The science behind creativity
Psychologists and neuroscientists are exploring where creativity comes from and how to increase your own
Vol. 53 No. 3 Print version: page 40
- Neuropsychology
- Creativity and Innovation
Paul Seli, PhD, is falling asleep. As he nods off, a sleep-tracking glove called Dormio, developed by scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, detects his nascent sleep state and jars him awake. Pulled back from the brink, he jots down the artistic ideas that came to him during those semilucid moments.
Seli is an assistant professor of psychology and neuroscience at the Duke Institute for Brain Sciences and also an artist. He uses Dormio to tap into the world of hypnagogia, the transitional state that exists at the boundary between wakefulness and sleep. In a mini-experiment, he created a series of paintings inspired by ideas plucked from his hypnagogic state and another series from ideas that came to him during waking hours. Then he asked friends to rate how creative the paintings were, without telling them which were which. They judged the hypnagogic paintings as significantly more creative. “In dream states, we seem to be able to link things together that we normally wouldn’t connect,” Seli said. “It’s like there’s an artist in my brain that I get to know through hypnagogia.”
The experiment is one of many novel—and, yes, creative—ways that psychologists are studying the science of creativity. At an individual level, creativity can lead to personal fulfillment and positive academic and professional outcomes, and even be therapeutic. People take pleasure in creative thoughts, research suggests—even if they don’t think of themselves as especially creative. Beyond those individual benefits, creativity is an endeavor with implications for society, said Jonathan Schooler, PhD, a professor of psychological and brain sciences at the University of California, Santa Barbara. “Creativity is at the core of innovation. We rely on innovation for advancing humanity, as well as for pleasure and entertainment,” he said. “Creativity underlies so much of what humans value.”
In 1950, J. P. Guilford, PhD, then president of APA, laid out his vision for the psychological study of creativity ( American Psychologist , Vol. 5, No. 9, 1950). For half a century, researchers added to the scientific understanding of creativity incrementally, said John Kounios, PhD, an experimental psychologist who studies creativity and insight at Drexel University in Philadelphia. Much of that research focused on the personality traits linked to creativity and the cognitive aspects of the creative process.
But in the 21st century, the field has blossomed thanks to new advances in neuroimaging. “It’s become a tsunami of people studying creativity,” Kounios said. Psychologists and neuroscientists are uncovering new details about what it means to be creative and how to nurture that skill. “Creativity is of incredible real-world value,” Kounios said. “The ultimate goal is to figure out how to enhance it in a systematic way.”
Creativity in the brain
What, exactly, is creativity? The standard definition used by researchers characterizes creative ideas as those that are original and effective, as described by psychologist Mark A. Runco, PhD, director of creativity research and programming at Southern Oregon University ( Creativity Research Journal , Vol. 24, No. 1, 2012). But effectiveness, also called utility, is a slippery concept. Is a poem useful? What makes a sculpture effective? “Most researchers use some form of this definition, but most of us are also dissatisfied with it,” Kounios said.
Runco is working on an updated definition and has considered at least a dozen suggestions from colleagues for new components to consider. One frequently suggested feature is authenticity. “Creativity involves an honest expression,” he said.
Meanwhile, scientists are also struggling with the best way to measure the concept. As a marker of creativity, researchers often measure divergent thinking—the ability to generate a lot of possible solutions to a problem or question. The standard test of divergent thinking came from Guilford himself. Known as the alternate-uses test, the task asks participants to come up with novel uses for a common object such as a brick. But measures of divergent thinking haven’t been found to correlate well with real-world creativity. Does coming up with new uses for a brick imply a person will be good at abstract art or composing music or devising new methods for studying the brain? “It strikes me as using way too broad a brush,” Seli said. “I don’t think we measure creativity in the standard way that people think about creativity. As researchers, we need to be very clear about what we mean.”
One way to do that may be to move away from defining creativity based on a person’s creative output and focus instead on what’s going on in the brain, said Adam Green, PhD, a cognitive neuroscientist at Georgetown University and founder of the Society for the Neuroscience of Creativity . “The standard definition, that creativity is novel and useful, is a description of a product,” he noted. “By looking inward, we can see the process in action and start to identify the characteristics of creative thought. Neuroimaging is helping to shift the focus from creative product to creative process.”
That process seems to involve the coupling of disparate brain regions. Specifically, creativity often involves coordination between the cognitive control network, which is involved in executive functions such as planning and problem-solving, and the default mode network, which is most active during mind-wandering or daydreaming (Beaty, R. E., et al., Cerebral Cortex , Vol. 31, No. 10, 2021). The cooperation of those networks may be a unique feature of creativity, Green said. “These two systems are usually antagonistic. They rarely work together, but creativity seems to be one instance where they do.”
Green has also found evidence that an area called the frontopolar cortex, in the brain’s frontal lobes, is associated with creative thinking. And stimulating the area seems to boost creative abilities. He and his colleagues used transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS) to stimulate the frontopolar cortex of participants as they tried to come up with novel analogies. Stimulating the area led participants to make analogies that were more semantically distant from one another—in other words, more creative ( Cerebral Cortex , Vol. 27, No. 4, 2017).
Green’s work suggests that targeting specific areas in the brain, either with neuromodulation or cognitive interventions, could enhance creativity. Yet no one is suggesting that a single brain region, or even a single neural network, is responsible for creative thought. “Creativity is not one system but many different mechanisms that, under ideal circumstances, work together in a seamless way,” Kounios said.
In search of the eureka moment
Creativity looks different from person to person. And even within one brain, there are different routes to a creative spark, Kounios explained. One involves what cognitive scientists call “System 1” (also called “Type 1”) processes: quick, unconscious thoughts—aha moments—that burst into consciousness. A second route involves “System 2” processes: thinking that is slow, deliberate, and conscious. “Creativity can use one or the other or a combination of the two,” he said. “You might use Type 1 thinking to generate ideas and Type 2 to critique and refine them.”
Which pathway a person uses might depend, in part, on their expertise. Kounios and his colleagues used electroencephalography (EEG) to examine what was happening in jazz musicians’ brains as they improvised on the piano. Then skilled jazz instructors rated those improvisations for creativity, and the researchers compared each musician’s most creative compositions. They found that for highly experienced musicians, the mechanisms used to generate creative ideas were largely automatic and unconscious, and they came from the left posterior part of the brain. Less-experienced pianists drew on more analytical, deliberative brain processes in the right frontal region to devise creative melodies, as Kounios and colleagues described in a special issue of NeuroImage on the neuroscience of creativity (Vol. 213, 2020). “It seems there are at least two pathways to get from where you are to a creative idea,” he said.
Coming up with an idea is only one part of the creative process. A painter needs to translate their vision to canvas. An inventor has to tinker with their concept to make a prototype that actually works. Still, the aha moment is an undeniably important component of the creative process. And science is beginning to illuminate those “lightbulb moments.”
Kounios examined the relationship between creative insight and the brain’s reward system by asking participants to solve anagrams in the lab. In people who were highly sensitive to rewards, a creative insight led to a burst of brain activity in the orbitofrontal cortex, the area of the brain that responds to basic pleasures like delicious food or addictive drugs ( NeuroImage , Vol. 214, 2020). That neural reward may explain, from an evolutionary standpoint, why humans seem driven to create, he said. “We seem wired to take pleasure in creative thoughts. There are neural rewards for thinking in a creative fashion, and that may be adaptive for our species.”
The rush you get from an aha moment might also signal that you’re onto something good, Schooler said. He and his colleagues studied these flashes of insight among creative writers and physicists. They surveyed the participants daily for two weeks, asking them to note their creative ideas and when they occurred. Participants reported that about a fifth of the most important ideas of the day happened when they were mind-wandering and not working on a task at hand ( Psychological Science , Vol. 30, No. 3, 2019). “These solutions were more likely to be associated with an aha moment and often overcoming an impasse of some sort,” Schooler said.
Six months later, the participants revisited those ideas and rated them for creative importance. This time, they rated their previous ideas as creative, but less important than they’d initially thought. That suggests that the spark of a eureka moment may not be a reliable clue that an idea has legs. “It seems like the aha experience may be a visceral marker of an important idea. But the aha experience can also inflate the meaningfulness of an idea that doesn’t have merit,” Schooler said. “We have to be careful of false ahas.”
Boosting your creativity
Much of the research in this realm has focused on creativity as a trait. Indeed, some people are naturally more creative than others. Creative individuals are more likely than others to possess the personality trait of openness. “Across different age groups, the best predictor of creativity is openness to new experiences,” said Anna Abraham, PhD, the E. Paul Torrance Professor and director of the Torrance Center for Creativity and Talent Development at the University of Georgia. “Creative people have the kind of curiosity that draws them toward learning new things and experiencing the world in new ways,” she said.
We can’t all be Thomas Edison or Maya Angelou. But creativity is also a state, and anyone can push themselves to be more creative. “Creativity is human capacity, and there’s always room for growth,” Runco said. A tolerant environment is often a necessary ingredient, he added. “Tolerant societies allow individuals to express themselves and explore new things. And as a parent or a teacher, you can model that creativity is valued and be open-minded when your child gives an answer you didn’t expect.”
One way to let your own creativity flow may be by tapping into your untethered mind. Seli is attempting to do so through his studies on hypnagogia. After pilot testing the idea on himself, he’s now working on a study that uses the sleep-tracking glove to explore creativity in a group of Duke undergrads. “In dream states, there seems to be connectivity between disparate ideas. You tend to link things together you normally wouldn’t, and this should lead to novel outcomes,” he said. “Neurally speaking, the idea is to increase connectivity between different areas of the brain.”
You don’t have to be asleep to forge those creative connections. Mind-wandering can also let the ideas flow. “Letting yourself daydream with a purpose, on a regular basis, might allow brain networks that don’t usually cooperate to literally form stronger connections,” Green said.
However, not all types of daydreams will get you there. Schooler found that people who engage in more personally meaningful daydreams (such as fantasizing about a future vacation or career change) report greater artistic achievement and more daily inspiration. People who are prone to fantastical daydreaming (such as inventing alternate realities or imaginary worlds) produced higher-quality creative writing in the lab and reported more daily creative behavior. But daydreams devoted to planning or problem-solving were not associated with creative behaviors ( Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts , Vol. 15, No. 4, 2021).
It’s not just what you think about when you daydream, but where you are when you do it. Some research suggests spending time in nature can enhance creativity. That may be because of the natural world’s ability to restore attention, or perhaps it’s due to the tendency to let your mind wander when you’re in the great outdoors (Williams, K. J. H., et al., Journal of Environmental Psychology , Vol. 59, 2018). “A lot of creative figures go on walks in big, expansive environments. In a large space, your perceptual attention expands and your scope of thought also expands,” Kounios said. “That’s why working in a cubicle is bad for creativity. But working near a window can help.”
Wherever you choose to do it, fostering creativity requires time and effort. “People want the booster shot for creativity. But creativity isn’t something that comes magically. It’s a skill, and as with any new skill, the more you practice, the better you get,” Abraham said. In a not-yet-published study, she found three factors predicted peak originality in teenagers: openness to experience, intelligence, and, importantly, time spent engaged in creative hobbies. That is, taking the time to work on creative pursuits makes a difference. And the same is true for adults, she said. “Carve out time for yourself, figure out the conditions that are conducive to your creativity, and recognize that you need to keep pushing yourself. You won’t get to where you want to go if you don’t try.”
Those efforts can benefit your own sense of creative fulfillment and perhaps lead to rewards on an even grander scale. “I think everyday creativity is the most important kind,” Runco said. “If we can support the creativity of each and every individual, we’ll change the world.”
How to become more creative
1. Put in the work: People often think of creativity as a bolt of inspiration, like a lightbulb clicking on. But being creative in a particular domain—whether in the arts, in your work, or in your day-to-day life—is a skill. Carve out time to learn and practice.
2. Let your mind wander: Experts recommend “daydreaming with purpose.” Make opportunities to let your daydreams flow, while gently nudging them toward the creative challenge at hand. Some research suggests meditation may help people develop the habit of purposeful daydreaming.
3. Practice remote associations: Brainstorm ideas, jotting down whatever thoughts or notions come to you, no matter how wild. You can always edit later.
4. Go outside: Spending time in nature and wide-open spaces can expand your attention, enhance beneficial mind-wandering, and boost creativity.
5. Revisit your creative ideas: Aha moments can give you a high—but that rush might make you overestimate the merit of a creative idea. Don’t be afraid to revisit ideas to critique and tweak them later.
Further reading
Creativity: An introduction Kaufman, J. C., and Sternberg, R. J. (Eds.), Cambridge University Press, 2021
The eureka factor: Aha moments, creative insight, and the brain Kounios, J., & Beeman, M., Random House, 2015
Creativity anxiety: Evidence for anxiety that is specific to creative thinking, from STEM to the arts Daker, R. J., et al., Journal of Experimental Psychology: General , 2020
Predictors of creativity in young people: Using frequentist and Bayesian approaches in estimating the importance of individual and contextual factors Asquith, S. L., et al., Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts , 2020
Recommended Reading
Contact apa, you may also like.
Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge?
- To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
- As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
- As a template for you assignment
Which is more important: creativity or knowledge? Find here the answer! This creativity vs. knowledge essay explains the relationship between imagination and intelligence and gives examples.
Introduction
- Creativity vs. Knowledge
Works Cited
Schools are institutions that are set up with the aim of impacting students with knowledge. This being the primary focus of most education systems, generating new knowledge through creativity becomes secondary to most scholars. This leads to the question of which, between knowledge and creativity, is more important? This question is more relevant to students in higher institutions of learning since this level of learning is developed enough to generate creative thinking, in addition to impacting students with knowledge.
Creativity Is More Important than Knowledge
As such, a college student should ponder on this question, considering that such a student is almost ready for the job market. As a college student, creativity is more important than knowledge since creativity allows one to explore ideas with no boundaries, it gives birth to innovation, and it provides room for developing practical solutions to real life challenges, unlike knowledge which is limited to one’s expertise and experience.
While knowledge is limited to one’s skills, creativity has no boundaries since it goes as far as one’s imagination can reach. Knowledge hardly goes beyond one’s training or experience in a certain field, whereas creativity/imagination follows intuition and transcends one’s acquired skills (Ox and van der Elst 84).
Creative minds do not necessarily focus on achieving good grades in school. This is because good grades do not always imply creativity; instead, good grades are usually a reflection of one’s knowledge in a given subject since schooling systems are more oriented on impacting knowledge than creating an environment that enhances creativity.
Knowledge is determined by set standards and systems, but creativity transcends these systems since a creative mind is more flexible and imaginative. With specific focus on great people like Albert Einstein, who came up with the laws of relativity, it is very clear that Einstein exercised more creativity than knowledge in coming up with the laws (Gardner 108).
Although it is acknowledgeable that his prior knowledge in the field of physical science created an environment for developing the laws of relativity, his sense of imagination was far much important than the acquired knowledge. It is for such a reason that college students should be more creative, other than just acquiring knowledge in their course of learning.
Creativity births innovation since it is not bound by experience, unlike knowledge that is limited to acquired skills and experience. Creativity encompasses the intrinsic motivation to pursue a certain interest, and this gives birth to innovation. Creativity allows college students to think in a flexible and imaginative way such that when a motivating environment is provided, students can end up creating very impressive solutions to problems. Global success is pegged on innovation.
Virtually every sphere of life in the current world is competitive in its own way. This calls for innovative minds in order to emerge successful (HR Focus 8). On the other hand, new ideas cannot be generated by relying on knowledge alone since knowledge is limited to the skills that are acquired through a formal or informal process of learning.
As such, creative thinking remains to be the solution to innovation in the current world. It is said that contemporary organizations are encouraging creative thinking as a way of remaining competitive. College students can supplement the existing gap in innovation by being more creative, in addition to being knowledgeable in their fields of study. To a college student, divergent and convergent thinking are a recipe for success, even outside college (HR Focus 8).
Creativity holds promise to providing solutions to the numerous challenges in the work environment and the larger society. Combining expertise with imagination, which encompasses flexible thinking, would help explore problems beyond the limited human understanding and develop effective solutions.
Colleges, among other institutions of higher learning, should offer the best platform for developing individual creativity. College students have the right environment to develop creativity since university-level education encourages individual learning more than pedagogical structured learning.
The wide access to information and elaborate interaction and networking available in colleges should ignite students to be more creative and become problem solvers. Moreover, college students should realize that they are under preparation for the great roles they will later play in the society, especially in their places of work (Livingston 60). For this reason, creativity is far much important than knowledge to a college student.
Combined knowledge and creativity can generate greater achievement, thus the importance of both cannot be underestimated. For instance, while someone like Einstein used imagination to come up with the laws of relativity, he also relied heavily on his immense knowledge of physical science to draft these laws (Gardner 104). Thus, while it is right to argue that creativity is more important than knowledge to a college student, it does not mean that knowledge has no place in fostering creativity.
In fact, it is right to argue that creativity is boosted by one’s knowledge, thus a very thin line exists between knowledge and creativity. Creativity comprises of expertise, flexible thinking and imagination, and motivation. Hope (39) acknowledges that creative potential is build over time and calls for consistent study with a particular goal in mind. The study must be focused on a specific field for creativity in that field to be developed.
This implies that knowledge must be acquired under certain structures, such as schooling structures, to develop creative potential. An environment that does not foster creative thinking kills creativity. In addition, creativity is developed by acknowledging knowledge in a particular field (Ox and van der Elst 84). As such, college students cannot afford to ignore the need for structured learning and pursue creativity solely. Such an approach may not give birth to creativity since creativity is built on knowledge.
The world today is need of creative and innovative minds for global success to be achieved, and creative college minds can meet this need. To a college student, creativity will help in thinking and developing solutions beyond one’s acquired knowledge and skills.
Moreover, creative college students will find relevance in the present work environment since they will be able to come up with innovations. This notwithstanding, it is important for college student to acquire knowledge since creativity in any field is catalyzed by accumulated knowledge in the field of study.
As a college student, imagination should be given a priority in the course of acquiring knowledge if one wants to be creative. Moreover, college education should foster flexible thinking and provide a motivating environment that will give birth to creativity. Creativity among college students should be encouraged than the sole pursuit for knowledge in order to develop solutions that are so much needed in the working world and the society at large.
Gardner, Howard. Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen Through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi . New York, NY: Basic Books, 2011. Print.
Hope, Samuel. “Creativity, Content, and Policy.” Arts Education Policy Review 111.2 (2010): 39-47. Print.
HR Focus. “Creativity and Innovation: Must-Haves for Global Success.” HR Focus News Briefs (2007): 8. Print.
Livingston, Larry. “Teaching Creativity in Higher Education.” Arts Education Policy Review 111.2 (2010): 59-62. Print.
Ox, Jack, and van der Elst Judith. “How Metaphor Functions as a Vehicle of Thought: Creativity as a Necessity for Knowledge Building and Communication.” Journal of Visual Art Practice 10.1 (2011): 83-102. Print.
- Habit 3 Put First Things First
- Revision of Problem Gambling
- Ethical Idealism in Science: A Look at Einstein's Legacy
- Whorf's linguistic relativity hypothesis
- Albert Einstein as an Influential Scientist
- Dementia Life Expectancy: Developed vs. Developing Countries
- State of Consciousness
- How Do We Live Justly with Others?
- How decisions reveal our identity
- Personal Responsibility: Students Mission and Plan
- Chicago (A-D)
- Chicago (N-B)
IvyPanda. (2018, December 11). Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge? https://ivypanda.com/essays/as-a-college-student-creativity-is-more-important-than-knowledge/
"Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge?" IvyPanda , 11 Dec. 2018, ivypanda.com/essays/as-a-college-student-creativity-is-more-important-than-knowledge/.
IvyPanda . (2018) 'Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge'. 11 December.
IvyPanda . 2018. "Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge?" December 11, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/as-a-college-student-creativity-is-more-important-than-knowledge/.
1. IvyPanda . "Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge?" December 11, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/as-a-college-student-creativity-is-more-important-than-knowledge/.
Bibliography
IvyPanda . "Which Is More Important: Creativity or Knowledge?" December 11, 2018. https://ivypanda.com/essays/as-a-college-student-creativity-is-more-important-than-knowledge/.
IvyPanda uses cookies and similar technologies to enhance your experience, enabling functionalities such as:
- Basic site functions
- Ensuring secure, safe transactions
- Secure account login
- Remembering account, browser, and regional preferences
- Remembering privacy and security settings
- Analyzing site traffic and usage
- Personalized search, content, and recommendations
- Displaying relevant, targeted ads on and off IvyPanda
Please refer to IvyPanda's Cookies Policy and Privacy Policy for detailed information.
Certain technologies we use are essential for critical functions such as security and site integrity, account authentication, security and privacy preferences, internal site usage and maintenance data, and ensuring the site operates correctly for browsing and transactions.
Cookies and similar technologies are used to enhance your experience by:
- Remembering general and regional preferences
- Personalizing content, search, recommendations, and offers
Some functions, such as personalized recommendations, account preferences, or localization, may not work correctly without these technologies. For more details, please refer to IvyPanda's Cookies Policy .
To enable personalized advertising (such as interest-based ads), we may share your data with our marketing and advertising partners using cookies and other technologies. These partners may have their own information collected about you. Turning off the personalized advertising setting won't stop you from seeing IvyPanda ads, but it may make the ads you see less relevant or more repetitive.
Personalized advertising may be considered a "sale" or "sharing" of the information under California and other state privacy laws, and you may have the right to opt out. Turning off personalized advertising allows you to exercise your right to opt out. Learn more in IvyPanda's Cookies Policy and Privacy Policy .
- Table of Contents
- Random Entry
- Chronological
- Editorial Information
- About the SEP
- Editorial Board
- How to Cite the SEP
- Special Characters
- Advanced Tools
- Support the SEP
- PDFs for SEP Friends
- Make a Donation
- SEPIA for Libraries
- Entry Contents
Bibliography
Academic tools.
- Friends PDF Preview
- Author and Citation Info
- Back to Top
Few things shape the human experience as profoundly or as pervasively as creativity does. And creativity raises a wealth of philosophical issues. Since art is such a salient domain of creativity, you might assume, at first, that the philosophy of creativity is the philosophy of art or aesthetics, or a branch thereof. But creativity invites questions of its own that go beyond the purview of those other fields.
Note that the adjective “creative” can be applied to three kinds of things: a person (“Beyoncé is creative”), a process or activity (“Tell us about your creative process”), or a product , where the latter is taken broadly to include an idea in someone’s mind or an observable performance or artifact (“That’s a creative design”).
Now suppose you are looking at a creative product, like a painting or sculpture. The philosophy of art may ask, “What makes this a work of art?” and aesthetics may ask, “What makes this beautiful?”. By contrast, the philosophy of creativity asks, “What makes this creative? Is it just that it’s new, or must it meet further conditions?” We may ask the same question not just of artworks but of any creative product, whether it be a new scientific theory, a technological invention, a philosophical breakthrough, or a novel solution to a mathematical or logical puzzle. Beyond creative products, we can ask about the creative process : Must it proceed without following rules? Is it conscious, unconscious, or both? Must it be an expression of the creator’s agency, and, if so, must that agency be exercised intentionally? Exactly how does the process manage to produce new things? Can it be explained scientifically? Furthermore, we can ask about creative persons, or more generally, creators. What does it mean for a person to be creative? Is it a virtue to be creative? What capacities and characteristics does a being need to have in order to be creative? Could a computer be creative? These are the kinds of questions animating the literature we’ll survey below.
Some of these questions have an empirical dimension, most obviously those which pertain to how the creative process is actually carried out. Thus, much of the research we’ll canvass falls under the inter-disciplinary umbrella of cognitive science, with contributions not only from philosophers but also from researchers in neighboring fields like psychology, neuroscience, and computer science.
1. The Philosophy of Creativity: Past and Present
2.1 challenges to the value condition, 2.2.1 surprise, 2.2.2 originality, 2.2.3 spontaneity, 2.2.4 agency, 2.3 is creativity a virtue, 3. can creativity be learned, 4. can creativity be explained, 5.1 preparation, 5.2.1 blind variation, 5.2.2 the default-mode network, 5.2.3 imagination, 5.2.4 incubation, 5.3 insight, 5.4 evaluation, 5.5 externalization, 5.6 worries and future directions, 6. creativity and artificial intelligence, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.
Given the significance creativity has in our lives and the deep philosophical questions it raises, one might expect creativity to be a major topic in philosophy. Curiously, it isn’t.
To be sure, some of the most prominent figures in the history of Western philosophy have been fascinated with creativity—or what we now call “creativity”. According to some scholars, the abstract noun for creativity did not appear until the nineteenth century—but the phenomenon certainly existed and many philosophers took an interest in it (McMahon 2013; Nahm 1956; Murray 1989; Tatarkiewicz 1980: chapter 8).
To name just a few examples: Plato (4 th century BCE) had Socrates say, in certain dialogues, that when poets produce truly great poetry, they do it not through knowledge or mastery, but rather by being divinely “inspired” by the Muses, in a state of possession that exhibits a kind of madness ( Ion and Phaedrus ). Aristotle (3 rd century BCE), in contrast, characterized the work of the poet as a rational, goal-directed activity of making ( poeisis ), in which the poet employs various means (such as sympathetic characters and plots involving twists of fate) to achieve an end (of eliciting various emotions in the audience). Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) and Émilie du Châtelet (1706–1749) championed the creative use of the imagination to pursue freedom, overcome prejudice, and cultivate natural abilities even despite social and political oppression . Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) conceived of artistic genius as an innate capacity to produce original works through the free play of the imagination, a process which does not consist in following rules, can neither be learned nor taught, and is mysterious even to geniuses themselves. Schopenhauer (1788–1860) stressed that the greatest artists are distinguished not only by the technical skill they employ in the production of art, but also by the capacity to “lose themselves” in the experience of what is beautiful and sublime (Schopenhauer 1859: Vol. I: 184–194 and Vol. II: 376–402). Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900) argued that the greatest feats of creativity, which he took to be exemplified by the tragic poetry of ancient Greece, was being born out of a rare cooperation between the “Dionysian” spirit of ecstatic intoxication, which imbues the work with vitality and passion, and the “Apollonian” spirit of sober restraint, which tempers chaos with order and form (Nietzsche 1872 [1967]). William James (1842–1910) theorized about creative genius exerts the causal power to change the course of history (Simonton 2018). This is just a glimpse of what each of these philosophers had to say about creativity, and many other figures could be added to their number.
Nevertheless, while some of the topics explored by earlier thinkers have come to occupy a central place in philosophy today—such as freedom, justice, consciousness, and knowledge—creativity is not among them. Indeed, “philosophy of creativity” is still a neologism in most quarters, just as, for example, “philosophy of action” and “philosophy of gender” were not too long ago. However, philosophical work on creativity has been picking up steam over the last two decades (as shown, for example, in a few important collections of essays: B. Gaut & Livingston 2003; Krausz, Dutton, & Bardsley 2009; Paul & Kaufman 2014; B. Gaut & Kieran 2018). We’ll now dive into those contributions, along with earlier work, beginning with what is perhaps the most basic question one can ask in this field.
2. What is Creativity?
As we noted at the outset, the term “creative” can be applied to three kinds of things: a person , a process , or a product (where a product could be an idea, performance, or physical artifact).
Most definitions focus on the product. According to one common approach, persons or processes are creative to the extent that they produce creative products, and a product is creative if it meets two conditions: in addition to being new it must also be valuable . Many theorists argue that novelty is not sufficient, because something can be new but worthless (e.g., a meaningless string of letters), in which case it doesn’t merit the compliment of being called “creative”. Immanuel Kant is often cited as anticipating this definition of creativity in his discussion of (artistic) genius. According to a common interpretation, Kant defines (artistic) genius as the ability to produce works that are not only “original”—since “there can be original nonsense”—but also “exemplary” (Kant 1790: §§43–50 [2000: 182–197]). (Hills & Bird [2018] challenge this reading of Kant.) This definition is so widely accepted among psychologists that it has come to be known as “the standard definition” of creativity in psychology. In practice, “creativity is often not defined” (J.C. Kaufman 2009: 19) in psychological experiments—more on this in §5 below. When psychologists do explicitly adopt a definition, however, they usually say that creative products are not only new, but also valuable in some way, though they variously express the product’s value in terms of its being “useful”, “effective”, “worthwhile”, “fit”, or “appropriate to the task at hand” (Bruner 1962: 18; A. J. Cropley 1967: 67; Jackson & Messick 1965: 313; Kneller 1965: 7; Cattell & Butcher 1968; Heinelt 1974; J.C. Kaufman 2009: 19–20; S.B. Kaufman & Gregoire 2016; Stein 1953; Sternberg & Lubart 1999: 3—for an overview, see Runco & Jaeger 2012). A few psychologists have suggested that the standard definition doesn’t fully capture the concept of creativity (Amabile 1996; Simonton 2012b). As for philosophers, at least one of them defends the standard definition with qualifications (Klausen 2010), but many of them challenge it, as we’ll soon see.
While it is uncontroversial that novelty is required for creativity, philosophers have refined that point. Certain examples may seem, at first, to suggest that novelty isn’t really necessary for creativity. Newton’s discovery of calculus was creative even if, unbeknownst to him at the time, Leibniz got there first—one of many examples of what are called “multiples” in the history of science (Simonton 2004). A beginning student’s idea that freedom is compatible with causal determinism might be creative even if, as she will soon learn, philosophers have been defending such “compatibilist” theories for millennia. However, examples like these do not force us to abandon the novelty requirement, but only to qualify it. Newton’s calculus and the student’s compatibilism were not new in all of history, but they were new to their respective creators, and that is enough for them to count as creative. In the terminology of philosopher Margaret Boden, these ideas are “psychologically creative” (P-creative) even though they are not “historically creative” (H-creative). Notice that P-creativity is more fundamental. Anything that is new in all of history (H-creative) must also be new to its creator (P-creative). Thus, creativity always exhibits psychological novelty, though it doesn’t always exhibit historical novelty.
Again, no one denies that a creative product must be new, at least to its creator. But as we’ll now see, some philosophers depart from the standard definition of creativity by rejecting the value condition ( §2.1 ), or by proposing some further condition(s) ( §2.2 ), or by doing both.
Some theorists have argued that although creative things are valuable, we shouldn’t build value into the definition of creativity, because doing so is not informative or explanatory:
Knowing that something is valuable or to be valued does not by itself reveal why or how that thing is. By analogy, being told that a carburetor is useful provides no explanatory insight into the nature of a carburetor: how it works and what it does. (Stokes 2008: 119; Stokes 2011: 675–76)
Those who maintain that value is required for creativity might reply that it doesn’t need to be informative or explanatory. Being a man is required for being a bachelor even though it’s not informative or explanatory to say that bachelors are men. Stokes notes that “creative” is a term of praise, and uses this point to argue that what is creative must be produced intentionally (since we don’t rightly praise what is unintentional or accidental)—an idea we’ll return to below. But the same point also seems to imply that what is creative must also have value (since we don’t rightly praise what doesn’t have value). And while the concept “carburetor” is value-neutral, as shown by the fact that a carburetor can be worthless or useless (if it’s broken), “creative”, one might argue, is a value-laden concept, like “progress”. Progress necessarily involves novelty or change, but we don’t praise change as progress unless it’s good change. Likewise, defenders of the value condition urge, creativity necessarily involves novelty, but we don’t praise novelty as creative unless it’s good novelty.
