induction process essay

📕 Studying HQ

Inductive Essays: Tips, Examples, and Topics

Carla johnson.

• June 14, 2023
• How to Guides

Inductive essays are a common type of academic writing. To come to a conclusion, you have to look at the evidence and figure out what it all means. Inductive essays start with a set of observations or evidence and then move toward a conclusion. Deductive essays start with a thesis statement and then give evidence to support it. This type of essay is often used in the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences.

The goal of an inductive essay is to look at the evidence and draw a conclusion from it. It requires carefully analyzing and interpreting the evidence and being able to draw logical conclusions from it. Instead of starting with a conclusion in mind and trying to prove it, the goal is to use the evidence to build a case for that conclusion.

You can’t say enough about how important it is to look at evidence before coming to a conclusion. In today’s world, where information is easy to find and often contradictory, it is important to be able to sort through the facts to come to a good decision. It is also important to be able to tell when the evidence isn’t complete or doesn’t prove anything, and to be able to admit when there is uncertainty.

In the sections that follow, we’ll talk about some tips for writing good inductive essays, show you some examples of good inductive essays, and give you some ideas for topics for your next inductive essay. By the end of this article, you’ll know more about how to write an inductive essay well.

What You'll Learn

Elements of an Inductive Essay

Most of the time, an inductive essay has three main parts: an intro, body paragraphs, and a conclusion.

The introduction should explain what the topic is about and show the evidence that will be looked at in the essay . It should also have a thesis statement that sums up the conclusion that will be drawn from the evidence.

In the body paragraphs, you should show and explain the evidence. Each paragraph should focus on one piece of evidence and explain how it supports the thesis statement . The analysis should make sense and be well-supported, and there should be a clear link between the evidence and the conclusion.

In the conclusion, you should sum up the evidence and the conclusion you came to based on it. It should also put the conclusion in a bigger picture by explaining why it’s important and what it means for the topic at hand.

How to Choose a Topic for an Inductive Essay

It can be hard to choose a topic for an inductive essay, but there are a few things you can do that will help.

First, it’s important to look at the assignment prompt carefully. What’s the question you’re supposed to answer? What evidence do you have to back up your claim? To choose a topic that is both possible and interesting , you need to understand the prompt and the evidence you have.

Next, brainstorming can be a good way to come up with ideas. Try writing down all the ideas that come to mind when you think about the prompt. At this point, it doesn’t matter if the ideas are good or not. The goal is to come up with as many ideas as possible.

Once you have a list of possible topics , it’s important to pick one that you can handle and that you’re interested in. Think about how big the topic is and if you will have enough time to analyze the evidence in enough depth for the assignment . Also, think about your own passions and interests. If you choose a topic that really interests you, you are more likely to write a good essay .

Some potential topics for an inductive essay include:

– The impact of social media on mental health

– The effectiveness of alternative medicine for treating chronic pain

– The causes of income inequality in the United States

– The relationship between climate change and extreme weather events

– The effects of video game violence on children

By following these tips for choosing a topic and understanding the elements of an inductive essay, you can master the art of this type of academic writing and produce compelling and persuasive essays that draw on evidence to arrive at sound conclusions.

Inductive Essay Outline

An outline can help you to organize your thoughts and ensure that your essay is well-structured. An inductive essay outline typically includes the following sections:

– Introduction: The introduction should provide background information on the topic and present the evidence that will be analyzed in the essay . It should also include a thesis statement that summarizes the conclusion that will be drawn from the evidence.

– Body Paragraphs: The body paragraphs should present the evidence and analyze it in depth. Each paragraph should focus on a specific piece of evidence and explain how it supports the thesis statement . The analysis should be logical and well-supported, with clear connections made between the evidence and the conclusion.

– Conclusion: The conclusion should summarize the evidence and the conclusion that was drawn from it. It should also provide a broader context for the conclusion, explaining why it matters and what implications it has for the topic at hand.

Inductive Essay Structure

The structure of an inductive essay is similar to that of other types of academic essays. It typically includes the following elements:

– Thesis statement: The thesis statement should summarize the conclusion that will be drawn from the evidence and provide a clear focus for the essay .

– Introduction: The introduction should provide background information on the topic and present the evidence that will be analyzed in the essay. It should also include a thesis statement that summarizes the conclusion that will be drawn from the evidence.

– Body Paragraphs: The body paragraphs should present the evidence and analyze it in depth. Each paragraph should focus on a specific piece of evidence and explain how it supports the thesis statement. The analysis should be logical and well-supported, with clear connections made between the evidence and the conclusion.

It is important to note that the body paragraphs can be organized in different ways depending on the nature of the evidence and the argument being made. For example, you may choose to organize the paragraphs by theme or chronologically. Regardless of the organization, each paragraph should be focused and well-supported with evidence.

By following this structure, you can ensure that your inductive essay is well-organized and persuasive, drawing on evidence to arrive at a sound conclusion. Remember to carefully analyze the evidence, and to draw logical connections between the evidence and the conclusion. With practice, you can master the art of inductive essays and become a skilled academic writer.

Inductive Essay Examples

Examples of successful inductive essays can provide a helpful model for your own writing. Here are some examples of inductive essay topics:

– Example 1: The Link Between Smoking and Lung Cancer: This essay could look at the studies and statistics that have been done on the link between smoking and lung cancer and come to a conclusion about how strong it is.

– Example 2: The Effects of Social Media on Mental Health: This essay could look at the studies and personal experiences that have been done on the effects of social media on mental health to come to a conclusion about the effects of social media on mental health.

– Example 3: The Effects of Climate Change on Agriculture: This essay could look at the studies and expert opinions on the effects of climate change on agriculture to come to a conclusion about how it might affect food production..

– Example 4: The Benefits of a Plant-Based Diet: This essay could look at the available evidence about the benefits of a plant-based diet, using studies and dietary guidelines to come to a conclusion about the health benefits of this type of diet.

– Example 5: The Effects of Parenting Styles on Child Development: This essay could look at the studies and personal experiences that have been done on the effects of parenting styles on child development and come to a conclusion about the best way to raise a child.

Tips for Writing an Effective Inductive Essay

Here are some tips for writing acompelling and effective inductive essay:

1. Presenting evidence in a logical and organized way: It is important to present evidence in a clear and organized way that supports the thesis statement and the conclusion. Use topic sentences and transitions to make the connections between the evidence and the conclusion clear for the reader.

2. Considering alternative viewpoints: When analyzing evidence, it is important to consider alternative viewpoints and opinions. Acknowledge counterarguments and address them in your essay, demonstrating why your conclusion is more compelling.

3. Using strong and credible sources: Use credible sources such as peer-reviewed journal articles , statistics, and expert opinions to support your argument. Avoid relying on unreliable sources or anecdotal evidence.

4. Avoiding fallacies and biases: Be aware of logical fallacies and biases that can undermine the credibility of your argument. Avoid making assumptions or jumping to conclusions without sufficient evidence.

By following these tips, you can write an effective inductive essay that draws on evidence to arrive at a sound conclusion. Remember to carefully analyze the evidence, consider alternative viewpoints, and use credible sources to support your argument. With practice and dedication, you can master the art of inductive essays and become a skilled academic writer.

Frequently Asked Questions

1. what is an inductive essay.

An inductive essay is an academic writing that starts with a set of observations or evidence and then works towards a conclusion. The essay requires careful analysis and interpretation of evidence, and the ability to draw logical conclusions based on that evidence.

2. What are the elements of an inductive essay?

An inductive essay typically consists of an introduction, body paragraphs, and a conclusion. The introduction provides background information and presents the thesis statement. The body paragraphs present the evidence and analyze it in depth. The conclusion summarizes the evidence and the conclusion drawn from it.

3. How do I choose a topic for an inductive essay?

To choose a topic for an inductive essay, carefully analyze the assignment prompt, brainstorm ideas, narrow down the topic, and select a topic that interests you.

4. What is the difference between an inductive essay and a deductive essay?

An inductive essay starts with evidence and works towards a conclusion, while a deductive essay starts with a thesis statement and provides arguments to support it.

5. How do I structure an inductive essay?

An inductive essay typically follows a structure that includes a thesis statement, introduction, body paragraphs, and conclusion.

Inductive essays are an important type of academic writing that require careful analysis and interpretation of evidence to come to a conclusion. By using the advice in this article, you can become a good inductive essay writer. Remember to carefully look at the evidence, think about other points of view, use reliable sources, and stay away from logical errors and biases. In conclusion , learning how to write inductive essays is important for developing critical thinking skills and making arguments that are compelling and convincing. You can make a valuable contribution to your field of study and to society as a whole by looking at the facts and coming to logical conclusions. With practice and hard work , you can learn to write good inductive essays that will help you in school and in your career.

Start by filling this short order form order.studyinghq.com

And then follow the progressive flow. 

Having an issue, chat with us here

Cathy, CS. 

New Concept ? Let a subject expert write your paper for You​

Have a subject expert write for you now, have a subject expert finish your paper for you, edit my paper for me, have an expert write your dissertation's chapter, popular topics.

Business Analysis Examples Essay Topics and Ideas How to Guides Literature Analysis Nursing

• Nursing Solutions
• Study Guides
• Cookie Policy
• Free College Essay Examples
• Privacy Policy
• Research Paper Writing Service
• Research Proposal Writing Services
• Writing Service 
• Discounts / Offers 

Study Hub: 

• Studying Blog
• Topic Ideas 
• Business Studying 
• Nursing Studying 
• Literature and English Studying

Writing Tools  

• Citation Generator
• Topic Generator
• Paraphrasing Tool
• Conclusion Maker
• Research Title Generator
• Thesis Statement Generator
• Summarizing Tool
• Terms and Conditions
• Confidentiality Policy
• Cookies Policy
• Refund and Revision Policy

Our samples and other types of content are meant for research and reference purposes only. We are strongly against plagiarism and academic dishonesty. 

Contact Us:

📧 [email protected]

📞 +1 (315)-961-6813

2012-2024 © studyinghq.com. All rights reserved

Typically replies within minutes

Hey! 👋 Need help with an assignment?

🟢 Online | Privacy policy

WhatsApp us

The Concept of Induction Report

• To find inspiration for your paper and overcome writer’s block
• As a source of information (ensure proper referencing)
• As a template for you assignment

Introduction

Current business context, learning theory – current business context, reference list.

For most organizations, induction programs for new employees are becoming a common practice. This is because the retention of employees has become a critical problem owing to the changing workforce trends and business setting. Induction programs are being adopted to enable the employees adjust to the new work environment. This discussion explores the concept of induction and its benefits to both the organization and the employees.

Learning and Development in the Current Business context

Learning and development is the process of improving employees’ performance in the organization through training, education, and development. It entails a continuing commitment towards the development of employees as an important part of the operations of an organization. Learning and development involves continuous professional development of the employees and this gives them a chance to improve their knowledge, skills, and practice (Sadler-Smith 2006).

Learning and development has various benefits. It increases the confidence, motivation, morale, and satisfaction among the employees. Moreover, it enables the employees to perform their roles efficiently and therefore increases the productivity of the organization.

Learning and development also increases the organization’s capacity to keep pace with new methods and emerging technologies, and also increases innovation in terms of products and strategies. Proper learning and development also minimizes employee turnover. In addition, it enhances the organization’s image (Joy-Matthews, Megginson, & Surtees 2004).

Induction – Current Business context

This is a process through which firms welcome new workers and ensure that they are prepared for their new assignments. During this process, the employees should be trained on both the practical and theoretical skills (Toten 2005). The process of induction includes several activities.

The new employees are welcomed into the organization and given a general introduction. Employment’s terms and conditions are confirmed with the necessary paperwork being processed. Employees are then trained in areas such as occupational health & safety and equal opportunity. The employees are also informed about any legal and regulatory requirements.

They are also introduced to the company and given a tour around the organization. The new employees are also introduced to key staff members. The new employees also go through detailed on-the-job training. They are also trained on the organizational culture. They also learn information such as employee benefits and organizational procedures and policies (Stewart & Rigg 2011).

Best practices should be adopted in order to achieve a successful induction process. Firstly, the program for the employee induction should be scheduled in advance. A program for the induction process should be prepared, including details such as the specific induction activities that will be carried out at a specific time during the entire induction period.

The schedule should also include the name of the person responsible for every induction activity. All the people involved in the induction process should have access to the induction plan before the program commences. Moreover, all new employees should be assigned a member of staff to guide them during the induction process and make them feel welcome to the organization (ACAS 2007).

Induction has numerous benefits both to the organization and the employees. Induction ensures that the employees acquire information about the knowledge and skills necessary to effectively do the job. The employees are able to settle easily and confidently into their new roles in the organization. Induction also leads to better retention of new employees. It also increases the morale and productivity of new employees.

Besides, it assists in the quick integration of new employees into the working environment and increases their productivity. The induction procedure portrays a positive image of the firm to the new workforce making them feel appreciated and welcomed. Besides, the employees develop positive attitudes towards the organization and their roles and this leads to increased commitment and motivation.

In addition, it reduces the costs of recruitment and employee turnover. Furthermore, it enables the employees to understand how the organization runs and its culture, mission, vision, objectives, procedures, and policies. Induction also makes sure that the organization complies with the legal obligations covering the employees (Toten 2005).

Developing an effectual induction (training) line up

The programme should be developed with the consideration of all involved parties. This will mostly depend on the complexity as well as the size of the organization. Those involved include: line managers, senior most management team, representatives of trade unions, among others.

Typically induction entails the new member of staff meeting and paying attention to divergent group of individuals as they converse about features of the business. Other techniques include audio visual aids, on paper information, and group conversation.

Items to be touched on in a successful induction plan will include:

• Introduction to the organization as well as its management composition.
• Buildings layout (industrial unit and offices).
• Employment’s terms as well as the set conditions. This will involve clarification on the contact at hand.
• Information regarding pertinent personnel guidelines, such as preparation, promotion among others.
• Organization’s set practices and rules.
• Preparations for worker participation and communication.
• Welfare and employee benefits or facilities (Sadler-Smith 2006).

Adult Learning

Adults have unique requirements, needs, and characteristics as learners. They only get committed to learning if they can see the relevance and application to real life of the objectives of learning. During professional development, adults should be given some control over their learning as they will not accept learning activities that may seem to undermine their competence. Adult learners also have a wealth of knowledge, experience, and competence and these must be accommodated in the planning of professional development (Siddons 2001).

Adult learners also need to protect their ego and therefore the learning environment should be such that there is no fear of being judged during professional development. Moreover, adult learners need to perceive the connection between their day-to-day roles and professional growth. They also need real and direct experiences to apply the learning at the workplace (Conlan, Grabowski, & Smith 2003).

Training Needs Analysis

This involves the process of identifying gaps at the place of work and suggesting whether training should be the ideal response. A consultant or an in-house trainer can perform a needs analysis in an organization. The analysis is carried out in a firm whenever there is a major development e.g. buying of new tools.

New training needs can be determined through observation, interviews, and questionnaires, analysis of the organization policy, job descriptions, appraisal reviews, and problem-solving conferences, among others. One should not rely on one method only but should use a combination of methods to determine the training needs (Reid, Barrington, & Brown 2004).

