example, Tylor (1871) regarded animism as the earliest form of religious belief. James Frazer’s Golden Bough (1890) is somewhat unusual within this literature, as he saw commonalities between magic, religion, and science. Though he proposed a linear progression, he also argued that a proto-scientific mindset gave rise to magical practices, including the discovery of regularities in nature. Cultural evolutionist models dealt poorly with religious diversity and with the complex relationships between science and religion across cultures. Many authors proposed that religion was just a stage in human development, which would eventually be superseded. For example, social theorists such as Karl Marx and Max Weber proposed versions of the secularization thesis, the view that religion would decline in the face of modern technology, science, and culture.

Functionalism was another theoretical framework that sought to explain religion. Functionalists did not consider religion to be a stage in human cultural development that would eventually be overcome. They saw it as a set of social institutions that served important functions in the societies they were part of. For example, the sociologist Émile Durkheim (1912 [1915]) argued that religious beliefs are social glue that helps to keep societies together.

Sigmund Freud and other early psychologists aimed to explain religion as the result of cognitive dispositions. For example, Freud (1927) saw religious belief as an illusion, a childlike yearning for a fatherly figure. He also considered “oceanic feeling” (a feeling of limitlessness and of being connected with the world, a concept he derived from the French author Romain Rolland) as one of the origins of religious belief. He thought this feeling was a remnant of an infant’s experience of the self, prior to being weaned off the breast. William James (1902) was interested in the psychological roots and the phenomenology of religious experiences, which he believed were the ultimate source of all institutional religions.

From the 1920s onward, the scientific study of religion became less concerned with grand unifying narratives, and focused more on particular religious traditions and beliefs. Anthropologists such as Edward Evans-Pritchard (1937) and Bronisław Malinowski (1925) no longer relied exclusively on second-hand reports (usually of poor quality and from distorted sources), but engaged in serious fieldwork. Their ethnographies indicated that cultural evolutionism was a defective theoretical framework and that religious beliefs were more diverse than was previously assumed. They argued that religious beliefs were not the result of ignorance of naturalistic mechanisms. For instance, Evans-Pritchard (1937) noted that the Azande were well aware that houses could collapse because termites ate away at their foundations, but they still appealed to witchcraft to explain why a particular house collapsed at a particular time. More recently, Cristine Legare et al. (2012) found that people in various cultures straightforwardly combine supernatural and natural explanations, for instance, South Africans are aware AIDS is caused by the HIV virus, but some also believe that the viral infection is ultimately caused by a witch.

Psychologists and sociologists of religion also began to doubt that religious beliefs were rooted in irrationality, psychopathology, and other atypical psychological states, as James (1902) and other early psychologists had assumed. In the US, in the late 1930s through the 1960s, psychologists developed a renewed interest for religion, fueled by the observation that religion refused to decline and seemed to undergo a substantial revival, thus casting doubt on the secularization thesis (see Stark 1999 for an overview). Psychologists of religion have made increasingly fine-grained distinctions between types of religiosity, including extrinsic religiosity (being religious as means to an end, for instance, getting the benefits of being a member of a social group) and intrinsic religiosity (people who adhere to religions for the sake of their teachings) (Allport & Ross 1967). Psychologists and sociologists now commonly study religiosity as an independent variable, with an impact on, for instance, health, criminality, sexuality, socio-economic profile, and social networks.

A recent development in the scientific study of religion is the cognitive science of religion (CSR). This is a multidisciplinary field, with authors from, among others, developmental psychology, anthropology, philosophy, and cognitive psychology (see C. White 2021 for a comprehensive overview). It differs from other scientific approaches to religion in its presupposition that religion is not a purely cultural phenomenon. Rather, authors in CSR hold that religion is the result of ordinary, early developed, and universal human cognitive processes (e.g., Barrett 2004, Boyer 2002). Some authors regard religion as the byproduct of cognitive processes that are not evolved for religion. For example, according to Paul Bloom (2007), religion emerges as a byproduct of our intuitive distinction between minds and bodies: we can think of minds as continuing, even after the body dies (e.g., by attributing desires to a dead family member), which makes belief in an afterlife and in disembodied spirits natural and spontaneous. Another family of hypotheses regards religion as a biological or cultural adaptive response that helps humans solve cooperative problems (e.g., Bering 2011; Purzycki & Sosis 2022): through their belief in big, powerful gods that can punish, humans behave more cooperatively, which allowed human group sizes to expand beyond small hunter-gatherer communities. Groups with belief in big gods thus out-competed groups without such beliefs for resources during the Neolithic, which would explain the current success of belief in such gods (Norenzayan 2013). However, the question of which came first—big god beliefs or large-scale societies—is a continued matter of debate.

2. Science and religion in various religions

As noted, most studies on the relationship between science and religion have focused on science and Christianity, with only a small number of publications devoted to other religious traditions (e.g., Brooke & Numbers 2011; Lopez 2008). Since science makes universal claims, it is easy to assume that its encounter with other religious traditions would be similar to its interactions with Christianity. However, given different creedal tenets (e.g., in Hindu traditions God is usually not entirely distinct from creation, unlike in Christianity and Judaism), and because science has had distinct historical trajectories in other cultures, one can expect disanalogies in the relationship between science and religion in different religious traditions. To give a sense of this diversity, this section provides a bird’s eye view of science and religion in five major world religions: Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Judaism.

Christianity is an Abrahamic monotheistic religion, currently the religion with the most adherents. It developed in the first century CE out of Judaism. Christians adhere to asserted revelations described in a series of canonical texts, which include the Old Testament, which comprises texts inherited from Judaism, and the New Testament, which contains the Gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John (narratives on the life and teachings of Jesus), as well as events and teachings of the early Christian churches (e.g., Acts of the Apostles, letters by Paul), and Revelation, a prophetic book on the end times.

Given the prominence of revealed texts in Christianity, a useful starting point to examine the relationship between Christianity and science is the two books metaphor (see Tanzella-Nitti 2005 for an overview): God revealed Godself through the “Book of Nature”, with its orderly laws, and the “Book of Scripture”, with its historical narratives and accounts of miracles. Augustine (354–430) argued that the book of nature was the more accessible of the two, since scripture requires literacy whereas illiterates and literates alike could read the book of nature. Maximus Confessor (c. 580–662), in his Ambigua (see Louth 1996 for a collection of and critical introduction to these texts) compared scripture and natural law to two clothes that envelop the Incarnated Logos: Jesus’ humanity is revealed by nature, whereas his divinity is revealed by the scriptures. During the Middle Ages, authors such as Hugh of St. Victor (ca. 1096–1141) and Bonaventure (1221–1274) began to realize that the book of nature was not at all straightforward to read. Given that original sin marred our reason and perception, what conclusions could humans legitimately draw about ultimate reality? Bonaventure used the metaphor of the books to the extent that “ liber naturae ” was a synonym for creation, the natural world. He argued that sin has clouded human reason so much that the book of nature has become unreadable, and that scripture is needed as an aid as it contains teachings about the world.

Christian authors in the field of science and religion continue to debate how these two books interrelate. Concordism is the attempt to interpret scripture in the light of modern science. It is a hermeneutical approach to Bible interpretation, where one expects that the Bible foretells scientific theories, such as the Big Bang theory or evolutionary theory. However, as Denis Lamoureux (2008: chapter 5) argues, many scientific-sounding statements in the Bible are false: the mustard seed is not the smallest seed, male reproductive seeds do not contain miniature persons, there is no firmament, and the earth is neither flat nor immovable. Thus, any plausible form of integrating the book of nature and scripture will require more nuance and sophistication. Theologians such as John Wesley (1703–1791) have proposed the addition of other sources of knowledge to scripture and science: the Wesleyan quadrilateral (a term not coined by Wesley himself) is the dynamic interaction of scripture, experience (including the empirical findings of the sciences), tradition, and reason (Outler 1985).

Several Christian authors have attempted to integrate science and religion (e.g., Haught 1995, Lamoureux 2008, Murphy 1995), making integration a highly popular view on the relationship between science and religion. These authors tend to interpret findings from the sciences, such as evolutionary theory or chaos theory, in a theological light, using established theological models such as classical theism or the doctrine of creation. John Haught (1995) argues that the theological view of kenosis (self-emptying of God in creation) anticipates scientific findings such as evolutionary theory: a self-emptying God (i.e., who limits Godself), who creates a distinct and autonomous world, makes a world with internal self-coherence, with a self-organizing universe as the result.

The dominant epistemological outlook in Christian science and religion has been critical realism, a position that applies both to theology (theological realism) and to science (scientific realism). Barbour (1966) introduced this view into the science and religion literature; it has been further developed by theologians such as Arthur Peacocke (1984) and Wentzel van Huyssteen (1999). Critical realism aims to offer a middle way between naïve realism (the world is as we perceive it) and instrumentalism (our perceptions and concepts are purely instrumental). It encourages critical reflection on perception and the world, hence “critical”. Critical realism has distinct flavors in the works of different authors, for instance, van Huyssteen (1998, 1999) develops a weak form of critical realism set within a postfoundationalist notion of rationality, where theological views are shaped by social, cultural, and evolved biological factors. Murphy (1995: 329–330) outlines doctrinal and scientific requirements for approaches in science and religion: ideally, an integrated approach should be broadly in line with Christian doctrine, especially core tenets such as the doctrine of creation, while at the same time it should be in line with empirical observations without undercutting scientific practices.

Several historians (e.g., Hooykaas 1972) have argued that Christianity was instrumental to the development of Western science. Peter Harrison (2007) maintains that the doctrine of original sin played a crucial role in this, arguing there was a widespread belief in the early modern period that Adam, prior to the Fall, had superior senses, intellect, and understanding. As a result of the Fall, human senses became duller, our ability to make correct inferences was diminished, and nature itself became less intelligible. Postlapsarian humans (i.e., humans after the Fall) are no longer able to exclusively rely on their a priori reasoning to understand nature. They must supplement their reasoning and senses with observation through specialized instruments, such as microscopes and telescopes. As the experimental philosopher Robert Hooke wrote in the introduction to his Micrographia :

every man, both from a deriv’d corruption, innate and born with him, and from his breeding and converse with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of errors … These being the dangers in the process of humane Reason, the remedies of them all can only proceed from the real, the mechanical, the experimental Philosophy [experiment-based science]. (1665, cited in Harrison 2007: 5)

Another theological development that may have facilitated the rise of science was the Condemnation of Paris (1277), which forbade teaching and reading natural philosophical views that were considered heretical, such as Aristotle’s physical treatises. As a result, the Condemnation opened up intellectual space to think beyond ancient Greek natural philosophy. For example, medieval philosophers such as John Buridan (fl. 14th c) held the Aristotelian belief that there could be no vacuum in nature, but once the idea of a vacuum became plausible, natural philosophers such as Evangelista Torricelli (1608–1647) and Blaise Pascal (1623–1662) could experiment with air pressure and vacua (see Grant 1996, for discussion).

Some authors claim that Christianity was unique and instrumental in catalyzing the scientific revolution. For example, according to the sociologist of religion Rodney Stark (2004), the scientific revolution was in fact a slow, gradual development from medieval Christian theology. Claims such as Stark’s, however, fail to recognize the legitimate contributions of Islamic and Greek scholars to the development of modern science, and fail to do justice to the importance of practical technological innovations in map-making and star-charting in the emergence of modern science. In spite of these positive readings of the relationship between science and religion in Christianity, there are sources of enduring tension. For example, there is still vocal opposition to the theory of evolution among Christian fundamentalists. In the public sphere, the conflict view between Christianity and science prevails, in stark contrast to the scholarly literature. This is due to an important extent to the outsize influence of a vocal conservative Christian minority in the American public debate, which sidelines more moderate voices (Evans 2016).

Islam is a monotheistic religion that emerged in the seventh century, following a series of purported revelations to the prophet Muḥammad. The term “Islam” also denotes geo-political structures, such as caliphates and empires, which were founded by Muslim rulers from the seventh century onward, including the Umayyad, Abbasid, and Ottoman caliphates. Additionally, it refers to a culture which flourished within this political and religious context, with its own philosophical and scientific traditions (Dhanani 2002). The defining characteristic of Islam is belief in one God (Allāh), who communicates through prophets, including Adam, Abraham, and Muḥammad. Allāh‎’s revelations to Muḥammad are recorded in the Qurʾān, the central religious text for Islam. Next to the Qurʾān, an important source of jurisprudence and theology is the ḥadīth, an oral corpus of attested sayings, actions, and tacit approvals of the prophet Muḥammad. The two major branches of Islam, Sunni and Shia, are based on a dispute over the succession of Muḥammad. As the second largest religion in the world, Islam shows a wide variety of beliefs. Core creedal views include the oneness of God ( tawḥīd ), the view that there is only one undivided God who created and sustains the universe, prophetic revelation (in particular to Muḥammad), and an afterlife. Beyond this, Muslims disagree on a number of doctrinal issues.

The relationship between Islam and science is complex. Today, predominantly Muslim countries, such as the United Arabic Emirates, enjoy high urbanization and technological development, but they still underperform in common metrics of scientific research, such as publications in leading journals and number of citations per scientist, compared to other regions outside of the west such as India and China (see Edis 2007). Some Muslims hold a number of pseudoscientific ideas, some of which it shares with Christianity such as Old Earth creationism, whereas others are specific to Islam such as the recreation of human bodies from the tailbone on the day of resurrection, and the superiority of prayer in treating lower-back pain instead of conventional methods (Guessoum 2011: 4–5).

This contemporary lack of scientific prominence is remarkable given that the Islamic world far exceeded European cultures in the range and quality of its scientific knowledge between approximately the ninth and the fifteenth century, excelling in domains such as mathematics (algebra and geometry, trigonometry in particular), astronomy (seriously considering, but not adopting, heliocentrism), optics, and medicine. These domains of knowledge are commonly referred to as “Arabic science”, to distinguish them from the pursuits of science that arose in the west (Huff 2003). “Arabic science” is an imperfect term, as many of the practitioners were not speakers of Arabic, hence the term “science in the Islamic world” is more accurate. Many scientists in the Islamic world were polymaths, for example, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna, 980–1037) is commonly regarded as one of the most significant innovators, not only in philosophy, but also in medicine and astronomy. His Canon of Medicine , a medical encyclopedia, was a standard textbook in universities across Europe for many centuries after his death. Al-Fārābī (ca. 872–ca. 950), a political philosopher from Damascus, also investigated music theory, science, and mathematics. Omar Khayyám (1048–1131) achieved lasting fame in disparate domains such as poetry, astronomy, geography, and mineralogy. The Andalusian Ibn Rušd (Averroes, 1126–1198) wrote on medicine, physics, astronomy, psychology, jurisprudence, music, and geography, next to developing a Greek-inspired philosophical theology.

A major impetus for science in the Islamic world was the patronage of the Abbasid caliphate (758–1258), centered in Baghdad. Early Abbasid rulers, such as Harun al-Rashid (ruled 786–809) and his successor Abū Jaʿfar Abdullāh al-Ma’mūn (ruled 813–833), were significant patrons of science. The former founded the Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom), which commissioned translations of major works by Aristotle, Galen, and many Persian and Indian scholars into Arabic. It was cosmopolitan in its outlook, employing astronomers, mathematicians, and physicians from abroad, including Indian mathematicians and Nestorian (Christian) astronomers. Throughout the Islamic world, public libraries attached to mosques provided access to a vast compendium of knowledge, which spread Islam, Greek philosophy, and science. The use of a common language (Arabic), as well as common religious and political institutions and flourishing trade relations encouraged the spread of scientific ideas throughout the Islamic world. Some of this transmission was informal, e.g., correspondence between like-minded people (see Dhanani 2002), some formal, e.g., in hospitals where students learned about medicine in a practical, master-apprentice setting, and in astronomical observatories and academies. The decline and fall of the Abbasid caliphate dealt a blow to science in the Islamic world, but it remains unclear why it ultimately stagnated, and why it did not experience something analogous to the scientific revolution in Western Europe. Note, the decline of science in the Islamic world should not be generalized to other fields, such as philosophy and philosophical theology, which continued to flourish after the Abbasid caliphate fell.

Some liberal Muslim authors, such as Fatima Mernissi (1992), argue that the rise of conservative forms of Islamic philosophical theology stifled more scientifically-minded natural philosophy. In the ninth to the twelfth century, the Mu’tazila (a philosophical theological school) helped the growth of science in the Islamic world thanks to their embrace of Greek natural philosophy. But eventually, the Mu’tazila and their intellectual descendants lost their influence to more conservative brands of theology. Al-Ghazālī’s influential eleventh-century work, The Incoherence of the Philosophers ( Tahāfut al-falāsifa ), was a scathing and sophisticated critique of Greek-inspired Muslim philosophy, arguing that their metaphysical assumptions could not be demonstrated. This book vindicated more orthodox Muslim religious views. As Muslim intellectual life became more orthodox, it became less open to non-Muslim philosophical ideas, which led to the decline of science in the Islamic world, according to this view.

The problem with this narrative is that orthodox worries about non-Islamic knowledge were already present before Al-Ghazālī and continued long after his death (Edis 2007: chapter 2). The study of law ( fiqh ) was more stifling for science in the Islamic world than developments in theology. The eleventh century saw changes in Islamic law that discouraged heterodox thought: lack of orthodoxy could now be regarded as apostasy from Islam ( zandaqa ) which is punishable by death, whereas before, a Muslim could only apostatize by an explicit declaration (Griffel 2009: 105). (Al-Ghazālī himself only regarded the violation of three core doctrines as zandaqa , namely statements that challenged monotheism, the prophecy of Muḥammad, and resurrection after death.) Given that heterodox thoughts could be interpreted as apostasy, this created a stifling climate for science. In the second half of the nineteenth century, as science and technology became firmly entrenched in Western society, Muslim empires were languishing or colonized. Scientific ideas, such as evolutionary theory, became equated with European colonialism, and thus met with distrust. The enduring association between western culture, colonialism, and science led to a more prominent conflict view of the relationship between science and religion in Muslim countries.

In spite of this negative association between science and Western modernity, there is an emerging literature on science and religion by Muslim scholars (mostly scientists). The physicist Nidhal Guessoum (2011) holds that science and religion are not only compatible, but in harmony. He rejects the idea of treating the Qurʾān as a scientific encyclopedia, something other Muslim authors in the debate on science and religion tend to do. Moreover, he adheres to the no-possible-conflict principle, outlined by Ibn Rušd: there can be no conflict between God’s word (properly understood) and God’s work (properly understood). If an apparent conflict arises, the Qurʾān may not have been interpreted correctly.

While the Qurʾān asserts a creation in six days (like the Hebrew Bible), “day” is often interpreted as a very long span of time, rather than a 24-hour period. As a result, Old Earth creationism is more influential in Islam than Young Earth creationism. Adnan Oktar’s Atlas of Creation (published in 2007 under the pseudonym Harun Yahya), a glossy coffee table book that draws heavily on Christian Old Earth creationism, has been distributed worldwide (Hameed 2008). Since the Qurʾān explicitly mentions the special creation of Adam out of clay, most Muslims refuse to accept that humans evolved from hominin ancestors. Nevertheless, Muslim scientists such as Guessoum (2011) and Rana Dajani (2015) have advocated acceptance of evolution.

Hinduism is the world’s third largest religion, though the term “Hinduism” is an awkward catch-all phrase that denotes diverse religious and philosophical traditions that emerged on the Indian subcontinent between 500 BCE and 300 CE. The vast majority of Hindus live in India; most others live in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Southeast Asia, with a significant diaspora in western countries such as the United States (Hackett 2015 [ Other Internet Resources ]). In contrast to the Abrahamic monotheistic religions, Hinduism does not always draw a sharp distinction between God and creation. (While there are pantheistic and panentheistic views in Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, these are minority positions.) Many Hindus believe in a personal God, and identify this God as immanent in creation. This view has ramifications for the science and religion debate, in that there is no sharp ontological distinction between creator and creature (Subbarayappa 2011). Religious traditions originating on the Indian subcontinent, including Hinduism, Jainism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, are referred to as dharmic religions. Philosophical points of view are referred to as darśana .

One factor that unites the different strands of Hinduism is the importance of foundational texts composed between ca. 1600 and 700 BCE. These include the Vedas, which contain hymns and prescriptions for performing rituals, Brāhmaṇa, accompanying liturgical texts, and Upaniṣad, metaphysical treatises. The Vedas discuss gods who personify and embody natural phenomena such as fire (Agni) and wind (Vāyu). More gods appear in the following centuries (e.g., Gaṇeśa and Sati-Parvati in the 4th century). Note that there are both polytheistic and monotheistic strands in Hinduism, so it is not the case that individual believers worship or recognize all of these gods. Ancient Vedic rituals encouraged knowledge of diverse sciences, including astronomy, linguistics, and mathematics. Astronomical knowledge was required to determine the timing of rituals and the construction of sacrificial altars. Linguistics developed out of a need to formalize grammatical rules for classical Sanskrit, which was used in rituals. Large public offerings also required the construction of elaborate altars, which posed geometrical problems and thus led to advances in geometry. Classic Vedic texts also frequently used very large numbers, for instance, to denote the age of humanity and the Earth, which required a system to represent numbers parsimoniously, giving rise to a 10-base positional system and a symbolic representation for zero as a placeholder, which would later be imported in other mathematical traditions (Joseph 1991 [2000]). In this way, ancient Indian dharma encouraged the emergence of the sciences.