Other critics use counterexamples to argue that value isn’t necessary for creativity, the most prominent cases being ones of immoral creativity. (For a collection of essays by psychologists on the phenomenon of immoral or so-called “dark” creativity’, see D. Cropley et al. 2010). Putative cases of immoral creativity include creative accounting to cheat investors or creative testimony to mislead jurors, and the stock example in the literature is creative torture or murder. One can imagine novel and well-designed murders, as Thomas De Quincey once did in a satirical essay:
[S]omething more goes to the composition of a fine murder than two blockheads to kill and be killed—a knife—a purse—and a dark lane. Design, gentlemen, grouping, light and shade, poetry, sentiment, are now deemed indispensable to attempts of this nature. Mr. Williams has exalted the ideal of murder to all of us […] Like Æschylus or Milton in poetry, like Michael Angelo in painting, he has carried his art to a point of colossal sublimity. (De Quincey 1827; see also discussion in Battin et al. 1989)
Innovative ways of inflicting needless agony and craftily designed murders are not good (they have no value), and yet they can be creative. If this is right, then it seems to follow that creativity doesn’t require value.
One way of trying to save the value condition is by flatly denying that torture methods can be creative, and by denying more generally that creative things can be bad (Novitz 1999). But such denial seems ad hoc and implausible—“evil creativity” is not a contradiction in terms—and some have argued that this denial faces other problems besides (Livingston 2018).
Other theorists revise or qualify the value condition in order to accommodate examples of immoral creativity. Paisley Livingston (2018) proposes that a creative product only needs to be instrumentally valuable or “effective” as means to its intended end, regardless of whether that end is morally good, bad, or indifferent. Berys Gaut (2018) distinguishes between something’s being good (or good, period) versus being good of its kind . In his view, a new way of wielding blades and pulleys may be creative if it’s a good of its kind—good as a method of torture—even though it isn’t good. In order for something to count as creative, Gaut says, it doesn’t need to be good; it just needs to be good of its kind.
Alison Hills and Alexander Bird (2018) are unconvinced by such qualifications. They contemplate an elaborate torture device that ends up killing its victims immediately, “without enough suffering on the way”. The device may still be creative, they hold, even though “as a method of torture, it’s no good” (2018: 98). Indeed, they argue, a creative item needn’t be good in any way at all, not even for its creator. The ineffective torture device just described doesn’t satisfy its creator’s preferences, it doesn’t give him pleasure, it isn’t an achievement, it doesn’t contribute at all to his well-being—and yet, they contend, it may be creative, provided that it’s new and was produced in the right way. Exactly what “the right way” amounts to is the topic we turn to next.
2.2 Other proposed conditions
With or without the value condition, some theorists argue that a product must satisfy one or more further conditions, beyond being new, in order to count as creative. The four most prominent proposals are that the product must be (i) surprising, (ii) original (i.e., not copied), (iii) spontaneous, and/or (iv) agential. Each of these is a condition on the process of creativity. To be clear, we are still concerned with what it means for a product to be creative, but the proposals we’ll now consider say that in order for a product to count as creative, it must be brought about in the right way.
Margaret Boden holds that a creative product must be “ new, surprising, and valuable ” (2004: 1; cf. Boden 2010; 2014). It is perhaps most natural to assume that being surprising—like being new and valuable—is a feature of a product. But while Boden does think of creative products as surprising, her interest is more fundamentally in the underlying generative process, in how a creator manages to make something surprising. In her view, there are “three types of creativity”—combinatorial, exploratory, and transformative—“which elicit different forms of surprise, [and] are defined by the different kinds of psychological processes that generate the new structures” (2010: 1, italics added).
Combinatorial creativity occurs when old ideas are combined in new ways. Obvious examples include fictional hybrid creatures or chimeras: add wings to a horse (Pegasus), add the tail of a fish to a woman’s head and upper-body (a mermaid), add a lion’s body to a woman’s head and torso (Sphinx), and so on. Other combinations are found in analogies, such as when Niels Bohr compared an atom to the solar system. The term “combination” can refer either to the product of things combined or to the process of combining them, but Boden’s focus is on the process here, on the fact that one way to generate new ideas is to begin with old ideas and combine them in new ways.
To explain her other two kinds of creativity, Boden invokes the notion of a “conceptual space”, which is roughly a system comprising a set of basic elements (e.g., basic ideas or representations) as well as rules or “constraints” for manipulating or re-combining those elements. A conceptual space is not a painting, song, or poem, for example; it’s a way of creating a painting, song, poem, or theory. The rules or constraints are “the organizing principles that unify and give structure to a given domain of thinking”. And so a conceptual space is
the generative system that underlies that domain and defines a certain range of possibilities: chess moves, or molecular structures, or jazz melodies. (1994: 79)
We could think of a conceptual space as not just a set of thoughts but also a style of thinking defined by rules for generating new thoughts.
“Within a given conceptual space”, Boden observes, “many thoughts are possible, only some of which may have been actually thought” (2004: 4). Some conceptual spaces contain more possibilities than others. Consider different games. Tic-tac-toe is such a simple game that all of its possible moves have already been made many times over. The same is not true in chess, by contrast, which allows for a mind-boggling number of possible moves. The range of possible ideas is also practically inexhaustible in literature, music, the visual and performing arts, as well as the various domains of theoretical inquiry. And within those pursuits, there are various “structured styles of thought”—genres, paradigms, methodological orientations—which Boden thinks of as conceptual spaces.
Boden argues that the elements as well as the operating rules of a conceptual space can be, and in some cases have been, captured in computer programs. She has used this point not only to argue that computers can be creative (a topic we’ll return to below in §5 ), but also to suggest that we should employ the computational model of the mind in order to explain how humans create.
With her notion of conceptual spaces in hand, Boden says that exploratory creativity occurs within a given conceptual space. The new idea that emerges is one that was already possible within that space, because it was permitted by its rules. “When Dickens described Scrooge as ‘a squeezing, wrenching, grasping, scraping, clutching, covetous old sinner,’” Boden writes, “he was exploring the space of English grammar” in which “the rules of grammar allow us to use any number of adjectives before a noun” (Boden 1994: 79). Dickens’s description may strike us somewhat surprising, unexpected, or improbable, but it doesn’t have an air of impossibility about it.
By contrast, Boden argues, another form of creativity does. In this kind of case, the creative result is so surprising that it prompts observers to marvel, “But how could that possibly happen?” (2004: 6). Boden calls this transformational creativity because it cannot happen within a pre-existing conceptual space; the creator has to transform the conceptual space itself, by altering its constitutive rules or constraints. Schoenberg crafted atonal music, Boden says, “by dropping the home-key constraint”, the rule that a piece of music must begin and end in the same key. Lobachevsky and other mathematicians developed non-Euclidean geometry by dropping Euclid’s fifth axiom. Kekulé discovered the ring-structure of the benzene molecule by negating the constraint that a molecule must follow an open curve (Boden 1994: 81–3). In such cases, Boden is fond of saying that the result was “downright impossible” within the previous conceptual space (Boden 2014: 228).
Boden’s definition of creativity has perhaps been most influential among researchers who share her intertest in computer creativity (e.g., Halina 2021; Miller 2019: ch. 3; du Sautoy 2019). In a variation of Boden’s account, one philosopher proposes that what makes a mental process creative is not that it actually involves “the recombination of old ideas or the transformation of one’s conceptual space”, but rather that the creator experiences the process as having one of those features (Nanay 2014).
Maria Kronfeldner (2009; 2018) argues that the process of making something creative must exhibit originality . As she uses the term “original”, it does not simply mean “new”; instead, it has to do with the kind of causal process the creator must employ. She motivates her view by asking why it’s the case that, as we noted earlier, psychological novelty is required for creativity while historical novelty is not. Why is it, for example, that Newton’s invention of calculus was creative even if Leibniz invented it first? The answer, of course, is that it’s because Newton didn’t copy his calculus from Leibniz. Insofar as Newton came up with calculus independently, on his own, then he exhibited originality in his discovery, even though someone else got there first. This originality, Kronfeldner argues, is essential to creativity.
Kronfeldner (2009; 2018) also argues that spontaneity is required for creativity. An idea occurs spontaneously to the extent that it is produced without foresight or intentional control. If you were to foresee the output of the creative process at the beginning of that process, then you wouldn’t need any further process to come up with it. So if an idea is creative, you cannot have fully seen it coming. To that extent, insight comes as a surprise, hence the common phenomenological observation that creative breakthroughs feel like they come unbidden or out of the blue: “Eureka!”, “Aha!”, a lightbulb turns on.
Gaut (2018: 133–137) agrees that creativity requires spontaneity, and he points out, as Kronfeldner does, that it comes in degrees. He explains that you do something spontaneously to the extent that do it without planning it in advance. If you are going to act creatively, he argues, you cannot set out to follow an “exact plan”—a mechanical procedure, routine, or algorithmic rule—which would give you advance knowledge of exactly what the outcome will be and exactly the means you'll take to achieve it. At the outset of a creative act, you have to be to some extent ignorant of the end, or the means, or both. That ignorance opens up room for spontaneity and creativity.
Some philosophers argue that an item does not count as creative unless it has been produced by an agent. Consider a unique snowflake with an intricate shape, a distinctive sunset with stunning layers of red-orange hues, a novel patterning of dunes across a wind-blown desert. All of these things are aesthetically valuable and new. None of them are creative, however, insofar as they all occurred naturally and were not made by an agent. Gaut uses examples like these to argue that creative things must be created by agents (B. Gaut 2018: 129–30; cf. B. Gaut 2010, and B. Gaut 2014b) and several other philosophers agree (Carruthers 2006, 2011; Kieran 2014a, 2014b; Stokes 2008, 2011, 2014; Paul & Stokes 2018).
Of course, many theists would maintain that everything in nature is the handiwork of an agent—namely, God—and so arguably it would make sense for them to regard a natural phenomenon as creative if it is valuable and new. For theists, the unparalleled beauty of nature is a reason to praise the Creator. But this only supports the conceptual point that creativity, by definition, requires agency. We may coherently regard valuable new things as creative if we attribute them to a creative agent, as the theist does with the natural world; otherwise, we can’t. So again, it seems, creativity requires agency.
This leaves open the question of exactly how a creator’s agency must be exercised in order for the result to count as creative. Some philosophers argue that the agent’s act of creation must be intentional . Suppose you are snowboarding on a powder day and, unbeknownst to you, the tracks from your board result in a pleasing new pattern as viewed from high above. The new pattern has aesthetic value, but it isn’t creative. And that is because you didn’t intend to make it. Underlying this intuition, as well as our intuitions about the natural phenomena above, is the fact that “creative” is a term of praise, and we do not extend praise (or blame) for things that are not done by an agent, or for things that an agent doesn’t do in some sense intentionally.
While a number of philosophers endorse some version of the agency requirement for creativity, many theorists make no mention of it, whether to endorse it or reject it, including all of the psychologists cited above. Further, at least two philosophers are willing to attribute creativity to natural phenomena like trees and evolutionary processes: Arnheim (2001) and, in recent work, Boden (2018). These latter theorists don’t discuss agency as such, but insofar as the natural phenomena they call creative are not the result of agency, their view would imply that agency isn’t required for creativity.
The four proposals we’ve just considered all say that a product must arise from a certain kind of process—a process that exhibits surprise, originality, spontaneity, or agency—in order to count as creative. While there is wide agreement among philosophers that creativity requires some special kind of process, not just a special product, there is no consensus on what is required of the process. Of the four process conditions described here, the agency condition seems to be the one that is explicitly endorsed by the greatest number of philosophers thus far, though even they are still just a handful. And as we’ve seen, the other proposed conditions have serious arguments in their favor as well.
Some philosophers argue that if any process requirement is correct, this has an intriguing corollary for judgements about creativity: Even when we are explicitly judging only that a product is creative, we are implicitly assuming something about the process by which it was made. Suppose, for illustration, that the agency requirement is correct—that being generated through an agential process is built into the very concept of a creative product. Suppose further that you are applying that concept competently. It follows that if you come across a captivating arrangement of stones on the beach and you judge it to be creative, you are at least implicitly assuming that it was created through an agential process. If someone later persuades you that the stones happened to be moved into place by the wind and waves, not by any agent but just by chance, then you may still regard the result as aesthetically interesting but you would have to rescind your judgement that it is creative. So if the agency condition is correct, whenever you point to some item and say, “This is creative”, what you are saying, in part is, “This resulted from a creative process”. Furthermore, on this view, analogous implications follow if any other process condition is correct (Paul & Stokes 2018).
Having considered what is required for something to count as a creative product , and whether it must be produced by a certain kind of process , we now turn to analysis of the creative person .
Some theorists suggest that creativity, as an attribute of persons, is an ability to perform creative acts or produce creative things (Boden 2004). Others argue, however, that creativity isn’t merely an ability. An ability is something you can possess without ever putting it to use. You might have the ability to learn Swahili, for example, without ever making the effort to learn that language, despite having ample opportunities to do so. Creativity is different in this regard. If someone has the ability to be creative but never uses that ability when given numerous chances to do so, we would not call that person creative. Creative people are not merely able to act creatively. They are, moreover, disposed to exercise that ability, such that they do act creatively, at least some of the time, when the occasion arises. On this view creativity is a disposition , also referred to as a trait (Grant 2012; cf. B. Gaut 2014b, 2018).
Philosophers have long distinguished virtues as a special subclass of dispositions or traits. In Western philosophy, the tradition of theorizing about virtues goes back to the ancient Greeks, and over the last half-century it has enjoyed a renaissance in ethics (see entry on virtue ethics ) and, more recently, in epistemology (see entry on virtue epistemology ) and aesthetics (Lopes 2008; Roberts 2018; Hills 2018). Traditional examples of virtues include wisdom, justice, temperance, and courage. Should creativity be added to the list?
The answer depends, of course, on what it means for a trait to be a virtue. At the very least, a virtue is a trait that is good or valuable. So whether creativity counts as a virtue in this minimal sense depends on whether creativity is necessarily valuable, a point which is contested, as we saw in the previous section. In fact, those who contend that creativity isn’t necessarily valuable often do so in order to prove that it isn’t a virtue.
But let’s suppose for the sake of argument that creativity is indeed a valuable trait. Is it also a virtue in some more robust sense? Virtue theorists commonly take their cue from Aristotle’s classic discussion in the Nichomachean Ethics . Citing justice and temperance as paradigm virtues, Aristotle asserts that a trait must meet at least three conditions to count as a virtue:
For actions in accord with the virtues to be done temperately or justly it does not suffice that they themselves have the right qualities. Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when he does them. First, he must know [that he is doing virtuous actions]; second he must decide on them, and decide on them for themselves; and thrid, he must also do them from a firm and unchanging state. ( EN II.4, 1105a28–1105a33)
So, for example, if you return something you’ve borrowed, that act exhibits the virtue of justice if and only if (1) you know that you’re returning what you borrowed, (2) you choose to do so because it is the just thing to do, and for no other reason, and (3) you are disposed to do the just thing across the range of circumstances when the opportunity arises. In addition to justice and temperance, Aristotle enumerates other ethical virtues like prudence, generosity, and courage, as well as the intellectual virtue of theoretical wisdom. In his view, each of these traits requires one to meet the three conditions above. While he does not consider whether creativity is a virtue, we may ask whether creativity also has these three criteria. Does one have to meet these three requirements in order to count as creative?
We’ll begin with the third requirement to set it to one side. Does a person’s act count as creative only “if he does it from a fixed and permanent disposition of character”? Examples suggest otherwise. Consider the poet Arthur Rimbaud, who abandoned poetry at the age of 21 to pursue a life of adventure. The fact that he never produced another poem after that does not count against the fact that he was a creative poet in his youth (B. Gaut 2014b). Unlike the Aristotelian virtues, then, creativity does not have to be a permanent disposition.
Even so, it would still be significant if creativity turned out to be like an Aristotelian virtue in meeting the first two requirements. And arguably, creativity does meet the first requirement. A person doesn’t count as doing something creative unless “he knows what he is doing”. This was already implied by the agency condition for creativity discussed earlier.
Where things get interesting is with Aristotle’s second criterion for virtue. In order for your action to count as virtuous, he says, you have to do it “for its own sake”—i.e., you have to do it because you value virtue as an end itself, and not as a means to some external reward like praise, money, status, fame, or winning a competition. Consider the virtue of generosity, for instance. If you give money to someone in need merely because it will make you look good in the eyes of your friends, then you aren’t really being generous. Your act may outwardly look like generosity, but it’s not the real thing. To exhibit real generosity, you have to pursue generosity as an end in itself; you have to help others just for the sake of helping others. Now contrast being generous with being polite. If you compliment your colleague on the good work she’s done, then even if you’re doing this in order to manipulate her, you are being polite to her. You can have an ulterior motive for being polite. So politeness is not a virtue the way generosity is.
Is creativity a virtue in this respect? That is, does being creative require acting creatively for its own sake? Matthew Kieran’s (2014a, 2014b, 2018) answer is a qualified yes. While he grants that you can be motivated by external rewards to exhibit “minimal creativity” in producing valuable new things, he maintains that “exemplary creativity” requires you to be motivated by the value of creativity itself. Thus, in his view, exemplary creativity is a virtue.
To support this claim, Kieran points to a research program in psychology which purports to show that creativity is driven by “intrinsic motivation” rather than “extrinsic motivation”. A classic experiment in this program is “the magic markers study”, in which kids end up producing less creative drawings when they are offered a prize (Lepper et al. 1973). Many other studies have reported similar results, which lead Teresa Amabile to conclude, at first without qualification, that creativity is enhances by intrinsic motivation and hampered by extrinsic motivation (Amabile 1983: 107).
Further research introduced complications. In some studies, subjects were given “immunization techniques” whereby they were first primed or trained to focus on intrinsically motivating factors like the pleasure or aesthetical value of engaging in artistic activities, and it was found that when they engaged in those activities afterward, external rewards actually enhanced their creativity.
As researchers interpreted these findings, offering reward can support one’s intrinsic motivation, provided that the reward works either to boost one’s sense of agency or to provide useful feedback about what’s working and what isn’t. Intrinsic motivation is still what fuels creativity, on this interpretation; rewards help only indirectly, when they reinforce intrinsic motivation. This lead Amabile to revise her hypothesis as the Intrinsic Motivation Principle (IMP):
Intrinsic motivation is conducive to creativity; controlling extrinsic motivation is detrimental to creativity, but informational or enabling extrinsic motivation can be conducive, particularly if initial levels of intrinsic motivation are high. (1996: 107)
Kieran takes this as evidence for his claim that creativity, or at least what he calls exemplary creativity, requires intrinsic motivation and is therefore a virtue in that respect.
Objecting to this proposal, Gaut cites evidence that extrinsic motivation is not always detrimental to creativity. In one study, students in an introductory psychology class came up with more creative short story titles if they were offered a financial reward (Eisenberger & Rhodes 2001). In the studies where immunization techniques were used, proponents of IMP argue that rewards enhance creativity only indirectly, by buttressing intrinsic motivation. But in this case no such techniques were used, and so it seems the prospect of a reward enhanced creativity directly.
Further, Gaut argues that this point coheres with the role that rewards seem to play in so many real-world cases of creative achievement. In their quest to discover the structure of the DNA molecule, Watson and Crick were driven “to imitate Linus Pauling and beat him at his own game” (Watson 1968 [1999: 46]). Picasso and Matisse were both spurred on by their rivalry with each other (Flam 2003: 37). Paul McCready says he was driven to invent his award-winning human-powered glider in 1977 because he needed the prize-money to pay off his debts:
I felt that I didn’t have the time to mess with such things, but I had this strong economic motivation to take an interest in man-powered flight, so I charged around trying to figure out a way to solve it. (quoted in Sternberg & Lubart 1995: 242)
One historian argues that in World War II the Poles beat the French in cracking the Germans’ Enigma Code because they were more terrified of German invasion (Singh 1999: ch. 4). Gaut quips: “Fear of death is a more powerful motivator than the intrinsic satisfactions of code breaking” (Gaut 2014b: 196).
Finally, Gaut points out that even if IMP is true, it is only a causal, probabilistic claim: intrinsic motivation is “conducive” to creativity; extrinsic motivation is “detrimental”. But for a trait to be a virtue, intrinsic motivation must be conceptually necessary for the exercise of that trait. If we learn that someone gave to charity just to enhance his reputation, we conclude that he wasn’t really being generous. By contrast, if we discover that someone created gorgeous artwork just for the fame and glory, we may then lose some of our admiration for her creativity, but we do not deny that she was being creative.
Kieran could remind us that, in his view, intrinsic motivation is not required for all creativity, but only for the special form of it that he calls exemplary creativity. Anticipating this reply, Gaut says that to distinguish between two forms of creativity is just to concede his point. There are not two forms of generosity, one that requires intrinsic motivation and another that does not. If your act of giving isn’t motivated by the right kind of reason, then it doesn’t count as an act of generosity at all. Thus, Gaut argues, to grant the possibility of non-exemplary creativity is to grant that, unlike generosity, creativity isn’t a virtue in the traditional Aristotelian sense.
Another way to examine relations between creativity and virtue is through the lens of virtue epistemology. Linda Zagzebksi defines a virtue
as a deep and enduring acquired excellence of a person, involving a characteristic motivation to produce a certain desired end and reliable success in bringing about that end. (1997: 137, italics added)
While there is a lot packed into this definition, what we’ll pinpoint here is the idea that virtue involves reliable success in achieving a desired end, and that the agent who is epistemically virtuous, in particular, is one who is reliably successful in achieving knowledge. Knowledge requires truth, of course, so an epistemic virtue is a trait that is “truth-conducive”. Epistemologists typically regard a process as truth-conducive to the extent that the beliefs it produces are more often true than false. But Zagzebksi proposes that a process or trait may be truth-conducive in a different sense, insofar as it is necessary for advancing knowledge in some area, even if it produces a very small proportion of true beliefs. Creativity, she claims, is truth-conducive in this sense, and thus it qualifies as an epistemic virtue (1997: 182). Also note the emphasis on agency. In contrast to contemporary western epistemology, virtue epistemology identifies the agent (rather than, say her beliefs) as the essential locus of epistemic valence; it is the agent who is epistemically good (or not). This emphasis comports well with the proposal, discussed above, that the creator’s agency is necessary for genuine creative achievement. A virtue-theoretic approach thus illuminates what may (as we will discuss again later) be essential to creativity, namely, a process that non-trivially involves a responsible agent.
We’ve seen that even after we fix a specific referent for the term “creative”—whether it be a person, process, or product—there are lively disagreements about what it means. These debates often seem to presuppose that the term always expresses the same concept, for which we can seek necessary and sufficient conditions. But we’ve also seen that some theorists distinguish between different concepts of creativity, corresponding to different senses of the term “creative”. In future work we may see theorists develop such pluralistic approaches in more detail. The trick, though, will be to give principled reasons for multiplying different concepts of creativity so that the analyses do not simply reduce to saying that anything goes.
There is a long tradition of thinkers who answer no to the question above. Two of the most influential are from the eighteenth century—Edward Young and Immanuel Kant—who were concerned specifically with genius , the capacity for achieving the very highest levels of creativity. In Conjectures on Original Composition (1759), Young says,
An Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it rises spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows , it is not made …. (1759 [1966: 7])
His idea is that originality emerges naturally from something implanted in us by nature, and it can only be hindered by learning. Young seems to think of learning as proceeding either through imitation or through the following of rules, and both, he thinks, are detrimental to originality. Regarding imitation he writes,
Born Originals , how comes it to pass that we die Copies ? That meddling ape Imitation … destroys all mental individuality…. (1759 [1966: 20])
And insofar as learning is “a great lover of rules”, he warns that it “sets rigid bounds to that liberty, to which genius often owes its supreme glory” (1759 [1966: 13]).
Kant makes similar claims in his Critique of Judgment (1790). Like Young, he takes genius to be a natural capacity, though a very rare one:
such a skill cannot be communicated, but is apportioned to each immediately from the hand of nature and dies with him. (1790: §47 5:309 [2000: 188])
It certainly cannot be learned through imitation:
genius is entirely opposed to the spirit of imitation . Now since learning is nothing but imitation, even the greatest aptitude for learning, facility for learning (capacity) as such, still does not count as genius. (1790: §47 5:308 [2000: 187])
Nor can it be learned through rules, Kant holds, for genius is
the talent (natural gift) that gives the rule to art … the inborn predisposition of the mind ( ingenium ) through which nature gives the rule to art. (1790: §46 5:307 [2000: 186])
For Kant, a genius does not follow rules; a genius invents the rules, indirectly, by creating exemplary works from which other artists might extract rules and undertake “a methodical instruction in accordance with rules” (1790: §49 5:318 [2000: 196]).
Young and Kant are concerned with genius, specifically, but if we extend their reasoning to creativity in general, as Berys Gaut (2014a) has noted, we can discern two lines of argument:
The imitation argument All learning is a form of imitation. Imitating someone or something is incompatible with being creative. So, one cannot learn to be creative. The rules argument All learning consists in the following of rules. Following rules is incompatible with being creative. So, one cannot learn to be creative. (2014a: 266)
Gaut points out, first of all, that both arguments are invalid. In both cases, what the premises would entail is that learning cannot be creative, that, in other words, you cannot learn creatively (a claim about how you can learn). But even if that were true, it wouldn’t follow that you cannot learn to be creative (a claim about what you can learn). If you absorb the advice of a creative writing manual then this act of learning may not itself be creative. But if the manual is effective—and we’ll see in a moment how it can be—then what you will learn is how to become more creative.
Gaut also challenges the premises of these arguments. To start with the first premise of the imitation argument, it simply isn’t true that all learning proceeds through imitation, as we learn many things through direct experience, trial and error, and many other means.
The second premise is also suspect. Something superficially close to it is true: mere copying is incompatible with being creative. But to the extent that we learn from others by imitating them, this is not merely a matter of copying them. When a child learns to speak the language of those around her, she doesn’t simply parrot the exact same sentences she hears; she absorbs the vocabulary and underlying grammar in a way that enables her to form new sentences of her own devising.
Now for the rules argument. Contrary to the first premise, it cannot be the case that all learning consists in following rules, Gaut argues, because for any given rule there will be hard cases where it is unclear whether or how the rule applies to them, and so an individual still has to use her own judgment in applying the rule.
The second premise is false too. Recall the distinction from §3 above between two kinds of rules. An algorithm serves as an exact plan, specifying both the outcome and the path for getting to it in exact detail. In contrast, a heuristic is a looser “rule of thumb” that leaves room for an agent to exercise her own judgment, choice, and creativity in determining whether, when, and how to follow the rule. While algorithms, in this sense, may preclude creativity, heuristics do not, which is why, as we’ll see below, the teaching of creativity so often takes the form of heuristics.
There is a sense in which the question at hand can be answered empirically: We can show that creativity can be taught simply by pointing to cases where it has been taught. Gaut himself discusses such examples as they occur in mathematics and fiction writing, which we’ll turn to below. But while such cases may suffice to show that creativity can be taught, Gaut further enriches our understanding by explaining how this is possible . He does so partly by articulating and then debunking the imitation and rules arguments to the contrary. But in addition, he offers the following positive argument to show that creativity can be taught and learned. He calls it “the constitutive argument” because it begins with his view of what constitutes or defines creativity itself.
The constitutive argument
- Creativity is a disposition—involving both the ability and the motivation —to produce things that are new and valuable, and to do so in ways that express one’s agency through “the exercise of choice, evaluation, understanding, and judgment” (Gaut 2014a: 273).
- At least some people can learn to enhance their creative motivation .
- At least some people can learn to enhance their creative abilities .
- So, at least some people can learn to become more creative.
Premise 1 recapitulates the point we’ve already seen Gaut and others defend (in §2.3 above), that creativity is not merely an ability but a disposition or trait, whereby the creative person is disposed or motivated to exercise that ability when given the opportunity.
In support of premise 2, Gaut argues that you can strengthen both your intrinsic motivation to be creative (when you take pleasure in your creative activities), as well as your extrinsic motivation to be creative (when you are rewarded with praise, grades, pay, etc. for your creative efforts).
Defending premise 3, Gaut points out that you can develop your ability to produce valuable new things by practising and strengthening the relevant skills. And this development can be substantially aided by learning certain heuristics.
Heuristics are indeed a staple of education in creative pursuits from mathematics (draw the figure; consider special cases; consider extreme cases; generalize the problem; look for a related problem, etc.—see Pólya 1945; Schoenfeld 1982, 1987a, 1987b) to creative writing (write what you know; be specific and detailed in describing sensory experiences; practice seeing similarities between dissimilar things; show, don’t tell, etc.—see Bell & Magrs 2001; Anderson 2006; Maybury 1967; S. Kaufman & J. Kaufman 2009). Gaut also identifies several heuristics that might be used to foster creativity in philosophy, even among children (cf. M. Gaut 2010; B. Gaut & M. Gaut 2011).
With this last theme, Gaut has a kindred spirit in Alan Hájek (2014, 2016, 2017, 2018), who has independently proposed that by using various heuristics, philosophers can enhance their abilities to make valuable contributions to their field, including ideas that are distinctively creative. It has been said that anyone of average talent can become a strong chess player by learning and internalizing certain chess heuristics: “castle early”, “avoid isolated pawns”, etc. Analogously, Hájek suggests, philosophy has a wealth of heuristics— philosophical heuristics —although they have not been as well documented and studied. Sometimes these take the form of useful heuristics for generating counterexamples, such as “check extreme cases”. Sometimes they suggest ways of generating new arguments out of old ones, as in “arguments involving possibility can often be recast as arguments involving time, or space”. Sometimes they provide templates for positive arguments (e.g., ways of showing that something is possible). Hájek offers a catalogue of such philosophical heuristics to show that, contrary to a common assumption, creativity, even in philosophy, can be compatible with, and enhanced by, following rules.
Upon observing the work of creative people, it is natural to wonder: How do they do that? How do people create? The issue we turn to now is whether we could, at least in principle, answer this question scientifically, using the methods of modern empirical psychology and other cognitive and behavioral sciences. Those who take a negative stance on this matter are not merely saying that, in practice, it would be exceedingly difficult for science to explain creativity. They are saying that it’s altogether impossible that science could ever explain creativity.