Source: (Bartram & Gibson 2000).

Needs assessment occur in three levels: individual, task, and organizational. Individual assessment looks at how well the worker is carrying out his work thus determining those to be trained and the skills to be taught.

Task assessment offers data regarding a given job and the proficiency, understanding, attitudes as well as capability to attain best possible performance. Organizational analysis on the other hand focuses on organization’s effectiveness determining the areas in which training is required as well as the conditions of conducting the same (Reid, Barrington, & Brown 2004).

Learning Cycle

Employees undergo a learning cycle in going about their everyday experiences at the workplace and developing new capabilities and skills. The cycle includes four steps namely, doing, reflecting, linking, and planning. Doing involves getting engaged and having the awareness of the activities that one is taking part in. Reflecting refers to the process of appraising and summarizing the activities that have already taken place.

Linking involves making relations with previously acquired knowledge. Planning involves using the acquired knowledge to improve the work processes and come up with new ways of doing things. For effective learning to take place, individuals should engage in every stage of the learning cycle (Taylor 2010).

Source: (Taylor 2010).

Learning Styles

Different people prefer different techniques and styles of learning. Each person has a combination of learning styles. Some of the learning styles include visual, aural, verbal, kinesthetic, logical, social, and solitary. People who use the visual learning style prefer to use images, pictures, and spatial learning. Aural style involves the use of music and sound. The verbal style learners prefer to use words in writing and speaking.

Kinesthetic learners prefer to use the sense of touch (the hands, and the body). Logical style learners prefer the use of reasoning, judgment, and systems. Social learners prefer learning with other individuals in groups. On the other hand, solitary learners prefer to learn alone. Different learning styles utilize different brain parts. Learning styles influence the way people learn, recall information, and represent experiences (Sadler-Smith & Evans 2006).

ACAS, 2007, Recruitment and Induction. Web.

Bartram, S & Gibson, B 2000, Training Needs Analysis Toolkit , London, HRD Press.

Conlan, J Grabowski, S & Smith, K 2003, Adult Learning . Web.

Joy-Matthews, J Megginson, D & Surtees, M 2004, Human Resource Development, 3rd Ed, London, Kogan Page.

Reid, M Barrington, H & Brown, M 2004, Human Resource Development: Beyond Training Interventions , 3rd Ed, London, CIPD.

Sadler-Smith, E 2006, Learning and Development for Managers: Perspectives from Research and Practice , UK, Blackwell.

Sadler-Smith, E & Evans, C 2006, Learning Styles in Education and Training, UK, Emerald Group Publishing.

Siddons, S 2001, Developing Your People , London, CIPD.

Stewart, J & Rigg, C 2011, Learning and Talent Development , London, CIPD.

Taylor, S 2010, Resourcing and Talent Management, 5th Ed, London, Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development.

Toten, M 2005, Induction: an Underrated Aspect of People Management . Web.

• Pro Advertising Company Mission, Vision, Values and Ethics
• Leader Behaviors in a Job of Corporate CEO
• Seymour Whyte & Rob Carr Pty Companies' Partnership
• Induction Program for New Human Resource Administrator
• Laws of Electromagnetic Induction
• IT Project Planning Phase
• What It Means to Be a Leader?
• A Contract by a Construction Firm in the United Arab Emirates
• Change and Strategic Management
• The Myth of Multitasking
• Chicago (A-D)
• Chicago (N-B)

IvyPanda. (2019, March 29). The Concept of Induction. https://ivypanda.com/essays/induction/

"The Concept of Induction." IvyPanda , 29 Mar. 2019, ivypanda.com/essays/induction/.

IvyPanda . (2019) 'The Concept of Induction'. 29 March.

IvyPanda . 2019. "The Concept of Induction." March 29, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/induction/.

1. IvyPanda . "The Concept of Induction." March 29, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/induction/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "The Concept of Induction." March 29, 2019. https://ivypanda.com/essays/induction/.

A look at the induction process, and the purpose of induction for employer and employee

An employee’s first impressions of an organisation have a significant impact on their integration within the team and job satisfaction. Induction is an opportunity for an organisation to welcome their new recruit, help them settle in and ensure they have the knowledge and support they need to perform their role. For an employer, effective induction may also affect employee turnover, absenteeism and employer brand.

This factsheet covers the purpose of induction. It looks at the induction process, including who should attend, who should be involved, what to include (as well as what to avoid), and the role of HR and L&D teams. There’s also an induction checklist to help organisations plan or refine their own process.

• What is induction
• The purpose of induction
• The benefits of an effective induction programme
• HR and L&D teams' role in induction
• The induction process
• Induction essentials checklist
• Useful contacts and further reading

Members access only

Unlock exclusive, tailored content and resources, just for members.

Not a member yet? Find out how you can become a member today!

Tackling barriers to work today whilst creating inclusive workplaces of tomorrow.

Bullying and harassment

Discover our practice guidance and recommendations to tackle bullying and harassment in the workplace.

Related content

Read our latest Labour Market Outlook report for analysis on employers’ recruitment, redundancy and pay intentions

12 Mar, 2024

16 Jan, 2024

Looks at the main stages of the recruitment and resourcing process, from defining the role to making the appointment

Explore our other factsheets

Understand what employee relations means as a concept and what it means to employers

Understand the concept of employee engagement and learn how to build an engaged and motivated workforce

Explores the purpose and evolution of job design, its role in creating good work, and assessing job quality.

Learn how non-executive directors (NEDs) differ from executive directors and how they operate within an organisation

Your Article Library

Essay on the induction of employees in an organization.

ADVERTISEMENTS:

Read this essay to learn about the Induction of Employees in an Organisation. After reading this essay you will learn about: 1. Definition of Induction 2. Objectives of Induction 3. Procedure 4. Contents of Induction Programme 5. Elements of Good Induction Programme 6. Problems 7. Practices 8. Induction Training In India.

• Essay on the Induction Training In India

Essay # Definition of Induction :

Inductions may be viewed as the socialising process by which the organisation seeks to make an individual its agent for the achievement of its objectives and the individual seeks to make an agency of the organisation for the achievement of his personal goals.

A few definitions of induction are as follows:

According to Edwin B. Flippo, “Induction is the welcoming process to make the new employee feel at home and generate in him a feeling of belongingness to the organisation.”

According to Michael Armstrong, “Orientation or induction is the process of receiving and welcoming an employee when he first joins a company and giving him the basic information he needs to settle down quickly and happily and start work.”

After selecting compatible personnel the organisation must communicate to the new employees its philosophy, policies, customs and practices. Planned induction helps the new employee creates a good attitude, reduces labour turnover and the employee feels at home right from the very beginning.

“Orientation or induction is thus the process of indoctrination, welcoming, acclimatisation, acculturation and socialisation.”

Essay # Objectives of Induction :

An organisation especially a large one should have a systematic induction process to achieve the following aims:

1. To promote a feeling of belonging and loyalty to the organisation among new comers so that they may not form false impression regarding the company because first impression is the last impression.

2. To build up the new employee’s confidence in the organisation and in himself so that he may become an efficient employee.

3. To bring an agreement between the organisation goals and the personal goals of the organisation.

4. To give the new employee information regarding company (its structure, product, policies, rules and regulations) and facilities provided by the company such as cafeterias, locker room, break time, leave rules etc.

5. To introduce the new worker to the supervisor and the fellow workers with whom he has to work.

6. To create a sense of security for the worker in his job by impressing upon the idea that fairness to the worker is the inherent policy of the organisation.

7. To lessen or reduce the cost of replacing the worker in the early impressionable period because of lack of information or incorrect business impressions.

Essay # Procedure for Induction :

There is no model induction procedure. Each industry develops its own induction procedure as per its needs.

The procedure should basically follow the following steps:

1. The new person should be given a definite time and place to report.

2. A very important step is that the supervisor or the immediate boss should meet and welcome the new employee to the organisation.

3. Administrative work should be completed as early as possible. Such items as vacations, probationary period, medical leave, suggestion systems etc. should be conveyed to the employee.

4. Departmental orientation should be conducted. This should include a get acquainted talk, introduction to the department, explanation of the functions of the department, job instructions and to whom he should look for help and guidance when he has any problem.

5. Verbal explanations are, usually, supplemented by a wide variety of printed material, employee hand book, employee manuals, house journals, picture stories, pamphlets etc., along with short guided four around the plant.

Orientation programme usually covers things like employee compensation benefits, personnel policies, employee’s daily routine, company organisation and operations, safety measures and regulations. The supervisor should ensure that he covers all the necessary orientation steps.

Essay # Contents of Induction Programme :

Every organisation has an obligation to make integration of the individual into it as smooth and comfortable as possible. Small organisations may do it through informal orientation by the employee’s immediate supervisor whereas large organisations usually develop formal orientation programmes.

The range of information that may be covered under orientation training is as follows:

(i) Company’s history, philosophy and operations

(ii) Products and services of the company

(iii) Company’s organisation structure

(iv) Location of departments and employee services

(v) Personnel policies and practices

(vi) Employee’s activities

(vii) Rules and regulations

(viii) Grievance procedure

(ix) Safety measures

(x) Standing orders

(xi) Terms and conditions of service

(xii) Benefits and services for employees

(xiii) Opportunities for training, promotions, transfers etc.

Essay # Elements of Good Induction Programme :

A good induction programme has three main elements:

(I) Introductory Information :

Introductory information regarding the history of the company and company’s products, its organisational structure, policies, rules and regulations etc. should be given informally or in group session in the personnel department. It will help the candidate to understand the company and the organisational policies and standards well.

(II) On the Job Information :

Further information should be given to the new employee by the department supervisor in the department concerned where he is placed on the job about departmental facilities and requirements such as nature of the job, the extent of his liability and employee’s activities such as recreational facilities, safety measures, job routine etc.

(III) Follow up Interview :

A follow up interview should be arranged several weeks after the employee has been on the job by the supervisor or a representative of the personnel department to answer the problems that a new employee may have on the job.

Essay # Problems in Induction :

An orientation programme can go wrong for a number of reasons.

The HR department should try to avoid following errors:

1. The supervisor who has to induct the employee may not be trained or may be too bossy.

2. Employee is overwhelmed with too much information in a short time

3. Employee is confused with a wide variety of forms to be filled

4. In the initial stages, employee is given only manual jobs that discourage job interest and company loyalty

5. Employee is asked to perform challenging jobs where there are high chances of failure that could needlessly discourage the employee.

6. Employee is given only a sketchy induction under the mistaken belief that “trial and error” method is the best induction.

7. Employee is forced to balance between a broad orientation by the HR department and a narrow orientation at the departmental level.

8. Employee is thrown into action too soon. His mistakes can damage the company.

9. Employee may be asked to work on a number of jobs and he may develop wrong perceptions because of short periods spent on each job.

Essay # Practices of Induction :

Different induction practices which are generally used in an industry are:

(I) Induction Guide:

Such guide books are prepared by the personnel department with information on what induction steps have been taken and what are still to be covered various steps to be taken and by whom and when the instructions are to be given are listed in the guide book.

In some large concerns guide books containing the information regarding the company and its various personnel policies are distributed among the new comers.

(II) Counselling :

The supervisor may induct the new employees working under him by introducing and counselling them by reassuring and reinforcing the confidence and guarding against false impression.

On the basis of this interview, personnel department can take action to know the employee’s feelings and to remove the difficulties faced by him through personal talks, guidance and counselling. It may be coordinated by the joint efforts of job supervisor and the personnel department. Periodic following is required to ensure that the employee is properly placed and feels at home.

The best method of induction training is talk plus pictures followed by printed materials. A tour of the plant and the department should be arranged to acquaint the new employee with the overall operations of the company.

Essay # Induction Training In India :

Examples of the induction training programmes followed by a few companies in India are as follows:

1. Maruti Udyog:

Maruti Udyog has different types of induction programmes for different fields.

For engineers the programme is offered in four parts:

i. Familiarise with various functions and meet division heads

ii. Work on shop floor

iii. Work at various other departments

iv. Work finally in those departments for about 2 months, where they eventually have to work.

The company takes its new employees through a one day structured induction training programme.

The programme includes:

i. Briefing on the company’s market position

ii. Business of the company

iii. Functioning style

iv. Organisational structure

v. HR policies

In additional to this, six month behavioural training is offered in team building, self development, customer sensitivity etc. Finally the new employees are put through an appraisal process to judge the progress.

3. Standard Chartered Bank:

The Bank picks up management trainees from premier B-Schools and gives them induction training for about six months. During this period, the trainees spend time in various divisions of the bank to get a brief view of the bank’s operations and get a chance to meet each of the business heads.

Afterwards, a two day session on team building is also conducted. After taking charge of the jobs, the new employees have to attend a review session about the job itself.

4. Sony India:

This company does not follow any uniform policy for acclimatisation and there is no specific time frame given to the newcomers. The company, however, gives enough opportunities to them to understand the process, the culture and the systems of the organisation. In the case of junior managers, new recruits are given less time as compared to the entrants who need to supervise, chalk out strategies and delegate work.

Overall, Sony tries to bring out the best in a person, thus, allowing the individuals to develop their abilities.

Related Articles:

• Induction: Meaning and Importance of Induction
• How To Make An Induction Programme More Effective?

Comments are closed.

• Table of Contents
• New in this Archive
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

The Problem of Induction

The original problem of induction can be simply put. It concerns the support or justification of inductive methods; methods that predict or infer, in Hume's words, that “instances of which we have had no experience resemble those of which we have had experience” (THN, 89). Such methods are clearly essential in scientific reasoning as well as in the conduct of our everyday affairs. The problem is how to support or justify them and it leads to a dilemma: the principle cannot be proved deductively, for it is contingent, and only necessary truths can be proved deductively. Nor can it be supported inductively—by arguing that it has always or usually been reliable in the past—for that would beg the question by assuming just what is to be proved.

A century after Hume first put the problem, and argued that it is insoluble, J. S. Mill gave a more specific formulation of an important class of inductive problems: “Why,” he wrote, “is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, while in others myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception known or presumed, go such a little way towards establishing an universal proposition?” (Mill 1843, Bk III, Ch. III). (Compare: (i) Everyone seated on the bus is moving northward. (ii) Everyone seated on the bus was born on a prime numbered day of the month.)

In recent times inductive methods have fissioned and multiplied, to an extent that attempting to define induction would be more difficult than rewarding. It is however instructive to contrast induction with deduction: Deductive logic, at least as concerns first-order logic, is demonstrably complete. The premises of an argument constructed according to the rules of this logic imply the argument's conclusion. Not so for induction: There is no comprehensive theory of sound induction, no set of agreed upon rules that license good or sound inductive inference, nor is there a serious prospect of such a theory. Further, induction differs from deductive proof or demonstration (in first-order logic, at least) not only in induction's failure to preserve truth (true premises may lead inductively to false conclusions) but also in failing of monotonicity: adding true premises to a sound induction may make it unsound.

The characterization of good or sound inductions might be called the characterization problem: What distinguishes good from bad inductions? The question seems to have no rewarding general answer, but there are nevertheless interesting partial characterizations, some of which are explored in this entry.