Around the sixth–fifth century BCE, the northern part of the Indian subcontinent experienced an extensive urbanization. In this context, medicine ( āyurveda ) became standardized. This period also gave rise to a wide range of heterodox philosophical schools, including Buddhism, Jainism, and Cārvāka. The latter defended a form of metaphysical naturalism, denying the existence of gods or karma. The relationship between science and religion on the Indian subcontinent is complex, in part because the dharmic religions and philosophical schools are so diverse. For example, Cārvāka proponents had a strong suspicion of inferential beliefs, and rejected Vedic revelation and supernaturalism in general, instead favoring direct observation as a source of knowledge.

Natural theology also flourished in the pre-colonial period, especially in the Advaita Vedānta, a darśana that identifies the self, ātman , with ultimate reality, Brahman. Advaita Vedāntin philosopher Adi Śaṅkara (fl. first half eighth century) was an author who regarded Brahman as the only reality, both the material and the efficient cause of the cosmos. Śaṅkara formulated design and cosmological arguments, drawing on analogies between the world and artifacts: in ordinary life, we never see non-intelligent agents produce purposive design, yet the universe is suitable for human life, just like benches and pleasure gardens are designed for us. Given that the universe is so complex that even an intelligent craftsman cannot comprehend it, how could it have been created by non-intelligent natural forces? Śaṅkara concluded that it must have been designed by an intelligent creator (C.M. Brown 2008: 108).

From 1757 to 1947, India was under British colonial rule. This had a profound influence on its culture as Hindus came into contact with Western science and technology. For local intellectuals, the contact with Western science presented a challenge: how to assimilate these ideas with Hinduism? Mahendrahal Sircar (1833–1904) was one of the first authors to examine evolutionary theory and its implications for Hindu religious beliefs. Sircar was an evolutionary theist, who believed that God used evolution to create current life forms. Evolutionary theism was not a new hypothesis in Hinduism, but the many lines of empirical evidence Darwin provided for evolution gave it a fresh impetus. While Sircar accepted organic evolution through common descent, he questioned the mechanism of natural selection as it was not teleological, which went against his evolutionary theism. This was a widespread problem for the acceptance of evolutionary theory, one that Christian evolutionary theists also wrestled with (Bowler 2009). He also argued against the British colonists’ beliefs that Hindus were incapable of scientific thought, and encouraged fellow Hindus to engage in science, which he hoped would help regenerate the Indian nation (C.M. Brown 2012: chapter 6).

The assimilation of Western culture prompted various revivalist movements that sought to reaffirm the cultural value of Hinduism. They put forward the idea of a Vedic science, where all scientific findings are already prefigured in the Vedas and other ancient texts (e.g., Vivekananda 1904). This idea is still popular within contemporary Hinduism, and is quite similar to ideas held by contemporary Muslims, who refer to the Qurʾān as a harbinger of scientific theories.

Responses to evolutionary theory were as diverse as Christian views on this subject, ranging from creationism (denial of evolutionary theory based on a perceived incompatibility with Vedic texts) to acceptance (see C.M. Brown 2012 for a thorough overview). Authors such as Dayananda Saraswati (1930–2015) rejected evolutionary theory. By contrast, Vivekananda (1863–1902), a proponent of the monistic Advaita Vedānta enthusiastically endorsed evolutionary theory and argued that it is already prefigured in ancient Vedic texts. His integrative view claimed that Hinduism and science are in harmony: Hinduism is scientific in spirit, as is evident from its long history of scientific discovery (Vivekananda 1904). Sri Aurobindo Ghose, a yogi and Indian nationalist who was educated in the West, formulated a synthesis of evolutionary thought and Hinduism. He interpreted the classic avatara doctrine, according to which God incarnates into the world repeatedly throughout time, in evolutionary terms. God thus appears first as an animal, later as a dwarf, then as a violent man (Rama), and then as Buddha, and as Kṛṣṇa. He proposed a metaphysical picture where both spiritual evolution (reincarnation and avatars) and physical evolution are ultimately a manifestation of God (Brahman). This view of reality as consisting of matter ( prakṛti ) and consciousness ( puruṣa ) goes back to sāṃkhya , one of the orthodox Hindu darśana, but Aurobindo made explicit reference to the divine, calling the process during which the supreme Consciousness dwells in matter involution (Aurobindo, 1914–18 [2005], see C.M. Brown 2007 for discussion).

During the twentieth century, Indian scientists began to gain prominence, including C.V. Raman (1888–1970), a Nobel Prize winner in physics, and Satyendra Nath Bose (1894–1974), a theoretical physicist who described the behavior of photons statistically, and who gave his name to bosons. However, these authors were silent on the relationship between their scientific work and their religious beliefs. By contrast, the mathematician Srinivasa Ramanujan (1887–1920) was open about his religious beliefs and their influence on his mathematical work. He claimed that the goddess Namagiri helped him to intuit solutions to mathematical problems. Likewise, Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858–1937), a theoretical physicist, biologist, biophysicist, botanist, and archaeologist who worked on radio waves, saw the Hindu idea of unity reflected in the study of nature. He started the Bose institute in Kolkata in 1917, the earliest interdisciplinary scientific institute in India (Subbarayappa 2011).

Buddhism, like the other religious traditions surveyed in this entry, encompasses many views and practices. The principal forms of Buddhism that exist today are Theravāda and Mahāyāna. (Vajrayāna, the tantric tradition of Buddhism, is also sometimes seen as a distinct form.) Theravāda is the dominant form of Buddhism of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia. It traditionally refers to monastic and textual lineages associated with the study of the Pāli Buddhist Canon. Mahāyāna refers to a movement that likely began roughly four centuries after the Buddha’s death; it became the dominant form of Buddhism in East and Central Asia. It includes Chan or Zen, and also tantric Buddhism, which today is found mostly in Tibet, though East Asian forms also exist.

Buddhism originated in the historical figure of the Buddha (historically, Gautama Buddha or Siddhārtha Gautama, ca. 5 th –4 th century BCE). His teaching centered on ethics as well as metaphysics, incapsulated in the Four Noble Truths (on suffering and its origin in human desires), and the Noble Eightfold Path (right view, right aspiration, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration) to end suffering and to break the cycle of rebirths, culminating in reaching Nirvana. Substantive metaphysical teachings include belief in karma, the no-self, and the cycle of rebirth.

As a response to colonialist attitudes, modern Buddhists since the nineteenth century have often presented Buddhism as harmonious with science (Lopez 2008). The argument is roughly that since Buddhism doesn’t require belief in metaphysically substantive entities such as God, the soul, or the self (unlike, for example, Christianity), Buddhism should be easily compatible with the factual claims that scientists make. (Note, however, that historically most Buddhist have believed in various forms of divine abode and divinities.) We could thus expect the dialogue and integration view to prevail in Buddhism. An exemplar for integration is the fourteenth Dalai Lama, who is known for his numerous efforts to lead dialogue between religious people and scientists. He has extensively written on the relationship between Buddhism and various scientific disciplines such as neuroscience and cosmology (e.g., Dalai Lama 2005, see also the Science and Philosophy in the Indian Buddhist Classics series, a four-volume series conceived and compiled by the Dalai Lama, e.g., Jinpa 2017). Donald Lopez Jr (2008) identifies compatibility as an enduring claim in the debate on science and Buddhism, in spite of the fact that what is meant by these concepts has shifted markedly over time. As David McMahan (2009) argues, Buddhism underwent profound shifts in response to modernity in the west as well as globally. In this modern context, Buddhists have often asserted the compatibility of Buddhism with science, favorably contrasting their religion to Christianity in that respect.

The full picture of the relationship between Buddhism and religion is more nuanced than one of wholesale acceptance of scientific claims. I will here focus on East Asia, primarily Japan and China, and the reception of evolutionary theory in the early twentieth century to give a sense of this more complex picture. The earliest translations of evolutionary thought in Japan and China were not drawn from Darwin’s Origin of Species or Descent of Man , but from works by authors who worked in Darwin’s wake, such as Ernst Haeckel and Thomas Huxley. For example, the earliest translated writings on evolutionary theory in China was a compilation by Yan Fu entitled On Natural Evolution ( Tianyan lun ), which incorporated excerpts by Herbert Spencer and Thomas Huxley. This work drew a close distinction between social Darwinism and biological evolution (Ritzinger 2013). Chinese and Japanese Buddhists received these ideas in the context of western colonialism and imperialism. East Asian intellectuals saw how western colonial powers competed with each other for influence on their territory, and discerned parallels between this and the Darwinian struggle for existence. As a result, some intellectuals such as the Japanese political adviser and academic Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916) drew on Darwinian thought and popularized notions such as “survival of the fittest” to justify the foreign policies of the Meiji government (Burenina 2020). It is in this context that we can situate Buddhist responses to evolutionary theory.

Buddhists do not distinguish between human beings as possessing a soul and other animals as soulless. As we are all part of the cycle of rebirth, we have all been in previous lives various other beings, including birds, insects, and fish. The problem of the specificity of the human soul does not even arise because of the no-self doctrine. Nevertheless, as Justin Ritzinger (2013) points out, Chinese Buddhists in the 1920s and 1930s who were confronted with early evolutionary theory did not accept Darwin’s theory wholesale. In their view, the central element of Darwinism—the struggle for existence—was incompatible with Buddhism, with its emphasis on compassion with other creatures. They rejected social Darwinism (which sought to engineer societies along Darwinian principles) because it was incompatible with Buddhist ethics and metaphysics. Struggling to survive and to propagate was clinging onto worldly things. Taixu (1890–1947), a Chinese Reformer and Buddhist modernist, instead chose to appropriate Pyotr Kropotkin’s evolutionary views, specifically on mutual aid and altruism. The Russian anarchist argued that cooperation was central to evolutionary change, a view that is currently also more mainstream. However, Kropotkin’s view did not go far enough in Taixu’s opinion because mutual aid still requires a self. Only when one recognizes the no-self doctrine could one dedicate oneself entirely to helping others, as bodhisattvas do (Ritzinger 2013).

Similar dynamics can be seen in the reception of evolutionary theory among Japanese Buddhists. Evolutionary theory was introduced in Japan during the early Meji period (1868–1912) when Japan opened itself to foreign trade and ideas. Foreign experts, such as the American zoologist Edward S. Morse (1838–1925) shared their knowledge of the sciences with Japanese scholars. The latter were interested in the social ramifications of Darwinism, particularly because they had access to translated versions of Spencer’s and Huxley’s work before they could read Darwin’s. Japanese Buddhists of the Nichiren tradition accepted many elements of evolutionary theory, but they rejected other elements, notably the struggle for existence, and randomness and chance, as this contradicts the role of karma in one’s circumstances at birth.

Among the advocates of the modern Nishiren Buddhist movement is Honda Nisshō (1867–1931). Honda emphasized the importance of retrogressions (in addition to progress, which was the main element in evolution that western authors such as Haeckel and Spencer considered). He strongly argued against social Darwinism, the application of evolutionary principles in social engineering, on religious grounds. He argued that we can accept humans are descended from apes without having to posit a pessimistic view of human nature that sees us as engaged in a struggle for survival with fellow human beings. Like Chinese Buddhists, Honda thought Kropotkin’s thesis of mutual aid was more compatible with Buddhism, but he was suspicious of Kropotkin’s anarchism (Burenina 2020). His work, like that of other East Asian Buddhists indicates that historically, Buddhists are not passive recipients of western science but creative interpreters. In some cases, their religious reasons for rejecting some metaphysical assumptions in evolutionary theory led them to anticipate recent developments in biology, such as the recognition of cooperation as an evolutionary principle.

Judaism is one of the three major Abrahamic monotheistic traditions, encompassing a range of beliefs and practices that express a covenant between God and the people of Israel. Central to both Jewish practice and beliefs is the study of texts, including the written Torah (the Tanakh, sometimes called “Hebrew Bible”), and the “Oral Law” of Rabbinic Judaism, compiled in such works like the Talmud. There is also a corpus of esoteric, mystical interpretations of biblical texts, the Kabbalah, which has influenced Jewish works on the relationship between science and religion. The Kabbalah also had an influence on Renaissance and early modern Christian authors such as Pico Della Mirandola, whose work helped to shape the scientific revolution (see the entry on Giovanni Pico della Mirandola ). The theologian Maimonides (Rabbi Moshe ben-Maimon, 1138–1204, aka Rambam) had an enduring influence on Jewish thought up until today, also in the science and religion literature.

Most contemporary strains of Judaism are Rabbinic, rather than biblical, and this has profound implications for the relationship between religion and science. While both Jews and Evangelical Christians emphasize the reading of sacred texts, the Rabbinic traditions (unlike, for example, the Evangelical Christian tradition) holds that reading and interpreting texts is far from straightforward. Scripture should not be read in a simple literal fashion. This opens up more space for accepting scientific theories (e.g., Big Bang cosmology) that seem at odds with a simple literal reading of the Torah (e.g., the six-day creation in Genesis) (Mitelman 2011 [ Other Internet Resources ]). Moreover, most non-Orthodox Jews in the US identify as politically liberal, so openness to science may also be an identity marker given that politically liberal people in the US have positive attitudes toward science (Pew Forum, 2021 [ Other Internet Resources ]).

Jewish thinkers have made substantive theoretical contributions to the relationship between science and religion, which differ in interesting respects from those seen in the literature written by Christian authors. To give just a few examples, Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), a prominent neo-Kantian German Jewish philosopher, thought of the relationship between Judaism and science in the light of the advances in scientific disciplines and the increased participation of Jewish scholars in the sciences. He argued that science, ethics, and Judaism should all be conceived of as distinct but complementary sciences. Cohen believed that his Jewish religious community was facing an epistemic crisis. All references to God had become suspect due to an adherence to naturalism, at first epistemological, but fast becoming ontological. Cohen saw the concept of a transcendent God as foundational to both Jewish practice and belief, so he thought adherence to wholesale naturalism threatened both Jewish orthodoxy and orthopraxy. As Teri Merrick (2020) argues, Cohen suspected this was in part due to epistemic oppression and self-censuring (though Cohen did not frame it in these terms). Because Jewish scientists wanted to retain credibility in the Christian majority culture, they underplayed and neglected the rich Jewish intellectual legacy in their practice. In response to this intellectual crisis, Cohen proposed to reframe Jewish thought and philosophy so that it would be recognized as both continuous with the tradition and essentially contributing to ethical and scientific advances. In this way, he reframed this tradition, articulating a broadly Kantian philosophy of science to combat a perceived conflict between Judaism and science (see the entry on Hermann Cohen for an in-depth discussion).

Jewish religious scholars have examined how science might influence religious beliefs, and vice versa. Rather than a unified response we see a spectrum of philosophical views, especially since the nineteenth and early twentieth century. As Shai Cherry (2003) surveys, Jewish scholars in the early twentieth century accepted biological evolution but were hesitant about Darwinian natural selection as the mechanism. The Latvian-born Israeli rabbi Abraham Isaac Kook (1865–1935) thought that religion and science are largely separate domains (a view somewhat similar to Gould’s NOMA), though he believed that there was a possible flow from religion to science. For example, Kook challenged the lack of directionality in Darwinian evolutionary theory. Using readings of the Kabbalah (and Halakhah, Jewish law), he proposed that biological evolution fits in a larger picture of cosmic evolution towards perfection.

By contrast, the American rabbi Morcedai Kaplan (1881–1983) thought information flow between science and religion could go in both directions, a view reminiscent to Barbour’s dialogue position. He repeatedly argued against scientism (the encroachment of science on too many aspects of human life, including ethics and religion), but he believed nevertheless we ought to apply scientific methods to religion. He saw reality as an unfolding process without a pre-ordained goal: it was progressive, but not teleologically determined. Kaplan emphasized the importance of morality (and identified God as the source of this process), and conceptualized humanity as not merely a passive recipient of evolutionary change, but an active participant, prefiguring work in evolutionary biology on the importance of agency in evolution (e.g., Okasha 2018). Thus, Kaplan’s reception of scientific theories, especially evolution, led him to formulate an early Jewish process theology.

Reform Judaism endorses an explicit anti-conflict view on the relationship between science and religion. For example, the Pittsburgh Platform of 1885, the first document of the Reform rabbinate, has a statement that explicitly says that science and Judaism are not in conflict:

We hold that the modern discoveries of scientific researches in the domain of nature and history are not antagonistic to the doctrines of Judaism.

This Platform had an enduring influence on Reform Judaism over the next decades. Secular Jewish scientists such as Albert Einstein, Richard Feynman, Douglas Daniel Kahneman, and Stephen J. Gould have also reflected on the relationship between science and broader issues of existential significance, and have exerted considerable influence on the science and religion debate.

3. Central topics in the debate

Current work in the field of science and religion encompasses a wealth of topics, including free will, ethics, human nature, and consciousness. Contemporary natural theologians discuss fine-tuning, in particular design arguments based on it (e.g., R. Collins 2009), the interpretation of multiverse cosmology, and the significance of the Big Bang (see entries on fine-tuning arguments and natural theology and natural religion ). For instance, authors such as Hud Hudson (2013) have explored the idea that God has actualized the best of all possible multiverses. Here follows an overview of two topics that continue to generate substantial interest and debate: divine action (and the closely related topic of creation) and human origins. The focus will be on Christian work in science and religion, due to its prevalence in the literature.

Before scientists developed their views on cosmology and origins of the world, Western cultures already had a doctrine of creation, based on biblical texts (e.g., the first three chapters of Genesis and the book of Revelation) and the writings of church fathers such as Augustine. This doctrine of creation has the following interrelated features: first, God created the world ex nihilo, i.e., out of nothing. Differently put, God did not need any pre-existing materials to make the world, unlike, e.g., the Demiurge (from Greek philosophy), who created the world from chaotic, pre-existing matter. Second, God is distinct from the world; the world is not equal to or part of God (contra pantheism or panentheism) or a (necessary) emanation of God’s being (contra Neoplatonism). Rather, God created the world freely. This introduces an asymmetry between creator and creature: the world is radically contingent upon God’s creative act and is also sustained by God, whereas God does not need creation (Jaeger 2012b: 3). Third, the doctrine of creation holds that creation is essentially good (this is repeatedly affirmed in Genesis 1). The world does contain evil, but God does not directly cause this evil to exist. Moreover, God does not merely passively sustain creation, but rather plays an active role in it, using special divine actions (e.g., miracles and revelations) to care for creatures. Fourth, God made provisions for the end of the world, and will create a new heaven and earth, in this way eradicating evil.

Views on divine action are related to the doctrine of creation. Theologians commonly draw a distinction between general and special divine action, but within the field of science and religion there is no universally accepted definition of these two concepts. One way to distinguish them (Wildman 2008: 140) is to regard general divine action as the creation and sustenance of reality, and special divine action as the collection of specific providential acts, such as miracles and revelations to prophets. Drawing this distinction allows for creatures to be autonomous and indicates that God does not micromanage every detail of creation. Still, the distinction is not always clear-cut, as some phenomena are difficult to classify as either general or special divine action. For example, the Roman Catholic Eucharist (in which bread and wine become the body and blood of Jesus) or some healing miracles outside of scripture seem mundane enough to be part of general housekeeping (general divine action), but still seem to involve some form of special intervention on God’s part. Alston (1989) makes a related distinction between direct and indirect divine acts. God brings about direct acts without the use of natural causes, whereas indirect acts are achieved through natural causes. Using this distinction, there are four possible kinds of actions that God could do: God could not act in the world at all, God could act only directly, God could act only indirectly, or God could act both directly and indirectly.

In the science and religion literature, there are two central questions on creation and divine action. To what extent are the Christian doctrine of creation and traditional views of divine action compatible with science? How can these concepts be understood within a scientific context, e.g., what does it mean for God to create and act? Note that the doctrine of creation says nothing about the age of the Earth, nor does it specify a mode of creation. This allows for a wide range of possible views within science and religion, of which Young Earth creationism is but one that is consistent with scripture. Indeed, some scientific theories, such as the Big Bang theory, first proposed by the Belgian Roman Catholic priest and astronomer Georges Lemaître (1927), look congenial to the doctrine of creation. The theory is not in contradiction, and could be integrated into creatio ex nihilo as it specifies that the universe originated from an extremely hot and dense state around 13.8 billion years ago (Craig 2003), although some philosophers have argued against the interpretation that the universe has a temporal beginning (e.g., Pitts 2008).

The net result of scientific findings since the seventeenth century has been that God was increasingly pushed into the margins. This encroachment of science on the territory of religion happened in two ways: first, scientific findings—in particular from geology and evolutionary theory—challenged and replaced biblical accounts of creation. Although the doctrine of creation does not contain details of the mode and timing of creation, the Bible was regarded as authoritative, and that authority got eroded by the sciences. Second, the emerging concept of scientific laws in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century physics seemed to leave no room for special divine action. These two challenges will be discussed below, along with proposed solutions in the contemporary science and religion literature.

Christian authors have traditionally used the Bible as a source of historical information. Biblical exegesis of the creation narratives, especially Genesis 1 and 2 (and some other scattered passages, such as in the Book of Job), remains fraught with difficulties. Are these texts to be interpreted in a historical, metaphorical, or poetic fashion, and what are we to make of the fact that the order of creation differs between these accounts (Harris 2013)? The Anglican archbishop James Ussher (1581–1656) used the Bible to date the beginning of creation at 4004 BCE. Although such literalist interpretations of the biblical creation narratives were not uncommon, and are still used by Young Earth creationists today, theologians before Ussher already offered alternative, non-literalist readings of the biblical materials (e.g., Augustine De Genesi ad litteram , 416). From the seventeenth century onward, the Christian doctrine of creation came under pressure from geology, with findings suggesting that the Earth was significantly older than 4004 BCE. From the eighteenth century on, natural philosophers, such as Benoît de Maillet, Lamarck, Chambers, and Darwin, proposed transmutationist (what would now be called evolutionary) theories, which seem incompatible with scriptural interpretations of the special creation of species. Following the publication of Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859), there has been an ongoing discussion on how to reinterpret the doctrine of creation in the light of evolutionary theory (see Bowler 2009 for an overview).