Hospers (1985) defends this kind of pessimism based on the variety and complexity of creativity, given that creativity occurs not only in art, but in science, theorizing of any sort, engineering, business, medicine, sport, gaming, and so on. At least two worries may follow. First, given the complexity of any one of these individual domains, one might worry that there are simply too many variables to allow for a clear explanation. Art provides a paradigmatic example. Consider an artwork that you judge to be masterful (a sculpture, a painting, a film). Now imagine attempting to describe or identify all the reasons for which you think it is masterful. Take as much time as you like but, the skeptic will urge, any long description you construct will invariably strike you as woefully incomplete by comparison to the artwork, and the experience thereof. So, if the creative achievements of artists, in all of their complexity, cannot even be adequately described, we have little reason to think that such achievements can be explained.
How can theorists respond to these skeptical worries? Both the complexity and generalizability worries might be partially disarmed by noting analogies between creativity and other phenomena. For instance, consider the range of bodily movement involved in some of the very domains of activities listed above: art, science, engineering, medicine, sport. The kinds of bodily action specific to these domains are complex and vary dramatically: the relevant physical movements of the surgeon are much different from the tennis player. However, it is not plausible that this complexity and variety precludes explanation of bodily action in those domains. It simply implies that some features of the explanation will be context-sensitive, that is, specific to that domain of activity. And further to the analogy: the fact that the long description of, say, the tennis serve is incomplete does not preclude it from being apt and explanatory. If this line of reasoning is sound for bodily action, why not also for creative action?
At this point, one might argue that while complexity and generalizability worries would only show that creativity is difficult to explain in practice, the very nature of creativity implies, more strongly, that it could never be explained, not even in principle. Resources to support this kind of pessimism may be adduced from various past philosophers. We need to tread carefully, however, since most of the figures we are about to consider were writing long before the rise of the relevant sciences, so they could not have made any explicit claim either way as to whether creativity could be explained by those sciences. Nevertheless, some of them did make claims which entail, or seem to entail, that creativity simply isn’t the kind of thing that could be explained through scientific inquiry as we understand it today.
The classic expression of such a view comes from Plato. In his dialogues, Plato features his teacher Socrates as a spokesperson for his own views, and in the Ion he has Socrates argue that poets do not produce poetry through knowledge or skill. When you exercise a skill ( technē ), you apply techniques, rules, or methods to perform a given activity, like charioteering, fishing, or commanding an army. In principle, one could explain these activities by identifying the techniques they involve, and a student or apprentice could learn these activities by applying and practicing those techniques. But poetry is not like that, in Socrates’ view. A poet can only imitate the application of rules or techniques, mimicking the surface appearance of skill. Voicing an idea that was familiar in Ancient Greek culture, Socrates suggests that poetry emerges instead through divine inspiration, whereby a human being is inspired —literally “filled with a spirit”, with a god or goddess, with a muse:
You know, none of the epic [or lyric] poets, if they’re good, are masters of their subject; they are inspired, possessed, and that is how they utter all those beautiful poems. … [They] are not in their right minds when they make those beautiful lyrics, but as soon as they sail into harmony and rhythm they are possessed by Bacchic frenzy. […] For a poet is an airy thing, winged and holy, and he is not able to make poetry until he becomes inspired and goes out of his mind and his intellect is no longer in him. As long as a human being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy. […] You see, it’s not mastery [ technē ] that enables them to speak those verses, but a divine power. That’s why the god takes their intellect away from them when he uses them as his servants, as he does prophets and godly diviners, so that we who hear should know that they are not the ones who speak those verses that are of such high value, for their intellect is not in them: the god himself is the one who speaks, and he gives voice through them to us. In this more than anything, then, I think, the god is showing us, so that we should be in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but representatives of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them. ( Ion 534a-d)
Socrates repeats this view in the Phaedrus : “Some of the greatest blessings come by way of madness, indeed madness that is heaven-sent” (244a). He adds that while a poet may have some kind of skill, anyone who aspires to make poetry purely by skill, without the madness or the muse, will fail (245a).
It’s important to note that “madness”, for Plato, is a supernatural affair. From the vantage of contemporary behavioral science, we think of madness—or rather, mental illness—as a pathology arising from some combination of genetic and environmental factors, and those factors can be studied scientifically. So even if creativity is linked to mental illness—a highly controversial proposition—it could still be entirely within the scope of science. However, Plato’s talk of “madness” does not refer to any naturally occurring pathology, but rather to the result of divine intervention: the poet is taken over or “possessed” by the muse and that is precisely why he is “out of his mind”. Plato’s poet suffers divine madness.
According to this story, then, the person we call a poet isn’t really a creator of poetry, but is merely the vessel through which a divine being delivers poetry. If it is literally true that the source of poetry is supernatural, then poetic creativity could never be explained by science, which is limited to the investigation of natural causes. (For more on Plato, see Asmis 1992.)
This kind of supernaturalism has enjoyed a long afterlife in Western thought. In ancient Rome, the Latin term “ genius ” referred to a guiding spirit that was thought to accompany each person throughout their lives. The genius of an artist would occasionally deliver art through that person in the manner of Platonic inspiration.
Conceptions of the artist take a new turn when the idea of genius is transformed in the eighteenth century. As we saw above, Immanuel Kant defines genius as a natural capacity that a certain kind of artist possesses innately and which partly constitutes that artist’s identity. So rather than saying that a gifted artist “has a genius”, Kant says that such a person “is a genius”. What distinguishes the genius is fundamentally an imaginative capacity—an ability to engage in a “free play” of imagination to produce artworks of “exemplary originality”. These works are exemplary not only in the sense that they have artistic or aesthetic value, unlike “original nonsense”; they are also exemplary in the more radical sense of providing an exemplar—a new paradigm and precedent—for lesser artists to follow. A work of genius sets a new standard of artistic value, and, looking to that exemplar, lesser artists may then extract techniques or rules for their own craft. The genius therefore “gives the rule to art”. In creating such works, the genius does not follow any rules or methods. Instead the genius creates art through a “free play of imagination”—where the terms “free” and “play” characterize the nature of an activity unconstrained by any pre-established methods or rules:
[G]enius … is a talent for producing that for which no determinate rule can be given, not a predisposition of skill for that which can be learned in accordance with some rule …. (1790: §46 5:307–8; 2000 trans., 186)
Kant thought that genius, so conceived, is limited to the fine arts, poetry being chief among them. Meanwhile, in Kant’s view, there is no room for genius in science, for example, where good theories and hypotheses must emerge from the careful application of scientific method, and so he said that even Isaac Newton, “that great man of science”, was not a genius. We’ll soon consider why this view might seem to entail that creativity is inexplicable, but first it will be helpful to bring another figure, Arthur Schopenhauer, who was deeply influenced both by Kant and by Plato.
Like Kant, Schopenhauer thought of genius as a natural capacity that is limited to the fine arts. He also echoes Plato’s sentiments about madness, famously stating that “genius and madness have a side where they touch and even pass over into each other” ( The World as Will and Representation , 1859, WWV I: 190), and that “Genius lives only one storey above madness” ( Parerga and Paralipomena , SW 2:53, PP 2:49). In a state of madness, Schopenhauer’s genius is like Plato’s poet in experiencing a momentary loss of self, but what displaces the self is not any divine being but rather a pure Idea which seizes the author’s being and becomes the object of both his fascination and his artistic expression:
We lose ourselves entirely in this object, to use a pregnant expression; in other words, we forget our individuality, our will, and continue to exist only as pure subject, as clear mirror of the object, so that it is as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive it, and thus we are no longer able to separate the perceiver from the perception, but the two have become one, since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by a single image of perception. ( World WWV I: 178–179, §34).
With their focus on genius construed as a natural capacity, figures like Kant and Schopenhauer abandon the supernaturalism of the Platonic muse. Nevertheless, they retain the idea that creativity—specifically genius-level creativity in the fine arts—is not a matter of exercising a skill or applying given rules, methods, or techniques.
As we noted earlier, these figures did not and could not have explicitly denied that creativity could be explained by the sciences of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but they are commonly taken to represent such a denial (Kronfeldner 2018). Why?
Perhaps figures like Kant and Schopenhauer seem to make creativity, or at least creative genius, inexplicable insofar they suppose it to be innate and as they have no story to tell about how one came to acquire an innate capacity except to say that it was either an accident of chance (which is no explanation at all) or a gift from God (which again is not a scientific explanation). But while these figures seemed to think of artistic genius as being endowed entirely by nature with no contribution from nurture, modern genetic theory rejects that dichotomy. Instead of positing all-or-nothing natural abilities, behavioral scientists today think in terms of genetically inherited predispositions. In order for a genetic predisposition to develop into a trait with an observable phenotype, it needs to be triggered and shaped through a complex interaction between an organism’s genes and certain kinds of stimuli or environmental conditions. There are still open questions about exactly how, and how much, genes and environment feed into the development of any given trait, but it’s misguided to pose the binary nature-versus-nurture question as if the two were mutually exclusive (see Tabery 2014). Many researchers agree that some people have a stronger natural predisposition toward creativity than others, and that genius-level creativity partly stems from such a predisposition. Even so, the predisposition itself can be understood scientifically in terms of genetic heritability. (For a sampling of the relevant studies, see the essays collected in S.B. Kaufman 2013.)
Perhaps creativity seems inexplicable according to these accounts because it doesn’t follow rules or methods. In order to explain how to do something—how to build a boat or lead an army etc.—perhaps I need to be able to identify the rules or methods you should follow in order to practice and apply those skills. How-to explanations are instructions. But scientific explanations needn’t be instructions. A lot of good science explains how something happens—e.g., how heat melts ice or how a bat navigates its environment by echolocation—without explaining how to do it yourself.
Perhaps creativity seems inexplicable according to these accounts because creators themselves do not know how they create. But a scientific explanation needn’t be available through introspection. Most people cannot explain how their own digestive, circulatory, or perceptual systems work, but scientists who study those systems can.
Another line of thought is perhaps implicit in Kant but comes to the fore in Schopenhauer, who says that “the nature of genius consists precisely in the preeminent ability” to
consider things independently of the principle of sufficient reason , in contrast to the way of considering which proceeds in exact accordance with this principle, and is the way of science and experience. ( World WWV: I: 192, §36)
The principle of sufficient reason says that for every fact there is a cause which completely explains that fact. So the defining ability of genius is to see things in a way that transcends the causal order and defies all explanation.
A version of this view is defended more recently by Carl Hausman (1975 [1984], 1979, 1985) who frames it in terms of novelty that creativity involves. Hausman asserts that if a product is creative, it must be metaphysically novel (or in his terms, “genuinely novel”) in the sense that it cannot be predicted from, or explained by, prior events—not even in principle. Creativity is therefore incompatible with causal determination and causal explanation: “A causal view of explanation sets a framework for ways of denying that there is anything new under the sun” (Hausman 1984: ix). If something can be explained by prior causes, it is not metaphysically novel, and is therefore, in Hausman’s view, not truly creative.
Against Hausman’s skeptical charge, Maria Kronfeldner (2009) argues that creativity is compatible with causal determination. First, causal determinism does not preclude novelty or change. Determinism says the emergence of new kinds of things can at least in principle be predicted in advance. Importantly, though, when this prediction becomes true, then something new is added to the world. Of course, not all novelty instantiates creativity. The question is whether the kind of novelty involved in creativity must be metaphysical novelty, which is by definition incompatible with causal determination. This is doubtful. Notice that, by definition, metaphysical novelty defies natural laws. The production of something metaphysically novel would therefore require supernatural powers. Traditional Western religions conceive of God as performing the miracle of creation ex nihilo . But are we positing a miracle every time we describe a human artifact or achievement as creative? Surely not. As noted above, human creativity is manifest in things that are novel relative to the agent producing them or new to human history, but both of those kinds of novelty (psychological and historical) are perfectly compatible with causal determination. As Kronfeldner explains, creativity does not preclude causes in general; it only precludes certain kinds of causes. A creative product, she argues, must be original —which means that it cannot be produced through a process of copying something prior. And it must be spontaneous (not produced through a routine or mechanical procedure)—which means that it is to some extent independent of the agent’s intentional control and previously acquired knowledge. (For more on originality and spontaneity, recall §2.2 above). Intuitively, the causes of something creative cannot simply be a matter of copying or following a routine. But it may have causes nonetheless, and cognitive science can investigate those causes, at least in principle. Indeed, as we’ll see next, it is doing so in practice.
5. The Cognitive Science of Creativity
Although creativity has been relatively understudied by contemporary philosophers, as we noted in §1 , it has been receiving a great deal of attention from psychologists over the past few decades. In 1950, J. P. Guilford gave a presidential address at the American Psychological Association calling for research on the topic, and the field soon took off with waves of research investigating the traits and dispositions of creative personalities; the cognitive and neurological mechanisms at play in creative thought; the motivational determinants of creative achievement; the range of institutional, educational, and environmental factors that enhance or inhibit creativity; and more. Today, the blossoming of this field can be seen in the flurry of popular writing on its results; an official division of the American Psychological Association for the psychology of aesthetics, creativity, and the arts (Division 10); numerous academic conferences; dedicated peer-reviewed journals ( Psychology of Aesthetics , Creativity and the Arts ; Creativity Research Journal ; Journal of Creative Behavior ; International Journal of Creativity and Problem Solving ); special issues of journals ( Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences , Takeuchi & Jung 2019); literature surveys (Hennessey & Amabile 2010; Runco & Albert 2010; Runco 2017; Glaveanu 2014; Williams et al. 2016); textbooks (J.C. Kaufman 2009; Sawyer 2012; R. W. Weisberg 1986, 2006); and a comprehensive encyclopedia (Runco & Pritzker 2020). According to one overview, creativity has been studied by nearly all of the most eminent psychologists of the twentieth century, and “the field can only be described as explosive” (Albert & Runco 1999: 17). There is also a groundswell of new work on creativity in the fields of computer science, artificial intelligence (AI), and robotics.
The present section surveys empirical work in psychology along with some related work in neuroscience, while the next section ( §6 ) covers research in computing, AI, and robotics. Throughout, we’ll see that philosophers are actively in dialogue with these fields under the broad, interdisciplinary umbrella of cognitive science.
The vast body of empirical research of creativity can be seen as addressing a variety of issues, but the central question that concerns us here is the one we identified above as the challenge for explaining creativity: How are people creative? This question is analogous to a number of other questions in cognitive science: How do people perceive through sense modalities such as vision? How do they form concepts? How do they acquire a language? How do they make inferences? Just as psychologists investigate the psychological and neurological processes, systems, and mechanisms at work in these other mental operations, as well as the internal and external factors that either enhance or hinder these operations, they are doing the same for creativity. There is no pretension to achieving a complete explanation which would include each and every causal factor, and provide the basis for perfectly predicting creative outcomes in advance. But to the extent that we identify some of the relevant causal factors involved in creativity we thereby make progress in explaining creativity, just as we do with other features of the mind.
As we noted in §2 , the standard definition of creativity in psychology says that a product (idea or artefact) is creative to the extent that it is both new and valuable (“effective”, “useful” or “appropriate”), and, in turn, people and processes are creative to the extent that they produce new and valuable things. As we also noted, many psychologists do not actually employ this, or any, definition of creativity in conducting their research. In one sampling of studies of creativity published in peer-reviewed psychology journals, only 38% of them included an explicit definition of creativity (Plucker, Beghetto, & Dow 2004), as they rely in one way or another on the assumption that we know it when we see it. For example, many studies use the Consensual Assessment Technique (CAT), whereby experimental subjects produce things that are then rated for how creative they are by a panel of experts in the relevant field; so paintings are rated by professional painters, stories by published authors, etc. Many other research methodologies are used, as we’ll see below.
Empirical research on creativity departs in several ways from the traditional approaches that seemed to place creativity outside the scope of science. For starters, in stark contrast to Plato’s supernaturalism, empirical psychologists take creativity to be a completely natural phenomenon. Creative people may of course be “inspired” in the sense of feeling energized or filled with ideas, but rather than being literally “breathed into” by some god or muse, their thoughts and behaviors are presumed to have causes that are perfectly natural. While it is difficult in practice to identify these causes, they are not in principle beyond the reach of science.
Further, the range of phenomena that contemporary researchers countenance within the ambit of creativity is far broader and more diverse than the traditional focus on poetry and the fine arts, as creativity can be manifest in any kind of art or craft, as well as in the sciences, technology, entrepreneurship, cooking, humor, or indeed in any domain where people come up with ideas or things that are novel and valuable in some way or another. Departing from Kant, genius, the highest echelon of creativity, may be acknowledged in virtually any of these domains, not just in the fine arts. And while a few researchers (e.g., Simonton 1984, 1994, 1997, 2009; Root-Bernstein & Root-Bernstein 1999) venture to examine genius (so-called “Big-C” creativity), most of them focus instead on relatively ordinary creative feats (“little-c” creativity) including the kinds of story-making, drawing, and problem-solving that can be elicited on command from regular people in experimental settings. Some researchers propose that in order to understand how the mind generates new ideas, we should begin with even more rudimentary phenomena. For example, philosopher Jesse Prinz and psychologist Lawrence Barsalou focus on how we form new concepts to categorize the things we perceive, a process which they claim is creative, albeit in a “mundane” rather than “exceptional” way (Prinz & Barsalou 2002; Barsalou & Prinz 1997; cf. Child 2018).
Of course, many feats of human creativity, and the ones that are most interesting, go far beyond the basic formation of concepts. A major step toward explaining those feats is to recognize that what we call “the creative process”, as if it were a single, homogenous phenomenon, is in fact an assembly of multiple stages or operations. The simplest recognition of this fact is the Geneplore model which distinguishes just two stages: generating ideas and exploring ideas (Finke 1996; Smith, Ward, & Finke 1995). This distinction may be seen as echoing one made by philosophers of science in the early twentieth century, between the context of discovery and the context of justification (Popper 1934). Other theorists posit up to eight stages of creativity (for a summary of proposals, see Sawyer 2012: 89). But the most influential stage-theory traces back to Henri Poincaré’s lecture, “Mathematical Creation” (1908 [1913: 383–394]), in which he identifies four phases in his own innovative work as a mathematician:
- conscious hard work or preparation ,
- unconscious incubation ,
- illumination , and
- verification .
In his book, The Art of Thought (1926), the psychologist Graham Wallas endorses Poincaré’s four stages with corroborating evidence from the personal reports of other eminent scientists like Hermann von Helmholtz. Wallas’s scheme, as a development of Poincaré’s, is still the one that is most widely cited, and we employ a version of it here with some slightly different terminology and with two more substantive alterations: instead of “incubation”, we identify the second operation more generally as the “generation” of ideas, which may include unconscious incubation but may also occur in conscious, deliberate thought; and we add “externalization” for a total of five operations:
- Preparation —You invest a great deal of effort learning and practicing in order to acquire the knowledge, skills, and expertise required for work in a given domain.
- Generation —You produce new ideas, whether through conscious reflection or unconscious incubation.
- Insight —You consciously experience the emergence of a new idea, which would strike you with a feeling of surprise: “Aha!”, “Eureka!”
- Evaluation – You assess the idea to determine whether it should be discarded, retained, revised, or amended.
- Externalization —You express your idea in a concrete, observable form.
Artists provide compelling examples (though not the only ones) of each of these five operations. Such examples can be especially illustrative since they come straight from the artists’ mouths, as they reflect upon, and share, their creative process. The twentieth century painter Jacob Lawrence was known for painting in the style of visual narratives. Lawrence developed a system, much like a filmmaker’s storyboard, for the preparation of these paintings. He would lay as many as 60 wood panels on the studio floor, each with individual scenes and sometimes with captions. From these storyboards, Lawrence would generate and evaluate ideas and insights for a visual narrative, culminating in the paintings such as those in his Migration Series (see Whitney Museum, 2002, in Other Internet Resources ). Toni Morrison, the Nobel prize winning novelist, remarks on the labors and sustained effort required at the preparation, generation, evaluation, and externalization stages of a creative writing process. Commenting on her novel Jazz , she says,
I thought of myself as like the jazz musician—someone who practices and practices and practices in order to be able to invent and to make his art look effortless and graceful. I was always conscious of the constructed aspect of the writing process, and that art appears natural and elegant only as a result of constant practice and awareness of its formal structures.
She further notes that insight does not always come in a flash,
[I]t’s a sustained thing I have to play with. I always start out with an idea, even a boring idea, that becomes a question I don’t have any answers to. (T. Morrison 1993)
Writer Ishmael Reed claims that insight can come unexpectedly and in various contexts:
One can find inspiration from many sources. The idea of Japanese by Spring originated in a news item that claimed the endowment to a major university was traced to Japanese mob, the Yakuza. Flight to Canada began as a poem. The Terrible series began when I heard someone at party mention that there was a black figure, Black Peter, in the Dutch Christmas, and by coincidence I was invited to the Netherlands shortly afterwards, where I witnessed the arrival of Saint Nicholas and Peter on a barge that floated into Amsterdam with crowds looking on. I took photos of the ceremony …. (Howell 2020: 91)
And with signature profundity, James Baldwin suggested that all elements of the creative artistic process, from preparation to externalization, require a basic enabling condition: being (and willing to be) alone (Baldwin 1962).
As Wallas recognized (1926: 81), and as the above examples suggest, the “stages” of the creative process are not necessarily discrete steps that follow one another in a tidy sequence. Creative work is messy: over time you have numerous ideas, keeping some and abandoning others in multiple rounds of trial-and-error; you incubate new ideas for one problem while you’re busy externalizing your ideas for another; and your moments of insight, evaluation, and externalization trigger further generative processes that send you cycling through these operations many times over. It’s still important to distinguish these operations, however, because, as researchers are confirming, they are enabled and influenced by different causal factors.
Among the additional stages that researchers have posited, one of the most widely discussed is known as problem-finding. Psychologists often conceptualize creative thought in terms of problem-solving: the ideas generated within the creative process are seen as candidate solutions to a given problem—where “problems” are broadly construed to include any creative aim, like that of producing a particular kind of artwork or proving a particular theorem, etc. (Flavell & Draguns 1957: 201; Newell, Shaw, & Simon 1962). But following some early work by Mihalyi Csikszentmihalyi (1965), many researchers came to appreciate that a lot of creative work is done not just in solving problems but in finding the right problem to begin with (Abdulla et al. 2020; Csikszentmihalyi & Getzels 1970; Getzels 1965; Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi 1975). While we agree that problem-finding often plays a key role in creativity, we have not assigned it to a separate stage, for the following reasons. Consider that you might settle on a problem to work on in either of two ways. On one hand, you might choose a problem to work on from a pre-existing menu of options. In that case, your choice would fall under the evaluation phase; it’s just that the idea you select is a problem that calls for the pursuit of further ideas. If, on the other hand, you develop a new problem, you would thereby be engaging in the generation of a new idea—the new problem—which may emerge in a moment of insight . Einstein and his colleague celebrated the novelty in such problem-finding:
The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new possibilities, to regard old problems from a new angle, requires creative imagination and marks real advance in science. (Einstein & Infeld 1938: 92)
Either way—whether you “find” a problem by picking a pre-existing one or by coming up with a new one yourself—problem-finding, though important, does not need to be seen as an additional operation beyond the five listed above; it’s just a special case of generation, insight, or evaluation.
The next five sub-sections will respectively examine the five operations of creative work. Notice that three of them—preparation, evaluation, and externalization—are uncontroversially ordinary activities that involve no apparent mystery; it’s a challenge to explain them but no one is tempted to regard them as inexplicable or as violating the laws of nature. As we saw in §4 , traditional skepticism about the possibility of explaining creativity is really focused on the two remaining phenomena: the generation of new ideas ( §5.2 ) and the experience of insight whereby an idea seems to come out of the blue, as if from a god ( §5.3 ).
It’s myth that outsiders are more creative. To put yourself in a position to create anything of value, you have to spend a great deal of time and effort acquiring the relevant knowledge, skills, and expertise. In what has come to be called “the ten-year rule”, Howard Gardner (1993) found that, on average, people spend about 10 years learning and being immersed in a domain before they make any significant creative contribution to it.
Though a certain amount of rote learning is required, gaining mastery in a field is not simply a matter of passively absorbing information. Much of it involves what Anders Ericsson calls deliberate practice, where you focus on tasks which are a little beyond your current abilities, but which you eventually conquer through feedback and repetition. Across a variety of domains—including physics, medicine, programming, dance, and music—Ericsson found that, on average, world-class performance becomes possible for people only after 10,000 hours of deliberate practice in their chosen activity. This finding also converges on the ten-year rule, because if you engage in deliberate practice four hours a day, five days a week, that would add up to 10,000 hours in ten years (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Römer 1993; Ericsson et al. 2006).
However, there seems to be a point at which too much formal training can dampen creativity. Simonton (1984: 70–73) has reported that the relationship between creativity and education level is an inverted-U, as too much schooling can reinforce familiar, pre-established styles of thought. Even so, the point remains that, before you run into diminishing returns, years of preparatory learning and practice are required for exceptional creativity.
5.2 Generation
In this section we discuss four kinds of mental capacities or processes that researchers have posited for generating new ideas.
Psychologist Donald T. Campbell (1960, 1965) proposed that creative thought proceeds through “blind variation and selective retention (BVSR)”. The “variations” he refers to are the various ideas that might occur to a creator, and the process of generating them is “blind” to the extent that it is not guided or directed by prior knowledge of how valuable or useful they will be: “Real gains must have been the products of explorations going beyond the limits of foresight or prescience , and in this sense blind” (Campbell 1960: 92, emphasis added). Once ideas have been generated, however, there is a subsequent stage where the creator selectively retains some of those ideas while discarding others, and Campbell says this stage is “sighted” rather than blind since it is guided by the creator’s judgments as to which ideas are valuable. While there is little debate that selective retention is sighted in this sense, there has been more controversy over whether the initial production of ideas is, by contrast, blind.
In his prolific body of work, Dean Keith Simonton has extended and refined Campbell’s proposal. His work nicely illustrates the interdisciplinary nature of creativity research as he, like Campbell, is a psychologist who engages with philosophers, some of whom are broadly sympathetic to the BVSR theory (Briskman, 2009; Nickles, 2003), while others are skeptical (Kronfeldner 2010, 2011, 2018). In earlier writings Simonton suggested, in a way Campbell did not, that BVSR is to be understood on the model of Darwinian evolution (Simonton 1999a, 1999b). But Simonton (forthcoming: 2–3) has come to rescind the Darwinian framing of BVSR, conceding that it is misleading. Reprising Campbell’s core idea, he says that a process of generating an idea is blind to the extent that it is not guided by “the creator’s prior knowledge of the variation’s utility” (Simonton forthcoming: 5; cf. Simonton 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2018). He stresses that blindness is not all-or-nothing; it comes in degrees. An example of a highly sighted process is that of using the quadratic formula to find the roots of a quadratic equation: you know in advance that if you apply the formula correctly, it will yield the correct answer. Examples of relatively blind processes include remote association and mind wandering.
Despite the foregoing criticism of BVSR, recent neuroscientific studies suggest a network of brain activity that may serve the blind variation role. Brain activity doesn’t cease when one is not focusing on a task, when one is at rest, daydreaming, and so on. Following this insight, researchers have used neuroimaging methods to identify what is now called the default mode network (DMN). The precise anatomy of this network is still a matter of investigation, but it is supposed to be less active when one is focused on an external task (say a problem in the real world or in the lab) and more active when one is not so focused (Raichle et al. 2001; Buckner & DiNicola 2019). Notice then, that while this network is not creativity-specific—it is supposed to be active during memory recall, imagining future events, daydreaming, and so on—it does seem especially well-suited for creativity, and particularly for the random idea generation hypothesized by the BVSR (Jung et al. 2013). Creativity researchers in these fields often refer to this more “free” production of ideas as “divergent thinking”, and some argue on the basis of neuroimaging studies that creative thought requires cooperation between this mode of thought as well as that under “executive control”. As one team puts the point,
In general, we contend that the default network influences the generation of candidate ideas, but that the control network can constrain and direct this process to meet task-specific goals via top-down monitoring and executive control.. (Beaty, Benedek, et al. 2016; see also Mayseless, Eran, & Shamay-Tsoory 2015; Beaty, Seli, & Schacter 2019; Chrysikou 2019)
Notice how well this comports with both the Geneplore and the BVSR frameworks, perhaps identifying a way to keep some of the insights of both without commitment to a special creativity mechanism after all.
At least since Kant, theorists have identified an important link between creativity and imagination; indeed, the two are sometimes unfortunately conflated. Construed broadly, imagination can take various forms: sensory imagery, propositional imagination, supposition, free association. Berys Gaut (2003, 2009, 2010) and Stokes (2014, 2016) have both recently argued that, although imagination and creativity are distinct, imagination is especially well-suited to creative thought because of its characteristic flexibility. They both agree that imagination is decoupled from action (Gaut 2003) and “non-truthbound” (Stokes 2014) in the sense that, unlike belief, imagination is not limited by the proper function of accurately representing (some part of) the world. This freedom or playfulness of imagination is crucial to generating new ideas, since it allows one to safely “try out” hypotheses, conceptual combinations, strategies for solutions, and so on, without epistemic or behavioral commitment.
A series of studies illustrates both the need for non-truthbound capacities in creative thought, as well as the difficulty of employing them. When people—children and adults alike—are asked to imagine and draw non-existent houses, people, or animals, they depict things that are strikingly similar to their familiar counterparts in the real world: imagined people, for example, were generally drawn with some version of a head, limbs, eyes, and so forth. (Karmiloff-Smith 1990, 1992: 155–61; Cacciari et. al 1997; Ward 1994, 1995). This suggests that we are highly constrained in our creativity by the concepts we already have. Concepts of existing things are truth-bound: your concept of an animal, for example, has the proper function of accurately representing the range of things that are in fact animals. When you try to envision a new, fictional kind of animal, you begin with a mental image that exemplifies your existing concept of animal, which is why you are constrained by that concept. You then have to manipulate your initial image, varying its features in ways that abandon the aim of accuracy, using a capacity that isn’t truthbound. Generalizing this point yields the cognitive manipulation thesis , according to which creative thought requires cognitive manipulation, which involves thinking in ways that are not bound to the truth (Stokes 2014: 167). Plausibly, imagination is the mental capacity which is best suited to serve in this cognitive manipulation role. In the studies just cited, subjects must use their imagination to manipulate their existing concepts so as to form new ideas.
Recent empirical research on visual imagery seems to corroborate this claim. Various studies have identified positive correlations between creative problem solving and visual image generation, image transformation, and vividness of imagery (Finke 1990, 1996; Zemore 1995; R. Morrison & Wallace 2001; Pérez-Fabello and Campos 2007). A more recent study highlights the importance of image transformation ability—the ability to mentally manipulate a given image—and the ability to achieve high degrees of visual creativity. Further, the results of this study suggest that although vividness negatively correlates with the practicality of images created, vividness positively correlates with novel idea generation (Palmiero et al. 2015). The novelty involved is minimal, but again it appears that imagination, here in the form of imagery, well serves the role of cognitive manipulation.