1. The contemporary notion of induction

2.1 the justification of induction, 2.2 karl popper's views on induction, 3.1 elementary probability, 3.2 carnap's inductive logic, 3.3 reichenbach's frequentism, 4.1 induction and deduction, 4.2 a demonstrative argument to show the soundness of induction, 4.3 rationalistic criticism of hume, 5.1 the paradox of the ravens, 5.2 the grue paradox and the new riddle of induction, 5.3 return of the ravens, 6.1 pragmatism: induction as practical reason, 6.2 on the value of evidence, other internet resources, related entries.

The Oxford English Dictionary (OED Online, accessed October 20, 2012) defines “induction,” in the sense relevant here, as

7. The process of inferring a general law or principle from the observation of particular instances (opposed to deduction n., q.v.)

That induction is opposed to deduction is not quite right, and the rest of the definition is outdated and too narrow: much of what contemporary epistemology, logic, and the philosophy of science count as induction infers neither from observation nor particulars and does not lead to general laws or principles. This is not to denigrate the leading authority on English vocabulary—until the middle of the previous century induction was understood to be what we now know as enumerative induction or universal inference ; inference from particular inferences:

a 1 , a 2 , …, a n are all F s that are also G ,

to a general law or principle

All F s are G

The problem of induction was, until recently, taken to be to justify this form of inference; to show that the truth of the premise supported, if it did not entail, the truth of the conclusion. The evolution and generalization of this question—the traditional problem has become a special case—is discussed in some detail below.

A few simple counterexamples to the OED definition may suggest the increased breadth of the contemporary notion:

All observed emeralds have been green. Therefore, the next emerald to be observed will be green.

New York is east of the Mississippi. Delaware is east of the Mississippi. Therefore, everything that is either New York or Delaware is east of the Mississippi.

Further, on at least one serious view, due in differing variations to Mill and Carnap, induction has not to do with generality at all; its primary form is the singular predictive inference—the second form of enumerative induction mentioned above—which leads from particular premises to a particular conclusion. The inference to generality is a dispensable middle step.

Although inductive inference is not easily characterized, we do have a clear mark of induction. Inductive inferences are contingent, deductive inferences are necessary. Deductive inference can never support contingent judgments such as meteorological forecasts, nor can deduction alone explain the breakdown of one's car, discover the genotype of a new virus, or reconstruct fourteenth century trade routes. Inductive inference can do these things more or less successfully because, in Peirce's phrase, inductions are ampliative. Induction can amplify and generalize our experience, broaden and deepen our empirical knowledge. Deduction on the other hand is explicative. Deduction orders and rearranges our knowledge without adding to its content.

Of course, the contingent power of induction brings with it the risk of error. Even the best inductive methods applied to all available evidence may get it wrong; good inductions may lead from true premises to false conclusions. (A competent but erroneous diagnosis of a rare disease, a sound but false forecast of summer sunshine in the desert.) An appreciation of this principle is a signal feature of the shift from the traditional to the contemporary problem of induction.

How to tell good inductions from bad inductions? That question is a simple formulation of the problem of induction. In its general form it clearly has no substantive answer, but its instances can yield modest and useful questions. Some of these questions, and proposed answers to them, are surveyed in what follows.

Some authorities, Carnap in the opening paragraph of The Continuum of Inductive Methods (1952) is an example, take inductive inference to include all non-deductive inference. That may be a bit too inclusive; perception and memory are clearly ampliative but their exercise seems not to be congruent with what we know of induction, and the present article is not concerned with them. The scope of the contemporary concept is charted in the taxonomy in section 3.2 below.

Testimony is another matter. Although testimony is not a form of induction, induction would be all but paralyzed were it not nourished by testimony. Scientific inductions depend upon data transmitted and supported by testimony and even our everyday inductive inferences typically rest upon premises that come to us indirectly.

2. Hume on induction

The source for the problem of induction as we know it is Hume's brief argument in Book I, Part III, section VI of the Treatise (THN). The great historical importance of this argument, not to speak of its intrinsic power, recommends that reflection on the problem begin with a rehearsal of it.

First a note on vocabulary. The term ‘induction’ does not appear in Hume's argument, nor anywhere in the Treatise or the first Inquiry , for that matter. Hume's concern is with inferences concerning causal connections, which, on his account are the only connections “which can lead us beyond the immediate impressions of our memory and senses” (THN, 89). But the difference between such inferences and what we know today as induction, allowing for the increased complexity of the contemporary notion, is largely a matter of terminology.

Secondly, Hume divides all reasoning into demonstrative, by which he means deductive, and probabilistic, by which he means the generalization of causal reasoning. The deductive system that Hume had at hand was just the weak and complex theory of ideas in force at the time, augmented by syllogistic logic (THN, Book I, Part III, Section I for example). His ‘demonstrations’ rather than structured deductions are often founded on the principle that conceivable connections are possible, inconceivable connections impossible, and necessary connections those the denials of which are impossible or inconceivable. That said, and though we should today allow contingent connections that are neither probabilistic nor causal, there are few points at which the distinction is not clear.

It should also be remarked that Hume's argument applies just to what is known today as enumerative induction , based on instances, and primarily to singular predictive inference (including ‘predictions’ about the present or past; see section 3.2 below for a taxonomy of inductive inference) but, again, its generalization to other forms of inductive reasoning is straightforward. In what follows we paraphrase and interpolate freely so as to ease the application of the argument in contemporary contexts.

The argument should be seen against the background of Hume's project as he announces it in the introduction to the Treatise : This project is the development of the empirical science of human nature. The epistemological sector of this science involves describing the operations of the mind, the interactions of impressions and ideas and the function of the liveliness that constitutes belief. But this cannot be a merely descriptive endeavor; accurate description of these operations entails also a considerable normative component, for, as Hume puts it,

[o]ur reason [to be taken here quite generally, to include the imagination] must be consider'd as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, may frequently be prevented. (Hume THN, 180)

The account must thus not merely describe what goes on in the mind, it must also do this in such a way as to show that and how these mental activities lead naturally, if with frequent exceptions, to true belief (see Loeb 2006 for further discussion of these questions).

Now as concerns the argument, its conclusion is that in induction (causal inference) experience does not produce the idea of an effect from an impression of its cause by means of the understanding or reason, but by the imagination, by “a certain association and relation of perceptions.” The center of the argument is a dilemma: If inductive conclusions were produced by the understanding, inductive reasoning would be based upon the premise that nature is uniform;

that instances of which we have had no experience, must resemble those of which we have had experience, and that the course of nature continues always uniformly the same. (THN, 89)

And were this premise to be established by reasoning, that reasoning would be either deductive or probabilistic (i.e., causal). The principle can't be proved deductively, for whatever can be proved deductively is a necessary truth, and the principle is not necessary; its antecedent is consistent with the denial of its consequent. Nor can the principle be proved by causal reasoning, for it is presupposed by all such reasoning and any such proof would be a petitio principii .

The normative component of Hume's project is striking here: That the principle of uniformity of nature cannot be proved deductively or inductively shows that it is not the principle that drives our causal reasoning only if our causal reasoning is sound and leads to true conclusions as a “natural effect” of belief in true premises. This is what licenses the capsule description of the argument as showing that induction cannot be justified or licensed either deductively or inductively; not deductively because (non-trivial) inductions do not express logically necessary connections, not inductively because that would be circular. If, however, causal reasoning were fallacious, the principle of the uniformity of nature might well be among its principles.

The negative argument is an essential first step in Hume's general account of induction. It rules out accounts of induction that view it as the work of reason. Hume's positive account begins from another dilemma, a constructive dilemma this time: Inductive inference must be the work either of reason or of imagination. Since the negative argument shows that it cannot be a species of reasoning, it must be imaginative.

Hume's positive account of causal inference can be simply described: It amounts to embedding the singular form of enumerative induction in the nature of human, and at least some bestial, thought. The several definitions offered in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals (EHU, 60) make this explicit:

[W]e may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second . Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed .

Another definition defines a cause to be:

an object followed by another, and whose appearance always conveys the thought to that other.

If we have observed many F s to be followed by G s, and no contrary instances, then observing a new F will lead us to anticipate that it will also be a G . That is causal inference.

It is clear, says Hume, that we do make inductive, or, in his terms, causal, inferences; that having observed many F s to be G s, observation of a new instance of an F leads us to believe that the newly observed F is also a G . It is equally clear that the epistemic force of this inference, what Hume calls the necessary connection between the premises and the conclusion, does not reside in the premises alone:

All observed F s have also been G s,

a is an F ,

do not imply

It is false that “instances of which we have had no experience must resemble those of which we have had experience” (EHU, 89).

Hume's positive view is that the experience of constant conjunction fosters a “habit of the mind” that leads us to anticipate the conclusion on the occasion of a new instance of the second premise. The force of induction, the force that drives the inference, is thus not an objective feature of the world, but a subjective power; the mind's capacity to form inductive habits. The objectivity of causality, the objective support of inductive inference, is thus an illusion, an instance of what Hume calls the mind's “great propensity to spread itself on external objects” (THN, 167).

Hume's account of causal inference raises the problem of induction in an acute form: One would like to say that good and reliable inductions are those that follow the lines of causal necessity; that when

is the manifestation in experience of a causal connection between F and G , then the inference

All observed F s have also been G s, a is an F , Therefore, a , not yet observed, is also a G ,

is a good induction. But if causality is not an objective feature of the world this is not an option. The Humean problem of induction is then the problem of distinguishing good from bad inductive habits in the absence of any corresponding objective distinction.

Two sides or facets of the problem of induction should be distinguished: The epistemological problem is to find a method for distinguishing good or reliable inductive habits from bad or unreliable habits. The second and deeper problem is metaphysical . This is the problem of distinguishing reliable from unreliable inductions. This is the problem that Whitehead called “the despair of philosophy” (1925, 35). The distinction can be illustrated in the parallel case of arithmetic. The by now classic incompleteness results of the last century show that the epistemological problem for first-order arithmetic is insoluble; that there can be no method, in a quite clear sense of that term, for distinguishing the truths from the falsehoods of first-order arithmetic. But the metaphysical problem for arithmetic has a clear and correct solution: the truths of first-order arithmetic are precisely the sentences that are true in all arithmetic models. Our understanding of the distinction between arithmetic truths and falsehoods is just as clear as our understanding of the simple recursive definition of truth in arithmetic, though any method for applying the distinction must remain forever out of our reach.

Now as concerns inductive inference, it is hardly surprising to be told that the epistemological problem is insoluble; that there can be no formula or recipe, however complex, for ruling out unreliable inductions. But Hume's arguments, if they are correct, have apparently a much more radical consequence than this: They seem to show that the metaphysical problem for induction is insoluble; that there is no objective difference between reliable and unreliable inductions. This is counter intuitive. Good inductions are supported by causal connections and we think of causality as an objective matter: The laws of nature express objective causal connections. Ramsey writes in his Humean account of the matter:

Causal laws form the system with which the speaker meets the future; they are not, therefore, subjective in the sense that if you and I enunciate different ones we are each saying something about ourselves which pass by one another like “I went to Grantchester,” “I didn't”. (Ramsey 1931a, 137)

A satisfactory resolution of the problem of induction would account for this objectivity in the distinction between good and bad inductions.

It might seem that Hume's argument succeeds only because he has made the criteria for a solution to the problem too strict. Enumerative induction does not realistically lead from premises

All observed F s have also been G s a is an F ,

to the simple assertion

Therefore, a , not yet observed, is also a G .

Induction is contingent inference and as such can yield a conclusion only with a certain probability. The appropriate conclusion is

It is therefore probable that, a , not yet observed, is also a G

Hume's response to this (THN, 89) is to insist that probabilistic connections, no less than simple causal connections, depend upon habits of the mind and are not to be found in our experience of the world. Weakening the inferential force between premises and conclusion may divide and complicate inductive habits; it does not eliminate them. The laws of probability alone have no more empirical content than does deductive logic. If I infer from observing clouds followed by rain that today's clouds will probably be followed by rain this can only be in virtue of an imperfect habit of associating rain with clouds.

Hume's argument is often credited with raising the problem of induction in its modern form. For Hume himself the conclusion of the argument is not so much a problem as a principle of his account of induction: Inductive inference is not and could not be reasoning, either deductive or probabilistic, from premises to conclusion, so we must look elsewhere to understand it. Hume's positive account does much to alleviate the epistemological problem—how to distinguish good inductions from bad ones—without treating the metaphysical problem. His account is based on the principle that inductive inference is the work of association which forms a “habit of the mind” to anticipate the consequence, or effect, upon witnessing the premise, or cause. He provides illuminating examples of such inferential habits in sections I.III.XI and I.III.XII of the Treatise (THN). The latter accounts for frequency-to-probability inferences in a comprehensive way. It shows that and how inductive inference is “a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect.”

Although Hume is the progenitor of modern work on induction, induction presents a problem, indeed a multitude of problems, quite in its own right. The by now traditional problem is the matter of justification: How is induction to be justified? There are in fact several questions here, corresponding to different modes of justification. One very simple mode is to take Hume's dilemma as a challenge, to justify (enumerative) induction one should show that it leads to true or probable conclusions from true premises. It is safe to say that in the absence of further assumptions this problem is and should be insoluble. The realization of this dead end and the proliferation of other forms of induction have led to more specialized projects involving various strengthened premises and assumptions. The several approaches treated below exemplify this.

One of the most influential and controversial views on the problem of induction has been that of Karl Popper, announced and argued in The Logic of Scientific Discovery (LSD). Popper held that induction has no place in the logic of science. Science in his view is a deductive process in which scientists formulate hypotheses and theories that they test by deriving particular observable consequences. Theories are not confirmed or verified. They may be falsified and rejected or tentatively accepted if corroborated in the absence of falsification by the proper kinds of tests:

[A] theory of induction is superfluous. It has no function in a logic of science. The best we can say of a hypothesis is that up to now it has been able to show its worth, and that it has been more successful than other hypotheses although, in principle, it can never be justified, verified, or even shown to be probable. This appraisal of the hypothesis relies solely upon deductive consequences (predictions) which may be drawn from the hypothesis: There is no need even to mention “induction” . (LSD, 315)

Popper gave two formulations of the problem of induction; the first is the establishment of the truth of a theory by empirical evidence; the second, slightly weaker, is the justification of a preference for one theory over another as better supported by empirical evidence. Both of these he declared insoluble, on the grounds, roughly put, that scientific theories have infinite scope and no finite evidence can ever adjudicate among them (LSD, 253–254; Grattan-Guiness 2004). He did however hold that theories could be falsified, and that falsifiability, or the liability of a theory to counterexample, was a virtue. Falsifiability corresponds roughly to to the proportion of models in which a (consistent) theory is false. Highly falsifiable theories thus make stronger assertions and are in general more informative. Though theories cannot in Popper's view be supported, they can be corroborated : a better corroborated theory is one that has been subjected to more and more rigorous tests without having been falsified. Falsifiable and corroborated theories are thus to be preferred, though, as the impossibility of the second problem of induction makes evident, these are not to be confused with support by evidence.