Ted Peters and Martinez Hewlett (2003) have outlined a divine action spectrum to clarify the distinct positions about creation and divine action in the contemporary science and religion literature that focuses on Christians, agnostics, and atheists. They discern two dimensions in this spectrum: the degree of divine action in the natural world, and the form of causal explanations that relate divine action to natural processes. At one extreme are creationists. Like other theists, they believe God has created the world and its fundamental laws, and that God occasionally performs special divine actions (miracles) that intervene in the fabric of those laws. Creationists deny any role of natural selection in the origin of species. Within creationism, there are Old and Young Earth creationism, with the former accepting geology and rejecting evolutionary biology, and the latter rejecting both. Next to creationism is Intelligent Design, which affirms divine intervention in natural processes. Intelligent Design creationists (e.g., Dembski 1998) believe there is evidence of intelligent design in organisms’ irreducible complexity; on the basis of this they infer design and purposiveness (see Kojonen 2016). Like other creationists, they deny a significant role for natural selection in shaping organic complexity and they affirm an interventionist account of divine action. For political reasons they do not label their intelligent designer as God, as they hope to circumvent the constitutional separation of church and state in the US which prohibits teaching religious doctrines in public schools (Forrest & Gross 2004). Theistic evolutionists hold a non-interventionist approach to divine action: God creates indirectly, through the laws of nature (e.g., through natural selection). For example, the theologian John Haught (2000) regards divine providence as self-giving love, and natural selection and other natural processes as manifestations of this love, as they foster creaturely autonomy and independence. While theistic evolutionists allow for special divine action, particularly the miracle of the Incarnation in Christ (e.g., Deane-Drummond 2009), deists such as Michael Corey (1994) think there is only general divine action: God has laid out the laws of nature and lets it run like clockwork without further interference. Deism is still a long distance from ontological materialism, the view that the material world is all there is. Ontological materialists tend to hold that the universe is intelligible, with laws that scientists can discover, but there is no lawgiver and no creator.

Views on divine action were influenced by developments in physics and their philosophical interpretation. In the seventeenth century, natural philosophers, such as Robert Boyle and John Wilkins, developed a mechanistic view of the world as governed by orderly and lawlike processes. Laws, understood as immutable and stable, created difficulties for the concept of special divine action (Pannenberg 2002). How could God act in a world that was determined by laws?

One way to regard miracles and other forms of special divine action is to see them as actions that somehow suspend or ignore the laws of nature. David Hume (1748: 181), for instance, defined a miracle as “a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the deity, or by the interposal of some invisible agent”, and, more recently, Richard Swinburne (1968: 320) defines a miracle as “a violation of a law of Nature by a god”. This concept of divine action is commonly labeled interventionist. Interventionism regards the world as causally deterministic, so God has to create room for special divine actions. By contrast, non-interventionist forms of divine action require a world that is, at some level, non-deterministic, so that God can act without having to suspend or ignore the laws of nature.

In the seventeenth century, the explanation of the workings of nature in terms of elegant physical laws suggested the ingenuity of a divine designer. The design argument reached its peak during the seventeenth and early eighteenth century (McGrath 2011). For example, Samuel Clarke (1705: part XI, cited in Schliesser 2012: 451) proposed an a posteriori argument from design by appealing to Newtonian science, calling attention to the

exquisite regularity of all the planets’ motions without epicycles, stations, retrogradations, or any other deviation or confusion whatsoever.

A late proponent of this view of nature as a perfect smooth machine is William Paley’s Natural Theology (1802).

Another conclusion that the new laws-based physics suggested was that the universe was able to run smoothly without requiring an intervening God. The increasingly deterministic understanding of the universe, ruled by deterministic causal laws as, for example, outlined by Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749–1827), seemed to leave no room for special divine action, which is a key element of the traditional Christian doctrine of creation. Newton resisted interpretations like these in an addendum to the Principia in 1713: the planets’ motions could be explained by laws of gravity, but the positions of their orbits, and the positions of the stars—far enough apart so as not to influence each other gravitationally—required a divine explanation (Schliesser 2012). Alston (1989) argued, contra authors such as Polkinghorne (1998), that mechanistic, pre-twentieth century physics is compatible with divine action and divine free will. Assuming a completely deterministic world and divine omniscience, God could set up initial conditions and the laws of nature in such a way as to bring God’s plans about. In such a mechanistic world, every event is an indirect divine act.

Advances in twentieth-century physics, including the theories of general and special relativity, chaos theory, and quantum theory, overturned the mechanical clockwork view of creation. In the latter half of the twentieth century, chaos theory and quantum physics have been explored as possible avenues to reinterpret divine action. John Polkinghorne (1998) proposed that chaos theory not only presents epistemological limits to what we can know about the world, but that it also provides the world with an “ontological openness” in which God can operate without violating the laws of nature. One difficulty with this model is that it moves from our knowledge of the world to assumptions about how the world is: does chaos theory mean that outcomes are genuinely undetermined, or that we as limited knowers cannot predict them? Robert Russell (2006) proposed that God acts in quantum events. This would allow God to directly act in nature without having to contravene the laws of nature. His is therefore a non-interventionist model: since, under the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, there are no natural efficient causes at the quantum level, God is not reduced to a natural cause. Murphy (1995) outlined a similar bottom-up model where God acts in the space provided by quantum indeterminacy. These attempts to locate God’s actions either in chaos theory or quantum mechanics, which Lydia Jaeger (2012a) has termed “physicalism-plus-God”, have met with sharp criticism (e.g., Saunders 2002; Jaeger 2012a,b). After all, it is not even clear whether quantum theory would allow for free human action, let alone divine action, which we do not know much about (Jaeger 2012a). Next to this, William Carroll (2008), building on Thomistic philosophy, argues that authors such as Polkinghorne and Murphy are making a category mistake: God is not a cause in the way creatures are causes, competing with natural causes, and God does not need indeterminacy in order to act in the world. Rather, as primary cause God supports and grounds secondary causes. While this neo-Thomistic proposal is compatible with determinism (indeed, on this view, the precise details of physics do not matter much), it blurs the distinction between general and special divine action. Moreover, the Incarnation suggests that the idea of God as a cause among natural causes is not an alien idea in theology, and that God incarnate as Jesus at least sometimes acts as a natural cause (Sollereder 2015).

There has been a debate on the question to what extent randomness is a genuine feature of creation, and how divine action and chance interrelate. Chance and stochasticity are important features of evolutionary theory (the non-random retention of random variations). In a famous thought experiment, Gould (1989) imagined that we could rewind the tape of life back to the time of the Burgess Shale (508 million years ago); the chance that a rerun of the tape of life would end up with anything like the present-day life forms is vanishingly small. However, Simon Conway Morris (2003) has insisted species very similar to the ones we know now, including humans, would evolve under a broad range of conditions.

Under a theist interpretation, randomness could either be a merely apparent aspect of creation, or a genuine feature. Plantinga suggests that randomness is a physicalist interpretation of the evidence. God may have guided every mutation along the evolutionary process. In this way, God could

guide the course of evolutionary history by causing the right mutations to arise at the right time and preserving the forms of life that lead to the results he intends. (2011: 121)

By contrast, other authors see stochasticity as a genuine design feature, and not just as a physicalist gloss. Their challenge is to explain how divine providence is compatible with genuine randomness. (Under a deistic view, one could simply say that God started the universe up and did not interfere with how it went, but that option is not open to the theist, and most authors in the field of science and religion are not deists.) The neo-Thomist Elizabeth Johnson (1996) argues that divine providence and true randomness are compatible: God gives creatures true causal powers, thus making creation more excellent than if they lacked such powers. Random occurrences are also secondary causes. Chance is a form of divine creativity that creates novelty, variety, and freedom. One implication of this view is that God may be a risk taker—although, if God has a providential plan for possible outcomes, there is unpredictability but not risk. Johnson uses metaphors of risk taking that, on the whole, leave the creator in a position of control. Creation, then, is akin to jazz improvisation. Why would God take risks? There are several solutions to this question. The free will theodicy says that a creation that exhibits stochasticity can be truly free and autonomous:

Authentic love requires freedom, not manipulation. Such freedom is best supplied by the open contingency of evolution, and not by strings of divine direction attached to every living creature. (Miller 1999 [2007: 289])

The “only way theodicy” goes a step further, arguing that a combination of laws and chance is not only the best way, but the only way for God to achieve God’s creative plans (see, e.g., Southgate 2008 for a defense).

Christianity, Islam, and Judaism have similar creation stories, which ultimately go back to the first book of the Hebrew Bible (Genesis). According to Genesis, humans are the result of a special act of creation. Genesis 1 offers an account of the creation of the world in six days, with the creation of human beings on the sixth day. It specifies that humans were created male and female, and that they were made in God’s image. Genesis 2 provides a different order of creation, where God creates humans earlier in the sequence (before other animals), and only initially creates a man, later fashioning a woman out of the man’s rib. Islam has a creation narrative similar to Genesis 2, with Adam being fashioned out of clay. These handcrafted humans are regarded as the ancestors of all living humans today. Together with Ussher’s chronology, the received view in eighteenth-century Europe was that humans were created only about 6000 years ago, in an act of special creation.

Humans occupy a privileged position in these creation accounts. In Christianity, Judaism, and some strands of Islam, humans are created in the image of God ( imago Dei ). Humans also occupy a special place in creation as a result of the Fall. In Genesis 3, the account of the Fall stipulates that the first human couple lived in the Garden of Eden in a state of innocence and/or righteousness. This means they were able to not sin, whereas we are no longer able to refrain from sinning. By eating from the forbidden fruit of the Tree of Good and Evil they fell from this state, and death, manual labor, as well as pain in childbirth were introduced. Moreover, as a result of this so-called “original sin”, the effects of Adam’s sin are passed on to every human being. The Augustinian interpretation of original sin also emphasizes that our reasoning capacities have been marred by the distorting effects of sin (the so-called noetic effects of sin): as a result of sin, our original perceptual and reasoning capacities have been marred. This interpretation is influential in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. For example, Plantinga (2000) appeals to the noetic effects of sin to explain religious diversity and unbelief, offering this as an explanation for why not everyone believes in God even though this belief would be properly basic.

There are different ways in which Christians have thought about the Fall and original sin. In Western Christianity, Augustine’s doctrine of original sin is very influential, though there is no generally accepted Christian doctrine on original sin (Couenhoven 2005). For Augustine, humans were in a state of original righteousness before the Fall, and by their action not only marred themselves but the entirety of creation. By contrast, Eastern Orthodox churches are more influenced by Irenaeus, an early Church Father who argued that humans were originally innocent and immature, rather than righteous. John Hick (1966) was an influential proponent of “Irenaean style” theodicy in contemporary Christianity.

Over the past decades, authors in the Christian religion and science literature have explored these two interpretations (Irenaean, Augustinian) and how they can be made compatible with scientific findings (see De Smedt and De Cruz 2020 for a review). Scientific findings and theories relevant to human origins come from a range of disciplines, in particular geology, paleoanthropology (the study of ancestral hominins, using fossils and other evidence), archaeology, and evolutionary biology. These findings challenge traditional religious accounts of humanity, including the special creation of humans, the imago Dei , the historical Adam and Eve, and original sin.

In natural philosophy, the dethroning of humanity from its position as a specially created species predates Darwin and can already be found in early transmutationist publications. For example, Benoît de Maillet’s posthumously published Telliamed (1748, the title is his name in reverse) traces the origins of humans and other terrestrial animals from sea creatures. Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed chimpanzees as the ancestors to humans in his Philosophie Zoologique (1809). The Scottish publisher and geologist Robert Chambers’ anonymously published Vestiges of Creation (1844) stirred controversy with its detailed naturalistic account of the origin of species. He proposed that the first organisms arose through spontaneous generation, and that all subsequent organisms evolved from them. Moreover, he argued that humans have a single evolutionary origin:

The probability may now be assumed that the human race sprung from one stock, which was at first in a state of simplicity, if not barbarism (1844: 305)

a view starkly different from the Augustinian interpretation of humanity as being in a prelapsarian state of perfection.

Darwin was initially reluctant to publish on human origins. While he did not discuss human evolution in his Origin of Species , he promised, “Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history” (1859: 487). Huxley (1863) wrote Man’s Place in Nature , the first book on human evolution from a Darwinian point of view which discussed fossil evidence, such as the then recently uncovered Neanderthal fossils from Gibraltar. Darwin’s (1871) Descent of Man identified Africa as the likely place where humans originated, and used comparative anatomy to demonstrate that chimpanzees and gorillas were closely related to humans. In the twentieth century, paleoanthropologists debated whether humans separated from the other great apes (at the time wrongly classified into the paraphyletic group Pongidae ) about 15 million years ago, or about 5 million years ago. Molecular clocks—first immune responses (e.g., Sarich & Wilson 1967), then direct genetic evidence (e.g., Rieux et al. 2014)—favor the shorter chronology.

The discovery of many hominin fossils, including Ardipithecus ramidus (4.4 million years ago), Australopithecus afarensis (nicknamed “Lucy”), about 3.5 million years old, the Sima de los Huesos hominins (about 400,000 years old, ancestors to the Neanderthals), Homo neanderthalensis , and the intriguing Homo floresiensis (small hominins who lived on the island of Flores, Indonesia, dated to 700,000–50,000 years ago) have created a rich, complex picture of hominin evolution. These finds are supplemented by detailed analyses of ancient DNA extracted from fossil remains, bringing to light a previously unknown species of hominin (the Denisovans) who lived in Siberia up to about 40,000 years ago. Taken together, this evidence indicates that humans did not evolve in a simple linear fashion, but that human evolution resembles an intricate branching tree with many dead ends, in line with the evolution of other species. Genetic and fossil evidence favors a predominantly African origin of our species Homo sapiens (as early as 315,000 years ago) with limited gene-flow from other hominin species such as Neanderthals and Denisovans (see, e.g., Richter et al. 2017).

In the light of these scientific findings, contemporary science and religion authors have reconsidered the questions of human uniqueness, imago Dei , the Incarnation, and the historicity of original sin. Some authors have attempted to reinterpret human uniqueness as a number of species-specific cognitive and behavioral adaptations. For example, van Huyssteen (2006) considers the ability of humans to engage in cultural and symbolic behavior, which became prevalent in the Upper Paleolithic, as a key feature of uniquely human behavior. Other theologians have opted to broaden the notion of imago Dei. Given what we know about the capacities for morality and reason in non-human animals, Celia Deane-Drummond (2012) and Oliver Putz (2009) reject an ontological distinction between humans and non-human animals, and argue for a reconceptualization of the imago Dei to include at least some nonhuman animals. Joshua Moritz (2011) raises the question of whether extinct hominin species, such as Homo neanderthalensis and Homo floresiensis , which co-existed with Homo sapiens for some part of prehistory, partook in the divine image.

There is also discussion of how we can understand the Incarnation (the belief that Jesus, the second person of the Trinity, became a human being) with the evidence we have of human evolution. Some interpret Christ’s divine nature quite liberally. For instance, Peacocke (1979) regarded Jesus as the point where humanity is perfect for the first time. Christ is the progression and culmination of what evolution has been working toward in the teleological, progressivist interpretation of evolution by Teilhard de Chardin (1971). According to Teilhard, evil is still horrible but no longer incomprehensible; it becomes a natural feature of creation—since God chose evolution as his mode of creation, evil arises as an inevitable byproduct. Deane-Drummond (2009), however, points out that this interpretation is problematic: Teilhard worked within a Spencerian progressivist model of evolution, and he was anthropocentric, seeing humanity as the culmination of evolution. Contemporary evolutionary theory has repudiated the Spencerian progressivist view, and adheres to a stricter Darwinian model. Deane-Drummond, who regards human morality as lying on a continuum with the social behavior of other animals, conceptualizes the Fall as a mythical, rather than a historical event. It represents humanity’s sharper awareness of moral concerns and its ability to make wrong choices. She regards Christ as incarnate wisdom, situated in a theodrama that plays against the backdrop of an evolving creation. Like all human beings, Christ is connected to the rest of creation through common descent. By saving us, he saves the whole of creation.

Debates on the Fall and the historical Adam have centered on how these narratives can be understood in the light of contemporary science. On the face of it, limitations of our cognitive capacities can be naturalistically explained as a result of biological constraints, so there seems little explanatory gain to appeal to the narrative of the Fall. Some have attempted to interpret the concepts of sin and Fall in ways that are compatible with paleoanthropology, notably Peter van Inwagen (2004) and Jamie K. Smith (2017), who have argued that God could have providentially guided hominin evolution until there was a tightly-knit community of primates, endowed with reason, language, and free will, and this community was in close union with God. At some point in history, these hominins somehow abused their free will to distance themselves from God. These narratives follow the Augustinian tradition. Others, such as John Schneider (2014, 2020), on the other hand, argue that there is no genetic or paleoanthropological evidence for such a community of superhuman beings.

This survey has given a sense of the richness of the literature of science and religion. Giving an exhaustive overview would go beyond the scope of an encyclopedia entry. Because science and religion are such broad terms, the literature has split up in diverse fields of “science engaged theology”, where a specific claim or subfield in science is studied in relation to a specific claim in theology (Perry & Ritchie 2018). For example, rather than ask if Christianity is compatible with science, one could ask whether Christian eschatology is compatible with scientific claims about cultural evolution, or the cosmic fate of the universe. As the scope of science and religion becomes less parochial and more global in its outlook, the different topics the field can engage with become very diverse.

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• Evolution Resources by Kenneth R. Miller .

Comte, Auguste | cosmological argument | Hume, David: on religion | teleology: teleological arguments for God’s existence | theology, natural and natural religion

Acknowledgments

Many thanks to Bryce Huebner, Evan Thompson, Meir-Simchah Panzer, Teri Merrick, Geoff Mitelman, Joshua Yuter, Katherine Dormandy, Isaac Choi, Egil Asprem, Johan De Smedt, Taede Smedes, H.E. Baber, Fabio Gironi, Erkki Kojonen, Andreas Reif, Raphael Neelamkavil, Hans Van Eyghen, and Nicholas Joll, for their feedback on an earlier version of this manuscript.

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Science and religion have profound differences — they should be kept apart

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Anne Marie Conlon’s Career Feature on scientists balancing work and faith ( Nature 629 , 957–959; 2024 ) mentions studies, by sociologist Elaine Howard Ecklund, that find that religious scientists tend to avoid discussing their faith at work. Ecklund argues that rejecting religious scientists could hinder diversity in science, particularly because women and people of colour are more likely to identify as religious.

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Religion vs. Science: What Religious People Really Think

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Ecklund, Elaine Howard, and Christopher P. Scheitle. 2018. Religion vs. Science: What Religious People Really Think . New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

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At the end of a five-year journey to find out what religious Americans think about science, Ecklund and Scheitle emerge with the real story of the relationship between science and religion in American culture. Based on the most comprehensive survey ever done-representing a range of religious traditions and faith positions- Religion vs. Science  is a story that is more nuanced and complex than the media and pundits would lead us to believe. The way religious Americans approach science is shaped by two fundamental questions: What does science mean for the existence and activity of God? What does science mean for the sacredness of humanity? How these questions play out as individual believers think about science both challenges stereotypes and highlights the real tensions between religion and science. Ecklund and Scheitle interrogate the widespread myths that religious people dislike science and scientists and deny scientific theories. Religion vs. Science  is a definitive statement on a timely, popular subject. Rather than a highly conceptual approach to historical debates, philosophies, or personal opinions, Ecklund and Scheitle give readers a facts-on-the-ground, empirical look at what religious Americans really understand and think about science.

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Introduction

Scientific and technological advances have had profound effects on human life. In the 19th century, most families could expect to lose one or more children to disease. Today, in the United States and other developed countries, the death of a child from disease is uncommon. Every day we rely on technologies made possible through the application of scientific knowledge and processes. The computers and cell phones which we use, the cars and airplanes in which we travel, the medicines that we take, and many of the foods that we eat were developed in part through insights obtained from scientific research. Science has boosted living standards, has enabled humans to travel into Earth’s orbit and to the moon, and has given us new ways of thinking about ourselves and the universe.

Evolutionary biology has been and continues to be a cornerstone of modern science. This booklet documents some of the major contributions that an understanding of evolution has made to human well-being, including its contributions to preventing and treating human disease, developing new agricultural products, and creating industrial innovations. More broadly, evolution is a core concept in biology that is based both in the study of past life forms and in the study of the relatedness and diversity of present-day organisms. The rapid advances now being made in the life sciences and in medicine rest on principles derived from an understanding of evolution. That understanding has arisen both through the study of an ever-expanding fossil record and, equally importantly, through the application of modern biological and molecular sciences and technologies to the study of evolution. Of course, as with any active area of science, many fascinating questions remain, and this booklet highlights some of the active research that is currently under way that addresses questions about evolution.

However, polls show that many people continue to have questions about our knowledge of biological evolution. They may have been told that scientific understanding of evolution is incomplete, incorrect, or in doubt. They may be skeptical that the natural process of biological evolution could have produced such an incredible array of living things, from microscopic bacteria to whales and redwood trees, from simple sponges on coral reefs to humans capable of contemplating life’s history on this planet. They may wonder if it is possible to accept evolution and still adhere to religious beliefs.