Stokes observes further that we can voluntarily control imaginative states (in contrast with other non-truthbound states, like desires and wishes). And because imagination connects in important ways with inferential systems, as well as affective systems, the thoughts it produces can often be integrated with knowledge and skills to formulate an innovative strategy or solution to a problem. Finally, this role for imagination in creativity is not exclusive to the rich creativity of artists and scientists, but indeed seems to characterize the minimally creative behavior that we all enjoy. This claim is partly motivated by the empirical research just discussed. Here, as in the more radical cases, instances of novel achievement or learning by subjects requires more than rote memorization; it requires cognitive manipulation of the information in the relevant conceptual space (e.g., combining concepts about houses and persons). This kind of cognitive activity is best done by using the imagination.
Peter Carruthers has argued that imagination is important to creativity on evolutionary grounds (2002, 2006; see also Picciuto & Carruthers 2014). Like the above analyses, he focuses on the playfulness of imagination. Pretend play typically develops early in childhood in humans. And imagination in adults provides the right mechanisms for generating and exploring ideas (just as required by the Geneplore model). Carruthers argues that imagination evolves under adaptive advantage as a kind of practice for adult creativity—and may have been accordingly selected for, aligning with the putative creativity explosion of 40,000 years ago (Mithen 1996, 1998; Harris 2000). This, he argues, is the most parsimonious explanation of both the emergence and the ubiquity of creativity in the human species. See B. Gaut (2009) for a critique of Carruthers’ analysis.
While we may generate ideas consciously in imagination, we may also do so during a period of unconscious incubation, when we are focused on something else. This point is illustrated by any number of famous stories, though some are probably embellished after years of retelling. Isaac Newton witnessed an apple fall from a tree (on some accounts, falling upon Newton’s head) and thereby found the insight for his laws of gravity. August Kekulé is reported to have discovered the structure of the benzene molecule while daydreaming of a serpent circling upon and seizing its own tail. Henri Poincaré alleged that, while boarding a bus, he enjoyed a needed flash of insight that led to his discovery of non-Euclidian geometry. Richard Feynman, the Nobel prize winning physicist, claimed to find inspiration while sipping soda and doodling at adult clubs. And Einstein reported:
I was sitting in a chair in the patent office at Bern when all of a sudden a thought occurred to me. “If a person falls freely he will not feel his own weight”. I was startled. This simple thought made a deep impression on me. It impelled me toward a theory of gravitation. (Einstein, “Kyoto Lecture”, translated and quoted in Pais 1982: 179)
In each case, someone is suddenly struck with a flash of insight about one thing while engaged with something else entirely. The empirically-minded theorist rejects the notion that such ideas arise ex nihilo or through divine possession. So how are they explained in terms of natural mental phenomena?
Arthur Koestler, partly inspired by the work of Henri Poincaré (1908 [1913]), hypothesized that during creative thought processing, ideas are combined in novel ways, and this combination is performed largely unconsciously , by what Poincaré called the subliminal self (Koestler 1964: 164–5). For Poincaré there are only two ways we might think of the unconscious. One, we might think of the unconscious in Freudian terms, as a self capable of careful and fine discernment and, importantly, distinctions and combinations that the conscious self fails to make. Alternatively (and this is the option favored by both Poincaré and Koestler), we can think of the unconscious as a sub-personal automaton that mechanically runs through various combinations of ideas. Importantly, this unconscious process (or, if one likes, automaton) generates random conceptual associations and ideas. And these can then be further considered, examined, explored, and revised.
In the context of creativity in particular, there is precedent, or at least overlap, in Colin Martindale’s cortical arousal theory. This theory centers around the nature of focuses of attention (Martindale 1977, 1981, 1995, 1999; Martindale & Armstrong 1974; Martindale & Hines 1975). Martindale proposes a multi-stage model of problem solving, which if the right mechanism is possessed, leads to creative thought. In the initial stages, information is gathered, various approaches are taken to the problem, and there is a high level of cortical arousal with a narrow focus of attention. As information increases and the problem remains unsolved, two kinds of responses may occur. The first kind of response is to keep attempting the same solutions to the problem such that the arousal and attention focus stay high and narrow, respectively. Alternatively, some persons experience a decrease in cortical arousal coupled with a wider range of attention focus. Information then enters what Martindale calls primary processing: a kind of subconscious cognition not under the complete control of the agent. It is this kind of processing, and the arousal mechanisms that enable it, that distinguish creative insight or achievement from non-creative ones. The first kind of response typically results in frustration and failure (fixation), while the second often results in creative insight.
Some early studies on these phenomena centered around a familiar observation. Consider the tip-of the-tongue phenomenon, when you know that you know some bit of information (an actor’s name or the title of a song) but, try as you may, you just can’t recall it. It often helps to give up for a moment and allow the memory to surface without effort. Researchers found that the same approach—forgetting about a problem—works well to overcome fixation on ineffective ideas so as to allow the actual solution to pop up. Smith and Blankenship primed two groups of subjects with inappropriate or misleading solutions to problems. They left one group to continue struggling with the same problem, while they distracted the second group with a distinct but cognitively demanding task. The second group thereby overcame fixation and outperformed the first group when returning attention to the original target problem (Smith & Blankenship 1989, 1991; see also Smith, Ward, & Finke 1995).
These behavioral methods can be combined with contemporary understanding of neural plasticity and the effects of cognitive effort and attention. Neuroscientists have long recognized that the human brain is plastic —stable in genetic material but constantly undergoing functional change and development in neural networking in response to external stimuli, with the work of Donald Hebb in the middle of the twentieth century being one important early precedent. As Hebb put it, neural cells that “fire together, wire together”. Cell assemblies thus form as a result of the synchrony and proximity of the firing of individual cells.
[A]ny two cells or systems of cells that are repeatedly active at the same time will tend to become “associated”, so that activity in one facilitates activity in the other. (Hebb 1949 [2002: 70])
And continued attention to a problem, what some have called cerebral effort , causes changes in the networking of the brain’s cortex (Donald 2001: 175–8). Importantly, these changes can continue to take place, to “reverberate” even after one has removed attention from that problem. This motivates a simple (and somewhat unsurprising) hypothesis: attending to and performing cognitive tasks affects neural networking (Posner et al. 1997; Posner & Raichle 1994; see also Kami et al. 1995), and those changes can involve strengthening of synaptic connectivity (which correlate with conceptual connections and associations). These changes, again, can occur both when one is attending to a task and after one has diverted attention elsewhere. And, finally, the latter goes some way to explain a moment of insight after incubation (the so-called incubation effect): when one returns attention to the target problem, new or newly strengthened neural connectivity (as a result of previous cognitive effort) can give rise to a new idea. And because that neural process is not in any sense done by you, the emergence of the new idea can feel like a burst of insight (see Stokes 2007; Thagard & Stewart 2011; Ritter & Dijksterhuis 2014; and Heilman 2016).
There are also various recent studies on closely related topics: on mindwandering and spontaneous thought (Christoff et al. 2016; Irving & Thompson 2018; Murray et al. forthcoming), on so-called “divergent thinking” (Mekern et al. 2019), and more on the neural basis of insight (Jung-Beeman et al. 2004; Bowden et al. 2005; Limb & Braun 2008; Dietrich & Kanso 2010; Kounios & Beeman 2014).
It should be intuitive that creativity often involves solving problems and doing so in interesting or surprising ways. In exceptional cases, the individual identifies a problem solution that perhaps no one (including the creator) anticipated. But there are countless examples of more mundane instances of problem solving, where the solution may be surprising (or especially interesting) to only a few individuals, perhaps even only to the problem solver. One broad, standard experimental method used by researchers thus focuses on insight in problem solving. Some problems (thankfully!) can be solved by straightforward appeal to memory, or by applying some technique or method of calculation in a mechanical way. Solving the problem may still take time and effort, but the solution will come so long as one executes the appropriate strategy or applies the relevant knowledge from memory. An insight problem, by contrast, typically requires something new on the part of the individual, and one must often “change views” of the structure of the very problem. Predictably, there are a variety of definitions or characterizations of “insight” in the literature. Here are two recent, representative examples. Bowden et al. suggest that insight occurs
when a solver breaks free of unwarranted assumptions, or forms novel, task-related connections between existing concepts or skills. (Bowden et al. 2005: 322)
More recently, Kounios and Beeman write,
we define insight as any sudden comprehension, realization, or problem solution that involves a reorganization of the elements of a person’s mental representation of a stimulus, situation, or event to yield a nonobvious or nondominant interpretation. (2014: 74)
There are at least two, separable components of insight thus understood. First, an insight problem requires non-mechanical or non-algorithmic solution, and this in turn requires some kind of conceptual reorganization. A hackneyed phrase may come to mind here: one has to “think outside the box”.
The second element of insight as understood here is subjective or phenomenological. An insightful problem solution is often described as occurring suddenly and with little or no apparent effort. It is an aha moment, even if less dramatic than the traditionally romanticized Eureka moment. One way researchers have tested for this subjective feature is to ask subjects to report nearness or “warmth” relative to solving a problem. They find that for insight problems, by contrast to non-insight problems, subjects report that as they near solution they experience abrupt changes in the sense of warmth for solving the problem (Metcalfe & Wiebe 1987; see also Dominowski 1995; Laukkonen & Tangen 2018). More recently, researchers have begun to employ neuroimaging techniques to study insight and insightful problem solving (Luo & Niki 2003; Mai et al. 2004).
First, researchers have developed methods for using subjective report, where subjects rate whether they felt that they used insight in solving a designated problem (Bowden et al. 2005). And second, and coupled with those report methods, researchers have developed simple problems that can be solved with insight. One such example is the “Compound remote associates problem” (CRA). Here is an example of a CRA problem:
Each of the three words in (a) and (b) below can form a compound word or two-word phrase with the solution word. The solution word can come before or after any of the problem words. french, car, shoe boot, summer, ground [ 1 ] (Bowden et al. 2005: 324)
Because of their simplicity, these problems can be solved unambiguously and quickly, and with this speed comes better potential for neuroimaging study. In instances where subjects report insight solutions to these kinds of problems,
EEG shows a burst of high-frequency (gamma-band) EEG activity over the right temporal lobe, and fMRI shows a corresponding change in blood flow in the medial aspect of the right anterior superior temporal gyrus (Jung-Beeman et al. 2004). (Kounios & Beeman 2014: 78)
The question for neuroscientists is whether this convergence of evidence is sufficient to establish neural correlates of insight.
A moment of “insight” can be misleading, as what initially strikes you as a promising idea may ultimately turn out to be a dead end. You may have countless ideas in the course of undertaking a complex creative project, while only a few of them will make the final cut. A crucial part of your creative work therefore consists in evaluating your ideas. For any idea that occurs to you, you might have to ask: Will this work? Is it new? How does it fit in with other parts of your project? Do you have the resources and abilities to bring it to fruition? Is it worth the time and effort?
Much of the research on this phase of the creative process is concerned to identify and categorize the range of factors that people take into consider as they evaluate their ideas (Blair & Mumford 2007; Dailey & Mumford, 2006). Unsurprisingly, those factors vary from one domain to another. New culinary dishes are judged by factors like aroma, taste, texture, color, presentation (Horng & Lin 2009), whereas improved musical performances are judged according to their complexity, originality, and technical virtuosity (Eisenberg & Thompson 2003), and so on. Your understanding of the relevant factors is part of your internalized model of the domain (Bink & Marsh, 2000; Csikszentmihalyi & Sawyer 1995). And since you acquired and refined that model through years of preparation, your capacity for evaluation is largely a consequence of your efforts from that initial stage.
Somewhat more surprisingly, there is some evidence that people who are good at evaluating ideas are also good at generating them (Runco 1991; Runco & Dow 2004; Runco & Chand 1994; Runco & Vega 1990).
Other studies support what Sawyer calls Sawyer (2012: 131) calls the productivity theory, which says that the best way to get good ideas is to have lots of ideas and just throw away the bad ones. In historiometric studies, Simonton found that creators who yielded the greatest number of works over their lifetimes were mostly likely to produce works that were significant and stood the test of time. Even more striking, he discovered that, from year to year, the periods when creators were most productive were also the ones in which they were most likely to do exceptional work (Simonton 1988a, 1988b). Linus Pauling, who won the Nobel Prize in Chemistry in 1954 as well as the Nobel Peace Prize in 1962, summed up the productivity theory in a famous remark:
If you want to have good ideas you must have many ideas. Most of them will be wrong, and what you have to learn is which ones to throw away. (quoted by Crick 1995 [time 34:57])
The final operation of the creative process—externalizing ideas—may involve any number of disparate activities, which Keith Sawyer sums up as follows:
Creativity research has tended to focus on the early stages of the eight-stage creative process—particularly on the idea-generating stage. But a lot has to happen to make any idea a reality. Successful creators are skilled at executing their ideas, predicting how others might react to them and being prepared to respond, identifying the necessary resources to make them successful, forming plans for implementing the ideas, and improvising to adjust their plans as new information arrives. These activities are important in all creativity, but are likely to be even more important in practical domains such as technological invention and entrepreneurship (Mumford, 2003; Policastro & Gardner, 1999). (Sawyer 2012: 133–4)
It may be tempting to assume that the real creative work is finished once a new idea emerges in the moment of insight, and that externalization is just the uncreative, mechanical chore of making the idea public. But a closer look at the phenomenon reveals that externalization is often integral to creativity itself.
Vera John-Steiner (1985) interviewed, and examined the notebooks of, over 70 exceptional creators (ranging from author Anaïs Nin to composer Aaron Copland), and consulted the notebook of another 50 eminent historical creators such as Leo Tolstoy and Marie Curie. A recurring theme throughout was that at the beginning of each creative endeavor and continually throughout its development, creators manipulate and build upon their impressions, inklings, and tentative hunches using sketches, outlines, and other external representations.
Perkins (1981) corroborated this finding by analyzing the 61 sketches Picasso made en route to painting his famous work, Guernica , as well as Beethoven’s musical drafts and Darwin’s notebooks. In each case, the artist progressed by engaging with external representations.
Other studies found that people discovered and solved more problem when they used sketches during a task (Verstijnen 1997), and that people come up with better ideas for improving inventions when they work with visual diagrams (Mayer 1989).
One reason externalization is so vital to substantial creative work is because of our limited capacity to consciously hold and manipulate information in our minds. It helps to offload ideas and store them in the form of physical symbols and expressions in order to free up space for the mind to examine those ideas at arm’s length while entertaining new ones. Thus research shows that internal strategies like mental visualization can help with relatively simple tasks, but for more complex projects externalization is key (Finke et al. 1992: 60).
We close our survey of the cognitive science of creativity with a brief discussion of some general worries about current work, and some prescriptions for future research.
Some have worried about the validity of the psychometric measures employed in neuroimaging studies. One such concern regards the confidence that we should have that the tests employed are really tracking creative behavior. This is of course a general problem, partly symptomatic of the challenges that come with defining creativity (like other phenomena) and with the special challenges that attach to features such as insight and incubation. But there are particular challenges that come with using neuroimaging technologies such as fMRI scanning to attempt to study naturally occurring phenomena. Use of this technology is almost invariably ecologically invalid—one cannot run an fMRI in the artist’s studio. And because of the cost and sensitivity of these imaging systems, the correlative behavioral tests are often significantly abbreviated. This may impose constraints on space for occurrence of the target phenomena—novel thinking and insight—during the imaging session. As one researcher worries,
Too often single tests are used—or even single items! This is contrary of psychometric theory in general (where longer tests allow errors to cancel themselves out and are thus more reliable) and true of the research on creativity assessment in particular, where differences among items and even tests are common (Richards, 1976; Runco, Mohamad, & Paek, 2016 [sic should be Runco, Abdulla et al. 2016). Results from any one test will not generalize to other tests. Results from a single item of course have even less generalizability. (Runco 2017: 309–310; see also Abraham 2013)
Another empirical researcher criticizes what he sees as “the wild goose chase” in the neuroscience of creativity. Arne Dietrich (2019) recapitulates the above worries about validity of psychometric measures and their abbreviated and piecemeal application. He further worries about the now dominant emphasis on divergent thinking, and the default mode network (as well as the now mostly abandoned emphasis on notions such as madness, the right brain, and REM sleep). Dietrich’s concern in each case is that the research emphasis is unhelpfully myopic, and that while the imaging methods are sound and state of the art, the characterization of creativity is not. He decries the temptation to identify what may be a feature of creativity with the whole of the phenomenon. Divergent thinking, he suggests, is likely a cluster of various mental phenomena rather than a singular one, and
there is no effort underway to dissect divergent thinking and link it to the kinds of cognitive processes we use to operationalize all other psychological phenomena, such as working memory, cognitive control, semantic memory, perceptual processes, or executive attention. (2019: 37)
Notice, then, that the “wild goose” for Dietrich is to hastily conclude and then center studies around a singular, special creativity mechanism.
Dietrich also offers various prescriptions for remedy. To combat myopia, he suggests (as some have in other disciplines, e.g., Boden 2004) a plurality of types of creativity (and/or features of creativity). He cautions,
Since different types of creativity contain opposing brain mechanisms—focused versus defocused attention, for instance—any all-encompassing claim about creativity in the brain will almost certainly qualify as phrenology. (2019: 39)
He pairs this with a prescription for a more interdisciplinary approach to the topic. Others in the field have made the same prescription, advocating a “systems” approach sensitive both to the multi-faceted nature of creativity and the value of theorizing at multiple levels of explanation (Hennessy & Amabile 2010).
These directives for future research seem hard to resist. At the very least, it would seem advantageous to ensure that the full range of empirical method across the behavioral and brain sciences is communicated across the relevant sub-disciplines. This would ideally lead to better collaboration amongst such researchers. What’s interesting is that a cousin to this prescription is not well heeded by the same researchers advancing it here. However little crossover there is between, say, behavioral psychologists and neuroscientists in studies of creativity, there is comparatively even less crossover (almost none) between the psychological sciences and computational approaches to creativity. The next section thus begins by highlighting this “gap”, and identifying some of the potentially fruitful areas for interdisciplinary work on that front. It then continues with a discussion, generally, of research on creativity in the fields of computing science, artificial intelligence, and robotics.
Just as we find in psychology and neuroscience, there is a rich research literature on creativity in artificial intelligence and computer science, with devoted journals, special issues, and conferences ( The Journal of Artificial Creativity , The Journal of Creative Music Systems , Digital Creativity , Minds and Machines special issue on Computational Creativity [Gervás et al. 2010], The International Conference on Computational Creativity ). The question we focus on here is whether a computer could be creative . As background, it is worth considering how theorists approached the analogous question as to whether a computer could think .
Although theorists of various kinds have asked whether machines can think since at least the early modern period, the most important conceptual innovations on the topic came from Alan Turing, centering around his 1950 paper “Computing machinery and intelligence”. Here Turing provided a number of groundbreaking insights. Perhaps most familiar is Turing’s “imitation game”, now commonly known as “the Turing Test”. In brief, the test involved an unknowing interrogator who could ask an open-ended series of questions of both a human and a computer. If the interrogator could not distinguish computer from human, Turing postulated that this would suffice to illustrate genuine intelligence. There is no shortage of controversy regarding the aptness of the test for intelligence, and arguably no computer has yet passed it. (For more thorough discussion of Turing and the Turing test see entries on Alan Turing , Turing machines , and the Turing test ).
Successful performance in Turing’s game would require remarkable behavioral flexibility. And it is highly operational: specify a threshold for imitation, and then simply allow the interrogator to ask questions, then assess performance. If the behavior is sufficiently flexible to fool the interrogator, Turing claimed, the behavior was intelligent and, therefore, the computer intelligent.
With this background in mind, what are some of the cases in AI research lauded as success cases, and how do they align with some of Turing’s criteria?
Many of the familiar success cases are highly specialized. Deep Blue defeated chess master Garry Kasparov (Kasparov & Greengard 2017); some language processing systems managed to navigate social contexts such as ordering from a menu at a restaurant (Schank & Abelson 1977); AlphaGo more recently defeated the world champion Go player. This specialization is both a virtue and a limitation. On the one hand, achievement in such a specialized domain implies an exceptional amount of detailed memory and skill. On the other hand, this knowledge and skill does not generalize. Neither Deep Blue nor Alpha Go could successfully order from a menu, along with countless other basic human tasks. Put in terms of Turing’s imitation game, these systems would fail miserably to fool a human, or even remotely imitate one (except for their performance in a very narrow domain). What about systems such as IBM’s Watson , which famously won (against humans) on the television game show Jeopardy! This performance is more general, since topics on the show vary widely, and seemed to require both language comprehension and some minimal reasoning skills (see entry on artificial intelligence for extended discussion). Even so, Watson’s capabilities are still quite limited: it cannot make fluid conversation “in real time” and is largely insensitive to temporal and other factors that come with context.
There are many, many more examples of computational systems that display sophisticated behavior, from the highly specialized to the more general. On the language processing front, very recent AI systems such as OpenAI’s ChatGPT and Google’s LaMDA significantly outperform the systems described above. To be clear, these are remarkable achievements that display substantial complexity and, it appears in some cases, significant flexibility—features Turing highlighted in characteristically human behaviors. But this also underscores a distinction, often invoked by critics of artificial intelligence research. There is a difference between a computer’s displaying or merely imitating an intelligent behavior, and a computer’s instantiating intelligence through such behavior. And the critic will say, even if a computer behaves as if it is intelligent, this is just modeling or simulating intelligence. The greater ambition, though, is “genuine artificial intelligence”, a system that actually thinks. John Searle refers to this as the distinction between “weak AI” and “strong AI”, respectively.
- Weak AI : Could a computer behave as if it thinks?
- Strong AI: Could a computer genuinely think?
The general worry here is that however sophisticated a system’s behavior may appear “from the outside”, for all we know it may just be a “hollow shell” (Haugeland 1981 [1997]; Clark 2001). The worry has then been fleshed out in various ways by specifying what is missing from the shell, as it were. Here are three standard such candidates. And, again, in each case however sophisticated the computer’s behavior may appear it still may be lacking in any or all of the following. First, the computer may lack consciousness . Second, the computer may lack any understanding of the symbols over which it computes (Searle 1980). Finally, the computer may operate without caring about its own behavior or, as John Haugeland colorfully puts it, without “giving a damn”. In each case, any kind of response from the ambitious AI researcher encounters the substantial challenges that come with theorizing mental phenomena such as consciousness, understanding, linguistic competence, and emotion. (Turing 1950, for instance, recognized but largely eschewed these kinds of topics).
It’s one thing to ask whether computers could think, and another to ask whether they could be creative. And just as the prospect of artificial intelligence or thinking divides into two questions—of weak AI and strong AI—we may distinguish two analogous questions about artificial creativity, which we’ll refer to as the questions of “weak AC” and “strong AC”, respectively. To begin with the former:
- Weak AC : Could a computer behave as if it’s creative?
Something behaves as if it’s creative if it produces things which are psychologically new (new to that thing) and valuable . Arguably, a number of computers have already done that.
In the 1970s, Harold Cohen began using computational technologies to produce new drawings and paintings. The work of his computer painter, Aaron, has exhibited at galleries such as the Tate and the Victoria and Albert Museum in London. David Cope’s “EMI” (Experiments in Musical Intelligence) has composed musical works in the style of various known composers and styles, even a full-length opera. Some of these works have been recorded and produced by bona fide record labels. Just search “Emily Howell” on Spotify or Apple Music and give it a listen (Cope 1996, 2006). Simon Colton’s The Painting Fool is an ongoing project, involving a software that abstracts phrases, images, and other items from newspaper articles and creates collage-style pieces. It has also produced portraits, based on images of film characters, of the same individual in different emotional states (see Painting Fool in Other Internet Resources ; see Colton 2012 for theoretical discussion). Even more recently, there have been explosive developments in generative art systems like DALL•E, Midjourney, Stable Diffusion, VQGAN+CLIP. (For discussion see Paul & Stokes 2021). In all of these cases, the relevant outputs of the computer program are new relative to its past productions—so they are psychologically (or behaviorally) novel, which again is all the novelty that creativity requires. And although historical novelty isn’t required for creativity, it’s worth noting that these products appear to be to be new in all of history as well.
What about value? As noted above in §2.1 , some theorists reject the value condition, but even if value is required for creativity, that too is a condition these computer artworks seem to meet. Assessments of value can be controversial, but that is no less true for the outputs of human creativity. The fact that these works are critically acclaimed, showcased in prestigious galleries, and commissioned by selective record labels testifies to their artistic merit, and viewers find them pleasing, interesting, and appealing, even before being apprised of their unusual origin. So it is reasonable to conclude computer programs like the ones just described exhibit at least weak AC insofar as they produce works of valuable novelty, and one could cite many more examples in the same vein.
Some theorists have noted that, whether or not the original Turing test is a good test for intelligence or thinking, we might adopt an analogous test for creativity: If a computer can fool human observers into thinking that it is a human creator, then it is in fact creative (Pease & Colton 2011; see also Chen 2020 for useful discussion of artificial creativity, including many additional examples of particular cases, and so-called Dartmouth-based Turing tests). If we employ this test, we might find ourselves with an unexpected conclusion: computers can be creative; in fact, some of them already are. But one might reasonably worry that the test is inadequate and the conclusion is too quick (Berrar & Schuster 2014; Bringsjord et al. 2001). From the fact that a computer operates as if it’s creative, one might argue, it doesn’t follow that it really is. Which brings us to our next question:
- Strong AC : Could a computer genuinely be creative?
This obviously returns us to the question of what conditions something must meet in order to count as being genuinely creative. And here we need go beyond the outwardly observable product-features of novelty and value to consider the underlying processes of genuine creativity. As we saw in §2.2 , theorists have variously proposed that in order for a process to count as creative, it must be surprising, original, spontaneous, and/or agential. There is no consensus to appeal to here, but if any one of these conditions is indeed required for genuine creativity, then a computer could be genuinely creative only to the extent that it executes processes which satisfy that condition.
The classic statement of skepticism regarding the possibility of computer creativity is due to Lady Ada Lovelace who had this to say while remarking on “the Analytical Engine” designed by her friend Charles Babbage:
It is desirable to guard against the possibility of exaggerated ideas that might arise as to the powers of the Analytical Engine. The Analytical Engine has no pretensions whatever to originate anything. (Lovelace 1843, italics added)
Though Lovelace does not frame her comments in terms of “creativity” as such, she explicitly denied that a computer could satisfy at least one condition that is plausibly required for creativity, namely originality . A computer cannot be the originator, the author, or the creator of anything new, she contends; it can only do what it is programmed to do. We cannot get anything out of a computer that has not already been programmed into it. Further, Lovelace may also be interpreted as expressing or implying doubt about whether a computer could satisfy the three other proposed requirements for genuine creativity. Insofar as a computer’s outputs cannot be original, one might also suspect that they cannot be surprising . The image of a machine strictly following rules invokes precisely the kind of mechanical procedure that is the antithesis of spontaneity . And it may seem that such a machine could not be a genuine agent either. The problem isn’t just that a computer can’t produce anything original; it’s that it deserves no credit for whatever it does produce. Any praise or blame for the outputs of a computer rightly go to the engineers and programmers who made the machine, not to the machine itself. While these points may be intuitive, at least some of them are being challenged by modern technologies, which have come a long way since Babbage’s invention.
Consider AlphaGo again. This is a “deep learning” system, which involves two neural networks: a Policy network and a Value network. Very briefly: The system is trained using a vast number of legitimate moves made in actual games of Go played by professional human players (28.4 million moves from 160,000 games, to be precise; see Silver et al. 2016 and Halina 2021). The network is further trained, again using learning algorithms, by playing many games (some 100 million) against previous versions of itself (in the sense of a differently weighted neural network). The weights of nodes in the network are then adjusted by a learning algorithm that favors moves made in winning games. The value network is trained over a subset of these many games, with node weighting adjustments resulting in reliable probability assignments to moves vis-à-vis their potential to contribute to a win. Finally, the system employs a Monte Carlo search tree (MCT). Generally, this kind of algorithm is designed to simulate a decision process to optimize success given chosen parameters. In this case, the search algorithm selects a given path of moves, then adds some valid moves to this path, and then if this process does not terminate (end in win/loss), the system performs a “rollout”. A rollout essentially plays the game out for both players (using samples of possible moves) to its conclusion. The information that results from the MCT and processing by the value network are then fed back (back propagated) into the system. This entire process (once the system is trained) is rapid and determines how AlphaGo “decides” to move in any given game.
Here are some things to note. AlphaGo’s style of play is surprising . As commentators have noted, it is starkly unconventional relative to standards of human play (Halina cites Baker and Hui 2017 [ Other Internet Resources ]). Indeed, Lee Sodol, the world champion Go player defeated by AlphaGo in 2016, remarked that AlphaGo’s play revealed that much of human play is, contrary to prior common opinion, not creative after all—intimating that at least some of the play of AlphaGo is . Note further that this system is flexible. While there are learning algorithms and rules that adjust network weights, the system is not mechanical or predictable in the same fashion as earlier, classical systems (including Deep Blue , for example). In a recent paper, Marta Halina has made this argument (Halina 2021). She explicitly invokes Boden’s characterization, which requires novelty, value, and surprise of creativity. Again, the novelty and value should be plausibly attributed in this case. Regarding surprise, Halina suggests that it is AlphaGo’s employment of MCT that enables a kind of “insight”, flexibility, and unpredictable results. She writes,
It is the exploration parameter that allows AlphaGo to go beyond its training, encouraging it to simulate moves outside of those recommended by the policy network. As the search tree is constructed, the system starts choosing moves with the highest “action value” to simulate, where the action value indicates how good a move is based on the outcome of rollouts and value-network evaluations. (Halina 2021: 324)
Halina grants that given its domain-specificity, as we have already noted, this system’s particular abilities do not generalize in a way that may be required to properly attribute genuine intelligence. But she suggests that the complex use of the MCT search may amount to “mental scenario building” or, we might say, a kind of imagination. And insofar as this search algorithm technology can be applied to other systems in other domains, and imagination is a general component of intelligence, perhaps here lies space for generalizability. AlphaGo also affords at least some reply to the traditional Lovelace worry.
Artificial systems do not act only according to preprogrammed rules hand-coded by engineers. Moreover, current deep-learning methods are capable of producing systems that are superhuman in their abilities to discover novel and valuable solutions to problems within specific domains. (Halina 2021: 327)
If this is right, then AlphaGo exhibits originality . Finally, the flexibility with which this system operates may also satisfy Kronfeldner’s spontaneity requirement.