Popper's epistemology is almost exclusively the epistemology of scientific knowledge. This is not because he thinks that there is a sharp division between ordinary knowledge and scientific knowledge, but rather because he thinks that to study the growth of knowledge one must study scientific knowledge:

[M]ost problems connected with the growth of our knowledge must necessarily transcend any study which is confined to common-sense knowledge as opposed to scientific knowledge. For the most important way in which common-sense knowledge grows is, precisely, by turning into scientific knowledge. (Popper LSD, 18)

3. Probability and induction

A probability on a first-order language is a function that assigns a number between zero and one inclusive to each sentence in the language. The laws of probability require that if A is any sentence of the language then

The probability P is said to be regular iff the condition of P3 is also necessary, i.e., iff no contingent sentence has probability one.

Given a probability P on a language L the conditional probability P ( B  |  A ) is defined for pairs A , B of sentences when P ( A ) is positive:

If P ( A ) > 0 then P ( B | A ) = P ( A ∧ B ) / P ( A )

Conditional probability may also be taken as fundamental and simple probability defined in terms of it as, for example, probability conditioned on a tautology (see, for example, Hajek 2003).

Sentences A , B are said to be independent in P if

P ( A ∧ B ) = P ( A ) P ( B ).

The set { A 1 , …, A k } is thoroughly independent in P iff for each non-null subset { B 1 , …, B n } of { A 1 , …, A k }

P ( B 1 ∧ … ∧ B n ) = P ( B 1 ) P ( B 2 ) … P ( B n )

From the above laws and definitions it follows that:

(So every consistent sentence has positive probability.)

If A and B are logically equivalent then

[( A ∧ B ) ∨ ¬ A ]

[( A ∧ B ) ∨ ¬ B ]

are both logically necessary. Hence by P3 and P2, if A and B are logically equivalent

P ( A ) = P ( A ∧ B ) = P ( B )

If A and B are independent in P , then

P ( A ∧ ¬ B ) = P ( A ) − P ( A ∧ B ) = P ( A ) − P ( A ) P ( B ) = P ( A ) (1 − P ( B ) = P ( A ) P (¬ B )

One simple and important special case concerns a language L ( k ), the vocabulary of which includes just one monadic predicate R and k individual constants a 1 , …, a k . A k-sequence in L ( k ) is a conjunction that includes for each constant a i either R ( a i ) or ¬ R ( a i ) (not both). In a standard interpretation k -sequences represent samples from a larger population of individuals; then R and ¬ R represent presence and absence of a trait of interest.

We state without proof the generalization of C5:

P is symmetrical on a language L ( k ) iff it is invariant for the permutation of individual constants, i.e., iff

P [ A ( a 1 , …, a n )] = P[ A ( b 1 , …, b n )]

for each formula A and any individual constants { a i }, { b i }

Independence is sufficient for symmetry in the following precise sense:

The condition of C7 is not necessary; symmetry does not imply independence, i.e., there are languages L ( k ), k -sequences A in L ( k ) and symmetrical probabilities P on L ( k ) such that A is not thoroughly independent in P . (A simple example in section 3.2 below illustrates this.)

If X = { x 1 , …, x n } is a finite set of individuals and Y ⊆ X , then the relative frequency of Y in X is the proportion of members of X that are also members of Y :

R ( Y | X ) = (1/ n ) C { X ∩ Y }

One relation between probability and relative frequency is easily expressed in terms of symmetry. We state this without proof (see Carnap LFP, 495 for a proof):

C8 can be understood from a Kantian-Critical point of view to express that relative frequency is the schema of (symmetrical) probability; the manifestation of probability in experience.

Bayes' Theorem (to be distinguished from Bayes' Postulate , to be treated in section 4 ) is a truth of probability useful in evaluating support for probabilistic hypotheses. It is a direct consequence of the definition of conditional probability.

A second important principle, often used in conjunction with C9 is:

The simple probabilities defined in section 3.1 above can serve to illustrate and compare approaches to probabilistic induction; Carnap's logicism, Reichenbach's frequentism, and Bayesian subjectivism. These sponsor different formulations and proposed solutions of the problem of induction.

Perhaps the most evident difference among the three theories is just that of the bearers or objects of probability. Probability applies to sentences in Carnap' logicism, to event-types for Reichenbach and to beliefs in subjectivism.

Carnap's taxonomy of the varieties of inductive inference (LFP 207f) may help to appreciate the complexity of the contemporary concept.

• Direct inference typically infers the relative frequency of a trait in a sample from its relative frequency in the population from which the sample is drawn.
• Predictive inference is inference from one sample to another sample not overlapping the first. This, according to Carnap, is “the most important and fundamental kind of inductive inference” (LFP, 207). It includes the special case, known as singular predictive inference , in which the second sample consists of just one individual.
• Inference by analogy is inference from the traits of one individual to those of another on the basis of traits that they share.
• Inverse inference infers something about a population on the basis of premises about a sample from that population.
• Universal inference , mentioned in the opening sentence of this article, is inference from a sample to a hypothesis of universal form.

Probability in Carnap's theory is a metalinguistic operator, as it is in the exposition of section 3.1 above. In this context the problem of induction is to choose or to design a language appropriate to a given situation and to define a probability on this language that properly codifies inductive inference.

Carnap writes m ( s ) for the probability of the sentence s and

c ( h , e ) = m ( h ∧ e ) / m ( e )

when m ( e ) > 0, for the degree of confirmation of the hypothesis h on evidence e . Degree of confirmation satisfies the laws of probability and in addition symmetry. In standard cases c and m are also regular.

K -sequences ( state descriptions in Carnap's terminology) are the most specific sentences in a language L ( k ): every consistent sentence is logically equivalent to a disjunction of these pairwise incompatible conjunctions, so fixing the probabilities of all state descriptions, which must always sum to one, fixes the probability of every consistent sentence in the language. (The principle C1 of section 3.1 fixes the probability of inconsistent sentences at zero.) State descriptions are isomorphic if they include the same number of negations. A structure description is a maximal disjunction of isomorphic state descriptions; all and only the state descriptions with the same number of negations. Symmetry entails that state descriptions in the same structure description are equiprobable.

To fix ideas we consider L (3) which we take to represent three draws with replacement from an urn including an indefinite number of balls, each either Red ( R ) or Black (¬ R ) . There are then eight state descriptions (eight possible sequences of draws) and four structure descriptions: a state description says which balls drawn have which color. A structure description says just how many balls there are of each color in a sequence of draws without respect to order.

From a deductive-logical point of view, the set of logical consequences of a given state description is a maximal consistent set of sentences of L (3): The set is consistent (consisting as it does of the logical consequences of a consistent sentence) and maximal; no sentence of L (3) not implied by the set is consistent with it. The state descriptions correspond to models, to points in a logical space. A (symmetrical) probability on L (3) thus induces a normal measure on sets of models: Any assignment of non-negative numbers summing to one to the state descriptions or models fixes probabilities. In this finite case, the extent to which evidence e supports a hypothesis h is the proportion of models for e in which h is true. Deductively, e logically implies h if h is true in every model for e . Degree of confirmation is thus a metrical generalization of first-order logical implication.

There are two probabilities that support contrasting logical-probable relations among the sentences of L (3). The simpler of these, m † and c †, is uniform or equiprobable over state descriptions; each state description has probability 1/8. From the point of view of induction it is significant that every 3-sequence (every sequence of three draws) is thoroughly independent in m †. This means that drawing and replacing a Red ball provides no evidence about the constitution of the urn or the color of the next ball to be drawn. Carnap took this to be a strong argument against the use of m † in induction, since it seemed to prohibit learning from experience.

Although m † may not serve well inductively, it is one of a class of very important probabilities. These are probabilities that are equiprobable for R , and in which for each k , every k -sequence is thoroughly independent. Such measures are known as Bernoullian probabilities , they satisfy the weak law of large numbers, first proved by Jacob Bernoulli in 1713. This law states that in the Bernoullian case of thorough independence and equiprobability, as the number of trials increases without bound, the difference between the probability of S and its relative frequency becomes arbitrarily small.

The second probability in question is m * and c *. m * is uniform (equiprobable) not on state descriptions but on structure descriptions. This can be thought of as enforcing a division of labor between cause and chance: The domain of cause includes the structures of the urn and the balls, the number and colors of the balls, the way the balls are shuffled between draws and so on. Given these causal factors, the order in which the balls are drawn is a matter of chance; this order is not determined by the mechanics of the physical set up just described. Of course the mechanics of the draw are also causally determined, but not by the mechanics of the physical set up.

In the present example a simple calculation shows that:

m *( R (1)) = m *( R (2)) = m *( R (3)) = 1/2 c *( R (2), R (1) = 2/3 c *( R (3), R (1) ∧ R (2)) = 3/4 c *( R (3), R (1) ∧ ¬ R (2)) = 3/8 c *( R (2), ¬ R (1)) = 1/3 c *( R (3), ¬ R (1) ∧ ¬ R (2)) = 1/4

m * ( c *) is thus affected by evidence, positively and negatively, as m † is not. R (1), R (2) and R (3) are not independent in m *. This establishes, as promised above in section 3.2 , a symmetrical probability in which k -sequences are not thoroughly independent. Symmetry is a demonstrably weaker constraint on probability than independence.

In later work Carnap introduced systems (the λ systems) in which different predicates could be more or less sensitive to evidence.

Carnap's logical probability generalized the metalinguistic relation of logical implication to a numerical function, c ( h , e ), that expresses the extent to which an evidence sentence e confirms a hypothesis h . Reichenbach's probability implication is also a generalization of a deductive concept, but the concept generalized belongs first to an object language of events and their properties.

This generalization extends classical first-order logic to include probability implications. These are formulas (Reichenbach TOP, 45)

x ∈ A ⊃ p x ∈ B

where p is some quantity between zero and one inclusive.

In a more conventional notation this probability implication between properties or classes may be written

P ( B | A ) = p

(Reichenbach writes P ( A , B ) rather than P ( B | A ). The latter is written here to maintain consistency with the notations of other sections.)

Reichenbach's probability logic is a conservative extension of classical first-order logic to include rules for probability implications. The individual variables ( x , y ) are taken to range over events (“The gun was fired,” “The shot hit the target”) and, as the notation makes evident, the variables A and B range over classes of events (“the class of firings by an expert marksman,” “the class of hits within a given range of the bullseye”) (Reichenbach TOP, 47). The formal rules of probability logic assure that probability implications conform to the laws of conditional probability and allow inferences integrating probability implications into deductive logic, including higher-order quantifiers over the subscripted variables.

Reichenbach's rules of interpretation of probability implications require, first, that the classes A and B be infinite and in one-one correspondence so that their order is established. It is also required that the limiting relative frequency

lim n →∞ N ( A n ∩ B n ) / n

where A n , B n are the first n members of A , B respectively, and N gives the cardinality of its argument, exists. When this limit does exist it defines the probability of B given A (Reichenbach 1971, 68):

P ( B | A ) = df lim n →∞ N ( A n ∩ B n ) / n , when the limit exists.

The complete system also includes higher-order or, as Reichenbach calls them, concatenated probabilities. First-level probabilities involve infinite sequences; the ordered sets referred to by the predicates of probability implications. Second-order probabilities are determined by lattices, or sequences of sequences. (Reichenbach 1971, chapter 8 and ¶41).

3.3.1 Reichenbachian induction.

On Reichenbach's view, the problem of induction is just the problem of ascertaining probability on the basis of evidence (TOP, 429). The conclusions of inductions are not asserted, they are posited . “A posit is a statement with which we deal as true, though the truth value is unknown” (TOP, 373).

B in A = N ( A n ∩ B n ) / n

lim n →∞ [ N ( A n ∩ B n ) / n ]

N ( A n ∩ B n ) / n .

(This corresponds to the Carnapian λ-function c 0 (λ(κ) = 0) which gives total weight to the empirical factor and no weight to the logical factor.)

It is significant that finite relative frequencies are symmetrical, independent of order, but limiting relative frequencies are not; whether a limit exists, and if it exists its value, depend upon the order of the sequence. The definition of probability as limiting relative frequency thus entails that probability, and hence inductive inference, so defined is not symmetrical.

Reichenbach's justification of induction by enumeration is known as a pragmatic justification (see also Salmon 1967, 52–54). It is first important to keep in mind that the conclusion of inductive inference is not an assertion, it is a posit. Reichenbach does not argue that induction is a sound method; his account is rather what Wesley Salmon (1963) and others have referred to as vindication : that if any rule will lead to positing the correct probability, the inductive rule will do this, and it is, furthermore, the simplest rule that is successful in this sense.

What is now the standard difficulty with Reichenbach's rule of induction was noticed by Reichenbach himself and later strengthened by Salmon (1963). It is that for any observed relative frequency in an initial segment of any finite length, and for any arbitrarily selected quantity between zero and one inclusive, there exists a rule that leads to that quantity as the limit on the basis of that observed frequency. Salmon goes on to announce additional conditions on adequate rules that uniquely determine the rule of induction. More recently Cory Juhl (1994) has examined the rule with respect to the speed with which it approaches a limit.

4. Bayesianism and subjectivism

Bayesian induction incorporates a subjectivistic view of probability, according to which probability is identified with strength of belief. Objective Bayesianism incorporates also normative epistemic constraints. (“Logical Foundations of Evidential Support,” (Fitelson 2006a) is a good example of the genre.) Contemporary Bayesianism is not only a doctrine, or family of positions, about probability. It applies generally in epistemology and the philosophy of science as well. “Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research” (Edwards et al. 1963) gave a general Bayesian account of statistical inference. Savage (1954), Jeffrey (1983) and Skyrms (1980) give extensive Bayesian accounts of decision making in situations of uncertainty. More recently objective Bayesianism has taken on the traditional problem of the justification of universal inference. The matter is briefly discussed in section 5 below .

The Bayesian approach to induction can be illustrated in the languages L ( k ) of section 3.1 : Recall that an urn contains three balls, each either Red or Black (= not Red). It is not known how many balls of each color there are. Balls are to be drawn, their colors recorded, and replaced. On the basis of this evidence, the outcomes of the successive draws, we are to support beliefs about the constitution of the urn. There are four possible constitutions, determined by the numbers of Red (and Black) balls in the urn. We can list these as alternative hypotheses stating the number of Reds:

• H 0 : 0 Reds, 3 Blacks
• H 1 : 1 Red, 2 Blacks
• H 2 : 2 Reds, 1 Black
• H 3 : 3 Reds, 0 Blacks

It is useful to consider what our beliefs would be if we knew which hypothesis was true. If the probability P on the language L ( k ) gives our beliefs about this setup, then P is, as remarked in section 3.1 , symmetric. Further, if, for example, we knew that there were two Reds and one Black ball in the urn the sequences of draws would be symmetric and (thoroughly) independent with constant probability (= 2/3) of Red on each draw. To what extent a given sequence of draws supports the different hypotheses is, on the other hand, not at all clear. If σ( k ) is a k -sequence we want to find the probabilities P ( H i | σ( k )), for i = 0, 1, 2 and 3. We do know that after the first draw we shall reject either H 0 or H 3 , but little else is evident. Notice however that if the probabilities P ( H i | σ( k )), the extent to which given sequences support the different hypotheses, are not readily available, we just saw that their converses, P (σ( k ) | H i ) (these are the likelihoods of the hypotheses given the evidence σ( k )) are easily and directly calculated: If, for example, the k -sequence σ( k ) includes n Reds and ( k − n ) Blacks then

P (σ( k )| H 2 ) = (2/3) n (1/3) ( k − n )

Each k -sequence is thus thoroughly independent in each conditional probability, P (__| H i ), with constant probability of R j . These conditional probabilities are thus Bernoullian.