This Web site speaks to those questions. It is written to serve as a resource for people who find themselves embroiled in debates about evolution. It provides information about the role that evolution plays in modern biology and the reasons why only scientifically based explanations should be included in public school science courses. Interested readers may include school board members, science teachers and other education leaders, policymakers, legal scholars, and others in the community who are committed to providing students with quality science education. This site is also directed to the broader audience of high-quality school and college students as well as adults who wish to become more familiar with the many strands of evidence supporting evolution and to understand why evolution is both a fact and a process that accounts for the diversity of life on Earth.

Is Evolution a Theory or a Fact?

It is both. But that answer requires looking more deeply at the meanings of the words "theory" and "fact."

In everyday usage, "theory" often refers to a hunch or a speculation. When people say, "I have a theory about why that happened," they are often drawing a conclusion based on fragmentary or inconclusive evidence. The formal scientific definition of theory is quite different from the everyday meaning of the word. It refers to a comprehensive explanation of some aspect of nature that is supported by a vast body of evidence.

Many scientific theories are so well-established that no new evidence is likely to alter them substantially. For example, no new evidence will demonstrate that the Earth does not orbit around the sun (heliocentric theory), or that living things are not made of cells (cell theory), that matter is not composed of atoms, or that the surface of the Earth is not divided into solid plates that have moved over geological timescales (the theory of plate tectonics). Like these other foundational scientific theories, the theory of evolution is supported by so many observations and confirming experiments that scientists are confident that the basic components of the theory will not be overturned by new evidence. However, like all scientific theories, the theory of evolution is subject to continuing refinement as new areas of science emerge or as new technologies enable observations and experiments that were not possible previously.

One of the most useful properties of scientific theories is that they can be used to make predictions about natural events or phenomena that have not yet been observed. For example, the theory of gravitation predicted the behavior of objects on the moon and other planets long before the activities of spacecraft and astronauts confirmed them. The evolutionary biologists who discovered Tiktaalik predicted that they would find fossils intermediate between fish and limbed terrestrial animals in sediments that were about 375 million years old. Their discovery confirmed the prediction made on the basis of evolutionary theory. In turn, confirmation of a prediction increases confidence in that theory.

In science, a "fact" typically refers to an observation, measurement, or other form of evidence that can be expected to occur the same way under similar circumstances. However, scientists also use the term "fact" to refer to a scientific explanation that has been tested and confirmed so many times that there is no longer a compelling reason to keep testing it or looking for additional examples. In that respect, the past and continuing occurrence of evolution is a scientific fact. Because the evidence supporting it is so strong, scientists no longer question whether biological evolution has occurred and is continuing to occur. Instead, they investigate the mechanisms of evolution, how rapidly evolution can take place, and related questions.

Compatibility

Science is not the only way of knowing and understanding. But science is a way of knowing that differs from other ways in its dependence on empirical evidence and testable explanations. Because biological evolution accounts for events that are also central concerns of religion — including the origins of biological diversity and especially the origins of humans — evolution has been a contentious idea within society since it was first articulated by Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace in 1858.

Acceptance of the evidence for evolution can be compatible with religious faith. Today, many religious denominations accept that biological evolution has produced the diversity of living things over billions of years of Earth’s history. Many have issued statements observing that evolution and the tenets of their faiths are compatible. Scientists and theologians have written eloquently about their awe and wonder at the history of the universe and of life on this planet, explaining that they see no conflict between their faith in God and the evidence for evolution. Religious denominations that do not accept the occurrence of evolution tend to be those that believe in strictly literal interpretations of religious texts.

Science and religion are based on different aspects of human experience. In science, explanations must be based on evidence drawn from examining the natural world. Scientifically based observations or experiments that conflict with an explanation eventually must lead to modification or even abandonment of that explanation. Religious faith, in contrast, does not depend only on empirical evidence, is not necessarily modified in the face of conflicting evidence, and typically involves supernatural forces or entities. Because they are not a part of nature, supernatural entities cannot be investigated by science. In this sense, science and religion are separate and address aspects of human understanding in different ways. Attempts to pit science and religion against each other create controversy where none needs to exist.

Religious Leader Statements

Excerpts of Statements by Religious Leaders Who See No Conflict Between Their Faith and Science  

Many religious denominations and individual religious leaders have issued statements acknowledging the occurrence of evolution and pointing out that evolution and faith do not conflict.

"[T]here is no contradiction between an evolutionary theory of human origins and the doctrine of God as Creator."   — General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church

"[S]tudents' ignorance about evolution will seriously undermine their understanding of the world and the natural laws governing it, and their introduction to other explanations described as 'scientific' will give them false ideas about scientific methods and criteria."   — Central Conference of American Rabbis

"In his encyclical  Humani Generis  (1950), my predecessor Pius XII has already affirmed that there is no conflict between evolution and the doctrine of the faith regarding man and his vocation, provided that we do not lose sight of certain fixed points…. Today, more than a half-century after the appearance of that encyclical, some new findings lead us toward the recognition of evolution as more than an hypothesis. In fact it is remarkable that this theory has had progressively greater influence on the spirit of researchers, following a series of discoveries in different scholarly disciplines. The convergence in the results of these independent studies — which was neither planned nor sought — constitutes in itself a significant argument in favor of the theory.”   — Pope John Paul II, Message to the Pontifical Academy of Sciences, October 22, 1996.

"We the undersigned, Christian clergy from many different traditions, believe that the timeless truths of the Bible and the discoveries of modern science may comfortably coexist. We believe that the theory of evolution is a foundational scientific truth, one that has stood up to rigorous scrutiny and upon which much of human knowledge and achievement rests. To reject this truth or to treat it as 'one theory among others' is to deliberately embrace scientific ignorance and transmit such ignorance to our children. We believe that among God's good gifts are human minds capable of critical thought and that the failure to fully employ this gift is a rejection of the will of our Creator…. We urge school board members to preserve the integrity of the science curriculum by affirming the teaching of the theory of evolution as a core component of human knowledge. We ask that science remain science and that religion remain religion, two very different, but complementary, forms of truth."   — "The Clergy Letter Project"  signed by more than 10,000 Christian clergy members.

Scientist Statements

Excerpts of Statements by Scientists Who See No Conflict Between Their Faith and Science

Scientists, like people in other professions, hold a wide range of positions about religion and the role of supernatural forces or entities in the universe. Some adhere to a position known as scientism, which holds that the methods of science alone are sufficient for discovering everything there is to know about the universe. Others ascribe to an idea known as deism, which posits that God created all things and set the universe in motion but no longer actively directs physical phenomena. Others are theists, who believe that God actively intervenes in the world. Many scientists who believe in God, either as a prime mover or as an active force in the universe, have written eloquently about their beliefs.

"Creationists inevitably look for God in what science has not yet explained or in what they claim science cannot explain. Most scientists who are religious look for God in what science does understand and has explained." — Kenneth Miller, professor of biology at Brown University and author of Finding Darwin’s God: A Scientist’s Search for Common Ground Between God and Religion. Quote is excerpted from an interview available  here .

"In my view, there is no conflict in being a rigorous scientist and a person who believes in a God who takes a personal interest in each one of us. Science’s domain is to explore nature. God’s domain is in the spiritual world, a realm not possible to explore with the tools and language of science. It must be examined with the heart, the mind, and the soul." — Francis Collins, director of the Human Genome Project and of the National Human Genome Research Institute at the National Institutes of Health. Excerpted from his book, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (p. 6).

"Our scientific understanding of the universe … provides for those who believe in God a marvelous opportunity to reflect upon their beliefs." — Father George Coyne, Catholic priest and former director of the Vatican Observatory. Quote is from a talk,  "Science Does Not Need God, or Does It? A Catholic Scientist Looks at Evolution,"  at Palm Beach Atlantic University, January 31, 2006.

Creationist Perspectives

Creationist views reject scientific findings and methods.

Advocates of the ideas collectively known as "creationism" and, recently, "intelligent design creationism" hold a wide variety of views. Most broadly, a "creationist" is someone who rejects natural scientific explanations of the known universe in favor of special creation by a supernatural entity. Creationism in its various forms is not the same thing as belief in God because, as was discussed earlier, many believers as well as many mainstream religious groups accept the findings of science, including evolution. Nor is creationism necessarily tied to Christians who interpret the Bible literally. Some non-Christian religious believers also want to replace scientific explanations with their own religion's supernatural accounts of physical phenomena.

In the United States, various views of creationism typically have been promoted by small groups of politically active religious fundamentalists who believe that only a supernatural entity could account for the physical changes in the universe and for the biological diversity of life on Earth. But even these creationists hold very different views. Some, known as "young Earth" creationists, believe the biblical account that the universe and the Earth were created just a few thousand years ago. Proponents of this form of creationism also believe that all living things, including humans, were created in a very short period of time in essentially the forms in which they exist today. Other creationists, known as "old Earth" creationists, accept that the Earth may be very old but reject other scientific findings regarding the evolution of living things.

No scientific evidence supports these viewpoints. On the contrary, as discussed earlier, several independent lines of evidence indicate that the Earth is about 4.5 billion years old and that the universe is about 14 billion years old. Rejecting the evidence for these age estimates would mean rejecting not just biological evolution but also fundamental discoveries of modern physics, chemistry, astrophysics, and geology.

Some creationists believe that Earth's present form and the distribution of fossils can be explained by a worldwide flood. But this claim also is at odds with observations and evidence understood scientifically. The belief that Earth's sediments, with their fossils, were deposited in a short period does not accord either with the known processes of sedimentation or with the estimated volume of water needed to deposit sediments on the top of some of Earth's highest mountains.

Creationists sometimes cite what they claim to be an incomplete fossil record as evidence that living things were created in their modern forms. But this argument ignores the rich and extremely detailed record of evolutionary history that paleontologists and other biologists have constructed over the past two centuries and are continuing to construct. Paleontological research has filled in many of the parts of the fossil record that were incomplete in Charles Darwin's time. The claim that the fossil record is "full of gaps" that undermine evolution is simply false. Indeed, paleontologists now know enough about the ages of sediments to predict where they will be able to find particularly significant transitional fossils, as happened with Tiktaalik and the ancestors of modern humans. Researchers also are using new techniques, such as computed axial tomography (CT), to learn even more about the internal structures and composition of delicate bones of fossils. Exciting new discoveries of fossils continue to be reported in both the scientific literature and popular media.

Another compelling feature of the fossil record is its consistency. Nowhere on Earth are fossils from dinosaurs, which went extinct 65 million years ago, found together with fossils from humans, who evolved in just the last few million years. Nowhere are the fossils of mammals found in sediments that are more than about 220 million years old. Whenever creationists point to sediments where these relationships appear to be altered or even reversed, scientists have clearly demonstrated that this reversal has resulted from the folding of geological strata over or under others. Sediments containing the fossils of only unicellular organisms appear earlier in the fossil record than do sediments containing the remains of both unicellular and multicellular organisms. The sequence of fossils across Earth's sediments points unambiguously toward the occurrence of evolution.

Creationists sometimes argue that the idea of evolution must remain hypothetical because "no one has ever seen evolution occur." This kind of statement also reveals that some creationists misunderstand an important characteristic of scientific reasoning. Scientific conclusions are not limited to direct observation but often depend on inferences that are made by applying reason to observations. Even with the launch of Earth-orbiting spacecraft, scientists could not directly see the Earth going around the Sun. But they inferred from a wealth of independent measurements that the Sun is at the center of the solar system. Until the recent development of extremely powerful microscopes, scientists could not observe atoms, but the behavior of physical objects left no doubt about the atomic nature of matter. Scientists hypothesized the existence of viruses for many years before microscopes became powerful enough to see them.

Thus, for many areas of science, scientists have not directly observed the objects (such as genes and atoms) or the phenomena (such as the Earth going around the Sun) that are now well-established facts. Instead, they have confirmed them indirectly by observational and experimental evidence. Evolution is no different. Indeed, for the reasons described in this booklet, evolutionary science provides one of the best examples of a deep understanding based on scientific reasoning.

This contention that nobody has seen evolution occurring further ignores the overwhelming evidence that evolution has taken place and is continuing to occur. The annual changes in influenza viruses and the emergence of bacteria resistant to antibiotics are both products of evolutionary forces. Another example of ongoing evolution is the appearance of mosquitoes resistant to various insecticides, which has contributed to a resurgence of malaria in Africa and elsewhere. The transitional fossils that have been found in abundance since Darwin's time reveal how species continually give rise to successor species that, over time, produce radically changed body forms and functions. It also is possible to directly observe many of the specific processes by which evolution occurs. Scientists regularly do experiments using microbes and other model systems that directly test evolutionary hypotheses.

Creationists reject such scientific facts in part because they do not accept evidence drawn from natural processes that they consider to be at odds with the Bible. But science cannot test supernatural possibilities. To young Earth creationists, no amount of empirical evidence that the Earth is billions of years old is likely to refute their claim that the world is actually young but that God simply made it appear to be old. Because such appeals to the supernatural are not testable using the rules and processes of scientific inquiry, they cannot be a part of science.

Intelligent Design

"Intelligent design" creationism is not supported by scientific evidence.

Some members of a newer school of creationists have temporarily set aside the question of whether the solar system, the galaxy, and the universe are billions or just thousands of years old. But these creationists unite in contending that the physical universe and living things show evidence of "intelligent design." They argue that certain biological structures are so complex that they could not have evolved through processes of undirected mutation and natural selection, a condition they call "irreducible complexity." Echoing theological arguments that predate the theory of evolution, they contend that biological organisms must be designed in the same way that a mousetrap or a clock is designed - that in order for the device to work properly, all of its components must be available simultaneously. If one component is missing or changed, the device will fail to operate properly. Because even such "simple" biological structures as the flagellum of a bacterium are so complex, proponents of intelligent design creationism argue that the probability of all of their components being produced and simultaneously available through random processes of mutation are infinitesimally small. The appearance of more complex biological structures (such as the vertebrate eye) or functions (such as the immune system) is impossible through natural processes, according to this view, and so must be attributed to a transcendent intelligent designer.

However, the claims of intelligent design creationists are disproven by the findings of modern biology. Biologists have examined each of the molecular systems claimed to be the products of design and have shown how they could have arisen through natural processes. For example, in the case of the bacterial flagellum, there is no single, uniform structure that is found in all flagellar bacteria. There are many types of flagella, some simpler than others, and many species of bacteria do not have flagella to aid in their movement. Thus, other components of bacterial cell membranes are likely the precursors of the proteins found in various flagella. In addition, some bacteria inject toxins into other cells through proteins that are secreted from the bacterium and that are very similar in their molecular structure to the proteins in parts of flagella. This similarity indicates a common evolutionary origin, where small changes in the structure and organization of secretory proteins could serve as the basis for flagellar proteins. Thus, flagellar proteins are not irreducibly complex.

Evolutionary biologists also have demonstrated how complex biochemical mechanisms, such as the clotting of blood or the mammalian immune system, could have evolved from simpler precursor systems. With the clotting of blood, some of the components of the mammalian system were present in earlier organisms, as demonstrated by the organisms living today (such as fish, reptiles, and birds) that are descended from these mammalian precursors. Mammalian clotting systems have built on these earlier components.

Existing systems also can acquire new functions. For example, a particular system might have one task in a cell and then become adapted through evolutionary processes for different use. The Hox genes (described in the box on page 30) are a prime example of evolution finding new uses for existing systems. Molecular biologists have discovered that a particularly important mechanism through which biological systems acquire additional functions is gene duplication. Segments of DNA are frequently duplicated when cells divide, so that a cell has multiple copies of one or more genes. If these multiple copies are passed on to offspring, one copy of a gene can serve the original function in a cell while the other copy is able to accumulate changes that ultimately result in a new function. The biochemical mechanisms responsible for many cellular processes show clear evidence for historical duplications of DNA regions.

In addition to its scientific failings, this and other standard creationist arguments are fallacious in that they are based on a false dichotomy. Even if their negative arguments against evolution were correct, that would not establish the creationists' claims. There may be alternative explanations. For example, it would be incorrect to conclude that because there is no evidence that it is raining outside, it must be sunny. Other explanations also might be possible. Science requires testable evidence for a hypothesis, not just challenges against one's opponent. Intelligent design is not a scientific concept because it cannot be empirically tested.

Creationists sometimes claim that scientists have a vested interest in the concept of biological evolution and are unwilling to consider other possibilities. But this claim, too, misrepresents science. Scientists continually test their ideas against observations and submit their work to their colleagues for critical peer review of ideas, evidence, and conclusions before a scientific paper is published in any respected scientific journal. Unexplained observations are eagerly pursued because they can be signs of important new science or problems with an existing hypothesis or theory. History is replete with scientists challenging accepted theory by offering new evidence and more comprehensive explanations to account for natural phenomena. Also, science has a competitive element as well as a cooperative one. If one scientist clings to particular ideas despite evidence to the contrary, another scientist will attempt to replicate relevant experiments and will not hesitate to publish conflicting evidence. If there were serious problems in evolutionary science, many scientists would be eager to win fame by being the first to provide a better testable alternative. That there are no viable alternatives to evolution in the scientific literature is not because of vested interests or censorship but because evolution has been and continues to be solidly supported by evidence.

The potential utility of science also demands openness to new ideas. If petroleum geologists could find more oil and gas by interpreting the record of sedimentary rocks (where deposits of oil and natural gas are found) as having resulted from a single flood, they would certainly favor the idea of such a flood, but they do not. Instead, petroleum geologists agree with other geologists that sedimentary rocks are the products of billions of years of Earth's history. Indeed, petroleum geologists have been pioneers in the recognition of fossil deposits that were formed over millions of years in such environments as meandering rivers, deltas, sandy barrier beaches, and coral reefs.

The arguments of creationists reverse the scientific process. They begin with an explanation that they are unwilling to alter - that supernatural forces have shaped biological or Earth systems - rejecting the basic requirements of science that hypotheses must be restricted to testable natural explanations. Their beliefs cannot be tested, modified, or rejected by scientific means and thus cannot be a part of the processes of science.

Evolution and Creationism in Schools

The pressure to downplay evolution or emphasize nonscientific alternatives in public schools compromises science education.

Despite the lack of scientific evidence for creationist positions, some advocates continue to demand that various forms of creationism be taught together with or in place of evolution in science classes. Many teachers are under considerable pressure from policy makers, school administrators, parents, and students to downplay or eliminate the teaching of evolution. As a result, many U.S. students lack access to information and ideas that are both integral to modern science and essential for making informed, evidence-based decisions about their own lives and our collective future.

Regardless of the careers that they ultimately select, to succeed in today's scientifically and technologically sophisticated world, all students need a sound education in science. Many of today's fast-growing and high-paying jobs require a familiarity with the core concepts, applications, and implications of science. To make informed decisions about public policies, people need to know how scientific evidence supports those policies and whether that evidence was gathered using well-established scientific practice and principles. Learning about evolution is an excellent way to help students understand the nature, processes, and limits of science in addition to concepts about this fundamentally important contribution to scientific knowledge.

Given the importance of science in all aspects of modern life, the science curriculum should not be undermined with nonscientific material. Teaching creationist ideas in science classes confuses what constitutes science and what does not. It compromises the objectives of public education and the goal of a high-quality science education.

On the Intersection of Science and Religion

The relationship between science and religion is often viewed in a Western context and through a Christian perspective. We turned to Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists for a different view

In this Issue:

• Winter 2021 View All Other Issues
• Science Matters
• Crunch: Science Held in High Esteem
• Foreword: Acknowledging Our Limits
• Rebuild Trust in Science
• Data & Better Decisions
• Science in a Crisis
• Efficiencies in Science
• Science, Policy, and Practice
• Science & Religion
• Voices: Pandemic’s Impact on Science
• Five Questions: Dr. Anthony Fauci
• Scientists & Communications
• View All Other Issues

Over the centuries, the relationship between science and religion has ranged from conflict and hostility to harmony and collaboration, while various thinkers have argued that the two concepts are inherently at odds and entirely separate.

Pew Research Center surveys have documented those trends over more than a decade in the United States. We found that 56% of Americans say there generally is conflict between science and religion but that this sense of tension is more common among the religiously unaffiliated— those who describe their religion as atheist, agnostic, or “nothing in particular.” The survey showed that just 16% of Christians in the U.S. say their religious beliefs “often” conflict with science; another 3 in 10 say such conflict sometimes occurs.

We’ve also examined views on a range of issues in which science and religion might be flashpoints. On evolution, for example, we found that a majority of Catholics believe humans evolved over time, as do a similar number of White mainline Protestants, but far fewer Black Protestants and White evangelicals hold this view. 

Our research and much like it from other sources has taken place in a Western context, primarily through a Christian lens.  More recently, we sought to better understand the ways in which science relates to religion around the world and engaged a small group of Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists in Southeast Asia to talk about their perspectives.

The discussions reinforced the conclusion that there is no single, universally held view of the relationship between science and religion among the three religious groups, but they also identified common patterns and themes within each one. For example, many Muslims expressed the view that Islam and science are basically compatible, though they acknowledged some areas of friction, such as the theory of evolution conflicting with religious beliefs about the origins and development of human life on Earth.

Hindu interviewees generally took a different tack, describing science and religion as overlapping spheres. Many Hindus maintained that their religion contains elements of science, and that Hinduism long ago identified concepts that were later illuminated by science. Buddhist interviewees generally described religion and science as two separate and unrelated spheres. Several talked about their religion as offering guidance on how to live a moral life while describing science as observable phenomena. Often, they could not name any areas of scientific research that concerned them for religious reasons.

Some members of all three religious groups, however, did express religious concerns when asked to consider specific kinds of biotechnology research, such as gene editing to change a baby’s genetic characteristics and efforts to clone animals. For example, Muslim interviewees said cloning would tamper with the power of God, and some Hindus and Buddhists voiced concern that these scientific developments might interfere with karma or reincarnation.