Some of these same features are found in a related approach in AI, namely research in evolutionary robotics. These systems also involve various forms of machine learning but in this case the learning is distributed, as it were, across a population of individuals rather than one individual. This approach can be understood, albeit imperfectly, as analogous to natural evolution. One begins, typically in computer simulation, with a population of agents. These agents are typically identified with individual neural networks, the connections and weightings of which are random to start. Relative to some task—for instance, avoiding obstacles, collecting objects, performing photo or phonotaxis—a genetic algorithm assigns a fitness value to each individual agent after a certain period of time or number of trials. Fitter agents are typically favored and used to generate the next population of agents. Also included in this generation are random mutation and genetic crossover (digital breeding!). Although it can take hundreds of generations, this is a discovery approach to engineering or constructing a system that successfully performs a task; it is “gradient descent learning” (Clark 1996). In this bottom-up approach, no single individual, nor even an entire population, are in any strict sense programmed. Rather, successful agents have “learned” as a result of generations of randomness, crossover, and small fitness improvements (and lots and lots of failures). Early success cases evolved robots that can follow trails (Koza 1992), locomote in insect-fashion (Beer & Gallagher 1992), guide themselves visually (Cliff, Husbands, & Harvey 1993), and collect garbage (Nolfi & Floreana 2000). See Bird and Stokes (2006, 2007) and Stokes and Bird (2008) for analysis and study of creativity in the context of evolutionary robotics.
These systems most certainly produce novelty. Later, fit individuals achieve novelty at their aimed task relative to whole generations and populations of previous agents. And this novelty is often surprising to the engineers and programmers that build them, indeed sometimes even unpredictably independent of any relevant task for individuals in the population. There are many examples in the literature. Indeed Lehman and others (2020) catalog a large range of cases where digital evolution surprises its creators, categorizing them in four representative groups: “mis-specified fitness functions”, “unintended debugging”, “exceeded experimenter expectations”, and “convergence with biology”. Here is one now relatively famous example of the first type of case. In early research in artificial life (A-Life), Karl Sims (1994) designed virtual creatures that were supposed to learn to walk (as well as swim and jump) in a simulated environment. The fitness function assessed individual agents on their average ground velocity across 10 seconds. Some of the fittest individuals to evolve were surprising: they grew tall and rigid and when they would fall over they would achieve high ground velocity, thus maximizing fitness given the (mis)specified parameters in unpredicted ways.
This is but one example of how systems like these can evolve in unpredictable or surprising ways. This unpredictability has occurred not just in simulated robotics, but in embodied robotics as well. In using a genetic algorithm to attempt to evolve oscillating sensors, researchers unintentionally evolved a radio antenna (Bird & Layzell 2002). This unexpected result arose from a combination of the particular algorithm used (which was intended) and various physical features of the space such as proximity to a PC monitor (which the researchers had presumably deemed irrelevant but which the evolved system, in a sense, did not). And one might be further inclined to describe some of these achievements as creative (and not just in the trivial sense that they are original instances of robotic success), since they also produce value, at least insofar as they are useful at performing a task, whether it is locomoting or locating a source of light or sensing radio waves.
Some theorists in this domain might argue that these systems achieve spontaneity as well. Given the substantial inclusion of randomness in the system’s development—both at the outset when the individual’s neural networks are randomized and more importantly with random mutation across populations—it is intuitive to describe the system’s as not following a mechanical procedure. Indeed, the way in which systems exploit fitness functions and data patterns further underscores this point. (Again, see the rich catalog of cases offered by Lehman et al. 2020).
On the face of it, then, recent technologies in AI, evolutionary robotics, and artificial life, seem to fulfill many of the conditions proposed for genuine creativity. These systems produce things that are novel and valuable, and do so through computational processes that are plausibly surprising, original, and spontaneous. The one requirement we have yet to address, however, is agency . Recall the suggestion, implicit in Lovelace’s remarks, that whatever a computer produces is to the credit of the programmer, not the computer. Notice that as sophisticated as current technologies in artificial creativity may be, presumably they are still not subject to praise or blame for what they do. If any beings are responsible for the work of these programs, it still seems to be the programmers and engineers who make them, not the programs themselves. The programs themselves do not seem to “give a damn”. So, if the creative process requires agency, arguably we have not yet created, programmed, or evolved a computational system that is really creative, however much they might appear to be. In the pursuit of strong AC, agency might be the final frontier (Paul & Stokes 2021).
It should be clear from the above discussions that there are rich and lively research programs, across a range of scientific disciplines, studying human creativity. These approaches substantiate the view that, contrary to the romantic tradition, creativity can be explained. Psychological functions and neural correlates have been identified, and remarkable advances are being made with computational and robotics technologies. What may be less clear is that, despite these advances, the distinct research programs in question are largely disjoint or siloed.
In a recent paper, Geraint Wiggins and Joydeep Bhattacharya (2014) highlight this “gap” between scientific studies of creativity. Their particular emphasis is on the gaps between research in neuroscience and research in computer science, and they advocate a bridge in the form of a neurocomputational approach. This kind of bridging may be called for even beyond what these authors prescribe, since there are gaps not just between these disciplines, but also between these and behavioral psychology, AI and A-Life research, and philosophical analysis. Creativity is a deeply complex and deeply important phenomenon. Fully understanding it will require us to integrate a variety of theoretical perspectives, and, as this survey reveals, philosophy has a vital role to play in that endeavor.
- Abdulla, Ahmed M., Sue Hyeon Paek, Bonnie Cramond, and Mark A. Runco, 2020, “Problem Finding and Creativity: A Meta-Analytic Review”, Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts , 14(1): 3–14. doi:10.1037/aca0000194
- Abraham, Anna, 2013, “The Promises and Perils of the Neuroscience of Creativity”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , 7. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00246
- Albert, Robert S. and Mark A. Runco, 1999, “A History of Research on Creativity”, in Sternberg 1999: 16–32. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511807916.004
- Amabile, Teresa, 1983, The Social Psychology of Creativity , (Springer Series in Social Psychology), New York: Springer-Verlag.
- –––, 1996, Creativity in Context: Update to the Social Psychology of Creativity , Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Anderson, Linda, 2006, Creative Writing: A Workbook with Readings , Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781315811932
- Aristotle, The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation , Jonathan Barnes (ed.), Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
- Aristotle, [EN], Nicomachean Ethics , Terrence Irwin (trans.), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2019.
- Arnheim, R., 2001, “What It Means to Be Creative.” British Journal of Aesthetics 41(1): 24–25. doi:10.1093/bjaesthetics/41.1.24
- Asmis, Elizabeth, 1992, “Plato on Poetic Creativity”, in The Cambridge Companion to Plato , Richard Kraut (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 338–364. doi:10.1017/CCOL0521430186.011
- Baldwin, James, 1962, “The Creative Process”, in Creative America, New York, NY: Ridge Press.
- Barsalou, Lawrence W. and Jesse J. Prinz, 1997, “Mundane Creativity in Perceptual Symbol Systems”, in Creative Thought: An Investigation of Conceptual Structures and Processes. , Thomas B. Ward, Steven M. Smith, and Jyotsna Vaid (eds.), Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 267–307. doi:10.1037/10227-011
- Battin, Margaret P., John Fisher, Ronald Moore, and Anita Silvers, 1989, Puzzles about Art: An Aesthetics Casebook , New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Beaty, Roger E., Mathias Benedek, Paul J. Silvia, and Daniel L. Schacter, 2016, “Creative Cognition and Brain Network Dynamics”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 20(2): 87–95. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.10.004
- Beaty, Roger E., Paul Seli, and Daniel L Schacter, 2019, “Network Neuroscience of Creative Cognition: Mapping Cognitive Mechanisms and Individual Differences in the Creative Brain”, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences , 27(June): 22–30. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.08.013
- Beer, Randall D. and John C. Gallagher, 1992, “Evolving Dynamical Neural Networks for Adaptive Behavior”, Adaptive Behavior , 1(1): 91–122. doi:10.1177/105971239200100105
- Bell, Julia and Paul Magrs (eds), 2001, The Creative Writing Coursebook: Forty Authors Share Advice and Exercises for Fiction and Poetry , London: Macmillan UK.
- Berrar, Daniel Peter and Alfons Schuster, 2014, “Computing Machinery and Creativity: Lessons Learned from the Turing Test”, Kybernetes , 43(1): 82–91. doi:10.1108/K-08-2013-0175
- Bink, Martin L. and Richard L. Marsh, 2000, “Cognitive Regularities in Creative Activity”, Review of General Psychology , 4(1): 59–78. doi:10.1037/1089-2680.4.1.59
- Bird, Jon and P. Layzell, 2002, “The Evolved Radio and Its Implications for Modelling the Evolution of Novel Sensors”, in Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC’02 (Cat. No.02TH8600) , Honolulu, HI, USA: IEEE, 2:1836–1841. doi:10.1109/CEC.2002.1004522
- Bird, Jon and Dustin Stokes, 2006, “Evolving Minimally Creative Robots”, in Proceedings of the Third Joint Workshop on Computational Creativity, 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence , Simon Colton and Alison Pease (eds), 1–5. [ Bird and Stokes 2006 available online ]
- –––, 2007, “Minimal Creativity, Evaluation and Fractal Pattern Discrimination”, in Proceedings of the Fourth International Joint Workshop on Computational Creativity , Amílcar Cardosa and Geraint A. Wiggins (eds), 121–128. [ Bird and Stokes 2007 available online ]
- Blair, Cassie S. and Michael D. Mumford, 2007, “Errors in Idea Evaluation: Preference for the Unoriginal?”, The Journal of Creative Behavior , 41(3): 197–222. doi:10.1002/j.2162-6057.2007.tb01288.x
- Boden, Margaret A., 1994, “What Is Creativity?”, in Dimensions of Creativity , Margaret A. Boden (ed.), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 75–117. doi:10.7551/mitpress/2437.003.0006
- –––, 1998, “Creativity and Artificial Intelligence”, Artificial Intelligence , 103(1–2): 347–356. doi:10.1016/S0004-3702(98)00055-1
- –––, 2004, The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms , second edition, London/New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203508527
- –––, 2010, Creativity and Art: Three Roads to Surprise , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
- –––, 2014, “Creativity and Artificial Intelligence: : A Contradiction in Terms?”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 224–244. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0012
- –––, 2018, “The Value of Creativity”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 173–193.
- Borcherding, Julia, unpublished, “Fancies and Illusions: Cavendish and du Châtelet on the Liberating Powers of the Imagination”, Philosophy, Cambridge University.
- Bowden, Edward M., Mark Jung-Beeman, Jessica Fleck, and John Kounios, 2005, “New Approaches to Demystifying Insight”, Trends in Cognitive Sciences , 9(7): 322–328. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2005.05.012
- Bringsjord, Selmer, 1994, “Lady Lovelace Had It Right: Computers Originate Nothing”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 17(3): 532–533. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00035718
- Bringsjord, Selmer, Paul Bello, and David Ferrucci, 2001, “Creativity, the Turing Test, and the (Better) Lovelace Test”, Minds and Machines , 11(1): 3–27. doi:10.1023/A:1011206622741
- Briskman, Larry, 1980, “Creative Product and Creative Process in Science and Art.” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 23(1): 83–106. doi.org/10.1080/00201748008601892
- Bruner, Jerome S., 1962, “The Conditions of Creativity”, in Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking , H. Gruber, G. Terrell, and M. Wertheimer (eds), New York: Atherton, 1–30.
- Buckner, Randy L. and Lauren M. DiNicola, 2019, “The Brain’s Default Network: Updated Anatomy, Physiology and Evolving Insights”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 20(10): 593–608. doi:10.1038/s41583-019-0212-7
- Cacciari, Cristina, Maria Chiara Levorato, and Piercarla Cicogna, 1997, “Imagination at Work: Conceptual and Linguistic Creativity in Children”, in Creative Thought: An Investigation of Conceptual Structures and Processes. , Thomas B. Ward, Steven M. Smith, and Jyotsna Vaid (eds.), Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 145–177. doi:10.1037/10227-007
- Campbell, Donald T., 1960, “Blind Variation and Selective Retentions in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes”, Psychological Review , 67(6): 380–400. doi:10.1037/h0040373
- –––, 1965, “Variation and Selective Retention in Socio-Cultural Evolution”, in Social Change in Developing Areas : A Reinterpretation of Evolutionary Theory , H.R. Barringer, G.I. Blanksten, and R.W. Mack (eds), Cambridge, MA: Schenkman, 19–49.
- Carruthers, Peter, 2002, “Human Creativity: Its Cognitive Basis, Its Evolution, and Its Connections with Childhood Pretence”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 53(2): 225–249. doi:10.1093/bjps/53.2.225
- –––, 2006, The Architecture of the Mind: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought , Oxford: Clarendon Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207077.001.0001
- –––, 2011, “Creative Action in Mind”, Philosophical Psychology , 24(4): 437–461. doi:10.1080/09515089.2011.556609
- –––, 2020, “Mechanisms for Constrained Stochasticity”, Synthese , 197(10): 4455–4473. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01933-9
- Cattell, Raymond B. and Harold John Butcher, 1968, The Prediction of Achievement and Creativity , Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill.
- Chen, Melvin, 2020, “Imagination Machines, Dartmouth-Based Turing Tests, & a Potted History of Responses”, AI and Society , 35(1): 283–287. doi:10.1007/s00146-018-0855-3
- Child, William, 2018, “Wittgenstein, Seeing-As, and Novelty”, in Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-As and Novelty , Michael Beaney, Dominic Shaw, and Brendan Harrington (eds), New York: Routledge, 29–48.
- Christoff, Kalina, Zachary C. Irving, Kieran C. R. Fox, R. Nathan Spreng, and Jessica R. Andrews-Hanna, 2016, “Mind-Wandering as Spontaneous Thought: A Dynamic Framework”, Nature Reviews Neuroscience , 17(11): 718–731. doi:10.1038/nrn.2016.113
- Chrysikou, Evangelia G, 2019, “Creativity in and out of (Cognitive) Control”, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences , 27(June): 94–99. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.09.014
- Clark, Andy, 1996, Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- –––, 2001, Mindware , New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cliff, Dave, Phil Husbands, and Inman Harvey, 1993, “Explorations in Evolutionary Robotics”, Adaptive Behavior , 2(1): 73–110. doi:10.1177/105971239300200104
- Colton, Simon, 2012, “The Painting Fool: Stories from Building an Automated Painter”, in Computers and Creativity , Jon McCormack and Mark d’Inverno (eds.), Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 3–38. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-31727-9_1
- Cope, David, 1996, Experiments in Musical Intelligence , (Computer Music and Digital Audio Series 12), Madison, WI: A-R Editions.
- –––, 2006, Computer Models of Musical Creativity , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Crick, Francis, 1995, “The Impact of Linus Pauling on Molecular Biology”, video (with transcript), part of a conference, “The Life and Work of Linus Pauling (1901–1994): A Discourse on the Art of Biography”, 28 February – 2 March 1995, Oregon State University, Special Collections & Archives Research Center, Oregon State University Libraries. [ Crick 1995 available online .
- Cropley, A. J., 1967, Creativity (Education Today), London: Longmans.
- Cropley, David H., Arthur J. Cropley, James C. Kaufman, and Mark A. Runco (eds.), 2010, The Dark Side of Creativity , New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511761225
- Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly, 1965, “Artistic Problems and Their Solutions: An Exploration of Creativity in the Arts”, PhD thesis, University of Chicago. [ Csikszentmihalyi 1965 available online ]
- Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly and J. W. Getzels, 1970, “Concern for Discovery: An Attitudinal Component of Creative Production 1”, Journal of Personality , 38(1): 91–105. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1970.tb00639.x
- Csikszentmihalyi, Mihaly and Keith Sawyer, 1995, “Creative Insight: The Social Dimension of a Solitary Moment”, in The Nature of Insight , R. J. Steinberg and J. E. Davidson (eds.), Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 329–363. Reprinted in Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi’s The Systems Model of Creativity: The Collected Works of Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi , Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2014, 73–98. doi:10.1007/978-94-017-9085-7_7
- Dailey, Lesley and Michael D. Mumford, 2006, “Evaluative Aspects of Creative Thought: Errors in Appraising the Implications of New Ideas”, Creativity Research Journal , 18(3): 385–390. doi:10.1207/s15326934crj1803_11
- De Quincey, Thomas, 1827, “On Murder Considered as One of the Fine Arts”, Blackwood’s Magazine , 21(122/February): 199–213.
- Dietrich, Arne, 2019, “Where in the Brain Is Creativity: A Brief Account of a Wild-Goose Chase”, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences , 27(June): 36–39. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.09.001
- Dietrich, Arne and Riam Kanso, 2010, “A Review of EEG, ERP, and Neuroimaging Studies of Creativity and Insight”, Psychological Bulletin , 136(5): 822–848. doi:10.1037/a0019749
- Dominowski, Roger L., 1995, “Productive Problem Solving”, in Smith, Ward, and Finke 1995: 73–95.
- Donald, Merlin, 2001, A Mind so Rare: The Evolution of Human Consciousness , New York: W.W. Norton.
- du Sautoy, Marcus, 2019, The Creativity Code: Art and Innovation in the Age of AI , Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Einstein, Albert, “Kyoto Lecture”, 14 December 1922, from notes in Japanese taken by Jun Ishiwara and published as Einstein Koen-Roku , Tokyo: Tokyo-Tosho, 1977.
- Einstein, Albert and Leopold Infeld, 1938, The Evolution of Physics: The Growth of Ideas from Early Concepts to Relativity and Quanta , New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Eisenberger, Robert and Linda Rhoades, 2001, “Incremental Effects of Reward on Creativity”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 81(4): 728–741. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.81.4.728
- Eisenberg, Jacob and William Forde Thompson, 2003, “A Matter of Taste: Evaluating Improvised Music”, Creativity Research Journal , 15(2–3): 287–296. doi:10.1080/10400419.2003.9651421
- Ericsson, K. Anders, Neil Charness, Paul J. Feltovich, and Robert R. Hoffman (eds.), 2006, The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance , New York/Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511816796
- Ericsson, K. Anders, Ralf T. Krampe, and Clemens Tesch-Römer, 1993, “The Role of Deliberate Practice in the Acquisition of Expert Performance”, Psychological Review , 100(3): 363–406. doi:10.1037/0033-295X.100.3.363
- Essinger, James, 2014, Ada’s Algorithm: How Lord Byron’s Daughter Ada Lovelace Launched the Digital Age , Brooklyn: Melville House.
- Finke, Ronald A., 1990, Creative Imagery: Discoveries and Inventions in Visualization , Hillsdale, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates.
- –––, 1996, “Imagery, Creativity, and Emergent Structure”, Consciousness and Cognition , 5(3): 381–393. doi:10.1006/ccog.1996.0024
- Finke, Ronald A., Ward, Thomas B., Smith, Steven M., 1992, Creative Cognition: Theory, Research, and Applications , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Flam, Jack D., 2003, Matisse and Picasso: The Story of Their Rivalry and Friendship , Cambridge, MA: Icon Edition/Westview Press.
- Flavell, John H. and Juris Draguns, 1957, “A Microgenetic Approach to Perception and Thought”, Psychological Bulletin , 54(3): 197–217. doi:10.1037/h0041350
- Gardner, Howard, 1993, Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Gandhi , New York: BasicBooks.
- Gaut, Berys, 2003, “Creativity and Imagination”, in Gaut and Livingston 2003: 148–173 (ch. 6).
- –––, 2009, “Creativity and Skill”, in Krausz, Dutton, and Bardsley 2009: 83–104.
- –––, 2010, “The Philosophy of Creativity”, Philosophy Compass , 5(12): 1034–1046. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00351.x
- –––, 2012, “Creativity and Rationality”, Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , 70(3): 259–270. doi: 10.1111/jaac.2012.70.issue-3
- –––, 2014a, “Educating for Creativity”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 265–287. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0014
- –––, 2014b, “Mixed Motivations: Creativity as a Virtue”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement , 75: 183–202. doi:10.1017/S1358246114000198
- –––, 2018, “The Value of Creativity”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 124–39.
- Gaut, Berys and Morag Gaut, 2011, Philosophy for Young Children: A Practical Guide , London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203818428
- Gaut, Berys and Matthew Kieran (eds.), 2018, Creativity and Philosophy , New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781351199797
- Gaut, Berys Nigel and Paisley Livingston (eds.), 2003, The Creation of Art: New Essays in Philosophical Aesthetics , New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
- Gaut, Morag, 2010, “Can Children Engage in Philosophical Enquiry?” in Exploring Interdisciplinary Trends in Creativity and Engagement , Barbara McKenzie and Phil Fitzsimmons (eds), Oxford, U.K.: Oxford Inter-Disciplinary Press, 195–203.
- Gervás, Pablo, Rafael Pérez y Pérez, and Tony Veale, 2010, Computational Creativity , special issue of Minds and Machines , 20(4).
- Getzels, Jacob W., 1965, “Creative Thinking, Problem Solving, and Instruction”, in Theories of Learning and Instruction. Sixty-Third Year Book of the National Society for the Study of Education , E.R. Hilgard (ed.), Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 240–67.
- Getzels, Jacob W. and Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, 1975, “From Problem Solving to Problem Finding”, in Perspectives in Creativity , Irving A. Taylor and Jacob W. Getzels (eds.), Chicago: Aldine, chap. 4.
- Glaveanu, Vlad Petre, 2014, “The Psychology of Creativity: A Critical Reading”, Creativity. Theories—Research—Applications , 1(1): 10–32.
- Grant, James, 2012, “The Value of Imaginativeness”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 90(2): 275–289. doi:10.1080/00048402.2011.574143
- Guilford, J. P., 1950, “Creativity”, American Psychologist , 5(9): 444–454. doi:10.1037/h0063487
- Guyer, Paul, 2003, “Exemplary Originality: Genius, Universality, and Individuality”, in Gaut and Livingston 2003: 116–137.
- Hájek, Alan, 2014, “Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Creativity”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 288–318. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0015
- –––, 2016, “Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Methodology”, in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology , Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler, and John Hawthorne (eds), Oxford: Oxford University Press, ch. 19.
- –––, 2017, “The Philosophy Toolkit”, AEON , 3 April 2017. [ Hájek 2017 available online ]
- –––, 2018, “Creating Heuristics for Philosophical Creativity”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 292–312.
- Halina, Marta, 2021, “Insightful Artificial Intelligence”, Mind & Language , 36(2): 315–329. doi:10.1111/mila.12321
- Harris, Paul L., 2000, The Work of the Imagination , (Understanding Children’s Worlds), Oxford/Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- Haugeland, John (ed.), 1981 [1997], Mind Design , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Second and enlarged edition as Mind Design II: Philosophy, Psychology, and Artificial Intelligence , Cambridge, MA: A Bradford Book. First edition, 1997. doi:10.7551/mitpress/4626.001.0001
- Hausman, Carl R., 1975 [1984], A Discourse on Novelty and Creation , The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. New edition Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1984.
- –––, 1979, “Criteria of Creativity”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 40(2): 237–249. doi:10.2307/2106319
- –––, 1984, “Second Preface”, in the 1984 edition of Hausman 1975.
- –––, 1985, “Originality as a Criterion of Creativity”, in Creativity in Art, Religion, and Culture , Michael H. Mitias (ed.), Amsterdam: Rodopoi, 26–41.
- Hebb, D. O., 1949 [2002], The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory , New York: Wiley, Reprinted Mahwah, NJ: L. Erlbaum Associates, 2002.
- Heilman, Kenneth M., 2016, “Possible Brain Mechanisms of Creativity”, Archives of Clinical Neuropsychology , 31(4): 285–296. doi:10.1093/arclin/acw009
- Heinelt, Gottfried, 1974, Kreative Lehrer = Kreative Schüler , Freiburg: Herder.
- Hennessey, Beth A. and Teresa M. Amabile, 2010, “Creativity”, Annual Review of Psychology , 61(1): 569–598. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100416
- Hills, Alison, 2018, “Moral and Aesthetic Virtue”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 118(3): 255–274. doi:10.1093/arisoc/aoy015
- Hills, Alison and Alexander Bird, 2018, “Creativity Without Value”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 95–107.
- Hofstadter, Douglas, 2001, “Staring EMI Straight in the Eye—and Doing My Best Not to Flinch”, in Virtual Music: Computer Synthesis of Musical Style , David Cope (ed.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 33–82.
- Horng, Jeou-Shyan and Lin Lin, 2009, “The Development of a Scale for Evaluating Creative Culinary Products”, Creativity Research Journal , 21(1): 54–63. doi:10.1080/10400410802633491
- Hospers, John, 1985, “Artistic Creativity”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , 43(3): 243–255. doi:10.2307/430638
- Howell, Patrick A., 2020, Dispatches from the Vanguard: The Global International African Arts Movement versus Donald J. Trump , London: Repeater Books.
- Irving, Zachary and Evan Thompson, 2018, “The Philosophy of Mind-Wandering”, in Oxford Handbook of Spontaneous Thought: Mind-Wandering, Creativity, and Dreaming , Christoff Kalina and Fox Kieran, Oxford University Press, ch. 8.
- Jackson, Philip W. and Samuel Messick, 1965, “The Person, the Product, and the Response: Conceptual Problems in the Assessment of Creativity1”, Journal of Personality , 33(3): 309–329. doi:10.1111/j.1467-6494.1965.tb01389.x
- John-Steiner, Vera, 1985, Notebooks of the Mind: Explorations of Thinking . 1st ed. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Jung, Rex Eugene, Brittany S. Mead, Jessica Carrasco, and Ranee A. Flores, 2013, “The Structure of Creative Cognition in the Human Brain”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , 7. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2013.00330
- Jung-Beeman, Mark, Edward M Bowden, Jason Haberman, Jennifer L Frymiare, Stella Arambel-Liu, Richard Greenblatt, Paul J Reber, and John Kounios, 2004, “Neural Activity When People Solve Verbal Problems with Insight”, PLoS Biology , 2(4): e97. doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0020097
- Kami, Avi, Gundela Meyer, Peter Jezzard, Michelle M. Adams, Robert Turner, and Leslie G. Ungerleider, 1995, “Functional MRI Evidence for Adult Motor Cortex Plasticity during Motor Skill Learning”, Nature , 377(6545): 155–158. doi:10.1038/377155a0
- Kant, Immanuel, 1790 [2000], Kritik der Urteilskraft , Berlin und Libau : Lagarde und Friedrich. Translated as Critique of the Power of Judgment , Paul Guyer (ed.), Eric Matthews (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000. Citations include the section of the Critique , the volume and page number of the Akademie edition, and page number of this translation. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511804656
- Karmiloff-Smith, Annette, 1990, “Constraints on Representational Change: Evidence from Children’s Drawing”, Cognition , 34(1): 57–83. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(90)90031-E
- –––, 1992, Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science , (Learning, Development, and Conceptual Change), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Kasparov, Garry K. and Mig Greengard, 2017, Deep Thinking: Where Machine Intelligence Ends and Human Creativity Begins , New York: PublicAffairs, an imprint of Perseus Books.
- Kaufman, James C., 2009, Creativity 101 , (The Psych 101 Series), New York: Springer Publishing.
- Kaufman, Scott Barry (ed.), 2013, The Complexity of Greatness: Beyond Talent or Practice , Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794003.001.0001
- Kaufman, Scott Barry and Carolyn Gregoire, 2016, Wired to Create: Discover the 10 Things Great Artists, Writers and Innovators Do Differently , Perigee/Penguin.
- Kaufman, Scott Barry and James C. Kaufman (eds.), 2009, The Psychology of Creative Writing , Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0007
- Kieran, Matthew, 2014a, “Creativity as a Virtue of Character”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 125–144. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0007
- –––, 2014b, “Creativity, Virtue and the Challenges from Natural Talent, Ill-Being and Immorality”, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement , 75: 203–230. doi:10.1017/S1358246114000241
- –––, 2018, “Creativity, Vanity and Narcissism” in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 74–92.
- Kivy, Peter, 2001, The Possessor and the Possessed: Handel, Mozart, Beethoven, and the Idea of Musical Genius , (Yale Series in the Philosophy and Theory of Art), New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Klausen, Søren Harnow, 2010, “The Notion of Creativity Revisited: A Philosophical Perspective on Creativity Research” Creativity Research Journal , 22(4):347–360. doi:10.1080/10400419.2010.523390
- Kneller, George F., 1965, The Art and Science of Creativity , New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
- Koestler, Arthur, 1964, The Act of Creation , New York: Macmillan.
- Kounios, John and Mark Beeman, 2014, “The Cognitive Neuroscience of Insight”, Annual Review of Psychology , 65(1): 71–93. doi:10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115154
- Koza, John R., 1992, Genetic Programming: On the Programming of Computers by Means of Natural Selection , (Complex Adaptive Systems), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Krausz, Michael, Denis Dutton, and Karen Bardsley (eds.), 2009, The Idea of Creativity , Leiden/Boston: Brill. doi:10.1163/ej.9789004174443.i-348
- Kronfeldner, Maria E., 2009, “Creativity Naturalized”, The Philosophical Quarterly , 59(237): 577–592. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.637.x
- –––, 2010, “Darwinian ‘Blind’ Hypothesis Formation Revisited”, Synthese , 175(2): 193–218. doi:10.1007/s11229-009-9498-8
- –––, 2011, Darwinian Creativity and Memetics , (Acumen Research Editions), Durham, UK: Acumen Publishing.
- –––, 2018, “Explaining Creativity”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 213–229.
- Laukkonen, Ruben E. and Jason M. Tangen, 2018, “How to Detect Insight Moments in Problem Solving Experiments”, Frontiers in Psychology , 9(March): article 282. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00282
- Lehman, Joel, Jeff Clune, Dusan Misevic, Christoph Adami, Lee Altenberg, Julie Beaulieu, Peter J. Bentley, Samuel Bernard, Guillaume Beslon, David M. Bryson, et al., 2020, “The Surprising Creativity of Digital Evolution: A Collection of Anecdotes from the Evolutionary Computation and Artificial Life Research Communities”, Artificial Life , 26(2): 274–306. doi:10.1162/artl_a_00319
- Lepper, Mark R., David Greene, and Richard E. Nisbett, 1973, “Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the ‘Overjustification’ Hypothesis”, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology , 28(1): 129–137. doi:10.1037/h0035519
- Limb, Charles J. and Allen R. Braun, 2008, “Neural Substrates of Spontaneous Musical Performance: An FMRI Study of Jazz Improvisation”, PLoS ONE , 3(2): e1679. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001679
- Livingston, Paisley, 2018, “Explicating ‘Creativity’”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 108–123.
- Lopes, Dominic McIver, 2008, “Virtues of Art: Good Taste”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume , 82(1): 197–211. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00169.x
- Lovelace, Ada Augusta, 1843, “Translation of, and Notes to, Luigi F. Menabrea’s Sketch of the Analytical Engine Invented by Charles Babbage”, in Scientific Memoirs, Volume 3 , Richard Taylor (ed.), London: Richard and John E. Taylor, 691–731.