Bayes' theorem ( C9 of section 3.1 ) expresses the probability P ( H | E ) in terms of the likelihood P ( E | H ).

P ( H | E ) = P ( E | H ) P ( H ) / P ( E )

Bayes' postulate says in this case that if we have no reason to believe that any of the four hypotheses is more likely than the others, then we may consider them to be equiprobable. Since the hypotheses are pairwise incompatible, on the basis of this assumption it follows from C9.1 of section 3.1 that

P ( E ) = ∑ i P ( E | H i ) P ( H i )

And hence that for each hypothesis H j ,

P ( H j | E ) = P ( E | H j ) P ( H j ) / ∑ i P ( E | H i ) P ( H i )

Thus, for example, we have that

P ( H 1 | R 1 ) = (1/3) / ∑ i P ( E | H i ) P ( H i ) = (1/3) / 2 = 1/6

Similarly, P ( H 2 | R 1 ) = 1/3, P ( H 3 | R 1 ) = 1/2.

The simple, and obvious, criticism of the Bayesian method is that the prior (before knowledge of any evidence) probabilities fixed by Bayes' postulate are arbitrary. The Bayesian response is that the Bayesian method of updating probabilities with successive outcomes progressively diminishes the effect of the initial priors. This updating uses the posterior probabilities resulting from the first draw as the “prior” probabilities for the second draw. Further, as the number of trials increases without bound, the updated probability is virtually certain to approach one of the conditional probabilities P (_ | H i ) (de Finetti 1937). (See Zabell 2005 for a precise formulation and exposition of the de Finetti theorem and Jeffrey 1983, Section 12.6, for a more brief and accessible account.)

Our deep and extensive understanding of deductive logic, in particular of the first-order logic of quantifiers and truth functions, is predicated on two metatheorems; semantical completeness of this logic and the decidability of proofs and deductions . The decidability result provides an algorithm which when applied to a (finite) sequence of sentences decides in finitely many steps whether the sequence is a valid proof of its last member or is a valid deduction of a given conclusion from given premises. Semantical completeness enables the easy and enlightening movement between syntactical, proof theoretic, operations and reasoning in terms of models. In combination these metatheorems resolve both the metaphysical and epistemological problems for proofs and demonstrations in first-order logic: Namely, what distinguishes valid from invalid logical demonstration? and what are reliable methods for deductive inference? (It should however be kept in mind that neither logical validity nor logical implication is decidable.) Neither of these metatheorems is possible for induction. Indeed, if Hume's arguments are conclusive then the metaphysical problem, to distinguish good from bad inductions, is insoluble.

But this is not to say that no advance can be made on the epistemological problem, the task of finding or designing good inductive methods; methods that will lead to true conclusions or predictions if not inevitably then at least in an important proportion of cases in which they are applied. Hume himself, in fact, made significant advances in this direction: first in the section of the Treatise (I.III.XIII) on inductive fallacies in which he gives an account of how it is that “we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes,” (THN 149) and later (THN I.III.XV, “Rules by which to judge of causes and effects,”) which rules are clear predecessors of Mill's Four Methods (Mill 1843, Bk III, Ch. VIII).

As concerns differences between induction and deduction, one of these is dramatically illustrated in the problems with Williams' thesis discussed in section 4.2 below: This is that inductive conditional probability is not monotonic with respect to conditions: Adding conditions may increase or decrease the value of a conditional probability. The same holds for non-probabilistic induction: Adding premises to a good induction may weaken its strength: That the patient presents flu-like symptoms supports the hypothesis that he has the flu. When to this evidence is added that he has been immunized against flu, that support is undermined. A second difference concerns relativity to context, to which induction but not deduction is susceptible. We return to this question in section 5 below.

Among those not convinced by Hume's arguments stated in section 2.1 above are D.C. Williams, supported and corrected by D.C. Stove, and David Armstrong. Williams argued in The Ground of Induction (1947) that it is logically true that one form of probabilistic inductive inference is sound and that this is logically demonstrable in the theory of probability. Stove reiterated the argument with a few reformulations and corrections four decades later. Williams held that induction is a reasonable method. By this he intended not only that it is characterized by ordinary sagacity. Indeed, he says that that an aptitude for induction is just what we mean by ‘ordinary sagacity’. He claims that induction, or one important species of it, is reasonable in the (not quite standard sense) of being “ logical or according to logic ”.

Hume, on the other hand, according to Williams held that:

[A]lthough our nervous tissue is so composed that when we have encountered a succession on M 's which are P we naturally expect the rest of M 's to be P , and although this expectation has been borne out by the event in the past, the series of observations never provided a jot of logical reason for the expectation, and the fact that the inductive habit succeeded in the past is itself only a gigantic coincidence, giving no reason for supposing it will succeed in the future. (Williams 1947, 15)

Williams and Stove maintain that while there may be, in Hume's phrase, no “ demonstrative arguments to prove” the uniformity of nature, there are good deductive arguments that prove that certain inductive methods yield their conclusions with high probability.

The specific form of induction favored by Williams and Stove is now known as inverse inference ; inference to a characteristic of a population based on premises about that population (see the taxonomy in section 3.2 above ). Williams and Stove focus on inverse inferences about relative frequency. In particular on inferences of the form:

(Williams 1947, 12; Stove 1986, 71–75) (This includes, of course, the special case in which r = 1)

Williams, followed by Stove, sets out to show that it is necessarily true that the inference from (i) to (ii) has high probability:

Given a fair sized sample, then, from any [large, finite] population, with no further material information, we know logically that it very probably is one of those which [approximately] match the population, and hence that very probably the population has a composition similar to that which we discern in the sample. This is the logical justification of induction. (Williams 1947, 97)

Williams and Stove recognize that induction may depend upon context and also upon the nature of the traits and properties to which it is applied. And Stove, at least, does not propose to justify all inductions: “That all inductive inferences are justified is false in any case” (Stove 1986, 77).

Williams' initial argument was simple and persuasive. It turns out, however, to have subtle and revealing difficulties. In response to these difficulties, Stove modified and weakened the argument, but this response may not be sufficient. There is in addition the further problem that the sense of necessity that founds the inferences is not made precise and becomes increasingly stressed as the argument plays out.

There are two principles on which the (i) to (ii) inference depends: First is the proportional syllogism ( C8 of section 3.1 ). Second is a rule relating the frequency of a trait in a population to its frequency in samples from that population:

• Frequency Principle : It is necessarily true that the relative frequency of a trait in a large finite population is close to that of most large samples from that population. (We say that such samples resemble the population.)

The proof of the Frequency Principle depends upon the fact that the relative frequencies of a trait in samples from such a population are normally distributed with mean equal to the frequency of the trait in the population and dispersion (standard deviation) that diminishes with the sizes of the population and the samples.

Williams' ingenious argument from (i) to (ii) begins with an induction on a ‘hyperpopulation’ (Williams 1947, 94–96) of all samples of size k (‘ k -samples’—like the k -sequences of the previous section) drawn from a large finite population X of individuals. The ‘individuals’ of the hyperpopulation are themselves k -samples from the population X .

Now let P be a symmetrical probability. (Williams assumes symmetry without explicit notice.) Given a large population X and a k -sample S of appropriate size from X , in which the relative frequency of the trait R is r , the content of the premise (i) above can be expressed in two premises:

Premise A. S is a k -sample from X . Premise B. The relative frequency of R in S is r , i.e., f(R | S ) = r

To show that (i) implies (ii), Williams argued from A and B as follows: It follows from the Frequency Principle that

It follows from Premise A, (1), and the Proportional Syllogism (C8) that

By Premise B and the definition of resemblance

It follows from (2) and (3) by the laws of probability that

Hence, goes the argument, (i) above implies (ii).

We might like to reason in this way, and Williams did reason in this way, but as Stove pointed out in The Rationality of Induction (1986, 65) it ignores the failure of monotonicity. Inductive inference in general and inductive conditional probabilities in particular are not monotonic : adding premises may change a good induction to a bad one and adding conditions to a conditional probability may change, and sometimes reduce, its value. Here, (3) depends on Premise B but suppresses mention of it, thus failing to respect the requirement to take account of all available and relevant evidence. In stating (3) Williams neglected the critical distinction between the probability of f ( R | X ) = r conditioned on resemblance:

and the result of adding Premise B, which states the relative frequency of R in S 0 , to the condition of (3a)

When, however, the conditions of (3) are expanded to take account of premise B,

the result does not follow from the premises; (3*) is true for some values of r and not for others.

As Maher describes this effect (and as Williams himself (1947, 89) had pointed out):

Sample proportions near 0 or 1 increase the probability that the population is nearly homogeneous which, ceteris paribus , increases the probability that the sample matches the population; conversely, sample proportions around 1/2 will ceteris paribus , decrease the probability of matching. (Maher 1996, 426)

Thus the addition of premise B to the condition of (3) might decrease the probability that S 0 resembles the population X : (3b) might be low while (3a) is high.

Conditional probability contrasts with the deductive logic of the material conditional in this respect:

( A → B ) implies [( A ∧ C ) → B ]

P ( B | A ) = p does not imply P ( B | A ∧ C ) = p

Stove's response to this difficulty was to point out that neither he nor Williams had ever claimed that every inductive inference, nor even every instance of the (i) to (ii) inference, was necessarily highly probable. All that was needed on Stove's view to establish Williams's thesis was to provide one case of values for r, X, S and R for which the inference holds necessarily. This would, Stove claimed, show that at least one inductive inference was necessarily rational.

Stove (1986, chapter VII) provided examples of specific values for the above parameters that he argued do license the inference. Maher pointed out that the argument depends upon tacit assumptions about the prior probabilities of different populations and their constitutions, and that when this is taken account of the conclusions no longer follow deductively. Scott Campbell (2001) continued the discussion.

Williams' original argument when expressed in general terms is simple and seductive: It is a combinatorial fact that the relative frequency of a trait in a large population is close to its relative frequency in most large samples from that population. The proportional syllogism is a truth of probability theory: In the symmetrical case relative frequency equals probability. From these it looks to be a necessary truth that the probability of a trait in a large population is close to its relative frequency in that population. We have seen that and why the consequence does not follow. Various efforts at weakening the original Williams thesis have been more or less successful. It is in any event plausible that there are at least some examples of inductions for which some form of the Williams thesis is true, but the thesis emerges from this dialectic considerably weakened.

D.M. Armstrong, like Williams and Stove, is a rationalist about induction.

About one-third of What is a Law of Nature (Armstrong 1983) is devoted to stating and supporting three rationalistic criticisms of what Armstrong calls the regularity theory of law. Put very generally, the various forms of the regularity theory all count laws, if they count them at all, as contingent generalizations or mere descriptions of the events to which they apply: “All there is in the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular fact, just one little thing and then another,” as David Lewis put this view (1986, ix). Armstrong argues against all forms of the regularity theory; laws, on his view, are necessary connections of universals that neither depend nor supervene on the course of worldly events but determine, restrict, and govern those events. The law statement, a linguistic assertion, must in his view be distinguished from the law itself. The law itself is not linguistic; it is a state of affairs, “that state of affairs in the world which makes the law statement true” (Armstrong 1991, 505). A law of nature is represented as ‘ N ( F , G )’ where F and G are universals and N indicates necessitation; Necessitation is inexplicable, it is “a primitive, which we are forced to postulate” (Armstrong 1983, 92). “That each F is a G , however, does not entail that F -ness [the universal F ] has N to G -ness” (Armstrong 1983, 85). That is to say that the extensional inclusion ‘all F 's are G 's’ may be an accidental generalization and does not imply a lawlike connection between F 's and G 's. In a “first formulation” of the theory of laws of nature (Armstrong 1983, 85), if N ( F , G ) is a law, it “does not obtain of logical necessity, if it does obtain then it entails the corresponding Humean or cosmic uniformity: ( x )( Fx ⊃ Gx ).” In later reconsideration (Armstrong 1983, 149), however, this claim is withdrawn: N ( F , G ) does not entail that all F 's are G 's; for some F 's may be “interfered with,” preventing the law's power from doing its work.

Armstrong's rationalism does not lead him, as it did Williams and Stove, to see the resolution of the problem of induction as a matter of demonstrating that induction is necessarily a rational procedure:

[O]rdinary inductive inference, ordinary inference from the observed to the unobserved, is, although invalid , nevertheless a rational form of inference. I add that not merely is it the case that induction is rational, but it is a necessary truth that it is so. (Armstrong 1983, 52)

Armstrong does not argue for this principle; it is a premise of an argument to the conclusion that regularity views imply the inevitability of inductive skepticism; the view, attributed to Hume, that inferences from the observed to the unobserved are not rational (Armstrong 1983, 52). Armstrong seems to understand ‘rational’ not in Williams' stronger sense of entailing deductive proofs, but in the more standard sense of (as the OED defines it) “Exercising (or able to exercise) one's reason in a proper manner; having sound judgement; sensible, sane” (Williams' “ordinary sagacity,” near enough)

The problem of induction for Armstrong is to explain why the rationality of induction is a necessary truth (Armstrong 1983, 52). Or, in a later formulation, to “lay out a structure of reasoning which will more fully reconcile us (the philosophers) to the rationality of induction” (Armstrong 1991, 505). His resolution of this problem has two “pillars” or fundamental principles. One of these is that laws of nature are objective natural necessities and, in particular, that they are necessary connections of universals. The second principle is that induction is a species of inference to the best explanation (IBE), what Peirce called ‘abduction’.

[T]he core idea is very simple: observed regularities are best explained by hypotheses of strong laws of nature [i.e., objective natural necessities], hypotheses which in turn entail conclusions about the unobserved. (Armstrong 2001, 503)

IBE, as its name suggests, is an informal and non-metric form of likelihood methods. Gilbert Harman coined the term in “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” (Harman 1965, see also Harman 1968) where he argued that enumerative induction was best viewed as a form of IBE: The explanandum is a collection of statements asserting that a number of F 's are G 's and the absence of contrary instances, and the explanans , the best explanation, is the universal generalization, all F's are G's . IBE is clearly more general than simple enumerative induction, can compare and evaluate competing inductions, and can fill in supportive hypotheses not themselves instances of enumerative induction. (Armstrong's affinity for IBE should not lead one to think that he shares other parts of Harman's views on induction.)

An instantiation of a law is of the form

N ( F , G ) a 's being F , a 's being G

where a is an individual. Such instantiations are states of affairs in their own right.