These are some of the key findings from a qualitative analysis of 72 individual interviews with Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists conducted in Malaysia and Singapore—two nations that have made sizable investments in scientific research and development in recent years and are home to religiously diverse populations—between June 17 and Aug. 8, 2019. The study included 24 people in each of the three religious groups, with an equal number in each country. All interviewees said their religion was “very” or “somewhat” important to their lives, but they otherwise varied in terms of age, gender, profession, and education level.

These interviews are not representative of religious groups either in their country or globally, but they do provide insight into how individuals describe their beliefs, in their own words, and the connections they see (or don’t see) with science. We coded the responses into themes to avoid putting too much weight on any single individual’s comments.

Muslims frequently described science and their religion as related rather than separate concepts and often said the Quran contains many elements of science. One 24-year-old Muslim man in Malaysia said both science and his religion explain the same things, just from different perspectives: “I think there is not any conflict between them. … I still believe that it happens because of God, just that the science will help to explain the details about why it is happening.”

Still others described the relationship as conflicted. “I feel like sometimes, or most of the time, they are against each other. … Science is about experimenting, researching, finding new things, or exploring different possibilities. But then, religion is very fixed, to me,” said a 20-year-old Muslim woman in Singapore.

When asked, many of the Muslims who were interviewed identified specific areas of scientific research that bothered them on religious grounds. Multiple interviewees mentioned research that uses non-halal substances (such as marijuana, alcohol, or pigs), some pregnancy technologies that they considered unnatural (such as procedures that use genetic material not taken from a husband and wife), or cloning.

Representative surveys of Muslims in countries around the world also have found variation in the share of Muslims who see any conflict between science and religion, although this share is less than half in most countries surveyed.

A Pew Research Center survey conducted in 2011 and 2012 that examined the views of Muslims found that, in most regions, half or more said there was no conflict between religion and science, including 54% in Malaysia. (Muslims in Singapore were not surveyed.)

The predominant view among Hindus who were interviewed is that science and Hinduism are related and compatible. Many of them offered—without prompting—the assertion that their religion contains many ancient insights that have been upheld by modern science, such as the use of turmeric in cleansing solutions, or the use of copper in drinking mugs. They said that Hindus have known for thousands of years that these materials provide health benefits but that scientists have confirmed only relatively recently that it’s because turmeric and copper have antimicrobial properties. “ When you question certain rituals or rites in Hinduism, there’s also a relatively scientific explanation to it,” said a 29-year-old Hindu woman in Singapore.

Still, many Hindu interviewees said science and religion are separate realms. “Religion doesn’t really govern science, and it shouldn’t. Science should just be science,” said a 42-year-old Hindu man in Singapore.

Asked what scientific research might raise concerns or should not be pursued for religious reasons, Hindu interviewees generally came up blank.

The sense that Hindus generally see little conflict with science aligns with survey findings. In three of the four countries in the 2018 Wellcome Global Monitor with large enough samples of Hindus for analysis, majorities said science had “never disagreed” with the teachings of their religion, including two-thirds of Hindus in India, which is home to the vast majority of the world’s Hindus.

Members of all three religious groups, however, did express religious concerns when asked to consider specific kinds of biotechnology research, such as gene editing,

Buddhist interviewees described science and religion in distinctly different ways from Muslims or Hindus. For the most part, they said science and religion are unrelated. Some have long held that Buddhism and its practice are aligned with the empirically driven observations in the scientific method; connections between Buddhism and science have been bolstered by neuroscience research into the effects of Buddhist meditation at the core of the mindfulness movement.

One 39-year-old Buddhist woman in Malaysia said science is something that relates to “facts and figures,” while religion helps her live a good and moral life. A 26-year-old Singaporean Buddhist woman explained: “Science to me is statistics, numbers, texts—something you can see, you can touch, you can hear. Religion is more of something you cannot see, you cannot touch, you cannot hear.”

To many of the Buddhist interviewees, this means that science and religion cannot be in conflict and have a compatible relationship.

Even when prompted to think about potential areas of scientific research that could raise religious concerns, relatively few Buddhists mentioned any. Among those who did, a common response involved animal testing, with the interviewees talking about the importance of not killing living things in the practice of their religion. The tenor of these comments is consistent with survey findings from the 2018 Wellcome Global Monitor. Majorities of Buddhists in all 10 countries with large enough samples for analysis said science has “never disagreed” with the teachings of their religion.

In the interviews, we asked about a number of subjects that have sometimes been seen as in conflict for some people in other religions. These included evolution, reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization, gene editing, and cloning.

Evolution raised areas of disagreement for many Muslim interviewees, who often said it is incompatible with the Islamic tenet that humans were created by Allah.

 “This is one of the conflicts between religion and Western theory. Based on Western theory, they said we came from monkeys. For me, if we evolved from monkeys, where could we get the stories of [the prophet] Nabi? Was Nabi Muhammad like a monkey in the past? For me, he was human. Allah had created perfect humans, not from monkey to human,” said a 21-year-old Muslim man in Malaysia.

Data Points

A Pew Research Center survey of Muslims worldwide conducted in 2011 and 2012 found that a 22-public median of 53% said they believed humans and other living things evolved over time. However, levels of acceptance of evolution varied by region and country, with Muslims in South and Southeast Asian countries reporting lower levels of belief in evolution by this measure than Muslims in other regions. In Malaysia, for instance, 37% of Muslim adults said they believed humans and other living things evolved over time. Evolution posed no conflict for the Hindus interviewed, who said the concept of evolution was encompassed in their religious teachings. “In Hinduism we have something like this as well, that tells us we originated from different species, which is why we also believe in reincarnation, and how certain deities take different forms. This is why certain animals are seen as sacred animals, because it’s one of the forms that this particular deity had taken,” said a 29-year-old Hindu woman in Singapore.

The Buddhists interviewed also tended to say that there was no conflict between their religion and evolution and that they personally believed in the theory. Some added that they didn’t think their religion addressed humans’ origins at all.

There is limited global survey data on this issue. However, the Pew Research Center’s 2014 Religious Landscape Study found that 86% of Buddhists and 80% of Hindus in the U.S. said humans and other living things have evolved over time, with majorities also saying this was due to natural processes.

In discussing scientific research using gene editing, cloning, and reproductive technologies such as in vitro fertilization, Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist interviewees raised the idea that such practices may go against the natural order or interfere with nature. As one 64-year-old Buddhist man in Singapore put it: “If you have anything that interferes with the law of nature, you will have conflict. If you leave nature alone, you will have no conflict.” Similarly, a 20-year-old Muslim woman in Singapore said “anything that disrupts or changes the natural state” goes against religious beliefs.

Interviewees were asked to talk about their awareness and views of three specific research areas in biotechnology: new technologies to help women get pregnant, gene editing for babies, and animal cloning. People had generally positive views of pregnancy technology such as in vitro fertilization, although Muslim interviewees pointed out potential objections depending on how these techniques are used. Views of gene editing and cloning were more wide-ranging, with no particular patterns associated with the religious affiliation of the interviewees.

Individuals from all three religions generally approved of pregnancy technology and in vitro fertilization.

Some Muslim interviewees emphasized that they would be OK with these technologies only if certain criteria were met—specifically, if the technologies were used by married couples, and with the couples’ own genetic material.

Some Hindus and Buddhists noted that they were comfortable with pregnancy technologies themselves. “I feel it is fine. It’s still trying to get the balance of being a believer of a religion versus overly superstitious or believing too much in that religion that you forgo the reality of life going on,” said a 37-year-old Buddhist man in Singapore.

A common thread in these conversations pointed to the importance of nature and respect for living things.

Interviewees, regardless of their religion, said the idea of curing a baby of disease before birth or preventing a disease that a child could develop later in life would be a helpful, acceptable use of gene editing. But they often viewed gene editing for cosmetic reasons much more negatively.

Several interviewees brought up the idea of not agreeing with gene editing out of fear that people might want to Westernize their children. For example, some expressed the concern that gene editing would be used to create babies with blond hair and blue eyes.

Views of cloning were similarly conditional. Individuals from all three religions spoke of their disapproval of cloning for humans, with Muslims saying that cloning could interfere with the power of God, who should be the only one to create. But interviewees generally found animal cloning to be more acceptable. Many people interviewed envisioned useful outcomes for society from animal cloning, such as providing meat to feed more people, or helping to preserve nearly extinct animals.

When Hindus and Buddhists did express religious concerns pertaining to gene editing and cloning, it was because these scientific methods might interfere with karma or reincarnation. “Sometimes the person is born with sufferings, and it is because maybe previously he had been doing some evil things,” said a 45-year-old Buddhist woman in Singapore.

Pew Research Center surveys in the U.S. find a strong relationship between levels of religious commitment and views on biotechnology developments, including gene editing. In a 2018 survey, majorities of U.S. Christians, including white evangelicals and other Protestants as well as Catholics, said that if the development of gene editing for babies entailed embryonic testing, it would be taking the technology too far. A common finding in Center surveys of Americans on emerging biotechnology issues such as gene editing for babies and animal genetic engineering is that public opinion depends on the use and effects of emergent technologies for society.

Conversations with Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists enrich our understanding of the intersection of religion and science. Some Muslims saw evolutionary theory as being at odds with their beliefs about how Allah created human life, but Hindus and Buddhists saw no such tension with their religious beliefs. No area of scientific research was universally seen as off-limits, and most interviewees saw potential benefits from emerging developments in biotechnology such as gene editing and animal cloning. But a common thread in these conversations pointed to the importance of nature and respect for living things. People in all three religions raised concerns about scientific developments that could be seen as altering natural processes or used in ways that violate moral principles of their religion.

The Takeaway

There is no single, universal perspective on the relationship between science and religion. Science is often embraced by Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, though some raise concerns over how scientific developments could be used.

Courtney Johnson is a research associate, Cary Lynne Thigpen is a research assistant, and Cary Funk directs science research at the Pew Research Center.

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Highly religious americans are less likely than others to see conflict between faith and science..

Moreover, the view that science and religion are often in conflict is particularly common among Americans who are, themselves, not very religiously observant (as measured by frequency of attendance at worship services). Some 73% of adults who seldom or never attend religious services say science and religion are often in conflict. By contrast, among more religiously observant Americans – those who report that they attend religious services on a weekly basis – exactly half (50%) share the view that science and religion frequently conflict.

Of the country’s major religious groups, Hispanic Catholics and white evangelical Protestants are especially likely to say science and religion are mostly compatible; roughly half of both groups take this position. But white evangelical Protestants also are somewhat more likely than members of other large religious groups to see a conflict between science and their own religious beliefs; 40% of white evangelicals say their personal beliefs sometimes conflict with science, while 57% say they do not.

The general public is closely divided in its views about the role of religious organizations in scientific policy debates. Overall, half of adults say churches should express their views on policy decisions about scientific issues, while 46% say churches should keep out of such matters. White evangelical Protestants and black Protestants are more inclined than people in other major religious groups to say churches should express their views on such topics. A majority of those with no religious affiliation say churches should keep out of science policy debates.

These are some of the key findings from a Pew Research Center survey conducted Aug. 15-25, 2014, by landline and cellular telephone, among a nationally representative sample of 2,002 U.S. adults. The margin of error for results based on the full sample is +/- 3.1 percentage points.

Where people’s religious views fit – and don’t fit – with their attitudes about science issues: a special statistical analysis

Despite the differing views about the relationship between science and religion, there are only a handful of areas where people’s religious beliefs and practices have a strong connection to their views about a range of science-related issues. Statistical modeling shows religious differences in affiliation and worship service attendance come to the fore when the issue is related to human evolution or the creation of the universe.

At the same time, people’s religious differences do not play a central role in explaining their beliefs about a range of other science topics, including some in the realm of biomedical issues. The exceptions relate to whether it is appropriate to modify a baby’s genes: Those who attend religious services regularly are more likely than others to say gene modification “takes scientific advances too far.”

As Pew Research Center noted in a related report , there are multiple influences on people’s attitudes and beliefs about science topics. Public attitudes and beliefs about science topics are sometimes connected with political and ideological divides, while other differences in people’s views are connected with generational divides, educational attainment and knowledge about science, gender, race and ethnicity and, at times, religious factors.

Based on statistical modeling techniques that parse the independent effect of multiple factors at the same time, religious factors appear to be central to public views on only a handful of science topics. Foremost among these are people’s beliefs about human evolution. While other factors – especially political attitudes and educational attainment –also play an important role in adults’ beliefs about human evolution, religion is among the strongest predictors of their views on evolution, even when accounting for other influences. Similarly, religious group differences are particularly strong determinants of whether people perceive the existence of a scientific consensus about evolution and the creation of the universe.

In addition, there are a handful of biomedical topics where differences in religious observance, as measured by frequency of worship service attendance, play a sizeable role in shaping public views. One example is the use of genetic modifications to reduce a baby’s risk of serious diseases. A majority (61%) of U.S. adults who regularly attend worship services, regardless of their particular religious tradition, say genetic modification for this purpose would be “taking medical advances too far.” By comparison, among adults who seldom or never attend worship services, 55% say genetic modification for this purpose would be an appropriate use of medical advances and 41% say genetic modification for this purpose would be taking advances too far.

On a handful of energy issues, religious affiliation is just one of several factors that help to predict people’s views. For example, public attitudes about offshore oil drilling are strongly related to political party affiliation and ideology. But there also are differences in views by age, gender and religious affiliation, even when differences in political orientation are held constant. For example, both evangelical and mainline Protestants are more likely than religiously unaffiliated Americans to support more offshore drilling, with other factors held constant. Further, U.S. adults with a religious affiliation, such as Protestants, Catholics, Jews and Muslims, are more inclined than those with no particular religious affiliation to believe that mankind will be able to stretch natural resources such that the growing world population will not pose a major problem.

Still, on a number of other science-related topics, there is no independent effect of religious affiliation or frequency of church attendance on public attitudes , once differences by demographic background, educational attainment, science knowledge level and political background are taken into account. These include opinions about:

• Whether to allow access to experimental drug and medical treatments before they have been fully tested
• The appropriateness of using bioengineered artificial organs for human transplant
• The safety of genetically modified foods
• Climate change
• Space exploration
• The long-term payoffs from government investment in science

The accompanying charts shown in this report summarize the findings from multivariate analyses, a statistical technique which allows researchers to look at the relative influence of each characteristic, or factor, in predicting respondents’ views on each topic when all other factors are statistically controlled or held constant. The factors included in this analysis are gender, race and ethnicity, age, education, general knowledge about science, party affiliation and political ideology, along with religious affiliation and frequency of church attendance. As we did in our companion report , we note whether the strength of each factor is strong, medium or weak based on the statistical significance of each factor and the estimated difference in predicted probability between the maximum and minimum value for a given variable, holding all other variables at their means. (See Appendix A for more details.)

The remainder of this report looks at the degree to which public views about science-related topics are associated with religious affiliation and worship service attendance. As is typical of Pew Research Center reports, we characterize the relationships shown in these cross tabulations (sometimes referred to as bivariate relationships because they involve just two variables) based on tests of statistical significance that take into account the complex sample design of the survey.

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Understanding Science

How science REALLY works...

People of many different faiths and levels of scientific expertise see no contradiction between science and religion.

Science and religion: Reconcilable differences

In fact, people of many different faiths and levels of scientific expertise see no contradiction at all between science and religion. Many simply acknowledge that the two institutions deal with different realms of human experience. Science investigates the ​​ natural world , while religion deals with the spiritual and ​​ supernatural  — hence, the two can be complementary. Many religious organizations have issued statements declaring that there need not be any conflict between religious faith and the scientific perspective on evolution. 1

Furthermore, contrary to stereotype, one certainly doesn’t have to be an atheist in order to become a scientist. A 2005 survey of scientists at top research universities found that more than 48% had a religious affiliation and more than 75% believe that religions convey important truths. 2  Some scientists — like Francis Collins, former director of the National Human Genome Research Institute, and George Coyne, astronomer and priest — have been outspoken about the satisfaction they find in viewing the world through both a scientific lens and one of personal faith.

This is not to suggest that science and religion  never  come into conflict. Though the two generally deal with different realms (​​ natural  vs. spiritual), disagreements do arise about where the boundaries between these realms lie when dealing with questions at their interface. And sometimes, one side crosses a boundary in its claims. For example, when religious tenets make strong claims about the natural world (e.g., claiming that the world was created in six days, as some literal interpretations of the Bible might require), faith and science can find themselves in conflict.

Though such clashes may garner print, airwave, and bandwidth headlines, it’s important to remember that, behind the scenes and out of the spotlight, many cases exist in which religious and scientific perspectives present no conflict at all. Thousands of scientists busily carry out their research while maintaining personal spiritual beliefs, and an even larger number of everyday folks fruitfully view the natural world through an ​​ evidence -based, scientific lens and the supernatural world through a spiritual lens. Accepting a scientific worldview needn’t require giving up religious faith.

1 National Center for Science Education.  Voices for evolution . Retrieved December 29, 2008. 2 Ecklund, E.H., and C.P. Scheitle. 2007. Religion among academic scientists: Distinctions, disciplines, and demographics.  Social Problems  54(2):289-307.

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Conceptualizing religion and religious ideology in political science research: what is in a name and what description can do

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• Published: 18 September 2024

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• Irmak Yazici   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2177-2224 1  

This article demonstrates that concept of ‘Islamism’ is sometimes used arbitrarily in political science literature to describe ideological political activism, supposedly grounded in Islam, and argues that descriptive work can improve the academic engagement with Islam by acknowledging the pitfalls of naming ideologies that are affiliated with religions. Instead of labeling a broad range of political activism as Islamism in an arbitrary fashion and/or taking such labels for granted and proceeding with causal inquiry and inferences in reference to such labels, scholars can communicate the nuances in different forms and actors of activism to the readers by descriptively specifying the who, the what, and the when of the activisms that quote particular religions as their subject matters or motives—the histories, agencies, contexts, and contents that elaborate on what is in a name.

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See Table  1 .

Founded in 1924 to replace the Ministry of Sharia and Foundations (founded 1920), which was an extension of the Şeyhülislam of the Ottoman Empire. The Diyanet reframed the role and function of former religious authorities within the boundaries of secularism.

Cinar distinguishes the concepts Islamism, Islamic, Islamist, and Muslim and provides a detailed explanation of the uses and scope of these concepts in her work. Such context-specific use enables the readers to comprehend the complexity of the meanings these words embody within different contexts. For example, she distinguishes between ‘Islamist Muslims’ and ‘secularist Muslims,’ which is crucial to differentiate between different nationalist movements as well as to comprehend different social and political trends in Turkey, especially in the 1980s and 1990s.

Roy’s work makes a clear distinction between Islam and modernity and contrasts the values of latter with the so-called modern elements of governance, such as parliamentary democracy and secularization by defining modernity as something that ‘creeps into Muslim countries regardless of Islam.’ He also places an emphasis on Muslim societies as ‘other’ by suggesting that ‘they’ are dressed in Western clothes—‘raincoats, gloves and scarves for women, beards and parkas for men’—but have a ‘very American look’ (Roy 1994 , pp. 22–23).

Especially Lewis’ reference to an abstract ‘Muslim world’ when he discusses ‘why so many Muslims deeply resent the West’ is problematic, which is discussed further in relation to Islamism in the article. Lewis also uses other broad and vague references such as ‘classical Islamic view’ and ‘Islamic lands’ (Lewis 1990 ).

Huntington’s distinction between ‘civilizations’ is not only vague but also limited considering he implies that only ‘Westerners’ consider ‘nation states as the principal actors in global affairs’ (Huntington 1993 , p. 24).

This does not suggest a dichotomous understanding of the world nor of secularism, but points to the assumptions of mainly Western—or Anglo-Saxon—countries on the scope and functioning of secularism.

This narrative refers to the framework that considers The Peace of Westphalia (1648) as a turning point in international relations and history.

It should be noted that this model had its problems, such as ‘reinforcing religion as an ethnic marker’ and designating Muslim-Turkish identity as exclusively legitimate within the Ottoman Empire. That said, the article does not focus on these problems but rather on the fact that secularism’s Western roots should be scrutinized (Lord 2017 , p. 53).

This increase is seen especially after 2004, given that following the attacks of September 2001, the time spent on research and article submission, until the acceptance and publication of scholarly articles can be 1–2 years.

The sample includes journal articles, special sections (including symposia and critiques), editorials/notes, review essays (original work), forums, tributes, published interviews, responses and reactions, and issue introductions. Book reviews, review articles, retracted articles, or special reports/critiques of articles (e.g., referee reports), journal introductions, short communications, and announcements were not included. The findings are listed in the tables and graphs in the Appendix. The concepts of Islamism and Islamist were used at an average rate of 29.83% of the time in the sample. Broken down, International Studies Quarterly (ISQ) used both concepts at an average rate of 20.26% of the time, International Studies Review (ISR) averaged at 37.55%, International Studies Perspectives (ISP) averaged at 17.79%, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) averaged at 40.48%, International Political Sociology (IPS) averaged at 41.22%, and Journal of Global Security Studies (JoGSS) averaged at 60.71%. While this assessment is preliminary, the results nonetheless point to a need to investigate the extent to which these concepts have been used in other scholarly sources given the number of times they were used.

Here, it is important to note that the accuracy of their suggestion is irrelevant to the primary concern of this article regarding the use of Islamism.

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The Conflict Thesis Reimagined: From Theological Reform to Secular Weapon

by James Ungureanu September 17, 2024

R ecent scholarship on the so-called conflict between science and religion has revisited the reception of John William Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science (1875) and Andrew Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom (1896). [1] Indeed, contrary to common perception, Draper and White did not frame science and religion as inherently antagonistic; their positions were far more complex and nuanced.