- Luo, Jing and Kazuhisa Niki, 2003, “Function of Hippocampus in ‘Insight’ of Problem Solving”, Hippocampus , 13(3): 316–323. doi:10.1002/hipo.10069
- Mai, Xiao-Qin, Jing Luo, Jian-Hui Wu, and Yue-Jia Luo, 2004, “‘Aha!’ Effects in a Guessing Riddle Task: An Event-Related Potential Study”, Human Brain Mapping , 22(4): 261–270. doi:10.1002/hbm.20030
- Martindale, Colin, 1977, “Creativity, Consciousness, and Cortical Arousal”, Journal of Altered States of Consciousness , 3(1): 69–87.
- –––, 1981, Cognition and Consciousness , (Dorsey Series in Psychology), Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press.
- –––, 1995, “Creativity and Connectionism”, in Smith, Ward, and Finke 1995 :249–68.
- –––, 1999, “Biological Bases of Creativity”, in Sternberg 1999: 137–152. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511807916.009
- Martindale, Colin and James Armstrong, 1974, “The Relationship of Creativity to Cortical Activation and Its Operant Control”, The Journal of Genetic Psychology , 124(2): 311–320. doi:10.1080/00221325.1974.10532293
- Martindale, Colin and Dwight Hines, 1975, “Creativity and Cortical Activation during Creative, Intellectual and Eeg Feedback Tasks”, Biological Psychology , 3(2): 91–100. doi:10.1016/0301-0511(75)90011-3
- Maybury, Barry, 1967, Creative Writing for Juniors , London: B. T. Batsford.
- Mayer, Richard E., 1989, “Systematic Thinking Fostered by Illustrations in Scientific Text”, Journal of Educational Psychology , 81(2): 240–246. doi:10.1037/0022-0663.81.2.240
- Mayseless, Naama, Ayelet Eran, and Simone G. Shamay-Tsoory, 2015, “Generating Original Ideas: The Neural Underpinning of Originality”, NeuroImage , 116(August): 232–239. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.05.030
- McMahon, Darrin M., 2013, Divine Fury: A History of Genius , New York: Basic Books.
- Mekern, Vera, Bernhard Hommel, and Zsuzsika Sjoerds, 2019, “Computational Models of Creativity: A Review of Single-Process and Multi-Process Recent Approaches to Demystify Creative Cognition”, Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences , 27(June): 47–54. doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2018.09.008
- Metcalfe, Janet and David Wiebe, 1987, “Intuition in Insight and Noninsight Problem Solving”, Memory & Cognition , 15(3): 238–246. doi:10.3758/BF03197722
- Miller, Arthur I., 2019, The artist in the machine: The world of AI-powered creativity , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/11585.001.0001
- Mithen, Steven J., 1996, The Prehistory of the Mind: The Cognitive Origins of Art, Religion and Science , New York: Thames and Hudson.
- –––, 1998, “A Creative Explosion? Theory of Mind, Language, and the Disembodied Mind of the Upper Paleolithic”, in Creativity in Human Evolution and Prehistory , Steven Mithen (ed.) , London: Routledge, 97–106.
- Morrison, Robert G. and Benjamin Wallace, 2001, “Imagery Vividness, Creativity and the Visual Arts”, Journal of Mental Imagery , 25(3–4): 135–152.
- Morrison, Toni, 1993, “The of of Fiction No. 134”, interview by Elissa Schappell and Calaudia Brodsky Lacour, The Paris Review , 128(Fall 1993). [ Morrison 1993 available online ]
- Mumford, Michael D., 2003, “Where Have We Been, Where Are We Going? Taking Stock in Creativity Research”, Creativity Research Journal , 15(2–3): 107–120. doi:10.1080/10400419.2003.9651403
- Murray, Penelope, 1989, Genius: The History of an Idea , Oxford/New York: B. Blackwell.
- Murray, Samuel, Nathan Liang, Nicholaus Brosowsky, and Paul Seli, forthcoming, “What Are the Benefits of Mind Wandering to Creativity?”, Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts , early online: September 2021. doi:10.1037/aca0000420
- Nahm, Milton Charles, 1956, Genius and Creativity: An Essay in the History of Ideas , New York: Harper Torchbooks.
- Nanay, Bence, 2014, “An Experiential Account of Creativity”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 17–36. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0002
- Newell, Allen, J. C. Shaw, and Herbert A. Simon, 1962, “The Processes of Creative Thinking”, in Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking: A Symposium Held at the University of Colorado. , Howard E. Gruber, Glenn Terrell, and Michael Wertheimer (eds.), New York: Atherton Press, 63–119. doi:10.1037/13117-003
- Nickles, Thomas, 2003, “Evolutionary Models of Innovation and the Meno Problem”, in L. V. Shavinina (ed.), The International Handbook on Innovation, 54–78. New York, NY: Elsevier Science.
- Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1872 [1967], The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music , Walter Kaufmann (trans.), New York: Vintage.
- Nolfi, Stefano and Dario Floreano, 2000, Evolutionary Robotics: The Biology, Intelligence, and Technology of Self-Organizing Machines , Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. doi:10.7551/mitpress/2889.001.0001
- Novitz, David, 1999, “Creativity and Constraint”, Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 77(1): 67–82. doi:10.1080/00048409912348811
- Pais, Abraham, 1982, Subtle Is the Lord: The Science and the Life of Albert Einstein , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press.
- Palmiero, Massimiliano, Raffaella Nori, Vincenzo Aloisi, Martina Ferrara, and Laura Piccardi, 2015, “Domain-Specificity of Creativity: A Study on the Relationship Between Visual Creativity and Visual Mental Imagery”, Frontiers in Psychology , 6(December). doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01870
- Paul, Elliot Samuel and Scott Barry Kaufman (eds.), 2014, The Philosophy of Creativity: New Essays , Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.001.0001
- Paul, Elliot Samuel and Dustin Stokes, 2018, “Attributing Creativity”, in Gaut and Kieran 2018: 193–210.
- –––, 2021, “Computer Creativity is a Matter of Agency”, Institute of Arts and Ideas News , 11 November 2021, [ Paul and Stokes 2021 available online ]
- Pease, Alison and Simon Colton, 2011, “On Impact and Evaluation in Computational Creativity: A Discussion of the Turing Test and an Alternative Proposal”, in Proceedings of AISB ’11: Computing and Philosophy , Dimitar Kazakov and George Tsoulas (eds.), York: Society for the Study of Artificial Intelligence and Simulation of Behaviour, 15–22.
- Pérez-Fabello, María José and Alfredo Campos, 2007, “Influence of Training in Artistic Skills on Mental Imaging Capacity”, Creativity Research Journal , 19(2–3): 227–232. doi:10.1080/10400410701397495
- Perkins, David N., 1981, The Mind’s Best Work , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Picciuto, Elizabeth and Peter Carruthers, 2014, “The Origins of Creativity”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 199–223. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0011
- Plato, Plato: Complete Works , John M. Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson (eds), Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 1997.
- Plucker, Jonathan A., Ronald A. Beghetto, and Gayle T. Dow, 2004, “Why Isn’t Creativity More Important to Educational Psychologists? Potentials, Pitfalls, and Future Directions in Creativity Research”, Educational Psychologist , 39(2): 83–96. doi:10.1207/s15326985ep3902_1
- Poincaré, Henri, 1908 [1913], Science et Méthode , Paris: Flammarion. Translated as “Science and Method” in The Foundations of Science: Science and Hypothesis, The Value of Science, Science and Method , George Bruce Halsted (trans.), (Science and Education 1), New York: The Science Press, 1913. [ Poincaré 1913 available online ]
- Policastro, Emma and Howard Gardner, 1999, “From Case Studies to Robust Generalizations: An Approach to the Study of Creativity”, in Sternberg 1999: 213–225. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511807916.013
- Pólya, George, 1945, How to Solve It: A New Aspect of Mathematical Method , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Popper, Karl Raimund, 1934 [1959], Logik der forschung: zur erkenntnistheorie der modernen naturwissenschaft , (Schriften zur wissenschaftlichen weltauffassung, Bd. 9), Wien: J. Springer. Translated as The Logic of Scientific Discovery , London: Hutchinson, 1959.
- Posner, Micheal I., and Raichle, Marcus E., 1994, Images of Mind , New York, NY: WH Freeman and Co.
- Posner, Michael I., DiGirolamo, Gregory, J., Fernandez-Duque, Diego, 1997, “Brain mechanisms of cognitive skills”, Consciousness and Cognition 1997, 6(2-3):267-90. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1997.0301. PMID: 9262412.
- Prinz, Jesse and Laurence Barsalou, 2002, “Acquisition and Productivity in Perceptual Symbol Systems: An Account of Mundane Creativity”, in Creativity, Cognition, and Knowledge: An Interaction , Terry Dartnall (ed.), Westport, CT: Praeger, ch. 2.
- Raichle, Marcus E., Ann Mary MacLeod, Abraham Z. Snyder, William J. Powers, Debra A. Gusnard, and Gordon L. Shulman, 2001, “A Default Mode of Brain Function”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences , 98(2): 676–682. doi:10.1073/pnas.98.2.676
- Richards, Ruth L., 1976, “A Comparison of Selected Guilford and Wallach-Kogan Creative Thinking Tests in Conjunction With Measures of Intelligence*”, The Journal of Creative Behavior , 10(3): 151–164. doi:10.1002/j.2162-6057.1976.tb01018.x
- Ritter, Simone M. and Ap Dijksterhuis, 2014, “Creativity: The Unconscious Foundations of the Incubation Period”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , 8(April). doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00215
- Roberts, Tom, 2018, “Aesthetic Virtues: Traits and Faculties”, Philosophical Studies , 175(2): 429–447. doi:10.1007/s11098-017-0875-8
- Root-Bernstein, Robert Scott and Michèle Root-Bernstein, 1999, Sparks of Genius: The Thirteen Thinking Tools of Creative People , Boston, MA: Houghton, Mifflin and Company.
- Runco, Mark A., 1991, “The Evaluative, Valuative, and Divergent Thinking of Children*”, The Journal of Creative Behavior , 25(4): 311–319. doi:10.1002/j.2162-6057.1991.tb01143.x
- –––, 2017, “Comments on Where the Creativity Research Has Been and Where Is It Going”, The Journal of Creative Behavior , 51(4): 308–313. doi:10.1002/jocb.189
- Runco, Mark A., Ahmed M. Abdulla, Sue Hyeon Paek, Fatima A. Al-Jasim, and Hanadi N. Alsuwaidi, 2016, “Which Test of Divergent Thinking Is Best?”, Creativity. Theories—Research—Applications , 3(1): 4–18. doi:10.1515/ctra-2016-0001
- Runco, Mark A. and Robert S. Albert, 2010, “Creativity Research: A Historical View”, in The Cambridge Handbook of Creativity , James C. Kaufman and Robert J. Sternberg (eds.), New York: Cambridge University Press, 3–19. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511763205.003
- Runco, Mark A. and Ivonne Chand, 1994, “Problem Finding, Evaluative Thinking, and Creativity”, in Problem Finding, Problem Solving, and Creativity , Mark A. Runco (ed.), (Creativity Research), Westport, CT: Ablex Publishing, 40–76.
- Runco, Mark A. and Gayle T. Dow, 2004, “Assessing the Accuracy of Judgments of Originality on Three Divergent Thinking Tests”, Korean Journal of Thinking & Problem Solving , 14(2): 5–14.
- Runco, Mark A. and Garrett J. Jaeger, 2012, “The Standard Definition of Creativity”, Creativity Research Journal , 24(1): 92–96. doi:10.1080/10400419.2012.650092
- Runco, Mark A. and Steven R. Pritzker (eds.), 2020, Encyclopedia of Creativity , third edition, Amsterdam: Academic Press.
- Runco, Mark A. and Luiz Vega, 1990, “Evaluating the Creativity of Children’s Ideas”, Journal of Social Behavior & Personality , 5(5): 439–452.
- Sawyer, R. Keith, 2012, Explaining Creativity: The Science of Human Innovation , second edition, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Schank, Roger A. and Abelson, Robert P., 1977, Scripts, Plans, Goals, and Understanding: An Inquiry Into Human Knowledge Structures , London: Psychology Press.
- Schoenfeld, Alan H., 1982, “Measures of Problem-Solving Performance and of Problem-Solving Instruction”, Journal for Research in Mathematics Education , 13(1): 31–49. doi:10.2307/748435
- –––, 1987a, “Pólya, Problem Solving, and Education”, Mathematics Magazine , 60(5): 283–291. doi:10.2307/2690409
- –––, 1987b, “What’s All the Fuss about Metacognition?”, in Cognitive Science and Mathematics Education , Alan H. Schoenfeld (ed.), Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 189–215.
- Schopenhauer, Arthur, 1859 [WWV], Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung , third edition, Leipzig. First edition in 1811 and expanded in 1844. Translated as The World as Will and Representation , two volumes, E. F. J. Payne (trans.), Indian Hills, CO: The Falcon’s Wing Press, 1958. Reprinted New York: Dover Publications, 1966. Citations, WWV, with volume and page are to the 1966 edition.
- –––, 1851 [SW/PP], Parerga und Paralipomena: kleine philosophische Schriften , two volumes, Berlin. Collected in his Sämtliche Werke [SW], Arthur Hübscher (ed.), Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988, volumes 5 and 6. Translated as Arthur Schopenhauer: Parerga and Paralipomena Short Philosophical Essays , 2 volumes, Christopher Janaway, Sabine Roehr, and Adrian Del Caro (eds.), Adrian Del Caro (trans.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014 and 2015. Page numbers are given both to the SW edition with volume and page and to the Cambridge University edition [PP] with volume and page.
- Searle, John R., 1980, “Minds, Brains, and Programs”, Behavioral and Brain Sciences , 3(3): 417–424. doi:10.1017/S0140525X00005756
- Shevlin, Henry, Karina Vold, Matthew Crosby, and Marta Halina, 2019, “The Limits of Machine Intelligence: Despite Progress in Machine Intelligence, Artificial General Intelligence Is Still a Major Challenge”, EMBO Reports , 20(10). doi:10.15252/embr.201949177
- Silver, David, Aja Huang, Chris J. Maddison, Arthur Guez, Laurent Sifre, George van den Driessche, Julian Schrittwieser, Ioannis Antonoglou, Veda Panneershelvam, Marc Lanctot, et al., 2016, “Mastering the Game of Go with Deep Neural Networks and Tree Search”, Nature , 529(7587): 484–489. doi:10.1038/nature16961
- Simonton, Dean Keith, 1984, Genius, Creativity, and Leadership: Historiometric Inquiries , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- –––, 1988a, “Creativity, Leadership, and Chance”, in R. J. Sternberg (ed.), The Nature of Creativity , 386-426. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- –––, 1988b, Scientific genius: A psychology of science . New York: Cambridge University Press.
- –––, 1994, Greatness: Who Makes History and Why , New York: Guilford.
- –––, 1997, Genius and Creativity: Selected Papers , Westport, CT: Ablex Publishing.
- –––, 1999a, “Creativity as Blind Variation and Selective Retention: Is the Creative Process Darwinian?”, Psychological Inquiry , 10(4): 309–328.
- –––, 1999b, Origins of Genius: Darwinian Perspectives on Creativity , New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- –––, 2004, Creativity in Science: Chance, Logic, Genius, and Zeitgeist , Cambridge, UK/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- –––, 2009, Genius 101 , (The Psych 101 Series), New York: Springer.
- –––, 2011, “Creativity and Discovery as Blind Variation: Campbell’s (1960) BVSR Model after the Half-Century Mark”, Review of General Psychology , 15(2): 158–174. doi:10.1037/a0022912
- –––, 2012a, “Creativity, Problem Solving, and Solution Set Sightedness: Radically Reformulating BVSR”, The Journal of Creative Behavior , 46(1): 48–65. doi:10.1002/jocb.004
- –––, 2012b, “Taking the U.S. Patent Office Criteria Seriously: A Quantitative Three-Criterion Creativity Definition and Its Implications”, Creativity Research Journal , 24(2–3): 97–106. doi:10.1080/10400419.2012.676974
- –––, 2018, “Creative Genius as Causal Agent in History: William James’s 1880 Theory Revisited and Revitalized”, Review of General Psychology , 22(4): 406–421. doi:10.1037/gpr0000165
- –––, forthcoming, “The Blind-Variation and Selective-Retention Theory of Creativity: Recent Developments and Current Status of BVSR”, Creativity Research Journal , early online: 14 April 2022 (20 pages). doi:10.1080/10400419.2022.2059919
- Sims, Karl, 1994, “Evolving 3D Morphology and Behavior by Competition”, Artificial Life , 1(4): 353–372. doi:10.1162/artl.1994.1.4.353
- Singh, Simon, 1999, The Code Book: The Secret History of Codes and Codebreaking , London: Fourth Estate.
- Smith, Steven M. and Steven E. Blankenship, 1989, “Incubation Effects”, Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society , 27(4): 311–314. doi:10.3758/BF03334612
- –––, 1991, “Incubation and the Persistence of Fixation in Problem Solving”, The American Journal of Psychology , 104(1): 61–87. doi:10.2307/1422851
- Smith, Steven M., Thomas B. Ward, and Ronald A. Finke (eds.), 1995, The Creative Cognition Approach , Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Stein, Morris I., 1953, “Creativity and Culture”, The Journal of Psychology , 36(2): 311–322. doi:10.1080/00223980.1953.9712897
- Sternberg, Robert J. (ed.), 1999, Handbook of Creativity , Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511807916
- Sternberg, Robert J. and Todd I. Lubart, 1995, Defying the Crowd: Cultivating Creativity in a Culture of Conformity , New York, NY: Free Press.
- –––, 1999, “The Concept of Creativity: Prospects and Paradigms”, in Sternberg 1999: 3–15. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511807916.003
- Stokes, Dustin R., 2007, “Incubated Cognition and Creativity”, Journal of Consciousness Studies , 14(3): 83–100.
- –––, 2008, “A Metaphysics of Creativity”, in New Waves in Aesthetics , Kathleen Stock and Katherine Thomson-Jones (eds.), New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 105–124.
- –––, 2011, “Minimally Creative Thought: Minimally Creative Thought”, Metaphilosophy , 42(5): 658–681. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9973.2011.01716.x
- –––, 2014, “The Role of Imagination in Creativity”, in Paul and Kaufman 2014: 157–184. doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199836963.003.0009
- –––, 2016, “Imagination and Creativity”, in The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Imagination , Amy Kind (ed.), London/New York: Routledge, chapter 18.
- Stokes, Dustin R. and Jon Bird, 2008, “Evolutionary Robotics and Creative Constraints”, in Beyond the Brain: Embodied, Situated, and Distributed Cognition , Benoit Hardy-Vallée and Nicolas Payette (eds.), Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 227–245.
- Tabery, James, 2014, Beyond versus: The Struggle to Understand the Interaction of Nature and Nurture , (Life and Mind: Philosophical Issues in Biology and Psychology), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Takeuchi, Hikaru and Rex Jung (eds), 2019, Creativity , special issue of Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences , 27: 1–174.
- Tatarkiewicz, Władysław, 1980, A History of Six Ideas: An Essay in Aesthetics , Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media.
- Thagard, Paul and Terrence C. Stewart, 2011, “The AHA! Experience: Creativity Through Emergent Binding in Neural Networks”, Cognitive Science , 35(1): 1–33. doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2010.01142.x
- Turing, Alan M., 1950, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind , 59(236): 433–460. doi:10.1093/mind/LIX.236.433
- Verstijnen, Ilse Marieke, 1997, “Sketches of Creative Discovery: A Psycological Inquiry into the Role of Imagery and Sketching in Creative Discovery”, Doctoral thesis, Technische Universiteit, Delft, The Netherlands. [ Verstijnen 1997 available online ]
- Wallas, Graham, 1926, The Art of Thought , London: J. Cape.
- Ward, Thomas B., 1994, “Structured Imagination: The Role of Category Structure in Exemplar Generation”, Cognitive Psychology , 27(1): 1–40. doi:10.1006/cogp.1994.1010
- –––, 1995, “What’s Old about New Ideas?” in Smith, Ward, and Finke 1995: 157–178.
- Watson, James D., 1968 [1999], The Double Helix: A Personal Account of the Discovery of the Structure of DNA , New York: Atheneum. First Touchstone edition, London: Penguin, 1999.
- Weisberg, Robert W., 1986, Creativity: Genius and Other Myths , New York: W.H. Freeman.
- –––, 2006, Creativity: Understanding Innovation in Problem Solving, Science, Invention, and the Arts , Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
- Wiggins, Geraint A. and Joydeep Bhattacharya, 2014, “Mind the Gap: An Attempt to Bridge Computational and Neuroscientific Approaches to Study Creativity”, Frontiers in Human Neuroscience , 8(July). doi:10.3389/fnhum.2014.00540
- Williams, Rich, Mark A. Runco, and Eric Berlow, 2016, “Mapping the Themes, Impact, and Cohesion of Creativity Research over the Last 25 Years”, Creativity Research Journal , 28(4): 385–394. doi:10.1080/10400419.2016.1230358
- Young, Edward, 1759 [1966], Conjectures on Original Composition: In a Letter to the Author of Sir Charles Grandison , London: A. Millar. Reprinted Leeds: Scolar Press, 1966.
- Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus, 1997, Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge , Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Zemore, Sarah E., 1995, “Ability to Generate Mental Images in Students of Art”, Current Psychology , 14(1): 83–88. doi:10.1007/BF02686876
How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.
- Baker, Lucas and Fan Hui, 2017, “ Innovations of AlphaGo ”, on the DeepMind blog, 10 April 2017. Accessed 9 July 2021.
- Whitney Museum, 2002, The Migration Series: His Painting Method .
artificial intelligence | epistemology: virtue | ethics: virtue | imagination | Turing, Alan | Turing machines | Turing test
Copyright © 2023 by Elliot Samuel Paul < elliotspaul @ gmail . com > Dustin Stokes < dustin . stokes @ utah . edu >
- Accessibility
Support SEP
Mirror sites.
View this site from another server:
- Info about mirror sites
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2024 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University
Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054
- Yale University
- About Yale Insights
- Privacy Policy
- Accessibility
What Is Creativity?
Where do the new ideas come from—the ones that change industries and societies? In a lecture at Yale SOM, Prof. Richard Foster explains what creativity is—and isn’t—and describes the kinds of traits, knowledge, and ways of thinking that lead to the moment of creative insight.
- Richard N. Foster Lecturer in Management
In an age defined by technological innovations, creativity is prized. But as virtues go, it’s hard to pin down. In one moment, there’s a blank page; in the next, there’s an idea. What happened in between? Perhaps more importantly, what happened before—what are the kinds of traits, knowledge, and ways of thinking that lead to the moment of creative insight?
An entire industry has grown up focused on unlocking the mysteries of creativity. Both scholarly and popular books proliferate; universities have created courses aimed at breaking creativity into “a set of tools for generating new ideas”; and consultants, often working under the tag of “ design thinking ,” teach everyone from doctors to engineers how to unlock their creative selves and innovate.
The idea of humans as uniquely creative animals goes back at least as far as the ancient Greeks . Aristotle considered creativity to be a gift from the gods, something that resulted not during rational thought but when one was “bereft of his senses.” As society has become more scientific, so has its conception of creativity. Researchers use the latest imaging technology to analyze exactly what happens in our brains during the creative process.
Richard Foster, a lecturer in management at Yale SOM and emeritus director of McKinsey & Company, has made a study of creativity, both its history and the process itself. He differentiates creativity both from innovation and discovery, which often are used as synonyms. Only creativity, he says, is about making something new, rather than merely applying or discovering something new. “Creative solutions are insightful, they’re novel, they’re simple, they’re elegant, and they’re generative,” he says. “When you find one creative idea, more often than not it triggers other ideas in the same fashion.”
A key to being creative, as Foster sees it, is the ability to find associations between different fields of knowledge, especially ones that appear radically different at first. The process is iterative rather than linear and requires people with curiosity, energy, and the openness to see connections where others cannot. “New solutions are often the combination of two or more existing concepts. If you had a videotape store and combine it with Amazon and Priority Mail, you get Netflix,” he says. “It’s all about constructing associative networks of ideas. That’s what you’re doing when you’re creating a business. A business is not one idea; it’s many, many ideas.”
Our systems are now restored following recent technical disruption, and we’re working hard to catch up on publishing. We apologise for the inconvenience caused. Find out more: https://www.cambridge.org/universitypress/about-us/news-and-blogs/cambridge-university-press-publishing-update-following-technical-disruption
We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings .
Login Alert
- > Handbook of Creativity
- > Creativity and Knowledge: A Challenge to Theories
Book contents
- Frontmatter
- List of Contributors
- Handbook of Creativity
- PART I INTRODUCTION
- PART II METHODS FOR STUDYING CREATIVITY
- PART III ORIGINS OF CREATIVITY
- PART IV CREATIVITY, THE SELF, AND THE ENVIRONMENT
- 10 Creative Cognition
- 11 From Case Studies to Robust Generalizations: An Approach to the Study of Creativity
- 12 Creativity and Knowledge: A Challenge to Theories
- 13 Creativity and Intelligence
- 14 The Influence of Personality on Artistic and Scientific Creativity
- 15 Motivation and Creativity
- 16 Implications of a Systems Perspective for the Study of Creativity
- PART V SPECIAL TOPICS IN CREATIVITY
- PART VI CONCLUSION
- Author Index
- Subject Index
12 - Creativity and Knowledge: A Challenge to Theories
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 June 2014
An important component of research in creativity has been the development of theories concerning the mechanisms underlying creative thinking. Modern theories of creative thinking have been advanced from many different viewpoints, ranging from Guilford's pioneering psychometric theory (e.g., 1950; see also Runco, 1991) to those developing out of clinical interests, broadly conceived (e.g., Eysenck, 1993). Other theories have developed out of Gestalt psychology (e.g., Wertheimer, 1982), traditional associationistic experimental psychology (e.g., Mednick, 1962), Darwinian theory (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1988, 1995); social-psychological perspectives (e.g., Amabile, 1983), investment perspectives (e.g., Sternberg & Lubart, 1995), and modern cognitive science (e.g., Martindale, 1995). In this chapter, I examine one critical issue confronting all such theories: the role of knowledge in creativity.
Although the various theoretical views proposed by psychologists appear on the surface to be very different, there is among many of them, including all those just cited, one critical assumption concerning the relationship between knowledge and creativity. Since creative thinking by definition goes beyond knowledge, there is implicitly or explicitly assumed to be a tension between knowledge and creativity. Knowledge may provide the basic elements, the building blocks out of which are constructed new ideas, but in order for these building blocks to be available, the mortar holding the old ideas together must not be too strong.
Access options
Save book to kindle.
To save this book to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle .
Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.
Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service .
- Creativity and Knowledge: A Challenge to Theories
- By Robert W. Weisberg , Yale University, New Haven
- Edited by Robert J. Sternberg , Yale University, Connecticut
- Book: Handbook of Creativity
- Online publication: 05 June 2014
- Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511807916.014
Save book to Dropbox
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox .
Save book to Google Drive
To save content items to your account, please confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive .
Creative Writing Essays: Tips, Examples, and Strategies
Creative writing essays are a unique type of academic writing that lets you show your creativity and imagination while still following the rules of academic writing. Creative writing essays are not like other types of essays that rely heavily on research and facts. Instead, they depend on your ability to tell a story, create vivid images, and make your readers feel something.
Writing creatively is important for anyone who wants to express themselves in a unique and interesting way, not just fiction and poetry writers. Whether you are writing a personal essay , a descriptive essay, or an argumentative essay, adding creative elements can help make your writing more interesting and memorable.
In this article, we’ll talk about what to do and what not to do when writing a creative essay . We’ll look at tips, examples, and ways to write well. By following these rules, you can learn how to write creatively while still meeting the requirements of academic writing.
What You'll Learn
Understanding Creative Writing Essays
To write a good creative writing essay, you need to know how this unique type of academic writing works.
A creative writing essay is a type of academic essay that uses elements of creative writing, like telling a story, building characters, and using literary devices. The goal of a creative writing essay is to get the reader’s attention and hold it while still getting the message or argument across.
There are different kinds of creative writing essays, such as personal essays, essays that describe something, and essays that tell a story . Each of these types of essays needs a different way of writing them, but they all need to include creative elements.
Dos of Creative Writing Essays
Here are some dos of creative writing essays to keep in mind when writing:
1. Choosing a strong and interesting topic: Choose a topic that is interesting to you and that will engage your readers. This will help to keep your writing focused and engaging.
2. Developing a clear and engaging thesis statement: Your thesis statement should clearly convey the message or argument you are making in your essay . It should be engaging and capture the reader’s attention.
3. Creating well-rounded and dynamic characters: Characters are an important part of any creative writing essay. Develop characters that are well-rounded and dynamic, with their own unique personalities, motivations, and flaws.
4. Using sensory details to enhance the story: Sensory details, such as sights, sounds, smells, tastes, and textures, can help to bring yourwriting to life and create a more immersive experience for your readers. Use vivid and descriptive language to evoke the senses and create a more vivid world for your readers to imagine.
5. Incorporating dialogue effectively: Dialogue can be a powerful tool for conveying information and developing characters. Use dialogue to reveal character traits, advance the plot, and create tension.
6. Utilizing literary devices to enhance the story: Literary devices like metaphors, similes, symbols, and images can make a story more interesting and help the reader understand it better. Use these tools sparingly and on purpose to make your effect stronger.
By using these dos in your creative writing essay, you can make it more interesting, easy to remember, and effective.
To write a good creative writing essay, you need to use your imagination, skills, and knowledge. By learning the basics of this unique type of writing and following the dos in this article, you can make a more interesting and effective creative writing essay. Remember to pick a strong and interesting topic, make characters that are well-rounded, use details and dialogue well, and use literary devices to make the story better.
Don’ts of Creative Writing Essays
To avoid common pitfalls when writing a creative writing essay, here are some don’ts to keep in mind:
1. Overusing adjectives and adverbs: While descriptive language is important in creative writing, overusing adjectives and adverbs can make your writing feel cluttered and overwhelming.
2. Using cliches and predictable plot lines: Creative writing is all about bringing something new and fresh to the table. Using cliches and predictable plot lines can make your writing feel unoriginal and uninspired.
3. Writing flat and uninteresting characters: Characters are an important part of any creative writing essay. Flat and uninteresting characters can make your writing feel dull and unengaging.
4. Forgetting to revise and edit: Like any form of academic writing, it is important to revise and edit your creative writing essay to ensure that it is polished and error-free.
5. Using weak verbs and passive voice: Weak verbs and passive voice can make your writing feel flat and uninteresting. Use strong and active verbs to create a more dynamic and engaging narrative.