As concerns the problem of induction, the need to explain why inductive inferences are necessarily rational, one part of Armstrong's resolution of the problem can be seen as a response to the challenge put sharply by Goodman: Which universal generalizations are supported by their instances? Armstrong holds that necessary connections of universals, like N ( F, G ), are lawlike, supported by their instances, and, if true, laws of nature. It remains to show how and why we come to believe these laws. Armstrong's proposal is that having observed many F 's that are G , and no contrary instances, IBE should lead us to accept the law N ( F, G ).

[T]he argument goes from the observed constant conjunction of characteristics to the existence of a strong law, and thence to a testable prediction that the conjunction will extend to all cases. (Armstrong 1991, 507)

5. Paradoxes, the new riddle of induction and objectivity

The traditional problem of induction as Hume formulated it concerned what we now know as universal inference (see the taxonomy in section 3.2 above ). The premise

One or several A 's have been observed to be B 's, and no A 's are known to be not B 's.

Inductively supports

All A 's are B 's.

And singular predictive inference :

One or several A 's have been observed to be B 's, and no A 's are known to be not- B . a , heretofore unobserved, is known to be A , and not known to be not- B

The first of these forms, universal inference, can be codified or schematized by means of two definitions and two principles:

∀ x ( Ax → Bx ),

( Aa ∧ Ba ).

( Aa ∧ ¬ Ba ).

• Nicod's principle: Universal generalizations are supported or confirmed by their positive instances and falsified by their negative instances (Nicod 1930, 219).
• Equivalence principle : Whatever confirms a generalization confirms as well all its logical equivalents.

A simple example, due to C. G. Hempel, shows that all is not as simple as it might at first appear: By Nicod's principle

( Aa ∧ Ba ) supports ∀ x ( Ax → Bx ).

This last is logically equivalent to

∀ x [( Ax ∧ ¬ Bx ) → ( Ax ∧ ¬ Ax )].

But nothing can be a positive instance of the latter, and hence ( Aa ∧ Ba ) cannot support it. Thus if the equivalence principle is to obtain, Nicod's principle cannot be a necessary condition of inductive support, though it may be sufficient. The difficulty is endemic; the structure of logical equivalents may differ, but that of instances cannot.

The paradox of the ravens shows that even when suitably restricted, the Nicod principle is not without problems: By instance confirmation ‘a is not black and not a raven’ confirms ‘all non-black things are non-ravens.’ Since this is logically equivalent to ‘all ravens are black,’ by the equivalence principle:

• Paradoxical conclusion. ‘a is non-black and not a raven’ confirms ‘all ravens are black.’

And this is, or at least seems, paradoxical; that a non-raven lends support to a hypothesis about the color of ravens is highly implausible.

The paradox resides in the conflict of this counterintuitive result with our strong intuitive attachment to enumerative induction, both in everyday life and in the methodology of science.

The initial resolution of this dilemma was proposed by C. G. Hempel (1945) who credits discussion with Nelson Goodman. Assume first that we ignore all the background knowledge we bring to the question, such as that there are very many things that are either ravens or are not black, and that we look strictly at the truth conditions of the premise (this is neither a raven nor black) and the supported hypothesis (all ravens are black). The hypothesis says (is equivalent to)

Everything is either a black raven or is not a raven.

This hypothesis partitions the world into three exclusive and exhaustive classes of things: non-black ravens, black ravens, and non-ravens. Any member of the first class falsifies the hypothesis. Each member of the other two classes confirms it. A non-black non-raven is a member of the third class and is thus a confirming instance.

If this seems implausible it is because we in fact do not, as assumed, ignore the context in which the question is raised. We know before considering the inference that there are some black ravens and that there are many more non-ravens, many of which are not black. Observing, for example, a white shoe thus tells us nothing about the colors of ravens that we don't already know, and since (sound) induction is ampliative, good inductions should increase our knowledge. If we didn't know that many non-ravens are not black, the observation of a non-black, non-raven would increase our knowledge.

On the other hand, we don't know whether any of the unobserved ravens are not black, i.e., whether the first and falsifying class of things has any members, Observing a raven that is black tells us that this object at least is not a falsifying instance of the hypothesis, and this we did not know before the observation.

As Goodman puts it, the paradox depends upon “tacit and illicit evidence” not stated in its formulation:

Taken by itself, the statement that the given object is neither black nor a raven confirms the hypothesis that everything that is not a raven is not black as well as the hypothesis that everything that is not black is not a raven. We tend to ignore the former hypothesis because we know it to be false from abundant other evidence—from all the familiar things that are not ravens but are black. (Goodman 1955, 72)

The important lesson of the paradox of the ravens and the Hempel-Goodman resolution of it is that inductive inference is sensitive to background information and context. What looks to be a good induction when considered out of context and in isolation turns out not to be so when the context, including background knowledge, is taken into account. The inductive inference from

a is a white shoe

all ravens are black

is not so much unsound as it is uninteresting and uninformative.

Recent discussion of the paradox continues and improves on the Hempel-Goodman account by making explicit, and thus licit, the suppressed evidence. Further development, along generally Bayesian lines, generalizes the earlier approach by defining comparative and quantitative concepts of support capable of differentiating support for the two hypotheses in question. We return to the matter in discussing objective Bayesian approaches to induction below.

Suppose that at time t we have observed many emeralds to be green and no emeralds to be any other color. We thus have evidence statements

Emerald a is green, emerald b is green, etc.

and these statements support the generalization:

All emeralds are green.

Now define the predicate “grue” to apply to all things observed before time t just in case they are green and to other things just in case they are blue. Then we have also the evidence statements

Emerald a is grue, emerald b is grue, etc.

Hence the same observations support incompatible hypotheses about emeralds to be observed after t ; that they are green and that they are blue.

A few cautionary remarks about this frequently misunderstood paradox:

• The grue hypothesis is not well supported by its instances. The paradox makes it clear that there is something wrong with instance confirmation and enumerative induction as initially characterized.
• Neither the grue evidence statements nor the grue hypothesis entails that any emeralds change color. This is a common confusion. (See, for example, Armstrong 1983, 58; and Nix & Paris 2007, 36.)
• The grue paradox cannot be resolved, as was the ravens paradox, by looking to background knowledge (as would be the case if it entailed color changes). Of course we know that it is extremely unlikely that unobserved emeralds are grue. That just restates the point of the paradox and does nothing to resolve it.

That the definition of grue includes a time parameter is sometimes advanced as a criticism of the definition. But, as Goodman points out, were we to take “grue” and its obverse “bleen” (“blue up to t , green thereafter”) instead of “green” and “blue” as primitive terms, definitions of the latter, standard English, terms would include time parameters. The question here is whether inductive inference should be relative to the language in which it is formulated. Deductive inference is relative in this way as is Carnapian inductive logic.

The grue paradox raises and illustrates problems of a different nature from those raised by the paradox of the ravens: “All ravens are black” whether true or false is a clear example of a solid generalization. The questions that are raised by the ravens paradox concern the nature of this support and the role of context; not that the nature of the hypothesis itself can be called into question. The grue paradox, on the other hand, presents us with a quite different question; here is a generalization of appropriate form that is clearly not, indeed apparently cannot, be supported by its instances. What is the difference between healthy generalizations, which, like “All ravens are black” are supported by their instances, and grue-type generalizations that cannot be so supported? That is Goodman's new riddle of induction . (But see Mill's remark cited at the beginning of this article where the riddle is anticipated.)

The old, or traditional problem of induction was to justify induction; to show that induction, typically universal and singular predictive predictive inference, leads always, or in an important proportion of cases, from true premises to true conclusions. This problem, says Goodman, is, as Hume demonstrated, insoluble, and efforts to solve it are at best a waste of time. We have been looking at the wrong problem; it is only a careless reading of Hume that prevented us from seeing this. Once we see the difficulty, more homely examples than the grue hypothesis are easy to come by:

Albert is in this room and safe from freezing.

Everyone in this room is safe from freezing.

For the same reasons

supports the counterfactual

If Nanook of the north were in this room he would be safe from freezing.

Albert is in this room and is a third son.

does not support

Everyone in this room is a third son.

support the counterfactual

If my only son were in this room he would be a third son.

It is not the least of Goodman's accomplishments to have shown that three questions all issue from the same new riddle:

• What is the difference between those generalizations that are supported by their instances and those that are not?
• Which generalizations support counterfactual conditionals?
• How are lawlike generalizations to be distinguished from accidental generalizations?

Goodman's own response to the new riddle was that those generalizations that are supported by their instances involve predicates that have a history of use in prediction. Such predicates Goodman called projectible .

The project of the Carnapian logic of confirmation was to put inductive reasoning on the sure path of a science; to give a unified and objective account of inductive inference including clear rules of procedure, in close analogy to deductive inference (see Carnap LFP, section 43). The Hempel-Goodman resolution of the ravens paradox, according to which reference to context may be essential to induction, threatens to undermine this enterprise before it properly begins: If Hempel and Goodman have it right, a is a black raven may confirm all ravens are black in one context and not in another.

This relativity produces yet another problem of induction: How can the objectivity of inductive inference be assured given that it depends upon context? Context dependence must in this regard be distinguished from non-monotonicity: Monotonicity and its contrary concern relations among inductive arguments or inferences; a sound inductive argument can be converted into an unsound argument by adding premises. Context dependence, on the other hand, means that one and the same argument may be sound in one context and not in another. Context dependence, but not non-monotonicity, entails relativity and loss of objectivity.

It is useful to distinguish discursive context, such as that there are many more black things than ravens, from non-discursive context. Hume gives us a famous and striking example of the latter:

[A] man, who being hung out from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling, when he surveys the precipice below him, tho he knows himself to be perfectly safe from falling. (THN 149)

Hume's view is that such contextual factors can be neutralized by general rules, which rules will ascribe “one inference to our judgment, and the other to our imagination” (THN 149). Something like this must be the right account.

As concerns discursive context, objective Bayesianism seeks to eliminate or ameliorate the relativity illustrated and exemplified in the Ravens paradox first by supplementing the Nicod principle with a definition or necessary and sufficient condition of inductive support. This is done in terms of one of several appropriate objective probabilities, governed by normative principles. (Carnap's measures discussed in section 4.2 are examples of these.) Given such a probability, P , there are a number of alternative definitions of support. One widely accepted definition states that evidence E supports a hypothesis H if and only if E raises the probability of H (Carnap LFP, 464; Maher 1996; Fitelson and Hawthorne 2006, 10).

Support principle. Evidence E supports hypothesis H if and only if P ( H | E ) > P ( H )

We look briefly at two objective Bayesian approaches to the problem of relativity in induction.

5.3.1 Logical Bayesianism

Patrick Maher, in “Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox” (1999), argues that the conclusion of the Ravens paradox is in fact not paradoxical, and that its appearance as such is deceptive. Maher claims that for certain objective logical probabilities (defined by Carnap in the λ system of 1980) a is neither black nor a raven raises the probability of all ravens are black , thus supports the latter, and that there is hence no paradox. The probabilities in question, like the probability P* described in section 3.2 above , weight homogeneous structure descriptions more heavily.

Maher also accounts for our initial (and mistaken) rejection of the paradoxical conclusion;

By citing a false principle that is easily confused with PC. This is

(See also Hempel 1945, 19.)

As Maher puts it, “the observation of non-ravens tells us nothing about the color of [unobserved] ravens.”

5.3.2 Moving context into content

Branden Fitelson and James Hawthorne (2006) undermine the relativity entailed by context dependence by making of conditional probability a three-place function, in which probability is conditioned on evidence and context, the latter to include also background knowledge.

P K ( H, E )

to indicate relativity to background knowledge, including perhaps knowledge of (discursive) context. This permits the distinction of support relative to (i) some background knowledge, (ii) our actual, present background knowledge, (iii) tautological or necessary background knowledge and (iv) any background knowledge whatever.

In the signal example of the ravens paradox, background knowledge including a few remarkably weak modal assumptions (such as “Finding a to be a black raven neither absolutely proves nor absolutely falsifies ‘All ravens are black.’”) entail that a non-black non-raven supports that all ravens are black.

6. Knowledge, values and evaluation

In 1953 Richard Rudner published “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,” in which he argued for the thesis expressed in its title. Rudner's argument was simple:

[S]ince no hypothesis is ever completely verified, in accepting a hypothesis the scientist must make the decision that the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis. (Rudner 1953, 2)

Sufficiency in such a decision will and should depend upon the importance of getting it right or wrong.

The argument has a precise point in the case of tests or experiments with known error probability (the probability of rejecting a true hypothesis or of accepting a false hypothesis) but it applies quite generally: Tests of hypotheses about drug toxicity may and should have less chance of going wrong than those about the quality of a “lot of machine-stamped belt buckles”. The argument is not restricted to scientific inductions; it shows as well that our everyday inferences depend inevitably upon value judgments; how much evidence one collects depends upon the importance of the consequences of the decision.

Isaac Levi, in responding to Rudner's claim, and to later formulations of it, distinguished cognitive values from other sorts of values; moral, aesthetic, and so on. (Levi 1986, 43–46) Of course the scientist qua scientist, that is to say in his scientific activity, makes judgments and commitments of cognitive value, but he need not, and in many instances should not, allow other sorts of values (fame, riches) to weigh upon his scientific inductions. (See also Jeffrey, 1956 for a related response to Rudner's argument.)

What is in question is the separation of practical reason from theoretical reason. Rudner denies the distinction; Levi does too, but distinguishes practical reason with cognitive ends from other sorts. Recent pragmatic accounts of inductive reasoning are even more radical. Following Ramsey (1931a) and Savage (1954), they subsume inductive reasoning under practical reason; reason that aims at and ends in action. These and their successors, such as Jeffrey (1983), define partial belief on the basis of preferences; preferences among possible worlds for Ramsey, among acts for Savage, and among propositions for Jeffrey. Preferences are in each case highly structured. In all cases beliefs as such are theoretical entities, implicitly defined by more elaborate versions of the pragmatic principle that agents (or reasonable agents) act (or should act) in ways they believe will satisfy their desires: If we observe the actions and know the desires (preferences) we can then interpolate the beliefs. In any given case the actions and desires will fit distinct, even radically distinct, beliefs, but knowing more desires and observing more actions should, by clever design, let us narrow the candidates.

In all these theories the problem of induction is a problem of decision, in which the question is which action to take, or which wager to accept. The pragmatic principle is given a precise formulation in the injunction to act so as to maximize expected utility, to perform that action, A i , among the possible alternatives, that maximizes

U ( A i ) = ∑ j P ( S j | A i ) U ( S j ∧ A i )

where the S j are the possible consequences of the acts A i , and U gives the utility of its argument.