This complexity is reflected in the diverse public responses to their works, where three predominant patterns emerge. [2] First, the more liberal press heralded Draper and White’s narratives as facilitating a “new Reformation.” They viewed the conflict rhetoric as instrumental in advocating for a distinction between religion and theology, and as a necessary step towards aligning faith with modernity.

In contrast, orthodox religious critics found such separation untenable. For them, faith was inseparable from doctrinal foundations, and they regarded Draper and White’s approach as a direct threat to Christianity, condemning their works as historically inaccurate and ideologically dangerous.

Meanwhile, secularists and atheists appropriated Draper and White’s conflict thesis to advance their own agendas. They interpreted it as an indictment of all religious belief, deploying the language of conflict to erode faith entirely, while finding it paradoxical that Draper and White themselves retained religious convictions.

In retrospect, the anxieties of conservative critics were not entirely misplaced. Here I will investigate how early twentieth-century skeptics appropriated and transformed the conflict thesis into a more secular narrative, significantly broadening its influence.

Organized Freethought in Victorian England

Liberal Protestantism, emerging from the Enlightenment and Romanticism, sought to align religion with contemporary values and scientific understanding. However, this modernization often led to a deeper questioning of religion’s relevance. As James Turner noted, religion was increasingly humanized, making it feasible “to abandon God, to believe simply in man.” [3]

While liberal Protestants adapted their faith, skeptics doubted whether religion retained any substantive value. Leslie Stephen, for instance, critiqued Matthew Arnold’s idea of preserving a “sublimated essence of theology,” questioning whether aesthetic judgments could sustain religious belief in the absence of doctrinal foundations. [4] By the late nineteenth century, these theological concessions helped pave the way for organized secularism to gain societal respectability.

Victorian freethought inherited diverse traditions, particularly the Enlightenment’s commitment to reason and Deist principles. In mid-nineteenth-century England, “secularism” emerged as a philosophical movement, deeply influenced by Thomas Paine’s The Age of Reason (1793). Paine denounced the church as enslaving humanity, advocating for faith in reason and a “Religion of Humanity.” His critique of the Bible as inconsistent and mythological laid the groundwork for radical freethought.

Freethought, tracing its roots to English Deists, found resonance with the Protestant Reformation’s spirit of liberating religious thought from clerical authority. [5] Figures like Richard Carlile, Robert Taylor, Robert Owen, and Charles Southwell were key advocates of freethought, pushing for self-improvement, education, and reform. Carlile, imprisoned for reprinting Paine’s The Age of Reason , saw the printing press as a tool to dismantle the “double yoke” of “Kingcraft and Priestcraft,” using publications to rally against religious and political institutions.

As public opinion grew more tolerant and English society became more stable, freethinkers adopted a less combative stance. By mid-century, leading figures institutionalized irreligion on an unprecedented scale, shifting from radical opposition to a broader, more accepted promotion of secularism.

The Rise of Radical Freethought in the Late Nineteenth Century

The late nineteenth century marked a golden age for radical freethought, during which freethinkers celebrated the liberation of humanity from religious constraints. This movement, led by figures such as George Jacob Holyoake, Charles Bradlaugh, Robert G. Ingersoll, and Joseph M. McCabe, extended its influence across both urban and rural areas through tracts, pamphlets, and magazines.

Interestingly, many freethinkers came from liberal Protestant backgrounds. Scholars like Leigh Eric Schmidt and Christopher Grasso have highlighted the complex relationship between American Protestantism and secularism. [6] For instance, Robert Ingersoll, raised by a liberal Presbyterian minister, eventually favored science over religious belief. Similarly, Samuel P. Putnam’s rejection of theism was shaped by liberal religious ideas from figures like Channing and Emerson. Many American Protestants, navigating from liberalism to infidelity, demonstrated the intersection of Protestantism and secularism, revealing a matrix of rivalry, alliance, and opposition.

In Britain, secularism advanced through both secularists and agnostics. As Bernie Lightman observed, while Thomas H. Huxley used agnosticism to distance himself from atheism, secularists increasingly employed the term to articulate atheistic views. Yet secularists recognized the influence of thinkers like Spencer, Huxley, and Tyndall, even as they criticized agnostics and religious liberals for compromising with religion.

Foote’s Freethinker magazine ridiculed agnostics who attended church, and Bradlaugh condemned figures like Huxley and Spencer for “intellectual vacillation” in failing to promote materialism fully. [7] Darwin, too, faced Bradlaugh’s criticism for what was seen as pandering to religious norms, especially in securing his place in Westminster Abbey. [8]

Ultimately, figures like Bradlaugh were perplexed by agnostics who, in their view, remained too closely tied to religious traditions.

Responses from Agnostics and the Evolving Secularist Landscape

Agnostics often responded to critiques with sharp rebuttals. Thomas Huxley, a leading figure in the agnostic movement, expressed disdain for certain elements within the freethought community. He criticized much of its literature, dismissing what he saw as “heterodox ribaldry,” which he found more distasteful than orthodox fanaticism. Huxley argued that attacking Christianity with scurrilous rhetoric was counterproductive, particularly in England, where such methods were outdated. He harbored a “peculiar abhorrence” for Charles Bradlaugh and his associates.

Bernie Lightman has demonstrated that Huxley and his scientific naturalist peers were repelled by Bradlaugh’s coarse atheism. [9] In correspondence with agnostic Richard Bithell, Huxley declined to support Charles Watts, criticizing freethought literature as repetitive and tiresome. He lamented how such works alienated thoughtful readers, noting: “It is monstrous that I cannot let one of these professed organs of Freethought lie upon my table without someone asking if I approve of this réchauffé of Voltaire or Paine.” [10]

Even moderate freethinkers like George Jacob Holyoake faced discrimination from agnostics. Although Holyoake and Herbert Spencer were longtime friends, Spencer refused Holyoake’s proposal to travel together to America in 1882, fearing it would be seen as an endorsement of Holyoake’s ideas.

Despite this, Holyoake remained a central figure among secularists. Raised in a religious household, his path led him through Christian denominations and eventually to freethought and naturalism. Holyoake often referenced his Christian upbringing to bolster his credibility as a freethinker, using his religious past to enhance his standing as a critic of religion. [11]

Holyoake’s Secularism and Its Impact

During his studies, George Jacob Holyoake encountered Robert Owen’s teachings and joined the Owenite movement as a “social missionary.” By 1843, he had taken over The Oracle of Reason and later founded The Reasoner and Herald of Progress , which became one of the longest-running freethought publications. Throughout the 1850s, Holyoake traveled widely, advocating for social reform and engaging in debates with religious opponents.

In 1849, Holyoake designated The Reasoner as “secular,” and in 1851, coined the term “secularism” to describe his freethought philosophy. He saw secularism as focused on this life, differentiating it from atheism by attracting theists and deists while avoiding the negative connotations of atheism. Holyoake’s secularism centered on social reform rather than religious critique, arguing that salvation, if it existed, was achieved through works, not faith. By promoting secularism, Holyoake sought collaboration with Christian liberals to advance rational morality.

In 1855, Holyoake and his brother Austin established a printing house on Fleet Street to distribute secularist literature. As president of the London Secular Society, Holyoake first met Charles Bradlaugh. Unlike Bradlaugh, Holyoake advocated cooperation among unbelievers, deists, and liberal theists to promote social reform, encouraging atheists to collaborate with liberal clergy to bridge the gap between secularists and Christian liberals.

The Watts Legacy and Secular Propaganda

Most importantly, George Jacob Holyoake’s conciliatory approach to secularism was embraced by Charles Watts and his son, Charles Albert Watts. In 1884, Charles Albert took a significant step toward consolidating secularist efforts by publishing the Agnostic Annual , marking a shift toward greater coordination within the secular movement.

The story of the Watts family’s contribution to freethought is well-documented. [12] Charles Watts, originally a Wesleyan minister’s son, became involved with Bradlaugh’s National Reformer before distancing himself after the “Knowlton affair” and aligning with Holyoake’s ethical humanism. By the 1880s, he took over Austin Holyoake’s printing firm and became a leading rationalist publisher. He eventually left the business to his son, Charles Albert, who sought to attract middle-class unbelievers by promoting agnosticism through the Agnostic Annual . Despite an incident where Huxley publicly disavowed any connection to the Annual, Charles Albert’s relationships with scientific naturalists remained intact.

Charles Albert expanded his efforts by publishing The Agnostic and establishing the “Agnostic Temple” in 1885, offering literature and holding meetings grounded in Spencer’s ideas. That same year, he launched Watts’s Literary Guide , a monthly publication catering to working-class and lower-middle-class audiences. The Guide , which eventually became the New Humanist , featured works from notable figures like Spencer, Huxley, Darwin, and Draper, often depicting the conflict between theology and science in dramatic terms.

Charles Albert also established the Propagandist Press Committee to further the distribution of rationalist literature, successfully expanding both the subscriber base and the visibility of secular publications.

Charles Albert Watts and the Rationalist Press Association

By the late nineteenth century, Charles Albert Watts had founded Watts & Co., and in 1899, his group of rationalists formed the Rationalist Press Association (RPA). Evolving from the Propagandist Press Committee, the RPA sought to promote freedom of thought in ethics, theology, and philosophy while advocating secular education and challenging traditional religious creeds. The RPA published books on religion, biblical criticism, and intellectual progress, emphasizing the perceived conflict between science and religion and advocating secular moral instruction.

The RPA featured works from key figures like Joseph McCabe and John M. Robertson. McCabe, a former Jesuit and prolific author, predicted the downfall of Christianity through scientific naturalism and biblical criticism. His Biographical Dictionary of Modern Rationalists celebrated Draper and White, though he acknowledged that both were theists. McCabe viewed Draper’s work as rationalist literature and praised White’s contribution to rationalism while noting his aim to purify, rather than destroy, Christianity. [13]

John M. Robertson, in his History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century (1929), referred to Draper’s Intellectual Development as a key contribution to rationalist culture. He argued that Draper’s theism was likely a result of social pressure but acknowledged the naturalistic approach in his work. [14] Other secularists like Joseph Mazzini Wheeler and Samuel P. Putnam similarly recognized Draper and White as freethinkers, with Putnam seeing the Reformation as a precursor to the eventual decline of Protestantism and Roman Catholicism. [15]

In the early twentieth century, the RPA expanded its influence by reprinting “Rationalist classics” using mass-production techniques. Charles Albert Watts collaborated with publishers like Macmillan to produce affordable editions of influential works, distributing six-penny editions of texts by authors such as Darwin, Huxley, Spencer, Paine, and notably Draper and White. Draper’s work, which he saw as a preface to a broader departure from “the faith of the fathers,” was integral to the RPA’s mission to reach a wider audience with rationalist ideas.

Origins of American Freethought

The roots of American freethought trace back to Thomas Paine, whose influence remains foundational. Freethought, as a movement, challenges established beliefs and seeks knowledge, empowering citizens to discern truth and strengthen democracy. Freethinkers advocate reason over passion or outdated customs, overlapping with rationalism, secularism, and skepticism.

Paine’s Common Sense (1776) electrified America and became a rallying cry for revolution. His later works, The Rights of Man (1791) and The Age of Reason (1794), more directly engaged with freethought, with The Age of Reason launching a bold attack on organized religion. Declaring himself a deist, Paine famously stated, “my own mind is my own church.” For his views, he was censored, ridiculed, and ostracized upon his return to America. Even Thomas Jefferson distanced himself. Paine died in 1809, nearly forgotten, his funeral attended by only a few. It was only after the Civil War that freethought gained new life in the U.S.

Secularism, though less organized than in Britain, grew in prominence after the Civil War. James Turner notes that agnosticism emerged as a self-sustaining phenomenon within twenty years. [16] Robert G. Ingersoll, known as the “Great Agnostic,” became the chief exponent of this movement, leading the “Golden Age of Freethought” (1875–1914). Ingersoll’s oratory revived Paine’s tarnished reputation, defending his legacy in essays like Vindication of Thomas Paine (1877). Ingersoll himself opposed religion, which cost him his political career, though he diverged from Paine on issues like socialism. [17]

Ingersoll’s freethought views were complex. Though the son of a minister, he grew to abhor religion, and this stance cost him his political career, which ended while he was still in his twenties. His story reflects the broader challenge faced by the freethought movement, which struggled to gain mainstream acceptance. A mere accusation of being anti-religious could destroy a political candidate’s chances. Ingersoll himself opposed socialism, diverging from some of Paine’s more progressive ideas.

Ingersoll’s death in 1899 marked the end of an era. Unlike Paine, he was neither poor nor forgotten, and even his critics admired his eloquence and ability to connect with audiences across the social spectrum.

Freethinkers Respond to Draper

Freethinkers like Joseph Treat and T. D. Hall seized upon Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Religion and Science as a powerful tool in their efforts to promote secularism and challenge Christianity. Treat, in correspondence with Draper, argued that Christianity had consistently hindered genuine scientific inquiry. He praised Draper’s work for exposing this historical antagonism, asserting that Draper had liberated science from the “bondage” of Christian influence.

Hall, in his pamphlet Can Christianity Be Made to Harmonize with Science? , echoed Treat’s appreciation of Draper’s clarity but critiqued him for stopping short of declaring an outright incompatibility between science and Christianity. Hall insisted that Draper lacked the boldness to acknowledge Christianity’s inevitable collapse in the face of scientific progress. Once Christianity’s central doctrines—such as the Fall, Atonement, and Resurrection—were stripped away, Hall believed, the religion would unravel entirely.

These voices were part of a broader American freethought movement, led by publications like Truth Seeker , founded by D. M. Bennett in 1876. Truth Seeker and groups like the National Liberal League united freethinkers, rationalists, and religious skeptics in advocating for the complete secularization of society.

Across the Atlantic, Draper’s narrative also resonated with British freethinkers, particularly through Charles Albert Watts and the Rationalist Press Association. Watts, via his Watts’s Literary Guide (later New Humanist ), treated Draper’s work as a cornerstone for promoting secularism and rationalism. The Rationalist Press Association published works that undermined traditional religious views, with prominent figures like John M. Robertson and Joseph M. Wheeler consistently citing Draper’s analysis to support their campaigns for secular education and religious criticism.

For Robertson, Draper’s naturalistic outlook made his work indispensable to the freethought movement, despite Draper’s own theological leanings. Similarly, Wheeler and Samuel P. Putnam integrated Draper’s arguments into their broader critiques of religion, using his historical analysis not merely as a chronicle of science but as a potent tool in the battle to free society from religious dominance.

Freethinkers on both sides of the Atlantic adopted Draper’s narrative to legitimize their belief in the fundamental incompatibility of science and religion. Through their publications, organizations, and correspondence, they transformed Draper’s work into a weapon for advancing a secular society, one free from the influence of religious institutions.

Freethinkers Respond to White

Freethinkers, as they did with Draper, appropriated Andrew Dickson White’s A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom to further their secular agenda. Publications like The American Free Thought Magazine praised White’s work for illustrating the historical struggle to modernize Christian theology, framing it as a triumph of science over religious dogma. The magazine argued that White’s history was essential for any freethinker’s library, not merely for cataloging religious errors but for celebrating science’s victories.

In England, thinkers like Alfred W. Benn placed White alongside luminaries such as Buckle, Draper, and Lecky. However, Benn expressed frustration with White’s reluctance to fully reject Christianity, arguing that his conclusions logically pointed to the abandonment of its doctrines. For Benn and others, White’s work symbolized the deepening conflict between rational thought and religious belief.

White’s work also drew criticism from prominent atheists like Edward Payson Evans and Elizabeth Edson Gibson Evans. They were perplexed by White’s attempts to reconcile religion and science. Elizabeth criticized White’s refusal to fully disbelieve in religion, insisting that science had consistently debunked religious claims. Edward accused White of being overly generous to religion, contending that the conflict between science and faith was irreconcilable.

This tension was further evident in White’s interactions with Robert G. Ingersoll, the renowned agnostic orator. While Ingersoll appreciated White’s contribution to intellectual openness and his critique of religious authority, he saw White’s lingering religious sentiment as unnecessary. Ingersoll dismissed Christianity as not worth saving, sarcastically asking why God would make truth-seeking safe now after allowing it to be dangerous for centuries.

Despite White’s reluctance to fully embrace secularism, freethinkers eagerly adopted his work to undermine religious institutions. Charles Albert Watts, a prominent British secularist, published extensive reviews of White’s book in the Watts’s Literary Guide , encouraging White to write for the secularist Annual . Although White declined, secularists continued to use his work to advance their cause.

White himself was unsettled by this reception. He had aimed to provide a balanced critique, addressing both religious “scoffers” like Ingersoll and the religious “gush” of figures like John Henry Newman. In private, he expressed to his secretary George Lincoln Burr that he sought to present “the truth as it is in Jesus,” but both religious and irreligious readers often misinterpreted his work as an attack on faith itself.

In conclusion, while White’s intentions were more conciliatory than Draper’s, freethinkers and secularists embraced his narrative as part of their broader efforts to secularize society. Regardless of White’s personal beliefs, his work became a cornerstone in the intellectual campaign to discredit religious authority and advance rationalism.

Joseph McCabe and the “Land of Bunk”

One of the most significant secularists to appropriate Draper and White’s conflict thesis was Joseph McCabe, a former Franciscan monk turned outspoken atheist. McCabe believed that science and technology would not only solve society’s problems but also lead to a more rational and egalitarian world. His translation of Ernst Haeckel’s The Riddle of the Universe (1900) introduced Haeckel’s ideas to English-speaking audiences, and despite McCabe’s lack of formal scientific training, this association lent authority to his writings. A prolific author, McCabe produced over 200 books on science, history, and religion, championing evolutionary thought and forecasting Christianity’s inevitable demise in the face of modern science.

McCabe’s personal journey mirrored his intellectual transformation. Raised in a Franciscan monastery, where he took the name Brother Antony, McCabe was tormented by doubts about Christianity. His experiences in the monastery, marked by physical suffering and intellectual conflict, eventually led him to leave the priesthood in 1895. His account, Twelve Years in a Monastery (1897), detailed his disillusionment with the Church and marked his formal break with religion. From that point on, McCabe became a relentless advocate for atheism, insisting that science, not religion, held the answers to life’s great questions.

McCabe’s partnership with Kansas-based publisher Emanuel Haldeman-Julius was one of the defining collaborations of his career. Haldeman-Julius, known for his “Little Blue Books” series, provided affordable and accessible literature on topics ranging from politics to science. McCabe became the series’ most prolific contributor, writing 134 Little Blue Books and over 100 Big Blue Books . Haldeman-Julius praised McCabe as “the greatest scholar in the world,” crediting his works with advancing humanity’s cultural progress.

This partnership gave McCabe a renewed sense of purpose, especially after facing personal and professional setbacks in Britain. By 1925, after separating from his wife and severing ties with key British publishers, McCabe found both financial stability and intellectual validation through his collaboration with Haldeman-Julius. Over the following years, McCabe produced an immense body of work, earning substantial income while continuing to challenge religious orthodoxy.

One of McCabe’s most influential works, The Conflict Between Science and Religion (1927), essentially echoed Draper’s narrative but with a tone of triumph. McCabe confidently predicted that future historians would regard the denial of the science-religion conflict as laughable. He argued that “science has, ever since its birth, been in conflict with religion,” with Christianity as its “most deadly opponent.”

McCabe’s critique extended beyond traditional religious beliefs. He reserved particular scorn for modernist and liberal theologians, dismissing their attempts to reconcile Christianity with science as “the veriest piece of bunk that Modernism ever invented.” In McCabe’s view, rejecting Christianity’s core doctrines—whether through scientific reinterpretation or otherwise—was tantamount to rejecting Christianity entirely. For him, “progressive religion” was a contradiction, and those who embraced it were deluding themselves.

Ironically, McCabe used arguments similar to those of conservative Christians, accusing liberal theologians like Shailer Mathews of undermining Christianity’s foundations. He argued that attempts to reconcile science with religion were futile, given that science operated as a unified field while religion had never achieved such coherence. McCabe quipped that applying science to religion would require addressing “three hundred different collections of religious beliefs,” making any reconciliation impossible.

In McCabe’s final analysis, whether one adhered to orthodox Christianity or its modernist variants, the conflict with science was inevitable. He contended that modernists, in reducing God to abstractions like “Cosmic Force” or “Vital Principle,” had gutted religion of any meaningful content. Both fundamentalists and modernists, McCabe concluded, inhabited the same “land of bunk,” unable to recognize the inherent incompatibility between science and religion.

Emanuel Haldeman-Julius and the Philosophy of the “Little Blue Books”

Emanuel Haldeman-Julius, later known as the “Henry Ford of publishing,” was born to Jewish immigrants in Philadelphia and grew up in a secular household. Though his formal education ended in the eighth grade, his passion for reading and self-education shaped his early worldview. Influenced by thinkers like Omar Khayyam, Voltaire, and Robert Ingersoll, he developed a deep rejection of religion, identifying as a materialist and dismissing the notion of an afterlife. His early exposure to cheap pamphlets like The Rubaiyat and The Ballad of Reading Gaol ignited his desire to make literature accessible to the masses.

In 1915, Haldeman-Julius moved to Girard, Kansas, where he worked for the socialist newspaper Appeal to Reason . After marrying Annie Haldeman, niece of social reformer Jane Addams, he purchased the paper and began distributing pamphlets, marking the beginning of his publishing empire. His vision of providing affordable, pocket-sized booklets on a wide range of topics took shape in the Little Blue Books series, which covered literature, philosophy, science, and religion, and initially sold for just five cents. These pamphlets aimed to provide a “university in print” for working- and middle-class readers, offering access to ideas traditionally reserved for the educated elite.