Inspiring Creative Writing Essay Examples
To gain a better understanding of what makes a successful creative writing essay, here are some inspiring examples to analyze:
1. The Yellow Wallpaper” by Charlotte Perkins Gilman
2. “The Tell-Tale Heart” by Edgar Allan Poe
3. “The Lottery” by Shirley Jackson
4. “A Good Man is Hard to Find”by Flannery O’Connor
5. “The Cask of Amontillado” by Edgar Allan Poe
6. “The Secret Life of Walter Mitty” by James Thurber
7. “The Garden Party” by Katherine Mansfield
8. The Road Not Taken” by Robert Frost
9. The Love Song of J . Alfred Prufrock” by T.S. Eliot
10. “To His Coy Mistress” by Andrew Marvell
By looking at these examples, you can see that symbolism, foreshadowing, and irony are often used in creative writing essays that work well. They also have well-thought-out characters, interesting plots, and language that evokes the senses and helps the reader picture a vivid world.
Each of these examples shows a different side of what it means to be human and helps us learn more about the world around us. These essays show how creative writing can captivate and interest readers, whether it’s about love, death, or what it’s like to be human.
Some of the most important things to learn from these examples are how important it is to have strong characters, use descriptive language well, and use literary devices to make the story better. By looking at these good examples of creative writing essays, writers can learn how to use the same techniques in their own work to make essays that are more interesting and effective.
How to Start a Creative Writing Essay with a Bang
Starting a creative writing essay in a way that captivates your reader is crucial for the success of your essay. Here are some different strategies you can use to start your essay with a bang:
1. Using attention-grabbing hooks to draw in the reader: Start with a provocative statement, a surprising fact, or a rhetorical question to pique the reader’s interest.
2. Crafting a strong opening sentence or paragraph: Create a vivid image or use descriptive language to set the scene and draw the reader into the story.
3. Starting in the middle of the action: Begin your story in the middle of a dramatic or exciting scene to immediately engage your reader.
4. Using an anecdote: Start with a personal anecdote that relates to the theme or message of your essay to draw the reader into your story.
By using attention-grabbing hooks and crafting a strong opening sentence or paragraph, you can hook your reader from the beginning and keep them engaged throughout your essay.
Elements of a Successful Creative Writing Essay
To write a successful creative writing essay, it is important to incorporate certain elements into your writing. Here are some elements to keep in mind:
1. Developing a strong plot and narrative structure: Your essay should have a clear beginning, middle, and end, with a well-developed plot that keeps the reader engaged.
2. Creating compelling and relatable characters: Your characters should be well-rounded, withunique personalities, motivations, and flaws that make them relatable and interesting to the reader.
3. Using descriptive language and sensory details: Use vivid and sensory language to create a world that the reader can imagine and visualize. This can enhance the reading experience and make your writing feel more immersive.
4. Incorporating dialogue and literary devices effectively: Dialogue can be a powerful tool for conveying information and developing characters. Literary devices like metaphor, simile, and symbolism can also be used to enhance the story and create deeper meaning.
5. Crafting a satisfying ending : Your essay should have a satisfying and conclusive ending that ties up loose ends and leaves a lasting impression on the reader.
To write a good creative writing essay, you need to use your imagination, skills, and knowledge. Use hooks and a strong first sentence or paragraph to get people interested in your essay right away. To make sure your story is successful, include things like a strong plot and story structure, interesting characters, descriptive language and sensory details, good dialogue and literary devices, and a satisfying ending. With these tips and elements in mind, you can write a powerful and memorable creative writing essay that engages and inspires your readers.
Creative Writing Essay Format
When it comes to formatting a creative writing essay, there are a few guidelines to keep in mind:
1. Use a standard font, such as Times New Roman or Arial, in 12-point size.
2. Double-space the text and use 1-inch margins on all sides.
3. Include a header with your name, the title of your essay , and the page number.
4. Use paragraph breaks to separate different ideas or sections of your essay .
5. Use italics or quotation marks to indicate dialogue or emphasize certain words or phrases.
Proper formatting is important to ensure that your work looks professional and is easy to read. By following these guidelines, you can create a polished and well-formatted creative writing essay.
When organizing and structuring your essay , consider using a clear and logical structure. This can include an introduction, body paragraphs, and a conclusion. You may also want to use headings and subheadings to break up your writing into sections and make it easier to follow.
Creative Writing Essay Topics
Generating creative writing essay topics can be a fun and creative process. Here are some brainstorming techniques and examples to help you come up with ideas:
Brainstorming Techniques:
1. Freewriting: Set a timer for 10-15 minutes and write down whatever comes to mind. Don’t worry about grammar or spelling, just write freely.
2. Mind Mapping: Start with a central idea and branch out with related ideas. This can help you visualize connections between ideas and spark new ones.
3. Listing: Make a list of words or phrases that relate to a central theme or idea. This can help you see patterns and connections between ideas.
Examples of Creative Writing Essay Topics:
1. A childhood memory that shaped who you are today.
2. A personal essay about overcoming a challenge.
3. A fictional story set in a dystopian society.
4. A character study of a family member or friend .
5. A descriptive essay about a memorable place .
6. An exploration of a unique hobby or interest.
7. A persuasive essay about a social or political issue .
8. A narrative essay about a journey or adventure .
9. A creative nonfiction essay about a historical event or person.
10. A personal essay about your relationship with nature .
11. A fictional story about a time traveler.
12. An essay about a defining moment in your life .
13. A character study of a famous historical figure .
14. A descriptive essay about a favoritefood or dish.
15. A personal essay about your experience with mental health .
16. A fictional story about a haunted house.
17. A persuasive essay about the importance of education .
18. A narrative essay about a difficult decision you had to make.
19. A creative nonfiction essay about a place that has special meaning to you.
20. A personal essay about your experience with a different culture.
21. A fictional story about a person with a superpower.
22. A character study of a famous author or artist.
23. A descriptive essay about your favorite season.
24. A persuasive essay about the benefits of exercise.
25. A narrative essay about a trip that changed your perspective.
26. A creative nonfiction essay about your first job .
27. A personal essay about your experience with discrimination .
28. A fictional story about a post-apocalyptic world.
29. A character study of a famous musician or athlete.
30. A descriptive essay about a favorite childhood memory.
It is important to choose a topic that is both interesting and manageable. Consider your interests and passions, as well as the audience you are writing for. Remember that a well-chosen topic can make your writing more engaging and effective, while also making the writing process more enjoyable and fulfilling.
Tips for Making Your Creative Writing Essay Interesting
– Using descriptive language and sensory details
– Incorporating conflict and tension into the story
– Developing complex and dynamic characters
– Using humor, irony, or suspense to engage the reader
To make your creative writing essay interesting and engaging, consider the following tips:
1. Use descriptive language and sensory details: Creating a vivid world for the reader to imagine can enhance the reading experience and make your writing more immersive.
2. Incorporate conflict and tension into the story: Conflict drives the narrative forward and creates tension that keeps the reader engaged.
3. Develop complex and dynamic characters: Characters with unique personalities, motivations, and flaws can make your story more relatable and interesting.
4. Use humor, irony, or suspense to engage the reader: Adding a touch of humor, irony, or suspense can make your writing more engaging and keep the reader hooked.
By using these techniques, you can make your creative writing essay more interesting and memorable for your readers.
Revision and Editing Tips for Creative Writing Essays
Revision and editing are important steps in the writing process. Here are some tips for revising and editing your creative writing essay:
1. Take a break: Step away from your writing for a few hours or days to gain a fresh perspective on your work .
2. Read your work out loud: This can help you catch errors and awkward phrasing that may not be immediately apparent when reading silently.
3. Get feedback from others: Share your work with others and ask for constructive criticism and feedback.
4. Look for common mistakes: Pay attention to common mistakes such as grammar and spelling errors, repetition, and inconsistencies.
5.Focus on clarity and conciseness: Ensure that your writing is clear and concise, and that your ideas are presented in a logical and organized manner.
6. Make sure your characters are consistent: Ensure that your characters’ actions, motivations, and personalities are consistent throughout the story.
7. Cut unnecessary words and phrases: Eliminate unnecessary words and phrases to tighten your writing and make it more impactful.
8. Check for pacing: Ensure that your story is paced well and that it moves at a pace that keeps the reader engaged.
9. Pay attention to the ending: Ensure that your ending is satisfying and that it ties up loose ends in a way that leaves a lasting impression on the reader.
By revising and editing your creative writing essay, you can improve the overall quality of your work and ensure that it is polished and error-free.
Frequently Asked Questions
1. what is a creative writing essay.
A creative writing essay is a type of essay that allows writers to express their creativity and imagination. It can take many forms, including personal essays , short stories, poetry, and more.
2. What are the elements of a creative writing essay?
The elements of a creative writing essay include a strong plot and narrative structure, compelling and relatable characters, descriptive language and sensory details, effective use of dialogue and literary devices, and a satisfying ending.
3. How do I make my creative writing essay interesting?
You can make your creative writing essay interesting by using descriptive language and sensory details, incorporating conflict and tension into the story, developing complex and dynamic characters, and using humor, irony, or suspense to engage the reader.
4. What is the best way to start a creative writing essay?
You can start a creative writing essay with a provocative statement, a surprising fact, or a rhetorical question to pique the reader’s interest. Alternatively, you can create a vivid image or use descriptive language to set the scene and draw the reader into the story.
5. How can I revise and edit my creative writing essay effectively?
To revise and edit your creative writing essay effectively, take a break, read your work out loud, get feedback from others, look for common mistakes, focus on clarity and conciseness, ensure consistency in character development, cut unnecessary words and phrases, check for pacing, and pay attention to the ending.
In conclusion, a creative writing essay is a powerful way to express your creativity and imagination. By incorporating the elements of a strong plot and narrative structure, compelling characters, descriptive language and sensory details, effective use of dialogue and literary devices, and a satisfying ending, you can create a memorable and impactful piece of writing. To make your essay interesting , consider using descriptive language, incorporating conflict and tension, developing complex characters, and using humor, irony, or suspense. When revising and editing your essay, take a break, read your work out loud, get feedback, and pay attention to common mistakes.
We encourage you to start your own creative writing essay and explore the many possibilities that this type of writing offers. Remember to choose a topic that is both interesting and manageable, and to let your creativity and imagination shine through in your writing. With these tips and techniques in mind, you can create a powerful and memorable creative writing essay that engages and inspires your readers.
Start by filling this short order form order.studyinghq.com
And then follow the progressive flow.
Having an issue, chat with us here
Cathy, CS.
New Concept ? Let a subject expert write your paper for You
Post navigation
Previous post.
📕 Studying HQ
Typically replies within minutes
Hey! 👋 Need help with an assignment?
🟢 Online | Privacy policy
- Friday, September 13, 2024
Creativity or Knowledge – What do you prefer?
“ Which is better Knowledge or creativity? ” is a question that is hard to answer because both things have their own impact. Both are used to find the solution to the problem. Creativity and knowledge are like two rooms the creative side is filled with ideas, thoughts, and imagination while the other room has information, a set of facts, and figures. The end goal of both things is the same but the way of reaching to goal is different. A creative person refers to identifying a new way of doing the work to find something new. On the other side people who prefer knowledge always follow a predefined way to achieve the end goal.
Both things are applicable to all fields and help a person grow. But there is some philosopher who thinks that in order to achieve true creativity a person needs to detach himself from knowledge. Where some people argue without knowing something how you can achieve pure creativity? For example ” A person wants to create a new dish but without the knowledge of cooking, spices how he or she will able to create a dish?” Now let’s find out which one is more important creativity or knowledge.
What is Knowledge?
All of us possess some kind of knowledge whether it’s related to education, art, sports, or any other domain. Knowledge can be defined as the information or fact that we have learned about a thing. It is the most basic but the most important need of a person’s life. Knowledge is the application of the information which is already known to the person. For example, solving a math problem by using predefined formulas. Acquiring Knowledge is an ongoing process it starts from birth and remains till the last breath. In-can be gained from two sources mentioned below
Many times people confused knowledge with reading books or having a classroom education. But it is more than that, “ a lifelong journey without any stop “. It can be earned in many ways – from education, from videos, from friends, from mistakes, and from the experiences of others. Knowledge not only teaches us what to do, and how to do it but also what not to do.
Why having Knowledge is essential?
“ There is no wealth like knowledge, no poverty like ignorance. ” – Buddha
- Having knowledge helps a person grow as a person and makes us gentle human beings.
- Gaining new knowledge developed new skills and opens the gate to new opportunities for us.
- In comparison to creativity using knowledge is reduce the chances of risk. The reason being the knowledgeable approach uses facts and figures and previously used information to find the solution.
- Knowledge provides quicker solutions in comparison to creativity.
- Having a good amount of knowledge in a particular subject will also improve the ability of thinking of a person.
- As all of us know that knowledge is the basic need of every creature for survival. Like human beings, animals also acquire knowledge from their parents.
- For getting the success we need to face new challenges every day and knowledge helps us in developing a zeal to learn.
What is Creativity?
Creativity can be defined as the process of creating or generating something new or capable provide new solutions to problems. It does not have any boundaries and also the outcome of creativity is not predictable. In order to become a creative person, one needs to see things from a different perspective. Creative skills not only required how many solutions or ideas you can provide but the uniqueness of each idea or solution. Also, one does not need any knowledge to become a creative person but it’s better to have it.
Creativity is something that makes people say “wow” reason it offers something new to us in a unique way. Imaginative and innovative skills make a person playful, curious, and responsible but also put them in an uneasy state. It does not guarantee success but the ideas or solutions generated from creativity have more impact. Creativity is the only way to find solutions that are unknown to us.
Why Do People Favoring the Creativity over Knowledge?
“ Creativity doesn’t wait for that perfect moment. It fashions its own perfect moments out of ordinary ones.” – Bruce Garrabrandt
- Creativity provides you with a way to express yourself in a different way. It helps us stand apart from the crowd of people.
- It removes anxiety and stress, according to some psychological reports creative people are happier than others.
- Solutions that come from creativity are more feasible and have a great impact on others.
- Creative skills help all of us to find the things which are unknown to us. And that’s why the creative person survives easily in the toughest situations.
- It creates a limitless world for you as all of us know there is no boundary for creativity. It enables the imagination beyond knowledge to find solutions.
Which is More Important Creativity or Knowledge?
As said earlier in this article both things have their own impact and help a person to grow. Based on the nature of the problem both creativity and knowledge are used. If a person wants to create a painting then creativity skills are a must for him on the other side if a scientist wants to create a rocket then he or she needs in-depth knowledge of rocket science. In most cases, both things are used together in order the get the best result. Knowledge will help you with all the information and creativity will use that available information to create a new solution. It’s like inventing a new bike for an engineering student after gathering information about it through formal education.
Knowledge may limit the world for you but it’s the best tool to find the answer to the question of what not to do. While creativity may not guarantee success but the ideas, and innovation are way more impactful than existing solutions. Both can be used separately but for reaching new heights in creativity one needs to gain proper knowledge. And for the best use of knowledge, you need creative skills. So both things are significant and complete each other.
Understanding the Difference Between Creativity and Knowledge
By: Author Paul Jenkins
Posted on May 17, 2023
Categories Creativity
Creativity and knowledge are two concepts that are often intertwined but are not the same. Creativity generates new ideas, concepts, or solutions, while knowledge accumulates facts, information, and skills through experience or education. Although they are different, creativity and knowledge can complement each other, and both are important for success in many fields.
Creativity is often associated with artistic endeavors but is also essential in fields such as science, engineering, and business. Creative thinking allows individuals to develop innovative solutions to problems and think outside the box. However, creativity alone is not enough. To be successful, individuals also need a solid foundation of knowledge in their field. Knowledge provides the necessary background and understanding to generate creative ideas that are practical and effective.
The relationship between creativity and knowledge is complex and multifaceted. While creativity can lead to new knowledge, knowledge can also inspire creativity. Knowledge can sometimes even limit creativity by creating fixed ideas and assumptions. To be successful, individuals need to find a balance between creativity and knowledge, using both to their advantage.
Understanding Creativity and Knowledge
What is creativity.
Creativity refers to the ability to generate new and original ideas or develop innovative solutions to problems. It involves divergent thinking, the ability to generate multiple solutions to a problem, and convergent thinking, which involves narrowing down the possible solutions to find the best one. Creativity can be seen as a combination of imagination, originality, and insight.
What is Knowledge?
On the other hand, knowledge refers to the information, skills, and expertise a person possesses. It is acquired through learning, experience, and practice. Knowledge can be divided into two types: explicit knowledge, which is the knowledge that can be easily articulated and codified, and tacit knowledge, which is the knowledge that is difficult to articulate and is often acquired through experience.
Differences between Creativity and Knowledge
While creativity and knowledge are both critical for success, they differ in several ways. Creativity involves generating new ideas and solutions, while knowledge involves applying existing knowledge to solve problems.
Creativity and knowledge differ because creativity involves taking risks and trying new things, while knowledge often involves following established procedures and rules. Creativity is often associated with innovation and originality, while knowledge is associated with expertise and mastery.
Creativity and knowledge also differ in terms of their focus. Creativity is focused on generating new and original ideas, while knowledge is focused on understanding and applying existing information. Creativity is often associated with divergent thinking, while knowledge is associated with convergent thinking.
The Role of Creativity and Knowledge in Problem-Solving
Problem-solving is essential in various fields, from business to science to art. Creativity and knowledge are two critical components that play a significant role in problem-solving.
Creativity in Problem-Solving
Creativity involves generating original ideas and solutions, often through divergent thinking. In problem-solving, creativity can provide new perspectives and approaches to a problem. It allows individuals to see things from a different angle, which can lead to insights and breakthroughs.
However, creativity alone may not always be enough to solve a problem. It is essential to balance creativity with practicality and feasibility. Moreover, creativity can involve risk-taking, which can lead to failure. Therefore, carefully assessing the risks and benefits of creative solutions is crucial.
Knowledge in Problem-Solving
Knowledge is accumulating facts, information, and expertise in a particular field. In problem-solving, knowledge can provide a foundation for understanding the problem and potential solutions. It allows individuals to make informed decisions and evaluate the feasibility of solutions.
Expertise in a particular field can provide a unique perspective and insight into a problem. It can help identify potential roadblocks and anticipate potential consequences. However, relying solely on existing knowledge can lead to a lack of originality and creativity in problem-solving.
Balancing Creativity and Knowledge in Problem-Solving
To achieve successful problem-solving, it is essential to balance creativity and knowledge. Combining creativity with knowledge can lead to innovative and practical solutions. Considering the strengths and limitations of creativity and knowledge in problem-solving is essential.
Moreover, problem-solving often involves making connections between seemingly unrelated objects or concepts. Therefore, it is crucial to have diverse experiences and perspectives to draw upon.
In conclusion, problem-solving requires a balance of creativity and knowledge. Creativity can provide new perspectives and approaches to a problem, while knowledge can provide a foundation for understanding and evaluating potential solutions. Individuals can achieve innovative and practical solutions to complex problems by combining creativity and knowledge.
The Importance of Creativity and Knowledge in Various Fields
In today’s world, creativity and knowledge are two essential components needed to thrive in various fields. Both creativity and knowledge have unique roles in different areas of work.
In science, creativity is essential to come up with new ideas, theories, and hypotheses. It is the driving force behind scientific innovation and discovery. On the other hand, knowledge is necessary to understand and build upon existing scientific knowledge. Creativity and knowledge work hand in hand to push the boundaries of scientific understanding and achieve breakthroughs.
In writing, creativity is crucial to come up with original and engaging content that captures the reader’s attention. Creativity helps writers to think outside the box, experiment with new styles, and develop unique perspectives. Knowledge, on the other hand, is necessary to provide accurate and well-researched information. A writer’s ability to combine creativity and knowledge can lead to exceptional writing that is both informative and engaging.
In business, creativity is essential to come up with new ideas, products, and services that meet customers’ changing needs. Creativity helps businesses to stand out from the competition and stay relevant in a constantly evolving market. Knowledge is necessary to understand market trends, consumer behavior, and financial management. Combining creativity and knowledge can lead to successful business ventures that achieve innovation and profitability.
In education, creativity is essential to engage students and foster a love of learning. Creativity helps educators to develop innovative teaching methods, create engaging lesson plans, and encourage student participation. Knowledge is necessary to provide students with accurate and relevant information. Combining creativity and knowledge can lead to effective learning experiences that promote critical thinking, problem-solving, and academic achievement.
In conclusion, creativity and knowledge are two distinct but complementary concepts essential for success in many fields. Creativity is the ability to generate new ideas and solutions, while knowledge is the accumulation of information and experiences. Both are important, but they play different roles in the creative process.
While creativity is often seen as the driving force behind innovation and progress, it is important to note that creativity alone is not enough. Without a solid foundation of knowledge and expertise in a particular field, creative ideas may not be feasible or effective. Similarly, knowledge without creativity can lead to stagnation and a lack of progress.
The relationship between creativity and knowledge is complex and multifaceted. On the one hand, extensive knowledge in a particular domain is often a prerequisite for creative functioning. On the other hand, creativity can also lead to acquiring new knowledge and developing new skills.
It is important to recognize that creativity and knowledge are not mutually exclusive. They are often intertwined and can reinforce each other. By combining creativity and knowledge, individuals and organizations can achieve greater success and significantly impact their respective fields.
In summary, creativity and knowledge are both critical components of the creative process, and each has a unique role. By understanding the relationship between these two concepts and leveraging them effectively, individuals and organizations can unlock their full creative potential and achieve their goals.
- Bipolar Disorder
- Therapy Center
- When To See a Therapist
- Types of Therapy
- Best Online Therapy
- Best Couples Therapy
- Managing Stress
- Sleep and Dreaming
- Understanding Emotions
- Self-Improvement
- Healthy Relationships
- Student Resources
- Personality Types
- Sweepstakes
- Guided Meditations
- Verywell Mind Insights
- 2024 Verywell Mind 25
- Mental Health in the Classroom
- Editorial Process
- Meet Our Review Board
- Crisis Support
Understanding the Psychology of Creativity
Michael H / DigitalVision / Getty Images
What Is Creativity?
When does creativity happen, types of creativity, what does it take to be creative, creativity and the big five, how to increase creativity, frequently asked questions.
What is creativity? Creativity involves the ability to develop new ideas or utilize objects or information in novel ways. It can involve large-scale ideas that have the potential to change the world, such as inventing tools that impact how people live, or smaller acts of creation such as figuring out a new way to accomplish a task in your daily life.
This article explores what creativity is and when it is most likely to happen. It also covers some of the steps that you can take to improve your own creativity.
Studying creativity can be a tricky process. Not only is creativity a complex topic in and of itself, but there is also no clear consensus on how exactly to define creativity. Many of the most common definitions suggest that creativity is the tendency to solve problems or create new things in novel ways.
Two of the primary components of creativity include:
- Originality: The idea should be something new that is not simply an extension of something else that already exists.
- Functionality: The idea needs to actually work or possess some degree of usefulness.
In his book Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention , psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi suggested that creativity can often be seen in a few different situations.
- People who seem stimulating, interesting, and have a variety of unusual thoughts.
- People who perceive the world with a fresh perspective, have insightful ideas and make important personal discoveries. These individuals make creative discoveries that are generally known only to them.
- People who make great creative achievements that become known to the entire world. Inventors and artists such as Thomas Edison and Pablo Picasso would fall into this category.
Experts also tend to distinguish between different types of creativity. The “four c” model of creativity suggests that there are four different types:
- “Mini-c” creativity involves personally meaningful ideas and insights that are known only to the self.
- “ Little-c” creativity involves mostly everyday thinking and problem-solving. This type of creativity helps people solve everyday problems they face and adapt to changing environments.
- “Pro-C” creativity takes place among professionals who are skilled and creative in their respective fields. These individuals are creative in their vocation or profession but do not achieve eminence for their works.
- “Big-C” creativity involves creating works and ideas that are considered great in a particular field. This type of creativity leads to eminence and acclaim and often leads to world-changing creations such as medical innovations, technological advances, and artistic achievements.
Csikszentmihalyi suggests that creative people tend to possess are a variety of traits that contribute to their innovative thinking. Some of these key traits include:
- Energy: Creative people tend to possess a great deal of both physical and mental energy. However, they also tend to spend a great deal of time quietly thinking and reflecting.
- Intelligence: Psychologists have long believed that intelligence plays a critical role in creativity. In Terman’s famous longitudinal study of gifted children, researchers found that while high IQ was necessary for great creativity, not all people with high IQs are creative. Csikszentmihalyi believes that creative people must be smart, but they must be capable of looking at things in fresh, even naïve, ways.
- Discipline: Creative people do not just sit around waiting for inspiration to strike. They are playful, yet they are also disciplined in the pursuit of their work and passions.
Certain personality traits are also connected to creativity. According to the big five theory of personality , human personality is made up of five broad dimensions:
- Conscientiousness
- Extroversion
- Agreeableness
- Neuroticism
Each dimension represents a continuum, so for each trait, people can be either high, low, or somewhere between the two.
Openness to experience is a big five trait that is correlated with creativity. People who are high on this trait are more open to new experiences and ideas. They tend to seek novelty and enjoy trying new things, meeting new people, and considering different perspectives.
However, other personality traits and characteristics can also play a role in creativity. For example, intrinsic motivation , curiosity, and persistence can all determine how much people tend to pursue new ideas and look for novel solutions.
While some people seem to come by creativity naturally, there are things that you can do to increase your own creativity .
Some strategies that can be helpful for improving creativity include:
- Being open to new ideas : Openness to experience is the personality trait that is most closely correlated with creativity. Focus on being willing to try new things and explore new ideas.
- Be persistent : Creativity is not just about sitting around waiting for inspiration to strike. Creative people spend time working to produce new things. Their efforts don't always work out, but continued practice builds skills that contribute to creativity.
- Make time for creativity : In addition to being persistent, you also need to devote time specifically toward creative efforts. This might mean setting aside a little time each day or each week specifically to brainstorm, practice, learn, or create.
Csikszentmihalyi has noted that creativity requires both a fresh perspective combined with discipline. As Thomas Edison famously suggested, genius is 1% inspiration and 99% perspiration.
A Word From Verywell
Creativity is a complex subject and researchers are still working to understand exactly what factors contribute to the ability to think creatively. While some people seem to come by creativity naturally, there are also things you can do to build and strengthen this ability.
The late Maya Angelou also suggested that thinking creativity helps foster even greater creativity, "The important thing is to use it. You can’t use up creativity. The more you use it, the more you have," she suggested.
Creativity does not reside in one single area of the brain; many areas are actually involved. The frontal cortex of the brain is responsible for many of the functions that play a part in creativity.
However, other parts of the brain impact creativity as well, including the hippocampus (which is important to memory) and the basal ganglia (which is essential in the memory of how to perform tasks). The white matter of the brain, which keeps the various parts of the brain connected, is also essential for creative thinking.
Research suggests that people can train their brains to be more creative. Engaging in cognitively stimulating tasks, going on a walk, finding sources of inspiration, and meditating are a few strategies that may help boost creative thinking abilities.
The "big five" are the broad categories of traits that make up personality. The five dimensions are openness, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism. Each trait involves a range between two extremes, and people can be either at each end or somewhere in the middle.
American Psychological Association. The science of creativity .
Csikszentmihalyi M. Creativity: Flow and the Psychology of Discovery and Invention . New York: HarperCollins; 2013.
Kaufman J, Beghetto R. Beyond big and little: The four C model of creativity . Review of General Psychology . 2009;13(1):1-12. doi:10.1037/a0013688
Kaufman SB, Quilty LC, Grazioplene RG, et al. Openness to experience and intellect differentially predict creative achievement in the arts and sciences . J Pers . 2016;84(2):248-258. doi:10.1111/jopy.12156
Elliot J. Conversations With Maya Angelou . Jackson, Miss.: University Press of Mississippi; 1998.
Cavdarbasha D, Kurczek J. Connecting the dots: your brain and creativity . Front Young Minds . 2017;5:19. doi:10.3389/frym.2017.00019
Sun J, Chen Q, Zhang Q, Li Y, Li H, Wei D, Yang W, Qiu J. Training your brain to be more creative: brain functional and structural changes induced by divergent thinking training . Hum Brain Mapp . 2016;37(10):3375-87. doi:10.1002/hbm.23246
By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."
4.2 Creativity, Innovation, and Invention: How They Differ
Learning objectives.
By the end of this section, you will be able to:
- Distinguish between creativity, innovation, and invention
- Explain the difference between pioneering and incremental innovation, and which processes are best suited to each
One of the key requirements for entrepreneurial success is your ability to develop and offer something unique to the marketplace. Over time, entrepreneurship has become associated with creativity , the ability to develop something original, particularly an idea or a representation of an idea. Innovation requires creativity, but innovation is more specifically the application of creativity. Innovation is the manifestation of creativity into a usable product or service. In the entrepreneurial context, innovation is any new idea, process, or product, or a change to an existing product or process that adds value to that existing product or service.
How is an invention different from an innovation? All inventions contain innovations, but not every innovation rises to the level of a unique invention. For our purposes, an invention is a truly novel product, service, or process. It will be based on previous ideas and products, but it is such a leap that it is not considered an addition to or a variant of an existing product but something unique. Table 4.2 highlights the differences between these three concepts.
Concept | Description |
---|---|
Creativity | ability to develop something original, particularly an idea or a representation of an idea, with an element of aesthetic flair |
Innovation | change that adds value to an existing product or service |
Invention | truly novel product, service, or process that, though based on ideas and products that have come before, represents a leap, a creation truly novel and different |
One way we can consider these three concepts is to relate them to design thinking. Design thinking is a method to focus the design and development decisions of a product on the needs of the customer, typically involving an empathy-driven process to define complex problems and create solutions that address those problems. Complexity is key to design thinking. Straightforward problems that can be solved with enough money and force do not require much design thinking. Creative design thinking and planning are about finding new solutions for problems with several tricky variables in play. Designing products for human beings, who are complex and sometimes unpredictable, requires design thinking.
Airbnb has become a widely used service all over the world. That has not always been the case, however. In 2009, the company was near failure. The founders were struggling to find a reason for the lack of interest in their properties until they realized that their listings needed professional, high-quality photographs rather than simple cell-phone photos. Using a design thinking approach, the founders traveled to the properties with a rented camera to take some new photographs. As a result of this experiment, weekly revenue doubled. This approach could not be sustainable in the long term, but it generated the outcome the founders needed to better understand the problem. This creative approach to solving a complex problem proved to be a major turning point for the company. 7
People who are adept at design thinking are creative, innovative, and inventive as they strive to tackle different types of problems. Consider Divya Nag , a millennial biotech and medical device innovation leader, who launched a business after she discovered a creative way to prolong the life of human cells in Petri dishes. Nag’s stem-cell research background and her entrepreneurial experience with her medical investment firm made her a popular choice when Apple hired her to run two programs dedicated to developing health-related apps, a position she reached before turning twenty-four years old. 8
Creativity, innovation, inventiveness, and entrepreneurship can be tightly linked. It is possible for one person to model all these traits to some degree. Additionally, you can develop your creativity skills, sense of innovation, and inventiveness in a variety of ways. In this section, we’ll discuss each of the key terms and how they relate to the entrepreneurial spirit.