One significant advantage of treating induction as a matter of utility maximization is that the cost of gathering more information, of adding to the evidence for an inductive inference, can be factored into the decision. Put very roughly, the leading idea is to look at gathering evidence as an action on its own. Suppose that you are facing a decision among acts A i , and that you are concerned only about the occurrence or non-occurrence of a consequence S . The principle of utility maximization directs you to choose that act A i that maximizes

U ( A i ) = P ( S | A i ) U ( S ∧ A i )

Suppose further that you have the possibility of investigating to see if evidence E , for or against S , obtains. Assume further that this investigation is cost-free. Then should you investigate and find E to be true, utility maximization would direct you to choose that act A i that maximizes utility when your beliefs are conditioned on E :

U E ( A i ) = P ( S | E ∧ A i ) U ( S ∧ E ∧ A i ) + P (¬S | E∧A i ) U ( ¬S∧E∧A i )

And if you investigate and find E to be false, the same principle directs you to choose A i to maximize utility when your beliefs are conditioned on ¬ E :

U ¬ E ( A i ) = P ( S | ¬ E ∧ A i ) U ( S ∧¬ E ∧ A i )         + P (¬ S | ¬ E ∧ A i ) U (¬ S ∧¬ E ∧ A i )

Hence if your prior strength of belief in the evidence E is P ( E ), you should choose to maximize the weighted average

P ( E )( U E ( A i ) + P (¬ E )( U ¬ E ( A i )

and if the maximum of this weighted average exceeds the maximum of U ( A i ) then you should investigate. About this, several brief remarks:

Notice that the utility of investigation depends upon your beliefs about your future beliefs and desires, namely that you believe now that following the investigation you will maximize utility and update your beliefs.

Investigation in the actual world is normally not cost-free. It may take time, trouble and money, and is sometimes dangerous. A general theory of epistemic utility should consider these factors.

I. J. Good (1967) proved that in the cost-free case U ( A i ) can never exceed U E ( A i ) and that when the utilities of outcomes are distinct the latter always exceeds the former (Skyrms 1990, chapter 4).

The question of bad evidence is critical. The evidence gathered might take you further from the truth. (Think of drawing a succession of red balls from an urn containing predominantly blacks.)

• Achinstein, Peter, 1963, “Variety and Analogy in Confirmation Theory,” Philosophy of Science , 30: 207–221.
• Adams, Ernest, 1965, “A Logic of Conditionals,” Inquiry , 8: 166–97.
• Alfano, Sean, 2005, “Poll: Majority Reject Evolution,” CBS News . Oct. 23, 2005. [ available online ]
• Ambrose, Alice, 1947, “The Problem of Justifying Inductive Inference,” Journal of Philosophy , 44: 253–271
• Armstrong, D.M., 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism: Vol. 1. Nominalism vs. Realism , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism: Vol. 2. A Theory of Universals , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1983, What is a Law of Nature , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1989, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1991, “What Makes Induction Rational?,” Dialogue , 30: 503–11.
• –––, 1997, A World of States of Affairs , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1998, “Reply to van Fraassen,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 66(2): 224–229.
• Ayer, A.J., 1972, Probability and Evidence , New York: Columbia University Press.
• Bernoulli, Jacques, 1713, Ars Conjectandi , Basel: Impensis Thurnisiorum, English translation, The Art of Conjecturing , Edith D. Sylla (trans.), Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2006.
• Black, Duncan, 1963, The Theory of Committees and Elections , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Brown, M.B., 1987, Review of (Stove 1986), History and Philosophy of Logic , 8: 116–120.
• Campbell, Scott, 2001, “Fixing a Hole in the Ground of Induction,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 79(4): 553–563.
• Campbell, Scott and James Franklin, 2004, “Randomness and the Justification of Induction,” Synthese , 138(1): 79–99.
• Carnap, Rudolf, 1952, The Continuum of Inductive Methods , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• –––, [LFP] 1950[1962], Logical Foundations of Probability , second edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962. (First published 1950.)
• Cesa-Bianchi, Nicolo and Gabor Lugosi, 2006, Prediction, Learning and Games , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Daly, Chris, 1998, “Review of A World of States of Affairs , by D. M. Armstrong,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 76(4): 640–642.
• Dretske, F., 1977, “Laws of Nature,” Philosophy of Science , 44: 248–268.
• Edwards, W., H. Lindman, and L. Savage, 1963, “Bayesian statistical inference for psychological research,” Psychological Review , 70(3): 193–242.
• de Finetti, Bruno, 1937, “La prevision: ses lois logiques, ses sources subjective”. Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincare , 7: 1–68.
• –––, [FLL] 1964, “Foresight: Its Logical Laws, Its Subjective Sources”. A translation by Henry Kyburg of Finetti 1937, in Studies in Subjective Probability , Henry Kyburg and Howard Smokler (eds.), New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964.
• –––, [TOP] 1974[1977], Theory of Probability in two volumes, New York: John Wiley a nd Sons, 1974. A translation by Antonio Machi and Adrian Smith of Teoria delle Probabilita , 1970, Einaudi.
• Fitelson, Branden, 1999, “The Plurality of Bayesian Measures of Confirmation and the Problem of Measure Sensitivity,” Philosophy of Science , 66 (Sep., Supplement): S362–S378.
• –––, 2006a, “The Logic of Confirmation,” Philosophy Compass , 1(1): 95–113.
• –––, 2006b, “Logical Foundations of Evidential Support,” Philosophy of Science , 73(5): 500–512.
• –––, 2007, “Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and Relational Confirmation,” Synthese , 156: 473 –489.
• Fitelson, Branden and J. Hawthorne, 2006, “How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens,” in E. Eels and J. Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science , Chicago: Open Court.
• Franklin, James, 2001, “Resurrecting Logical Probability,” Erkenntnis , 55: 277–305.
• Frege, Gottlob, 1879, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens , Halle 1879.
• Friedman, Michael and Richard Creath (eds.), 2007, The Cambridge Companion to Carnap , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Giere, Ronald N. 1972, Review: The Significance Test Controversy , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 23(2): 170–181.
• Good, I. J., 1967, “On the Principle of Total Evidence,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 17: 319–321.
• George, Alexander, 2007, “A Proof of Induction?,” Philosopher's Imprint , 7(2, March). [ available online ]
• Giaquinto, M., 1987, “Review of The Rationality of Induction by D.C. Stove,” Philosophy of Science , 54/4: 612–615.
• Goldman, Alvin L., 1999, Knowledge in a Social World , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Goodman, Nelson, 1955, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Gower, Barry, 1990, “Stove on inductive scepticism,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 68(1): 109–112.
• Grattan - Guinness, I., 2004, “Karl Popper and the Problem of Induction, A Fresh Look at the Logic of Testing Scientific Theories,” Erkenntnis , 60(1): 107–120.
• Hacking, Ian, 1965, Logic of Statistical Inference , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1972, Review: Likelihood , British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 23(2): 132–137.
• Hajek, Alan, 2003, “What Conditional Probability Could not Be,” Synthese , 137(3): 273–323.
• Harman, Gilbert, 1965, “The Inference to the Best Explanation,” The Philosophical Review , 74(1): 88–95.
• –––, 1968, “Enumerative Induction as Inference to the Best Explanation,” The Journal of Philosophy , 65(18): 529–522.
• Helman David H. (ed.), 1988, Analogical Reasoning: Perspectives of Artificial Intelligence, Cognitive Science, and Philosophy , Dordrecht: Kluwer.
• Hempel, Carl G., 1945, “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” Mind , 54(213): 1–26 and 54(214): 97–121.
• Hochberg, Herbert, 1999, “D.M. Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs ,” Noûs , 33(3): 473–495.
• Hume, David, [THN] 1888, Hume's Treatise of Human Nature , edited by L. A. Selby Bigge, Oxford, Clarendon Press. Originally published 1739–40.
• –––, [EHU] 1975, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals , reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777 and edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and analytical index by L. A. Selby Bigge, MA. Third edition with text revised and notes by P. H. Nidditch. Oxford, Clarendon Press.
• Indurkhya, Bipin, 1990, “Some Remarks on the Rationality of Induction,” Synthese , 85(1): 95–114.
• Irzik, Gurol, 1991, “Armstrong's Account of Probabilistic Laws,” Analysis , 51/4: 214–217.
• Jeffrey, Richard, 1956, “Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses,” Philosophy of Science , 23: 237–246.
• –––, 1983, The Logic of Decision , second edition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• Johnson, W. E., 1921–1924, Logic: in three volumes , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted unchanged by Dover Publications in 1964.
• Juhl, Cory F., 1994, “The Speed-Optimality of Reichenbach's Straight Rule of Induction,” British Journal for the Philsosophy of Science , 45 (3): 857–863.
• Kelly, Kevin, and Oliver Schulte, 1997, “Church's Thesis and Hume's Problem,” Logic and Scientific Methods , M. L. Della Chiara et al . (eds.), Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 383–398.
• ––– and Clark Glymour, 2004, “Why Probability Does not Capture the Logic of Scientific Justification,” Contemporary Debates in the Philosophy of Science , Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.
• Kolmogorov, A. N., [FTP] 1956, Foundations of the Theory of Probability . A translation and revision by Nathan Morrison of Grundbegriffe der Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung, Ergebnisse Der Mathematik , 1933, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Reprinted unchanged by Dover Publications in 1964.
• Kyburg, Henry, 1956, “The Justification of Induction,” Journal of Philosophy , 54(12): 345–357.
• –––, 1974, The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference , Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
• Levi, Isaac, 1960, “Must the Scientist Make Value Judgments?” Journal of Philosophy , 57(11): 394–400.
• –––, 1986, Hard Choices: Decision Making under Unresolved Conflict , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Lewis, David, 1986, Philosophical Papers (Volume II), Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lipton, Peter, 2004, Inference to the Best Explanation , London and New York: Routledge. Second edition. First published in 1991.
• Loeb, Louis E., 2006, “Psychology, epistemology, and skepticism in Hume's argument about induction,” Synthese , 152: 321–338.
• Maher, Patrick, 1996, “The Hole in the Ground of Induction,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 74(3): 423–432.
• –––, 1999, “Inductive Logic and the Ravens Paradox,” Philosophy of Science , 66(1): 50–70
• –––, 2006, “The Concept of Inductive Probability,” Erkenntnis , 65: 185 – 206.
• Maxwell, N., 1993, “Induction and Scientific Realism: Einstein versus van Fraassen. Part One: How to Solve the Problem of Induction,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 44: 61–79.
• Mayberry, Thomas C., 1968, “Donald Williams on Induction,” Journal of Thought , 3: 204–211.
• Mayo, Deborah G., 1966, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• –––, and Aris Spanos, 2006, “Severe Testing as a Basic Concept in a Neyman–Pearson Philosophy of Induction.” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 57: 323–357.
• Mill, John Stuart, 1843, System of Logic, Ratiocinative and Inductive: Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, Volume 1 , London: John W. Parker.
• Miller, Dickinson S., 1947, “Professor Donald Williams versus Hume,” The Journal of Philosophy , 44(25): 673–684.
• Nagel, Ernest, 1947, “Review of The Ground of Induction by Donald Williams,” The Journal of Philosophy , 44(25): 685–693.
• Nicod, Jean, 1930, Foundations of Geometry and Induction , P. P. Wiener (trans.), London: Harcourt Brace.
• Nix, C.J. and B. Paris, 2007, “A Note on Binary Inductive Logic,” Journal of Philosophical Logic , 36(6): 735–771.
• Okasha, Samir, 2005, “Does Hume's argument against induction rest on a quantifier–shift fallacy?” Proceedings of the Aristotelean Society , 105: 237–255.
• Oliver, Alex, 1998 “Review of A World of States of Affairs by D.M. Armstrong,” The Journal of Philosophy , 95(10): 535–540.
• Peano, Giuseppe, [SWP] 1973, Selected Works of Giuseppe Peano , translated and edited by Hubert C. Kennedy, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
• Pearson, E. S., 1955, “Statistical concepts in their relation to reality,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: B , 17 (2): 204–207.
• Popper, Karl R. [LSD] 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , New York: Basic Books. A translation by the author with the assistance of Julius Freed and Jan Freed of Der Logik der Forschung , Vienna: J. Springer, 1935.
• Ramsey, Frank Plumpton, [TAP] 1931a, “Truth and Probability,”in Ramsey [FOM].
• –––, [FOM] 1931b, The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays , R.B. Braithwaite (ed.), London, Routledge and Kegan Pau.
• Reichenbach, Hans, [TOP] 1971 [1935], The Theory of Probability , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. A translation by Ernest R. Hutton and Maria Reichenbach of Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre. Eine Untersuchung uber die logischen und mathematischen Grundlagen der Wahrscheinlichskeitrechnung , Leiden, 1935. Revised by the author.
• –––, 1938, Experience and Prediction . Chicago: University of Chicago Press, Phoenix edition 1968.
• Rowan, Michael, 1993, “Stove on the Rationality of Induction and the Uniformity Thesis,” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 44(3): 561–566.
• Royall, Richard, 1997, Statistical Evidence: A Likelihood Paradigm . London, New York, Chapman and Hall.
• Rudner, Richard, 1953, “The Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments,” Philosophy of Science , 20(1): 1–6.
• Salmon, Wesley, 1963, “On Vindicating Induction,” Philosophy of Science , 30(3): 252–261.
• –––, 1967, Foundations of Scientific Inference , Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press.
• Savage, Leonard J., 1954, The Foundations of Statistics . New York: John Wiley & Sons.
• Schulte, Oliver, 1999, “Means–Ends Epistemology,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 50(1): 1–31.
• Schurz, Gerhard, 2008, “The Meta-inductivist's Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game. A New Approach to Hume's Problem,” Philosophy of Science , 75: 278–305.
• Skyrms, Brian, 1990, The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 2001, Choice and Chance . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• –––, 1994, “Bayesian Projectability,” in Douglas Stalker (ed.), Grue: Essays on the New Riddle of Induction , Chicago: Open Court.
• Slowik, Edward, 2005, “Natural laws, universals and the induction problem,” Philosophia , 32(1–4): 241–251.
• Sober, Elliot, 2002, “Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning.” International Journal for the Philosophy of Religion , 52: 65–80.
• Spohn, Wolfgang, 2005, “Enumerative induction and lawlikeness,” Philosophy of Science , 72(1): 164–187.
• Sprenger, Ian, 2009, “Evidence and Experimental Design in Sequential Trials,” Philosophy of Science , 76: 637–649.
• Steel, Daniel, 2003, “A Bayesian way to make stopping rules matter,” Erkenntnis , 58: 213–227.
• Stove, D.C., 1986 The Rationality of Induction , Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. Reprinted 2001.
• Suppes, Patrick, 1998, “Review of Kevin Kelly, The Logic of Reliable Inquiry ,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 49: 351–354.
• Surowiecki, James. 2004, The wisdom of crowds: why the many are smarter than the few and how collective wisdom shapes business, economies, societies, and nations , New York: Doubleday.
• Tooley, M., 1987, Causation , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• –––, 1977, “The Nature of Laws” Canadian Journal of Philosophy , 7: 667–698.
• van Fraassen, Bas, 1987, “Armstrong on Laws and Probabilities,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy , 65(3): 243–260.
• Vickers, John M., 1988, Chance and Structure: An Essay on the Logical Foundations of Probability , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Vranas, P., 2004, “Hempel's Raven Paradox: A Lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 55: 545–560.
• White, F.C., 1988, “Hempel's Raven Paradox: A lacuna in the Standard Bayesian Solution” British 66(4): 533–537.
• Whitehead, Alfred North, 1925, Science and the Modern World , New York: Mentor, 1948.
• Williams, Donald, 1947, The Ground of Induction , Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press. Reissued, New York: Russell and Russell Inc., 1963.
• –––, 1946, “The Problem of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 6(4): 619–622.
• –––, 1945a. “On the Derivation of Probabilities from Frequencies,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 5(4): 449–484.
• –––, 1945b, “The Challenging Situation in the Philosophy of Probability,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 6(1): 67–86.
• Yahya, Harun, 2007, Atlas of Creation , Hackensack, NJ: Global Publishing Company.
• Zabell, S.I., 2005, Symmetry and Its Discontents: Essays on the History of Inductive Probability , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2007, “Carnap on probability and induction,” in Friedman and Creath (eds.) 2007.