The Little Blue Books became a massive success, with over 500 million copies sold. Haldeman-Julius’s marketing genius—using sensational ads like “Books are cheaper than hamburgers!”—helped spread his freethought and socialist ideas. He published works by influential authors such as Shakespeare, Twain, Darwin, and Emerson, alongside freethought titles like Why I Am an Atheist and The Bible Unmasked , which challenged religious orthodoxy. His goal was to democratize knowledge and encourage critical thinking, particularly against religious and political authority.

Central to Haldeman-Julius’s success was his collaboration with Joseph McCabe, a former monk turned atheist and prolific writer. McCabe contributed significantly to the Little Blue Books , with works like The Story of Religious Controversy , a key text that attacked Christianity and promoted a rationalist worldview. Together, McCabe and Haldeman-Julius saw their work as a means to combat what they viewed as the intellectual stagnation of religious dogma.

Despite the series’ success, Haldeman-Julius faced criticism for the mixture of high-quality literature with less scholarly content. H. L. Mencken famously remarked that the Little Blue Books contained “extremely good books” alongside “unutterable drivel.” However, the series continued to thrive, offering over 2,000 titles on a range of subjects from classic literature to freethought.

Haldeman-Julius’s own contributions to the series often included sharp critiques of religion. He dismissed attempts to reform religion as futile, arguing that modernism was simply a way to escape the intellectual difficulties of faith without embracing rationalism. He viewed religion as “medieval” and atheism as “modern,” believing that science and the social sciences provided the tools to debunk religious beliefs. Pamphlets like Is Science the New Religion? and The Meaning of Modernism reflected his disdain for attempts to reconcile science and faith, which he saw as inherently contradictory.

At its peak, Haldeman-Julius’s publishing empire became the largest mail-order publishing house in the world, based in the small town of Girard, Kansas. By 1921, he was selling over a million Little Blue Books each month, reflecting the widespread appetite for accessible education and freethought. He argued that the success of his series demonstrated a growing tendency toward skepticism and intellectual independence in America.

However, the post-World War II rise of conservatism and the anti-communist fervor of the McCarthy era led to a decline in the influence of Haldeman-Julius’s publications. He continued to publish controversial pamphlets, including The F.B.I.: The Basis of an American Police State (1948), but faced increasing harassment from the government. In 1951, after being convicted of tax evasion, Haldeman-Julius was found dead under mysterious circumstances.

Despite his personal and financial struggles in his later years, Haldeman-Julius’s impact on American intellectual life was profound. His Little Blue Books brought sophisticated ideas and literature to the masses, helping to foster a culture of skepticism, critical thinking, and freethought in early twentieth-century America.

Thus by the early twentieth century, Draper, White, and the scientific naturalists had lost control of their attempts to reconcile science and religion. Their narratives, once intended to bridge the two fields, became powerful weapons for secularists in the battle for authority in public and political spheres, wielded against religion. Though some secularists later reconverted to forms of Christianity, the damage was done. The conflict narrative had taken hold, and many minds came to view the relationship between science and religion as one of perpetual antagonism. In time, historians of science would attribute to Draper, White, and the scientific naturalists the founding of what became known as the Conflict Thesis.

Reactions to Draper, White, and other scientific naturalists were varied and complex. Religious liberals were among the protagonists, many of whom went to great lengths to defend these figures against accusations of atheism and materialism. These liberal leaders sought to modernize Christianity, ensuring it remained in step with the emerging scientific worldview, hoping this would stem the erosion of belief. Some even argued that Christianity itself was outdated, suggesting that both physical and historical sciences had revealed a new religion or theology. Religious agnostics and scientific naturalists, in turn, were not only conciliatory toward liberal Christianity but also drew spiritual inspiration from its tenets, incorporating them into their own work.

The antagonists included not only conservative or orthodox theologians but also rationalists and secularists, all of whom rejected the so-called reconciliation between science and religion, though for different reasons. The efforts of the “peacemakers” ultimately failed. Secularists did not accept the redefinitions of religion and the reconstructions of Christianity that men like Draper and White proposed. A paradox emerged in their attempt to reconcile science and religion: narratives meant to demonstrate religion's progress through scientific investigation were instead seized by rationalists and secularists, who used them as a weapon against all religion, aiming to eradicate it entirely.

[1] See James C. Ungureanu, Science, Religion, and the Protestant Tradition: Retracing the Origins of Conflict (UPP, 2019).

[2] For a more detailed analysis, see James C. Ungureanu, “Science and Religion in the Anglo-American Periodical Press, 1860-1900: A Failed Reconciliation,” Church History , 88:1 (2019): 120-149.

[3] James Turner, Without God, Without Creed , 261.

[4] Leslie Stephen, Studies of a Biographer , 2 vols. (London: Duckworth and Co., 1898), 2.76-122.

[5] See Edward Royle, “Freethought: The Religion of Irreligion,” in D.G. Paz (ed.) Nineteenth-Century English Religious Traditions: Retrospect and Prospect (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1995), 171-196.

[6] Leigh Eric Schmidt, Village Atheists: How America’s Unbelievers Made Their Way in a Godly Nation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Christopher Grasso, Skepticism and American Faith: From the Revolution to the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018).

[7] Louis Greg, “The Agnostic at Church,” Nineteenth Century , vol. 11, no. 59 (Jan 1882): 73-76; Freethinker , vol. 1 (Jan 15, 1882).

[8] Cited in James Moore, The Darwin Legend (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1994), 64-65.

[9] Lightman, Victorian Popularizers of Science , 264.

[10] Richard Bithell to T.H. Huxley, 20 Sept 1894 and T.H. Huxley to Richard Bithell, 22 Sept 1894, T.H Huxley Collection, Imperial College Archives, Box 11.

[11] See McCabe, Life and Letters of George Jacob Holyoake , 1.1-17, 18-36; George Jacob Holyoake, The Trial of George Jacob Holyoake on an indictment for blasphemy (London: Printed and Published for “The Anti-Persecution Union,” 1842), 20-21.

[12] F.J. Gould, The Pioneers of Johnson’s Court: A History of the Rationalist Press Association from 1899 Onwards (London: Watts & Co., 1929); A.G. Whyte, The Story of the R.P.A., 1899-1949 (London: Watts & Co., 1949).

[13] Joseph McCabe, A Biographical Dictionary of Modern Rationalists (London: Watts & Co, 1920), 221-222, 886-887.

[14] J.M. Robertson, A History of Freethought in the Nineteenth Century , 2 vols. (London: Watts & Co., 1929), 1.261-262. See also A Short History of Freethought: Ancient and Modern (London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1899), 420. By 1906, Robertson revised and expanded this work into a massive two-volume edition (London: Watts & Co., 1906). In this edition Robertson listed Draper’s Intellectual Development and History of Conflict as general histories of freethought.

[15] J.M. Wheeler, A Biographical Dictionary of Freethinkers of All Ages and Nations (London: Progressive Publishing Co., 1889), 112, 332; S.P. Putnam, 400 Years of Freethought (New York: The Truth Seeker Company, 1894), 47-50.

[16] Turner, Without God, without Creed , 171.

[17] See Martin E. Marty, The Infidel: Freethought and American Religion (Cleveland: Meridian Books, 1961); Paul A. Carter, The Spiritual Crisis of the Gilded Age (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1971); and Eric T. Brandt and Timothy Larsen, “The Old Atheism Revisited: Robert G. Ingersoll and the Bible,” Journal of the Historical Society , vol. 11, no. 2 (2011): 211-238.

Featured Image: Udo Kepler, The last stand - science versus superstition, 1899; Source: Wikimedia Commons, PD-Old-100. 

James Ungureanu

James C. Ungureanu is Adjunct Professor at Carthage College, where he teaches in the Intellectual Foundations Program. He is the author of several books on science and religion, most recently, Science, Religion, and the Protestant Tradition: Retracing the Origins of Conflict .

Read more by James Ungureanu

A Catholic History of the Fake Conflict Between Science and Religion

May 04, 2020 | Christopher Baglow

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Honors 352: Beyond Burials: Death and Science in Archaeology

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Science backs traditional knowledge of Kakadu plum health benefits

University of Queensland research has confirmed antioxidant properties in an Australian bushfood used by Indigenous people for generations.

Dr Oladipupo Adiamo from UQ’s Centre for Nutrition and Food Sciences is investigating the safety and efficacy of powdered Kakadu plum as a food ingredient.

“Kakadu plum has been eaten and used for generations by Indigenous communities to treat headaches, colds and flu, and as an antiseptic,” Dr Adiamo said.

“But before the food industry can use it, they need scientific data to confirm what the fruit contains and what it does.”

Dr Adiamo says beyond its well-studied high vitamin C content, the fruit has polyphenolic compounds that give it antioxidant properties to prevent or delay cell damage.

“Polyphenolic compounds are found naturally in plant-based foods and can help lower risk for certain diseases,” he said.

“We wanted to see how these polyphenols behave when we consume Kakadu plum powder.

“We found that when those big compounds are broken into smaller compounds by microbiota in the gut, they have even higher antioxidant properties and are easier for the body to absorb.

“Our digestive microbiota plays a crucial role in helping us benefit from Kakadu plum and proves we can confidently use the powder in food products.”

Dr Adiamo said the results were promising and backed up Indigenous knowledge, but further work was needed.

“There are some things we didn’t cover in our research, such as the mechanism responsible for changing the big compounds to small compounds,” he said.

“Another challenge is fruit supply because it is wild harvested.

“I’m hoping that when the health benefits are proven, there will be more demand for Kakadu plum, leading to business opportunities for Indigenous communities to grow and value add to their harvest.”

The research was published in Food Chemistry.

This project was funded by the CRC for Developing Northern Australia, the ARC Industrial Training Centre for Uniquely Australian Foods, the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries and The University of Queensland.

Media assets

Images are available via Dropbox .

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John A. Clements Dies at 101; His Research Saved Thousands of Babies

He identified the cause of a respiratory condition that once killed 10,000 infants annually in the United States and helped design a drug that greatly reduced mortality rates.

By Trip Gabriel

Dr. John A. Clements, a towering figure in the field of pulmonary research who in the 1950s solved one of the great mysteries of the human lung, then helped to save thousands of lives by designing a drug to treat lung failure in premature infants, died on Sept. 3 at his home in Tiburon, Calif., north of San Francisco. He was 101.

The death was confirmed by his daughter Carol Clements.

In 1949, Dr. Clements was fresh out of Cornell University Medical College (now Weill Cornell Medical College) and working for the Army as a physiologist when he became intrigued by the remarkable mechanics of human breathing.

How could the millions of tiny air sacs in the lungs deflate when a person breathes out but not collapse like a balloon? Dr. Clements theorized that there must be some chemical that relaxes the surface tension of the air sacs. He went on to identify the substance as a surfactant, a class of lubricants that work like household detergents.

In a 1956 paper, based on research done with a crude instrument that he built himself, Dr. Clements demonstrated the presence of a surfactant in the lungs.

His work led to a breakthrough three years later by two Harvard researchers whom Dr. Clements advised: Pulmonary surfactant, they found , was absent in premature babies with undeveloped lungs who died of respiratory distress syndrome, or R.D.S.

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The Impact of Collaboration Between Science and Religious Education Teachers on Their Understanding and Views of Argumentation

Jessica chan.

Department of Education, University of Oxford, 15 Norham Gardens, Oxford, OX2 6PY UK

Sibel Erduran

Teachers’ understanding and teaching of argumentation is gaining more attention in science education research. However, little is known about how science teachers engage in argumentation with teachers of different subject taking an interdisciplinary perspective that may inspire new pedagogical ideas or strategies. In particular, the positioning of argumentation at the juncture of science and religion is rare. This paper reports an empirical study involving science and religious education (RE) teachers who collaborated on teaching argumentation in three secondary schools in England. Their interdisciplinary collaboration was sustained by a series of professional development sessions over 18 months. Analysis of the interview data unfolds how the teachers’ collaboration impacted their understanding of argumentation and views of teaching their subject. Through working relationally in exploring and teaching argumentation, the science teachers reflected more notable changes than their RE counterparts. Science teachers came to appreciate student voice in the learning process and the role of argumentation in fostering students’ scientific reasoning. The paper is a salient step to researching argumentation in a cross-curricular terrain, particularly in relation to RE. It also sheds light on how collaborating with teachers of another subject bolstered science teachers’ professional development and broke subject barriers.

Introduction

Argumentation, or the justification of knowledge claims with evidence and reasons (Toulmin, 1958 ), is a focus in many cross-curricular initiatives (Asterhan & Schwarz, 2016 ). The process of generating or engaging with arguments and backing up the arguments by evidence and warrant is often framed as argumentation  (Jiménez-Aleixandre & Erduran, 2007 ). Research has extensively reported the benefits of argumentation in fostering higher-order thinking skills (Rapanta, 2021 ). Because of its philosophical root and educational merits, argumentation is inherently a generic skill and is often discussed from a cross-curricular perspective (Joshi, 2016 ; Staples et al., 2016 ). Within the subject boundaries in education, argumentation has been widely researched in science (Zohar & Nemet, 2002 ), literacy (Bloome & Wilkinson, 2012 ; Lu & Zhang, 2013 ), language arts (Rapanta, 2021 ), history (Monte-Sano, 2016 ), mathematics (Staples & Newton, 2016 ), and social studies and civic education (Joshi, 2016 ). Applying argumentation to learning in a range of subjects and disciplines has therefore strengthened its power in and relevance to thinking in interdisciplinary domains.

In this paper, following a review of the literature in related areas, we focus on an empirical study conducted with science and religious education (RE) teachers, who were collaborating about argumentation in the context of a funded research project in England. The three-year project aimed to foster collaboration between the teachers in infusing argumentation in their teaching. The paper illustrates how the teachers’ collaboration on argumentation has impacted their views and understanding of argumentation and its teaching. Although there is research on science teachers’ views about the science and religion comparison (e.g. BouJaoude et al., 2011 ; Mansour, 2015 ), very little research has involved both science and RE teachers in the same study on interdisciplinary issues that concern the school subjects of science and religious studies (e.g. McKinney et al., 2014 ). In England, while there are ample opportunities for argumentation in the RE curriculum (Chan et al., 2021 ; Godfrey & Erduran, 2021 ; Ofsted, 2021 ), the scope in the science curriculum is very limited (Jenkins, 2013 ; Naylor et al., 2007 ). Despite these different expectations, this paper intends to contribute to the literature by elucidating how science and RE teachers collaborated to engage their students in argumentation.

Literature Review

There is extensive research on argumentation in science education (e.g. Duschl & Osborne 2002 ; Jiménez-Aleixandre & Erduran, 2007 ; Osborne et al., 2016 ; Zohar & Nemet, 2002 ). Increasingly, interdisciplinarity and argumentation are drawing more attention in the education research field for various reasons (Erduran et al., 2019 ). The emphasis on developing students’ higher-order skills and critical thinking in a cross-curricular context is a vehicle for researching the potentials of argumentation across different subjects. For instance, Crujeiras-Pérez and Jiménez-Aleixandre ( 2019 ) proposed that problem-solving in day-to-day life in the twenty-first century requires innovative thinking that adopts an interdisciplinary perspective. We need not wait too long to fully and immensely appreciate the importance of an interdisciplinary approach to argumentation for problem-solving from personal to national and supranational levels. Just months after their claim, the pandemic presented high-stakes and unprecedented challenges to virologists, public health experts, policymakers, healthcare professionals, business owners, teachers, and parents—simply humans from all walks of life in all countries. Advice or new rules swiftly imposed on citizens were communicated as compelling measures backed up by data and warrants. The policies were then scrutinised by a bottom-up rebuttal from citizens evaluating the impacts on the economic, educational, environmental, psychological, and social aspects of life. In short, good decision-making and problem-solving in education matters or others are largely contingent upon interdisciplinarity and argumentation. Developing students for these competencies has become more urgent and profound than most educators had forewarned.

Religion and science are conventionally polarised at two ends due to their classic epistemic and ontological divides. However, both subjects are unarguably developed and sustained by similar scholarly attitudes and share the same overarching goal of nurturing a critical mind—one that is open to argument, evidence and scepticism (Gauld, 2005 ). These commonalities of the two subjects have been disproportionately neglected in comparison to their disparities. Prolongedly driven by debates towards polarisation as well as unification, the two subjects are intrinsically the most interesting arena for researching argumentation and the question of knowing. Therefore, argumentation and its power in promoting cross-curricular learning can be effectively examined at the junction of religious and science education.

Argumentation is a pattern of reasoning (Basel et al., 2014 ). Toulmin’s ( 1958 ) framework of argumentation has been widely used to characterise the definition of argument (e.g. Bravo-Torija & Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2018 ). Toulmin presented an argument as having the following components: claim, data, warrant, backing, rebuttal, and qualifier. For the purposes of this paper, it suffices to say that an argument involves the justification (warrants and backings) of a claim with data under particular circumstances (qualifiers); and under certain conditions, a claim may be refuted (rebuttal). For example, Christians believe in the sanctity of life, that life is holy and belongs to God, and therefore, only God has the power to take life. Here, there is a claim that only God has the power to take life. The reason is that life is holy and it belongs to God. The justification being offered is the idea of the sanctity of life. This pattern of claim-reason-justification also applies to science. Plants require water to grow because water combines with carbon dioxide to produce oxygen and carbohydrates. In such case, the main claim is that plants require water to grow, and the reason is that water is part of a chemical reaction in plants. The justification of the argument is that growth is a chemical reaction. Some other claims might require putting scientific ideas and religious values together. For example, an issue such as why life originated on earth incites not only scientific but also religious curiosity. While the scientific arguments may draw on the biochemical mechanisms that enabled life to originate on the planet, the religious arguments might appeal to divine purpose in the creation of life. Although the arguments would be fairly distinct, they would be guided by the same question of why there is life at all.

Toulmin’s framework on argumentation addresses specific features of arguments in a particular domain (i.e. field dependent) as well as the generic aspects of argumentation that may apply to different domains (i.e. field invariant). For example, epistemic and methodological constructs can delineate and instantiate argumentation in teaching science, history, and literature (Goldman et al., 2018 ). These field-dependent rules specify what kind of information counts as evidence for a claim in science and how the criteria are different from those in history and literature. In short, argumentation encompasses a domain-general reasoning pattern based on evidence and reasons that operates across subjects and the epistemic nuances reflected in the particular justifications of different disciplines (Hetmanek et al., 2018 ; van Boxtel & van Drie, 2018 ).

Although argumentation has been extensively researched in various school subjects and in the context of socio-scientific issues (Martín-Gámez & Erduran, 2018 ) research about argumentation in RE is virtually non-existent (Erduran, 2020 ). Such lack of research is astonishing given that scientific and religious issues are often drawn together to be a focal axis in education research (Erduran et al., 2020 ). While argumentation research has thrived in science education over the last two decades, a blind spot emerged in RE. Nevertheless, a light within this blind spot is made dimly visible by a few scholars who studied argumentation in RE in German-speaking countries. Their interests in researching argumentation mostly concentrated on religio-scientific issues (Basel et al., 2013 ;  2014 ) or bioethical topics in schools (Schmidt et al., 2015 ;  2017 ), plus an outlier in pre-service teachers’ intercultural learning (Bender-Szymanski, 2013 ). Apart from this solitary group, other research on the English curriculum examined the role of RE in fostering generic intellectual skills which may entail argumentation (Chan et al., 2021 ).

It has been reported that teachers acknowledged the importance of teaching collaboratively to foster cross-curricular learning, but obstacles such as teachers’ limited expertise, roles, and policy in schools are not uncommon (Meskill & Oliveira, 2019 ; Spalding, 2002 ). Science teachers having to teach outside of their specialism at secondary school level is commonplace (Childs & McNicholl, 2007 ; Luft et al., 2020 ; Nixon et al., 2017 ). Due to the complex socio-political amalgam in teaching, science teachers often have to teach a scientific subject in which they have little background or limited subject-matter knowledge, for example, a biologist teaching physics. This systemic or institutional shortcoming negatively affects the development of science teacher’s pedagogical content knowledge and teaching in the classroom (McNicholl & Childs, 2010 ). Science teachers are also prone to isolation from collaborating with colleagues in other departments in school (Hargreaves, 1994 ; McNicholl & Childs, 2010 ; Spalding, 2002 ).

Much research on teachers learning about and teaching argumentation has focused on science education in schools. Some research has argued that teachers’ own experiences of learning science are limited to textbooks or exam syllabi and they have not learnt argumentation in their education trajectory (Sampson & Blanchard, 2012 ; Zembal-Saul & Vaishampayan, 2019 ). Since teaching argumentation is a higher-order skill which demands challenging one’s instructional practice in conceptual understanding as well as epistemic and social beliefs about learning (Zembal-Saul & Vaishampayan, 2019 ), it would not be prudent to rely on teachers to promote argumentation in classrooms if they themselves have no experience in engaging in scientific argumentation, or they are not supported to explore and understand this model and its potential for effective learning (Sampson & Blanchard, 2012 ; Zohar, 2007 ). Unsurprisingly, lack of pedagogical knowledge of teaching and supporting students in argumentation has been a common problem (Sampson & Blanchard, 2012 ). It is argued that conceptual strategies across subjects should be highlighted in teacher education so that teachers can be equipped to translate different cognitive models to other subjects (Cohen, 2018 ). Cross-subject collaboration among teachers in the same school is one strategy that can potentially enhance teachers’ pedagogical skills.