Entrepreneurial creativity and artistic creativity are not so different. You can find inspiration in your favorite books, songs, and paintings, and you also can take inspiration from existing products and services. You can find creative inspiration in nature, in conversations with other creative minds, and through formal ideation exercises, for example, brainstorming. Ideation is the purposeful process of opening up your mind to new trains of thought that branch out in all directions from a stated purpose or problem. Brainstorming , the generation of ideas in an environment free of judgment or dissension with the goal of creating solutions, is just one of dozens of methods for coming up with new ideas. 9
You can benefit from setting aside time for ideation. Reserving time to let your mind roam freely as you think about an issue or problem from multiple directions is a necessary component of the process. Ideation takes time and a deliberate effort to move beyond your habitual thought patterns. If you consciously set aside time for creativity, you will broaden your mental horizons and allow yourself to change and grow. 10
Entrepreneurs work with two types of thinking. Linear thinking —sometimes called vertical thinking —involves a logical, step-by-step process. In contrast, creative thinking is more often lateral thinking , free and open thinking in which established patterns of logical thought are purposefully ignored or even challenged. You can ignore logic; anything becomes possible. Linear thinking is crucial in turning your idea into a business. Lateral thinking will allow you to use your creativity to solve problems that arise. Figure 4.5 summarizes linear and lateral thinking.
It is certainly possible for you to be an entrepreneur and focus on linear thinking. Many viable business ventures flow logically and directly from existing products and services. However, for various reasons, creativity and lateral thinking are emphasized in many contemporary contexts in the study of entrepreneurship. Some reasons for this are increased global competition, the speed of technological change, and the complexity of trade and communication systems. 11 These factors help explain not just why creativity is emphasized in entrepreneurial circles but also why creativity should be emphasized. Product developers of the twenty-first century are expected to do more than simply push products and innovations a step further down a planned path. Newer generations of entrepreneurs are expected to be path breakers in new products, services, and processes.
Examples of creativity are all around us. They come in the forms of fine art and writing, or in graffiti and viral videos, or in new products, services, ideas, and processes. In practice, creativity is incredibly broad. It is all around us whenever or wherever people strive to solve a problem, large or small, practical or impractical.
We previously defined innovation as a change that adds value to an existing product or service. According to the management thinker and author Peter Drucker , the key point about innovation is that it is a response to both changes within markets and changes from outside markets. For Drucker, classical entrepreneurship psychology highlights the purposeful nature of innovation. 12 Business firms and other organizations can plan to innovate by applying either lateral or linear thinking methods, or both. In other words, not all innovation is purely creative. If a firm wishes to innovate a current product, what will likely matter more to that firm is the success of the innovation rather than the level of creativity involved. Drucker summarized the sources of innovation into seven categories, as outlined in Table 4.3 . Firms and individuals can innovate by seeking out and developing changes within markets or by focusing on and cultivating creativity. Firms and individuals should be on the lookout for opportunities to innovate. 13
Source | Description |
---|---|
The unexpected | Looking for new opportunities in the market; unexpected product performance; unexpected new products as examples |
The incongruity | Discrepancies between what you think should be and what is reality |
Process need | Weaknesses in the organization, product, or service |
Changes in industry/market | New regulations; new technologies |
Demographics | Understanding needs and wants of target markets |
Changes in perceptions | Changes in perceptions of life events and values |
New knowledge | New technologies; advancements in thinking; new research |
One innovation that demonstrates several of Drucker’s sources is the use of cashier kiosks in fast-food restaurants. McDonald’s was one of the first to launch these self-serve kiosks. Historically, the company has focused on operational efficiencies (doing more/better with less). In response to changes in the market, changes in demographics, and process need, McDonald’s incorporated self-serve cashier stations into their stores. These kiosks address the need of younger generations to interact more with technology and gives customers faster service in most cases. 15
Another leading expert on innovation, Tony Ulwick , focuses on understanding how the customer will judge or evaluate the quality and value of the product. The product development process should be based on the metrics that customers use to judge products, so that innovation can address those metrics and develop the best product for meeting customers’ needs when it hits the market. This process is very similar to Drucker’s contention that innovation comes as a response to changes within and outside of the market. Ulwick insists that focusing on the customer should begin early in the development process. 16
Disruptive innovation is a process that significantly affects the market by making a product or service more affordable and/or accessible, so that it will be available to a much larger audience. Clay Christensen of Harvard University coined this term in the 1990s to emphasize the process nature of innovation. For Christensen, the innovative component is not the actual product or service, but the process that makes that product more available to a larger population of users. He has since published a good deal on the topic of disruptive innovation, focusing on small players in a market. Christensen theorizes that a disruptive innovation from a smaller company can threaten an existing larger business by offering the market new and improved solutions. The smaller company causes the disruption when it captures some of the market share from the larger organization. 17 , 18 One example of a disruptive innovation is Uber and its impact on the taxicab industry. Uber’s innovative service, which targets customers who might otherwise take a cab, has shaped the industry as whole by offering an alternative that some deem superior to the typical cab ride.
One key to innovation within a given market space is to look for pain points, particularly in existing products that fail to work as well as users expect them to. A pain point is a problem that people have with a product or service that might be addressed by creating a modified version that solves the problem more efficiently. 19 For example, you might be interested in whether a local retail store carries a specific item without actually going there to check. Most retailers now have a feature on their websites that allows you to determine whether the product (and often how many units) is available at a specific store. This eliminates the need to go to the location only to find that they are out of your favorite product. Once a pain point is identified in a firm’s own product or in a competitor’s product, the firm can bring creativity to bear in finding and testing solutions that sidestep or eliminate the pain, making the innovation marketable. This is one example of an incremental innovation , an innovation that modifies an existing product or service. 20
In contrast, a pioneering innovation is one based on a new technology, a new advancement in the field, and/or an advancement in a related field that leads to the development of a new product. 21 Firms offering similar products and services can undertake pioneering innovations, but pioneering the new product requires opening up new market space and taking major risks.
Entrepreneur In Action
Pioneering innovation in the personal care industry.
In his ninth-grade biology class, Benjamin Stern came up with an idea to change the personal care industry. He envisioned personal cleaning products (soap, shampoo, etc.) that would contain no harsh chemicals or sulfates, and would also produce no plastic waste from empty bottles. He developed Nohbo Drops , single-use personal cleansing products with water-soluble packaging. Stern was able to borrow money from family and friends, and use some of his college fund to hire a chemist to develop the product. He then appeared on Shark Tank with his innovation in 2016 and secured the backing of investor Mark Cuban . Stern assembled a research team to perfect the product and obtained a patent ( Figure 4.6 ). The products are now available via the company website.
Is a pioneering innovation an invention? A firm makes a pioneering innovation when it creates a product or service arising from what it has done before. Pokémon GO is a great example of pioneering innovation. Nintendo was struggling to keep pace with other gaming-related companies. The company, in keeping with its core business of video games, came up with a new direction for the gaming industry. Pokémon GO is known worldwide and is one of the most successful mobile games launched. 22 It takes creativity to explore a new direction, but not every pioneering innovation creates a distinctly new product or capability for consumers and clients.
Entrepreneurs in the process of developing an innovation usually examine the current products and services their firm offers, investigate new technologies and techniques being introduced in the marketplace or in related marketplaces, watch research and development in universities and in other companies, and pursue new developments that are likely to fit one of two conditions: an innovation that likely fits an existing market better than other products or services being offered; or an innovation that fits a market that so far has been underserved.
An example of an incremental innovation is the trash receptacle you find at fast-food restaurants. For many years, trash cans in fast-food locations were placed in boxes behind swinging doors. The trash cans did one job well: They hid the garbage from sight. But they created other problems: Often, the swinging doors would get ketchup and other waste on them, surely a pain point. Newer trash receptacles in fast-food restaurants have open fronts or open tops that enable people to dispose of their trash more neatly. The downside for restaurants is that users can see and possibly smell the food waste, but if the restaurants change the trash bags frequently, as is a good practice anyway, this innovation works relatively well. You might not think twice about this everyday example of an innovation when you eat at a fast-food restaurant, but even small improvements can matter a lot, particularly if the market they serve is vast.
An invention is a leap in capability beyond innovation. Some inventions combine several innovations into something new. Invention certainly requires creativity, but it goes beyond coming up with new ideas, combinations of thought, or variations on a theme. Inventors build. Developing something users and customers view as an invention could be important to some entrepreneurs, because when a new product or service is viewed as unique, it can create new markets. True inventiveness is often recognized in the marketplace, and it can help build a valuable reputation and help establish market position if the company can build a future-oriented corporate narrative around the invention. 23
Besides establishing a new market position, a true invention can have a social and cultural impact. At the social level, a new invention can influence the ways institutions work. For example, the invention of desktop computing put accounting and word processing into the hands of nearly every office worker. The ripple effects spread to the school systems that educate and train the corporate workforce. Not long after the spread of desktop computing, workers were expected to draft reports, run financial projections, and make appealing presentations. Specializations or aspects of specialized jobs—such as typist, bookkeeper, corporate copywriter—became necessary for almost everyone headed for corporate work. Colleges and eventually high schools saw software training as essential for students of almost all skill levels. These additional capabilities added profitability and efficiencies, but they also have increased job requirements for the average professional.
Some of the most successful inventions contain a mix of familiarity and innovation that is difficult to achieve. With this mix, the rate of adoption can be accelerated because of the familiarity with the concept or certain aspects of the product or service. As an example, the “videophone” was a concept that began to be explored as early as the late 1800s. AT&T began extensive work on videophones during the 1920s. However, the invention was not adopted because of a lack of familiarity with the idea of seeing someone on a screen and communicating back and forth. Other factors included societal norms, size of the machine, and cost. It wasn’t until the early 2000s that the invention started to take hold in the marketplace. 24 The concept of a black box is that activities are performed in a somewhat mysterious and ambiguous manner, with a serendipitous set of actions connecting that result in a surprisingly beneficial manner. An example is Febreeze, a chemical combination that binds molecules to eliminate odors. From a black box perspective, the chemical engineers did not intend to create this product, but as they were working on creating another product, someone noticed that the product they were working on removed odors, thus inadvertently creating a successful new product marketed as Febreeze.
What Can You Do?
Did henry ford invent the assembly line.
Very few products or procedures are actually brand-new ideas. Most new products are alterations or new applications of existing products, with some type of twist in design, function, portability, or use. Henry Ford is usually credited with inventing the moving assembly line Figure 4.7 (a) in 1913. However, some 800 years before Henry Ford, wooden ships were mass produced in the northern Italian city of Venice in a system that anticipated the modern assembly line.
Various components (ropes, sails, and so on) were prefabricated in different parts of the Venetian Arsenal, a huge, complex construction site along one of Venice’s canals. The parts were then delivered to specific assembly points Figure 4.7 (b) . After each stage of construction, the ships were floated down the canal to the next assembly area, where the next sets of workers and parts were waiting. Moving the ships down the waterway and assembling them in stages increased speed and efficiency to the point that long before the Industrial Revolution, the Arsenal could produce one fully functional and completely equipped ship per day . The system was so successful that it was used from the thirteenth century to about 1800.
Henry Ford did not invent anything new—he only applied the 800-year-old process of building wooden ships by hand along a moving waterway to making metal cars by hand on a moving conveyor ( Figure 4.7 ).
Opportunities to bring new products and processes to market are in front of us every day. The key is having the ability to recognize them and implement them. Likewise, the people you need to help you be successful may be right in front of you on a regular basis. The key is having the ability to recognize who they are and making connections to them. Just as those ships and cars moved down an assembly line until they were ready to be put into service, start thinking about moving down the “who I know” line so that you will eventually have a successful business in place.
The process of invention is difficult to codify because not all inventions or inventors follow the same path. Often the path can take multiple directions, involve many people besides the inventor, and encompass many restarts. Inventors and their teams develop their own processes along with their own products, and the field in which an inventor works will greatly influence the modes and pace of invention. Elon Musk is famous for founding four different billion-dollar companies. The development processes for PayPal , Solar City , SpaceX , and Tesla differed widely; however, Musk does outline a six-step decision-making process ( Figure 4.8 ):
- Ask a question.
- Gather as much evidence as possible about it.
- Develop axioms based on the evidence and try to assign a probability of truth to each one.
- Draw a conclusion in order to determine: Are these axioms correct, are they relevant, do they necessarily lead to this conclusion, and with what probability?
- Attempt to disprove the conclusion. Seek refutation from others to further help break your conclusion.
- If nobody can invalidate your conclusion, then you’re probably right, but you’re not certainly right.
In other words, the constant underlying Musk’s decision process is the scientific method. 25 The scientific method , most often associated with the natural sciences, outlines the process of discovering an answer to a question or a problem. “The scientific method is a logical organization of steps that scientists use to make deductions about the world around us.” 26 The steps in the scientific method line up quite nicely with Musk’s decision-making process. Applying the scientific method to invention and innovation makes sense. The scientific method involves becoming aware of a problem, collecting data about it by observing and experimenting, and coming up with suggestions on how to solve it.
Economists argue that processes of invention can be explained by economic forces. But this hasn’t always been the case. Prior to 1940, economic theory focused very little on inventions. After World War II, much of the global economy in the developed world needed to be rebuilt. New technologies were developing rapidly, and research and development investment increased. Inventors and economists alike became aware of consumer demand and realized that demand can influence which inventions take off at a given time. 27 However, inventors are always up against an adoption curve. 28
The Rogers Adoption Curve was popularized through the research and publications of the author and scientist Everett Rogers . 29 He first used it to describe how agricultural innovations diffused (or failed to) in a society. It was later applied to all inventions and innovations. This curve illustrates diffusion of an innovation and when certain people will adopt it. First is the question of who adopts inventions and innovations in society: The main groups are innovators, early adopters, early and late-majority adopters, and “laggards” (Rogers’s own term). 30 The innovators are the ones willing to take a risk on a new product, the consumers who want to try it first. The early adopters are consumers who will adopt new inventions with little to no information. Majority adopters will adopt products after being accepted by the majority. And finally, laggards are often not willing to readily adopt change and are the hardest to convince to try a new invention. 31
Rogers’s second way of looking at the concept is from the point of view of the invention itself. A given population partially or completely adopts an invention or rejects it. If an invention is targeted at the wrong population or the wrong population segment, this can dramatically inhibit its chances of being adopted widely. The most critical point of adoption often occurs at the end of the early adoption phase, before the early majority steps in and truly confirms (or not) the diffusion of an invention. This is called the diffusion chasm (though this process is usually called the diffusion of innovations , for our purposes, it applies quite well to new inventions as we define them here).
The diffusion curve depicts a social process in which the value of an invention is perceived (or not) to be worth the cost ( Figure 4.9 ). Early adopters generally pay more than those who wait, but if the invention gives them a perceived practical, social, or cultural advantage, members of the population, the popularity of the invention itself, and marketing can all drive the invention over the diffusion chasm. Once the early majority adopts an innovation (in very large numbers), we can expect the rest of the majority to adopt it. By the time the late majority and the laggards adopt an innovation, the novelty has worn off, but the practical benefits of the innovation can still be felt.
Inventors are constantly trying to cross the diffusion chasm, often with many products at a time. Crossing the diffusion chasm is a nearly constant concern for business-focused or outcomes-focused inventors. Inventors put many of their resources into an invention during the innovation and early adoption stages. Inventions may not turn a profit for investors or the inventors themselves until they are well into the early majority stage of adoption. Some inventors are pleased to work toward general discovery, but most in today’s social and cultural context are working to develop products and services for markets.
One shortcoming of the diffusion of innovations model is that it treats inventions and innovations as though they are finished and complete, though many are not. Not all inventions are finished products ready for market. Iterative development is more common, particularly in fields with high levels of complexity and in service-oriented ventures. In the iterative development process, inventors and innovators continuously engage with potential customers in order to develop their products and their consumer bases at the same time. This model of business learning, also known as the science of customer development, is essential. 32 Business learning involves testing product-market fit and making changes to an innovation or invention many times over until either investment funding runs out or the product succeeds. Perhaps the most accurate way to summarize this process is to note that many inventions are hit-or-miss prospects that get only a few chances to cross the diffusion chasm. When innovators follow the build-measure-learn model (discussed in detail in Launch for Growth to Success ), they try to work their way across the diffusion chasm rather than making a leap of faith.
Work It Out
The safety razor was an innovation over the straight razor. Safety razor blades are small enough to fit inside a capsule, and the location and type of handle was altered to suit the new orientation of handle to blade ( Figure 4.10 ). Most contemporary razors are themselves innovations on the safety razor, whether they have two, three, four, or more blades. The method of changing razor blades has evolved with each innovation on the safety razor, but the designs are functionally similar.
The electric razor is a related invention. It still uses blades to shave hair off the face or body, but the blades are hidden beneath a foil or foils. Hairs poke through the foils when the razor is pressed against the skin, and blades moving in various directions cut the hairs. Although electric razors use blades as do mechanical razors, the new design and the added technology qualified the electric razor as an invention that offered something new in the shaving industry when Jacob Schick won the patent for a shaving machine in 1930. 33 Still other innovations in the shaving genre include gender-specific razors, beard trimmers, and, more recently, online clubs such as Dollar Shave Club and Harry’s Shave Club .
Think about the conceptual difference between innovation and invention. Is the safety razor a pioneering innovation or an incremental one? What makes the electric razor an invention, as we define it here? What makes it stand out as a leap from previous types of razors? Do you think the electric razor is a “sure thing”? Why or why not? Consider the availability of electricity at the time the first electric razors were being made. Why do you think the electric razor made it over the diffusion chasm between early adopters and early majority adopters? Do you think the electric razor was invented iteratively with small changes to the same product in response to customer preferences? Or did it develop in a series of black box inventions, with each one either diffusing or not?
- 7 “How Design Thinking Transformed Airbnb from Failing Startup to Billion Dollar Business.” First Round Review . n.d. https://firstround.com/review/How-design-thinking-transformed-Airbnb-from-failing-startup-to-billion-dollar-business/
- 8 “Divya Nag, 26.” Fortune . n.d. http://fortune.com/40-under-40/2017/divya-nag-27/
- 9 Rikke Dam and Teo Siang. “Introduction to the Essential Ideation Techniques Which Are the Heart of Design Thinking.” Interaction Design Foundation . April 2019. https://www.interaction-design.org/literature/article/introduction-to-the-essential-ideation-techniques-which-are-the-heart-of-design-thinking
- 10 Dawn Kelly and Terry L. Amburgey. “Organizational Inertia and Momentum: A Dynamic Model of Strategic Change.” Academy of Management Journal 34, no. 3 (1991): 591–612.
- 11 Ian Fillis and Ruth Rentschler. “The Role of Creativity in Entrepreneurship.” Journal of Enterprising Culture 18, no. 1 (2010): 49–81.
- 12 P. F. Drucker. Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practices and Principles . New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986.
- 13 P. F. Drucker. Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practices and Principles . (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986), 35.
- 14 P. F. Drucker. Innovation and Entrepreneurship: Practices and Principles . New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1986.
- 15 Blake Morgan. “5 Fresh Examples of Customer Service Innovation.” Forbes . July 17, 2017. https://www.forbes.com/sites/blakemorgan/2017/07/17/5-fresh-examples-of-customer-experience-innovation/#3ae5a46e5c18
- 16 Tony Ulwick. “Reinventing Innovation for 25 Years.” Strategyn . n.d. https://strategyn.com/tony-ulwick/?network=g&matchtype=p&keyword=tony%20ulwick&creative=268244402567&device=c&devicemodel=&placement=&position=1t1&campaignid=1394486829&adgroupid=57939305027&loc_physical_ms=9015694&loc_interest_ms=&gclid=CjwKCAjw29vsBRAuEiwA9s-0B2jD3BYbm-BEiPWHKfd6R6mnW4XCHuhXbX_JhUof76IdXh6joIzlWRoCqJAQAvD_BwE
- 17 Chris Larson. “Disruptive Innovation Theory: What It Is & 4 Key Concepts.” Harvard Business School . November 15, 2016. https://online.hbs.edu/blog/post/4-keys-to-understanding-clayton-christensens-theory-of-disruptive-innovation
- 18 Rosamond Hutt. “What Is Disruptive Innovation?” World Economic Forum . June 25, 2016. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/06/what-is-disruptive-innovation/
- 19 Lloyd Waldo. “What’s a Pain Point? A Guide for Startups.” StartupYard Seed Accelerator . December 1, 2016. https://startupyard.com/whats-pain-point/
- 20 Abdul Ali, Manohar U. Kalwani, and Dan Kovenock. “Selecting Product Development Projects: Pioneering versus Incremental Innovation Strategies.” Management Science 39, no. 3 (1993): 255–274.
- 21 Abdul Ali. “Pioneering versus Incremental Innovation: Review and Research Propositions.” Journal of Product Innovation Management 11, no. 1 (1994): 46–61.
- 22 JV Chamary. “Why ‘Pokémon GO’ Is the World’s Most Important Game.” Forbes . February 10, 2018. https://www.forbes.com/sites/jvchamary/2018/02/10/pokemon-go-science-health-benefits/#2b6f07fd3ab0
- 23 Morten Thanning Vendelø. “Narrating Corporate Reputation: Becoming Legitimate through Storytelling.” International Studies of Management & Organization 28, no. 3 (1998): 120–137.
- 24 Thomas J. Fitzgerald. “For the Deaf: Communication without the Wait.” The New York Times . December 18, 2003. https://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/18/technology/for-the-deaf-communication-without-the-wait.html
- 25 Abby Jackson. “Elon Musk Uses This 6-Step Process to Make Decisions.” Business Insider . November 16, 2017. https://www.inc.com/business-insider/how-elon-musk-makes-decisions-rolling-stone.html
- 26 Joan Whetzel. “Formula for Using the Scientific Method.” Owlcation . February 11, 2017. https://owlcation.com/academia/FormulaForUsingScientificMethod
- 27 N. Rosenberg. “Science, Invention and Economic Growth.” The Economic Journal 84, no. 333 (1974): 90–108.
- 28 Everett M. Rogers. Diffusion of Innovations , 5th ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.
- 29 John-Pierre Maeli. “The Rogers Adoption Curve & How You Spread New Ideas Throughout Culture.” The Political Informer . May 6, 2016. https://medium.com/the-political-informer/the-rogers-adoption-curve-how-you-spread-new-ideas-throughout-culture-d848462fcd24
- 30 Everett M. Rogers. Diffusion of Innovations , 5th ed. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010.
- 31 Wayne W. LaMorte. “Diffusion of Innovation Theory.” September 9, 2019. http://sphweb.bumc.bu.edu/otlt/MPH-Modules/SB/BehavioralChangeTheories/BehavioralChangeTheories4.html
- 32 Eric Ries. The Lean Startup: How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses . Largo, Maryland: Crown Books, 2011.
- 33 “Jacob Schick Invents the Electric Razor.” Connecticut History . May 13, 2017. https://connecticuthistory.org/jacob-schick-invents-the-electric-razor/
This book may not be used in the training of large language models or otherwise be ingested into large language models or generative AI offerings without OpenStax's permission.
Want to cite, share, or modify this book? This book uses the Creative Commons Attribution License and you must attribute OpenStax.
Access for free at https://openstax.org/books/entrepreneurship/pages/1-introduction
- Authors: Michael Laverty, Chris Littel
- Publisher/website: OpenStax
- Book title: Entrepreneurship
- Publication date: Jan 16, 2020
- Location: Houston, Texas
- Book URL: https://openstax.org/books/entrepreneurship/pages/1-introduction
- Section URL: https://openstax.org/books/entrepreneurship/pages/4-2-creativity-innovation-and-invention-how-they-differ
© Jun 26, 2024 OpenStax. Textbook content produced by OpenStax is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution License . The OpenStax name, OpenStax logo, OpenStax book covers, OpenStax CNX name, and OpenStax CNX logo are not subject to the Creative Commons license and may not be reproduced without the prior and express written consent of Rice University.
Knowledge vs. Creativity
Do you agree or disagree with the following statement?
It is more important to learn knowledge from studying than to develop creativity.
Use specific reasons and examples to support your answer.
SAMPLE ESSAY
My teachers are always encouraging the students to memorize lots of different facts. However, I feel this is the wrong approach to education. Instead, it is more important to develop students’ creativity than to learn knowledge from studying.
For one thing, creative people are often more successful. It does not take intelligence to do well in life. In fact, many of the most successful people were the most creative. One example is Henry Ford. He did not invent the assembly line. Instead, he used his creativity to adapt it to make cars on it. That made his company incredibly profitable. Additionally, there are many artists and other individuals who lack “book learning.” Instead, they have huge amounts of creativity. These people range from Pablo Picasso to Steven Spielberg, but they all have two things in common: They were highly creative and highly successful.
Additionally, creative people can dramatically change the world. This is possible because they think “outside the box.” They are open to new ways of seeing the world and are willing to explore them. Bill Gates is one such example. He never graduated from college. Instead, he quit school to help form Microsoft. His creativity made Microsoft a world leader in computer technology, and now the great majority of people in the world use its software products on their computers. Steve Jobs of Apple is another success story through creativity. He too never graduated from college. Thanks to his creative mind, however, he has led Apple to success after success. Thanks to Jobs, people listen to music on their iPods and call their friends on their iPhones today. Creative people like Bill Gates and Steve Jobs have improved the world by introducing new ideas and products.
Therefore, developing creativity is more important than learning knowledge from studying. Creative people usually have more success and can also change the world in a positive way. I would much rather be creative than have lots of book knowledge.
(327 Words)
Related posts:
- Knowledge gained from experience vs. knowledge gained from books
- School Teach for Careers or General Knowledge?
- Teachers: Relate Well or Pass on Knowledge? – TOEFL Essays Score 27 +
- Updating Teachers’ Knowledge
IMAGES
VIDEO
COMMENTS
Imagination spans the world.". It gives a sense of the scope of creativity as opposed to that of knowledge. Knowledge is limited to what's already happened or been discovered, whereas creativity is unlimited in time and place. Creative minds relish the chance to explore the unknown and come up with innovative ideas.
Specifically, creativity often involves coordination between the cognitive control network, which is involved in executive functions such as planning and problem-solving, and the default mode network, which is most active during mind-wandering or daydreaming (Beaty, R. E., et al., Cerebral Cortex, Vol. 31, No. 10, 2021).
While knowledge is limited to one's skills, creativity has no boundaries since it goes as far as one's imagination can reach. Knowledge hardly goes beyond one's training or experience in a certain field, whereas creativity/imagination follows intuition and transcends one's acquired skills (Ox and van der Elst 84).
15. Knowledge is the information that we have through the experiences of our predecessors and our own at present. Information of all things discovered or experienced is knowledge. But, creativity is needed to put that information together to come up with new results and solutions. Albert Einstein said "Imagination is more important than ...
Creativity. Few things shape the human experience as profoundly or as pervasively as creativity does. And creativity raises a wealth of philosophical issues. Since art is such a salient domain of creativity, you might assume, at first, that the philosophy of creativity is the philosophy of art or aesthetics, or a branch thereof.
Only creativity, he says, is about making something new, rather than merely applying or discovering something new. "Creative solutions are insightful, they're novel, they're simple, they're elegant, and they're generative," he says. "When you find one creative idea, more often than not it triggers other ideas in the same fashion.".
creatively. Creativity represents a balance between knowledge and freeing oneself of that knowledge' (Johnson-Laird, 1988, p.207, cited by Sternberg, 2012, p.4). For creative thinking to deepen and extend learning, rather than be an enjoyable but superficial activity, it must be grounded in understanding of the content being investigated.
Posted June 25, 2020. By Emily Boudreau. Understanding the learning that happens with creative work can often be elusive in any K-12 subject. A new study from Harvard Graduate School of Education Associate Professor Karen Brennan, and researchers Paulina Haduong and Emily Veno, compiles case studies, interviews, and assessment artifacts from ...
An important component of research in creativity has been the development of theories concerning the mechanisms underlying creative thinking. Modern theories of creative thinking have been advanced from many different viewpoints, ranging from Guilford's pioneering psychometric theory (e.g., 1950; see also Runco, 1991) to those developing out of clinical interests, broadly conceived (e.g ...
While usually argued to be fostering creativity, the effect of knowledge depth and breadth on creativity is actually mixed. We take a dynamic approach to the knowledge-creativity relationship and argue that the effect of knowledge depth and knowledge breadth is likely to be contingent on career age. We propose that individuals' knowledge structures become increasingly rigid as career age ...
1. Overusing adjectives and adverbs: While descriptive language is important in creative writing, overusing adjectives and adverbs can make your writing feel cluttered and overwhelming. 2. Using cliches and predictable plot lines: Creative writing is all about bringing something new and fresh to the table.
Existing knowledge is the foundation of creativity because it's needed to build upon. The foundation and the walls are provided by knowledge. The roof, on the other hand, is created by creativity. Knowledge is needed to build the house, while creativity is needed to design it. Creativity is the process by which something new and potentially ...
The associative theory of creativity argues that higher creative individuals have a richer semantic memory structure that facilitates broader associative search processes, that leads to the combination of remote concepts into novel and appropriate ideas. Based on this theory, in my research I investigate the role of knowledge - or semantic ...
Having knowledge helps a person grow as a person and makes us gentle human beings. Gaining new knowledge developed new skills and opens the gate to new opportunities for us. In comparison to creativity using knowledge is reduce the chances of risk. The reason being the knowledgeable approach uses facts and figures and previously used ...
The Importance of Creativity and Knowledge in Various Fields. In today's world, creativity and knowledge are two essential components needed to thrive in various fields. Both creativity and knowledge have unique roles in different areas of work. Science. In science, creativity is essential to come up with new ideas, theories, and hypotheses.
Extroversion. Agreeableness. Neuroticism. Each dimension represents a continuum, so for each trait, people can be either high, low, or somewhere between the two. Openness to experience is a big five trait that is correlated with creativity. People who are high on this trait are more open to new experiences and ideas.
This article examines the management of that paradox at three levels: organizational, group, and individual. At the organizational level, knowledge is the basis for both core capabilities and core rigidities. At the group level, team composition and norms can influence how knowledge and expertise is utilized to either enhance or inhibit innovation.
Although all are concerned with creativity, the four creativity types may be substantially different in antecedents, processes, and outcomes—just as carrot cake is different to chocolate cake, and as in-role or task performance is different to extra-role or contextual performance (e.g., Borman & Motowidlo, 1997; Motowidlo & Van Scotter, 1994).
Over time, entrepreneurship has become associated with creativity, the ability to develop something original, particularly an idea or a representation of an idea. Innovation requires creativity, but innovation is more specifically the application of creativity. Innovation is the manifestation of creativity into a usable product or service.
Creative people like Bill Gates and Steve Jobs have improved the world by introducing new ideas and products. Therefore, developing creativity is more important than learning knowledge from studying. Creative people usually have more success and can also change the world in a positive way. I would much rather be creative than have lots of book ...