Although some research has explored science and RE teachers’ thinking about argumentation (Erduran et al., 2020 ; Guilfoyle et al., 2021), the teachers' views were given in a questionnaire when they were not collaborating with another subject teacher. The findings presented in this paper, which are based on semi-structured interviews, will thus augment this body of work by highlighting potential changes in teachers after a cross-subject collaboration and a continuous professional development (CPD) programme. The rest of the paper will hitherto investigate if and how such collaboration can be beneficial for science and RE teachers’ engagement with argumentation.

Methodology

Context and participants.

The data for this paper were taken from the Oxford Argumentation in Religion and Science (OARS), a funded research project on argumentation in science and RE classrooms in England (Erduran et al., 2019 ; Erduran et al., 2020 ; Godfrey & Erduran, 2021 ; Guilfoyle & Erduran, 2021 ). The teacher participants volunteered to take part after an invitation was circulated in local schools. Each science teacher was paired with an RE teacher in the same school to enable cross-subject collaboration. This paper presents three pairs of science and RE teachers from three secondary schools. Two of which were non-faith schools and the third was Catholic. All the six teachers were female and were chosen as examples of effective collaboration for reason of sample adequacy (Morse et al., 2002 ). Their teaching experience ranged from five to 32 years.

The project consisted of a CPD programme (see OARSeducation.com for further details). The programme was predicated on principles of effective professional learning such as teacher agency, shared goals and equity (Andrews & Richmond, 2019 ; Supovitz & Turner, 2000 ). These principles were embedded in five workshops over the course of 18 months. Research evidence suggests that novice science teachers are often caught up in classroom management with limited capacity to apply innovative strategies (Luft et al., 2011 ). In a similar vein, when experienced science teachers change schools or have to teach unfamiliar content, they resume the role of a novice science teacher (Loughran, 2007 ). To tackle these potential barriers, the CPD workshops presented work samples that would facilitate the participants to flexibly try out different strategies. Teachers explored argumentation within and between their subjects and sought to generate feasible ways of collaborating in their school. The ultimate goal of the collaboration was to develop students’ argumentation in science and RE. The co-learner model also encouraged the teachers to draw on and share their expertise with other teachers and the researchers. 

Teachers frequently work in silos (Hargreaves & O’Connor, 2018 ) so the CPD programme first guided the teachers to identify the common ground between science and RE through critically discussing the curriculam context. The second workshop examined the contrast of science and RE and designed lessons which focused on argumentation. For example, teachers explored the role of group discussion in developing argumentative skills. In the third workshop, teachers reflected on their school-based collaborations thus far. We observed that RE teachers were relatively comfortable in teaching argumentation, whereas science teachers expressed the need for more support. In fact, some RE teachers had a strong understanding of argumentation having completed doctoral degrees in fields such as philosophy and theology. Findings from the curriculum analyses were presented in workshop four, in which the teachers’ elaboration of the room for argumentation was also capitalised. The final workshop led teachers to review all the shared resources and reflect on how they embedded argumentation in school-wide activities. Over the 18 months, the teachers designed their collaboration and adapted it in the face of the pandemic.

Across the series of workshops, Toulmin’s framework of argument (Toulmin, 1958 ) was used to define argumentation. This framework has been utilised in science education (Lazarou & Erduran, 2021 ; Naylor et al., 2007 ; Zohar & Nemet, 2002 ). All teachers were interviewed at the start and end of their participation in this research. The interview questions sought to unpack the teachers’ views of argumentation, teaching argumentation, and their collaboration by the end of the project. For example, the teachers were asked how they had integrated argumentation in their lessons and what strategies had favoured their science-RE collaboration.

Research Question

The study was guided by the following research question: How does science and RE teachers' cross-subject collaboration impact their understanding and views of argumentation, teaching argumentation and their collaboration?

Data Collection and Analysis

The data set for our analysis is interview transcripts from three pairs of science and RE teachers. Understanding of argumentation, views about teaching argumentation, and collaboration were primarily adopted as three themes to examine the transcripts to ensure methodological coherence (Morse et al., 2002 ). This examination was then refined by highlighting any changes in those views and understanding or new perspectives to evidence CPD impacts. Both authors read the data separately, made notes, and then discussed together to reach shared interpretations, verification, and a confirmability audit (Nowell et al., 2017 ). The semantic analysis was facilitated by a constant comparison of the commonalities across the individual accounts (Parry, 2004 ; Polkinghorne, 2007 ). Given the flexibility of thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006 ), this iterative process was also enhanced by evaluating how the interviewees warranted their views and experiences (Silverman, 2017 ). Each discrete theme was first identified and then surveyed into an interrelated narrative guided by the research question to maintain consistency (Braun & Clarke, 2012 ). Emerging findings were also fed into the CPD workshops so that teachers could scrutinise those findings as part of our iterative analysis. This transparency was to make the research more meaningful to them.

The findings are organised in three sections: (a) teachers’ understanding of argumentation, (b) teachers’ views of teaching argumentation, and (c) teachers’ views of collaboration. In each case, data from the three schools are used to illustrate science and RE teacher pairs’ understanding and views before and after the CPD intervention. In each section, data are drawn from the three schools labelled as A, B, and C, and the particular science or RE teacher is indicated.

Teachers’ Understanding of Argumentation

The question “what is a good argument” gave us an introduction to what the teachers understood about argumentation. The initial responses by the RE and science teachers broadly aligned with the Toulmin’s model in the simplest manner. However, many of them thought engaging in argumentation demanded presenting contrastive views at the same time:

Compare, contrast, and come to conclusion… so that you can get practicing putting two things against each other. You’re not going to have a rigorous argument if one side is lacking. [B1/Sci]

Before the CPD intervention, the science teachers in the three schools emphasised the priority of learning scientific facts over practising argumentation, but this view was not mentioned by the RE teachers:

I think they [students] do have opinions. But they actually need enough information to be able to argue their point and back it up with facts. [A1/Sci]

After a series of CPD workshops and collaboration, the scientists became more aware of the need for critical thinking apart from linking “opinions” to “information” to formulate a claim. Evaluating a claim using evidence is an extra level in their understanding:

It is about developing students’ own view, being able to justify why they have that view. […] If they look at the evidence, do they need to rethink their opinion? In that way, they’re learning the information and they're growing. And discussing it, talking to each other. [A2/Sci]

The social aspect of learning had little place in the science teachers’ initial accounts in the three schools. “Talking to each other” was an evident shift from this science teacher’s pedagogical objective on scientific “information”. Her more articulate response about using “evidence” to “justify” students’ views aligned with Toulmin’s insertion of data and warrant to validate a claim. This reflective comment fathomed how the science teacher appropriated her understanding of Toulmin’s argumentation and connected it with the social dimension of arguing-to-learn.

Meanwhile, recognising the potentials of arguing-to-learn means the teachers in both subjects were able to appreciate the broader value of argumentation as a generic skill outside the classroom:

Actually, how argumentation tied into life skills, was one of the things that I did pick up on. [B2/Sci] It just shows how argumentation as a skill. I guess it goes back to what [science teacher] said, it’s a life skill. [B2/RE]

Discussing argumentation also prompted the teachers to re-examine the nature of evidence in the two subjects and their convergence. The teachers illuminated what counts as evidence and explored its nuances between science and RE:

Different subjects might approach evidence from different ways. She’s [science teacher] seeing empirical knowledge only as evidence. I’m more open. I’m still trying to understand what is evidence in RE. [B2/RE] Some of the things I wrote down was definitely explicit input on argumentation in the CPD sessions, which did help to clarify exactly what it was because I think when it comes to that warrant, argument and evidence thing, in the science aspects of it, we look at evidence slightly differently. [B2/Sci]

Here, the teacher pair was examining the field-dependent rules in argumentation (Toulmin, 1958 ), i.e. what qualifies as evidence in scientific reasoning and how it compares with evidence in RE. The nature of evidence categorically defines the disciplinary domain of the two subjects. Before working together on argumentation, the teachers delineated how science and RE differentiated in terms of what count as evidence and a claim. For example, the RE teacher shared her views on how the two subjects diverge, “science is all based in facts that are proved or data that is provided. RE is about interpretation of texts to make conclusions”. This divergence was agreed by her science colleague prior to their collaboration:

Claims in RE can be backed by evidence but it does not get you closer to a truth about the claim. You can contest claims with a great deal more philosophical thought that evidence from text may not be able to counter. I think RE is more about presenting evidence on both sides of an issue and then giving your own opinion. In science you hope that your evidence brings you further to finding an uncontested logical reasoned fact about the nature of the observed world. [C1/Sci]

Interestingly, at the end of their participation, both teachers agreed that on the basis of argumentation, the two subjects have more in common than they had thought:

But there was maybe a preconception on our part, that we were looking at very different types of writing and evidence, using evidence to develop an argument. When we dug deeper, we realise that no, we are the same. [C2/RE]

The same “types of writing and evidence” the RE teacher was referring to exemplify the domain-general rule in Toulmin’s argumentation (van Boxtel & van Drie, 2018 ). It is noteworthy that all the teachers’ post-intervention understanding of argumentation should not be interpreted as corrections of their pre-intervention views. Instead, we argue that their understanding became more sophisticated or complex. Through argumentation as a conceptual model, their understanding of RE and science might have taken a different angle, for instance, by examining what counts as evidence in a specific subject, but a large part of their understanding about the subject might remain unchanged. Engaging in argumentation has also led the teachers to rethink how to teach science by encouraging pupil talk.

Teachers’ Views of Teaching Argumentation

Before the intervention, the science teachers lamented about the constraints of teaching science which made some of them hesitate about implementing argumentation:

The problem with science is that it's received knowledge and you don’t question it. There’s just so much factual stuff that you got to get into the little heads. […] This is constantly frustrating. [B1/Sci]

These comments on the science curriculum seem to relate to what the science teachers saw their role in teaching argumentation:

Students actually need enough information to be able to argue their point and back it up with facts. They need expert views, they need more than we know as classroom teachers. [A1/Sci]

This “expert views” showed a sharp turn after teaching collaboratively. Argumentative activity encourages students to explicate their scientific reasoning. This proactive process makes students’ potentials and difficulties visible. Students justifying and evaluating claims while organising the “factual stuff” prompted the teacher to assess understanding or misconceptions meaningfully:

It’s made me more aware of the fact that my kids might be thinking in other ways. So I've got to be more observant in the way in which they come to their conclusions. [B2/Sci]

This new avenue afforded by argumentation gave the science teachers confidence in adopting discursive pedagogy which engaged their students:

Sometimes I do allow room for discussions. I want them to find their voice in the whole knowledge being presented. I want them to become masters of their own views and of their own mind. [B2/Sci] Bringing RE into science does make it more relevant to the students. It does help… to bring their own opinions rather than just me giving facts and saying, “this is how it is”. I really liked how most of the activities I did seem to be so accessible for all ranges of abilities. […] When we did the argumentation type lessons, they were involved in it. [A2/Sci]

The changes towards a student-centred perspective were more noticeable amongst the science teachers and not as much on their RE counterparts. Yet, the RE teachers also reflected on their increased understanding about students’ learning through coordinating with science:

I’ve learned that I didn’t actually have full knowledge of what the students were studying in science. [A2/RE]

This gain of knowledge about students learning argumentation was echoed by her science colleague:

I didn’t realise just how much science was being taught in RE. It’s been really thought-provoking, really getting me to think about the pupils’ experience in school. [A2/Sci]

All teachers in the three schools agreed that teaching argumentation in RE and science helped them to link different subjects together and learning would become integrated:

If you can draw in things from other disciplines, students realise that everything fits together. […] It had benefit to the students […] there is cross fertilisation between different disciplines. [B2/Sci] It’s not just RE, not just science. Sometimes you bring something into the subject […] because RE pulls in lots of different things. [B2/RE]

Conjoining science and RE with other subjects would likely sharpen the teachers’ skills in cross-curricular learning which is a policy directive in many countries. Some teachers took the initiative to teach argumentation outside the target level and subjects of our research:

We now split into three different subjects. That’s an extra that they [students] were able to start those connections about how argumentation goes across the curriculum. [C2/RE]

Surprisingly, a few teachers also sustained teaching argumentation when coping with the challenges of teaching virtually due to Covid-19. Here is one example:

Back in lockdown, […] I literally had them in breakout rooms on Zoom, filling out one of these tables on literally point, evidence, explanation. [C2/RE]

Teaching argumentation in online classrooms was apparently beyond the teachers’ original intent when joining the study. Their adaptive experiences lend support to the versatile characteristics of argumentative activity reported in the literature.

Teachers’ Views on Collaboration

Prior to this study, the duos mentioned that they had had no or little experience in collaborating with teachers from a different discipline or subject:

We’re in a small school so [before this research] I don't collaborate with anybody . [C1/Sci] There’s no one like... I am on my own. [C1/RE]

In a collaborative partnership, the science or RE colleague became a useful resource which has enriched one’s own pedagogical repertoire:

I found it really, really interesting to look at how other subjects approach the topics, and how they set out their arguments. I did steal quite a few things from [RE teacher]. The collaboration was highly enjoyable. Because you get different perspectives. It makes life a lot more interesting. [RE teacher] and I disagree on quite a few things, quite robustly. But being able to have these conversations was lovely. [B2/Sci]

The professional exchanges brought fresh ideas and stimulated the teacher’s reverse thinking. Synchronising the focus on teaching argumentation in science and RE lessons has not only benefited student engagement but also the teachers’ pedagogical perspectives. The fruitful experiences motivated them to expand interdisciplinary collaboration in future:

I would definitely do it again. Probably with not just RE, but with some of my other colleagues, because we’ve got a lot of cross pollination between geography. […] That’s going to be a permanent change in insight, and how I think about what I need to do. [B2/Sci]

The successful collaboration affirmed the CPD programme principles which drew on teachers’ expertise to empower teachers’ agency in their pedagogical innovations:

This [teaching argumentation collaboratively] wasn’t something we were given to do. First of all we developed our own understanding, then we developed what it was that we were going to do so we owned that from the beginning. I think that also helped us with motivation. The fact that it was grown from us probably really helped it rather than anything else. [C2/RE]

All teacher participants enjoyed a high degree of pedagogical freedom to decide how they would collaborate. Over the course of the 18 months, no teachers were given a prescriptive scheme of work or materials to be replicated in any lessons. Neither was there any collaborative schedule to follow:

Maybe that was an advantage of all of it... it [the collaboration] became very specific to our needs; our school needs, our pupil needs, our learning needs. As opposed to kind of trying to shoehorn something you wanted into our school. [C2/RE]

The co-learner role adopted by the researchers also helped promote the sense of teacher ownership, which in turn increased the viability of implementing argumentation in different contexts.

Discussion and Implications

Despite decades of research on argumentation particularly in science education (Erduran et al., 2015 ), Toulmin’s argument framework is still an unheard topic to many teachers. The three pairs of teachers featured in this paper were no exception. By comparing the pre- and post-intervention interviews, we have demonstrated that the six teachers reflected remarkable changes in how they understood argumentation following the CPD programme. These changes are especially profound in what they thought about the properties of an argument, the nuances of evidence, and the epistemic nature of the two subjects. Compared to the RE teachers, the scientists recounted more changes in their views about how argumentation prompts students to back up scientific ideas with evidence. Their changing views of argumentation are quite surprising, considering that teachers’ professional beliefs are generally stable or resistant to change (Clarke & Hollingsworth, 2002 ; Gregoire, 2003 ); and tensions may arise in shared pedagogical practice which requires teachers to cross subject boundaries (Aalton et al., 2019 ). Our findings offer insights into how understanding of argumentation is more than adopting a new conceptual framework such as Toulmin’s because it constitutes a teacher’s epistemological beliefs about the subject and what counts as knowledge in that subject boundary (Brownlee et al., 2017 ; Capps & Crawford, 2013 ; Strouper, 2014 ). Developing this understanding requires expertise on the nature of the subject as well as theory of knowledge at a meta level. Toulmin’s argument pattern provided the science teachers with a theoretical model to define what is science and to inspect if that contrasts with RE.

An overview of the findings from the three schools suggests that the teaching of argumentation created an epiphany to the science teachers to a larger extent than their RE counterparts. Prior to the CPD programme, RE teachers expressed greater engagement with pedagogical strategies related to argumentation than science teachers in a questionnaire (Erduran et al., 2020 ). Our findings from interviews corroborated the relative reservation shared by many science teachers, which concurrently explains their pronounced changes. Before the intervention, science teachers in different schools stressed the importance of teaching scientific facts and prioritised exam-oriented strategies over developing argumentation. They maintained a disciplinary focus and mentioned very little about how the two subjects might be related. These conceptions are unsurprising and are not limited to science. Curriculum overloaded with content knowledge may confine teachers to fixed subject boundaries and restrict them from facilitating students’ inquiry skills (Adolfsson, 2018 ). After a series of CPD activities and implementing argumentation in the classroom, the science teachers realised the potential of argumentation as a generic skill (Cohen, 2018 ) and an exam skill because evaluation of data is part of the science syllabus in high-stakes examinations (Childs & Baird, 2020 ). The teachers started to focus on students’ reasoning while instilling scientific facts, thus stating “I’m not reverting back to just giving the facts” by one of the science teachers. This revelation echoed the claim that the teacher is a facilitator and not an authority in teaching argumentation (Zohar, 2007 ). Understanding how teachers themselves engage with argumentation is paramount to its adoption in science education because “one must experience what it is like to come to understand the big ideas in science and the nature of science before s/he can be receptive to imagining the possibilities for designing opportunities for students’ science learning” (Zembal-Saul & Vaishampayan, 2019 , p.168). Recent research has also shown that science teachers’ professional learning, their pedagogical content knowledge, and students’ understanding of scientific concepts are positively correlated (Yang et al., 2020 ).

The positive impact on the teachers’ views of teaching argumentation and collaboration is predominantly underpinned by the CPD programme designed for this study. The CPD programme was characterised by valuing teachers’ professional knowledge and judgement. This learning community consisting of teacher educators, researchers, and teachers was sustained by equity, inclusivity, and a shared goal of improving students’ thinking skills through interdisciplinary learning (Andrews & Richmond, 2019 ). Effective CPD programmes are usually those that are teacher-led, personalised, and congruent with teachers’ professional beliefs (Beisiegel et al., 2018 ; Noonan, 2019 ; Southerland et al., 2016 ). In this CPD context, the RE teachers were also a key professional resource for the science teachers, having reported using pedagogical strategies to support argumentation to a greater extent than the science teachers (Erduran et al., 2020 ). Before joining this research, all potential participants were well informed about the goals of the project, and the participation would involve co-teaching or co-planning lessons with a science or RE colleague. In the course of the research, the teachers were given considerable autonomy to collaborate in ways that would meet their specific needs. In each workshop, teachers were encouraged to share their different views or resources to exemplify a variety of collaborative styles and lesson designs. Interdisciplinary collaboration is growing in schools, and many policy initiatives have also urged for cross-curricular learning (OECD 2005 ; Ofsted, 2018 ). The experiences of collaborating with RE encouraged the science teachers to evaluate the relevance of argumentation to science education and the value of pupil talk. Future CPD promoting argumentation can be composed by teachers from various disciplines in one programme, for example, history teachers for their long advocacy of argumentation (Karras, 1993 ), and incorporate cross-curricular skills into the programme design.

By pairing up science and RE teachers and observing the outcomes in terms of changes in the teachers’ views, this paper contributes to the scarce literature that has involved both teacher cohorts in collaborative CPD. It sheds light on how science teachers’ learning can be supported through working with other subject teachers (Billingsley et al., 2020 ; Hardré et al., 2013 ). The teacher pairs identified an increasing intersection between science and RE, and such insight might have inspired their plan to collaborate with more subjects in the future. In this regard, the relational and contrary nature of the subject combination appears to be a distinctive feature (Edwards, 2017 ). Further professional development for science teachers should consider partnering with humanities or arts subjects to stimulate innovative pedagogical ideas or approaches.

Another contribution of this study is responding to the lack of argumentation research in RE. Although many RE curricular advocate an arguing-to-learn approach (Chan et al., 2021 ), argumentation in RE has been seriously under-researched. Future studies may explore its potential in RE in an array of faith and non-faith schools as well as curricular, though we argue that argumentation is a generic skill that is applicable to many subjects in different school contexts.

The paper raises questions about teachers’ learning when learning goals are shifted from learning subject/discipline knowledge to learning of the ways of reasoning in a subject, including “how claims are justified and validated, and what doing and engaging in discourse in the field entails” (Ball & McDiarmid,  1990 , p. 438; Capps & Crawford, 2013 ). It is interesting that through discussing evidence, both science and RE teachers revisited argumentation as a life skill and discovered a bigger reconciliation between the two subjects. If the purpose of education is to develop learners who will function and engage effectively in democratic societies in meaningful ways as future citizens (Gutmann & Ben-Porath, 2015 ), then the teaching of argumentation can serve this important function (Erduran & Kaya, 2016 ).

Certainly, the six teachers in this paper do not represent many science and RE teachers outside our sample, yet our findings provide some insights into the generalisability of argumentation to cross-curricular learning, based on which the common ground between science and RE also becomes revealable (Gauld, 2005 ). Our descriptive findings are exploratory in nature because research on argumentation in RE has been empirically tested through this science-RE teacher collaboration (Swedberg, 2020 ). The teachers’ accounts by the science-RE pairs can inform future design of professional development, especially if it involves epistemic or interdisciplinary learning. A limitation of the study is the small teacher sample selected. Furthermore, the validity of those views would have been strengthened had they been verified by other research instruments. On this note, future research on CPD impact can focus on classroom practices in a cross-subject context.

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge funding from the Templeton World Charity Foundation to OARS Project (Grant Number TWCF0238) awarded to Sibel Erduran as the Principal Investigator

Declarations

The authors declare no competing interests.

Publisher's Note

Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

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