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Indiana Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Teaching Theory of Knowledge: Probability and Induction , organization of topics and bibliography by Brad Armendt (Arizona State University) and Martin Curd (Purdue).
• Forecasting Principles , A brief survey of prediction markets.

actualism | Bayes' Theorem | -->Carnap, Rudolf --> | conditionals | confirmation | epistemology: Bayesian | epistemology: evolutionary | epistemology: naturalism in | epistemology: social | fictionalism: modal | Frege, Gottlob: theorem and foundations for arithmetic | Goodman, Nelson | Hempel, Carl | Hume, David | logic: inductive | logic: non-monotonic | memory | Mill, John Stuart | perception: epistemological problems of | Popper, Karl | probability, interpretations of | -->Ramsey, Frank --> | Reichenbach, Hans | testimony: epistemological problems of | Vienna Circle

Acknowledgments

The author would like to thanks to Patrick Maher for helpful comments, and the editors would like to thank Wolfgang Swarz for his suggestions for improvement.

Copyright © 2014 by John Vickers

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2016 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Center for the Study of Language and Information (CSLI), Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Induction: Progress in Philosophy of Science

• February 2022

• University of Bristol

Discover the world's research

• 25+ million members
• 160+ million publication pages
• 2.3+ billion citations

• Karl Popper
• Jonathan Vogel
• William G. Lycan
• P.M. Churchland

• Gilbert H. Harman

• Crispin Sartwell
• CARL G. HEMPEL
• Recruit researchers
• Join for free
• Login Email Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google Welcome back! Please log in. Email · Hint Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google No account? Sign up

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

Unit 523 Manage induction processes for health and social care or children and young people's settings (O35

Level: Level 4 Credit value: 3 Aim The purpose of this unit is to assess the learner's knowledge, understanding and skills for managing induction in health and social care or children and young people's settings. Learning outcome 1. Understand the purpose of induction for health and social care or children and young people's settings 1.1 Explain why induction is important for practitioners, individuals and organisations Proper induction training is increasingly a legal requirement. Employers have a formal duty to provide new employees with all relevant information and training relating to health and safety particularly. Most employers recognise the fact that their staff are their greatest asset, and the right recruitment and induction processes are vital in ensuring that the new employee becomes effective in the shortest time. The success of an organisation depends on having the right number of staff, with the right skills and abilities. According to the Social Care Institute for Excellence (SCIE) induction is the process of introducing an employee or volunteer to a job and an organisation. The induction period is a time when individuals are keen to do well and the best time for ensuring staff understand the standards and requirements of their jobs. The quality of induction can determine the success of an appointment. In particular, if someone is not properly trained and coached, then problems may occur later. Poor induction damages the prospects of long-term retention and can contribute to staff turnover. The effective implementation of induction in social care is a significant step towards the delivery of high-quality care and support. This can be achieved by ensuring that staff achieve acceptable levels of competence to practice and show commitment to practices that value diversity and empowerment. All staff in social care, including students and agency staff, should receive an induction. Induction is crucial to effective retention, as a failure to properly support and assess performance during this period can result in losing or demotivating the worker at a crucial time. In disciplinary cases it can be more difficult to challenge bad practice if expectations and necessary learning have not been communicated properly as part of the induction process.

Related Papers

Journal for New Generation Sciences

Hermanus Moolman

This paper discusses the development and enrichment of a theoretical framework for a staff induction programme for South Africa. Such a research project could add value to the hospitality industry in South Africa and further a field, by providing a solution to the challenges involved in the recruitment, development and retention of qualified and skilled hospitality employees. A literature review paved the way for the formulation of a generic four-stage staff induction programme. Semi-structured personal interviews were conducted with five representatives responsible for the staff induction programmes at five of the best companies to work for in South Africa, to contextualise this to the South African context. Personal interviews were then conducted with two representatives of two major hotel groups in order to contextualise the staff induction programme to the South African hospitality industry. This led to the proposal of a staff induction programme that consists of three stages, namely the anticipatory, encounter and adjustment phases. The implementation of this proposed staff induction programme for hotels in South Africa may act as a best practice in the development of new staff induction programmes, and may improve the effectiveness of current staff induction programmes. This may lead to better staff retention rates, reduction in absenteeism, a higher level of skills and productivity, as well as increased staff morale and motivation.

Sathish Kumar

Edith Giani

Jennie Morgan

Research report available at: http://www.iosh.co.uk/Books-and-resources/Health-and-safety-in-a-changing-world/SMEs-and-micro-organisations-engagement-with-occupational-safety-and-health.aspx Co-authored with A. Gibb, J. Pinder, P. Bust, A. Cheyne, A. Dainty, M. Fray, A. Finneran, J. Glover, R. Hartley, R. Haslam, W. Jones, S. Pink, P. Waterson, E. Yolande Gosling

Health and safety in a changing world (research programme)

Research project report available at: http://www.iosh.co.uk/Books-and-resources/Health-and-safety-in-a-changing-world/Management-of-OSH-in-networked-systems-of-production-or-service-delivery.aspx Co-authored with A. Gibb, A. Finneran, A. Cheyne, A. Dainty, J. Glover, M. Fray, P. Waterson, P. Bust, R. Haslam, R. Hartley, S. Pink

edison fernandez

King's College London

Shereen Hussein

"While two-thirds of first-year graduates have found social work jobs, quite a high proportion (c. 15%) are still looking for a job in social work some months after graduating – before the public sector cuts beginning to take effect in 2010 and since. • More than four out of five graduates not currently working in social work express an intention to take up employment in social work in the future. There is thus no evidence of qualifying in social work ‘just to get a degree’. • Many new graduates are going straight into child protection (CP) work; that is where many vacancies are. But not all graduates have CP experience, because the number of relevant practice placement opportunities for students is limited. CP cases used to be regarded in the past as too complex for newly qualified social workers to handle effectively, until they had accumulated experience in lower-risk cases. • Overhalfoffirst-yeargraduatesemployedinsocialworkexpecttostaywith their current employer for at least the next two years. A quarter expect to start looking for another job within the next two years, and around one in ten are already looking. While not a perfect predictor of the future, intentions to leave do provide a guide to actual job-changing. Not having supportive colleagues influences propensity to look for another job most strongly, apart from graduates wanting to move from the private/voluntary sector into statutory social work. • Linemanagersidentifyseveralfactorsaffectingretention: - social work is often a difficult job; - reserves of personal resilience are needed to cope successfully; - capacity problems in social work teams can lead to high workloads and a lack of support; - poor quality managers."

Erica Smith

Mark Burton

Provides an account of the ways in which agencies across health and social services can work beyond traditional boundaries to provide effective services for people with learning difficulties. This text is written by the practitioners who have developed, implemented and managed this service - it contains guidance on how such a position can be achieved to the benefit of all involved.

Building Research & Information

Dylan Tutt , Sarah Pink

Ethnographic methodologies developed in social anthropology and sociology hold considerable promise for addressing practical, problem-based research concerned with the construction site. The extended researcher-engagement characteristic of ethnography reveals rich insights, yet is infrequently used to understand how workplace realities are lived out on construction sites. Moreover, studies that do employ these methods are rarely reported within construction research journals. This paper argues that recent innovations in ethnographic methodologies offer new routes to: posing questions; understanding workplace socialities (i.e. the qualities of the social relationships that develop on construction sites); learning about forms, uses and communication of knowledge on construction sites; and turning these into meaningful recommendations. This argument is supported by examples from an interdisciplinary ethnography concerning migrant workers and communications on UK construction sites. The presented research seeks to understand how construction workers communicate with managers and each other and how they stay safe on site, with the objective of informing site health-and-safety strategies and the production and evaluation of training and other materials.

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

RELATED PAPERS

Gajanan Shirke Author-mih

Boldwin Shumba

Aliona Vilinsky-Redmond

martin caraher

Petko Ruskov

kenniscentrumonderwijsopvoeding. …

Pavel Zgaga

zablon ole nakarda

Neill Thompson , Illing J.

Yvonne Toft

Dr. Uday Dokras

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

This website is intended for healthcare professionals

• { $refs.search.focus(); })" aria-controls="searchpanel" :aria-expanded="open" class="hidden lg:inline-flex justify-end text-gray-800 hover:text-primary py-2 px-4 lg:px-0 items-center text-base font-medium"> Search

Search menu

Barbour R. Introducing qualitative research.London: SAGE Publications Ltd; 2008

Bradbury-Jones C, Sambrook S, Irvine F. Power and empowerment in nursing: a fourth theoretical approach. J Adv Nurs. 2008; 62:(2)258-66 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1365-2648.2008.04598.x

Cartwright A. Mothers experiences of induction. BMJ. 1977; 2:(6089)745-9 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.2.6089.745

Cheyne H, Abhyankar P, Williams B. Elective induction of labour: the problem of interpretation and communication of risks. Midwifery. 2012; 28:(4)412-15 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.midw.2012.06.009

Cooper M, Warland J. Improving women's knowledge of prostaglandin induction of labour through the use of information brochures: A quasi-experimental study. Women Birth. 2011; 24:(4)156-64 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wombi.2010.10.003

Maternity matters: choice, access and continuity of care in a safe service.London: DH; 2007

DeVries R, Salvesen HB, Wiegers TA, Williams S. What (and why) do women want?.(eds). New York: Routledge; 2001

Edwards N. Safety in birth: the contextual conundrums faced by women in a ‘risk society’ driven by neoliberal policies. MIDIRS. 2008; 18:(4)463-70

Fahy K. Reflecting on practice to theorise empowerment for women: using Foucaults concepts. Aust J Midwifery. 2002; 15:(1)5-13 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S1445-4386(02)80017-9

Furedi F. Culture of Fear Revisited, 4th edn. London: Continuum; 2006

Gammie N, Key S. Time's up! Womens experience of induction of labour. Pract Midwife. 2014; 17:(4)15-18

Gatward H, Simpson M, Woodhart L, Stainton MC. Women's experiences of being induced for post-dates pregnancy. Women Birth. 2007; 23:(1)3-9 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wombi.2009.06.002

Gibson WJ, Brown A. Working with qualitative data.Los Angeles and London: Sage; 2009

Gigerenzer G, Muir-Gray J. Better doctors, better patients, better decisions: envisioning health care 2020.Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press; 2011

Green JM, Coupland VA, Kitzinger JV. Great expectations: a prospective study of women's expectations and experiences of childbirth.Hale: Books for Midwives Press; 1998

Hallgren A, Kihlgren M, Norberg A, Forslin L. Women's perceptions of childbirth and childbirth education before and after education and birth. Midwifery. 1995; 11:(3)130-7 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/0266-6138(95)90027-6

Heimstad R, Romundstad PR, Hyett J, Mattsson LA, Salvesen KA. Women's experiences and attitudes towards expectant management and induction of labor for post-term pregnancy. Acta Obstet Gynecol Scand. 2007; 86:(8)950-6 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/00016340701416929

Henderson J, Redshaw M. Womens experience of induction of labor: a mixed methods study. Acta Obstet Gynecol Scand. 2013; 92:(10)1159-67

Jay A, Thomas H, Brooks F. In labor or in limbo? the experiences of women undergoing induction of labour in hospital: findings of a qualitative study. Birth. 2017; https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/birt.12310

Johanson R, Burr R, Leighton N, Jones P. Informed choice? Evidence of the persuasive power of professionals. J Public Health (Bangkok). 2000; 22:(3)439-40 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1093/pubmed/22.3.439

Jomeen J. Choice in childbirth: a realistic expectation?. British Journal of Midwifery. 2007; 15:(8)485-90 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2007.15.8.24388

Kirkham M. Informed Choice in Maternity Care.Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2004

Kirkham M, Stapleton H. The culture of maternity service as a barrier to informed choice. In: Kirkham M (ed). Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2004

Kitzinger S. Some mothers' experiences of induced labour (report from the National Childbirth Trust).London: Department of Health and Social Security; 1975

Levine C. Research involving economically disadvantaged people. In: Emanuel EJ, Grady CC, Crouch RA, Lie RK, Miller FG, Wendler D (eds). Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2008

Levy V. Maintaining equilibrium: a grounded theory study of the processes involved when women make informed choices during pregnancy. Midwifery. 1999; 15:(2)109-19 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0266-6138(99)90007-4

Levy V. How midwives used protective steering to facilitate informed choice in pregnancy. In: Kirkham M. (ed). Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan; 2004

Lewis BV, Rana S, Crook E. Letter: patient response to induction of labour. Lancet. 1975; 305:(7917) https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(75)93188-8

Maher J. Progressing through labour and delivery: Birth time and women's experiences. Women's Studies International Forum. 2008; 31:129-37

Moore JE, Low LK, Titler MG, Dalton VK, Sampselle CM. Moving toward patient-centered care: womens decisions, perceptions, and experiences of the induction of labor process. Birth. 2014; 41:(2)138-46 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/birt.12080

Murtagh M, Folan M. Womens experiences of induction of labour for post-dates pregnancy. British Journal of Midwifery. 2014; 22:(2)105-10 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2014.22.2.105

Induction of labour.London: RCOG Press; 2008

Induction of labour [CG70].London: NICE; 2008

Induction of labour: NICE Quality Standard 60.London: NICE; 2014

Newburn M. Culture, control and the birth environment. Pract Midwife. 2003; 6:(8)20-5

Hospital Maternity Activity.London: Health and Social Care Information Centre; 2016

Nuutila M, Halmesmäki E, Hiilesmaa V, Ylikorkala O. Womens anticipations of and experiences with induction of labor. Acta Obstet Gynecol Scand. 1999; 78:(8)704-9 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/j.1600-0412.1999.780808.x

Rees JT. A consideration of ethical issues fundamental to researching sensitive topics: substance use during pregnancy. Evidence Based Midwifery. 2011; 9:(1)16-22

Roberts LJ, Young KR. The management of prolonged pregnancy-an analysis of womens attitudes before and after term. BJOG. 1991; 98:(11)1102-6 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-0528.1991.tb15361.x

Rogers K. Ethics and qualitative research: issues for midwifery researchers. British Journal of Midwifery. 2008; 16:(3)179-82 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2008.16.3.28694

Sakala C. Roundtable discussion Part 2: Why do women go along with this stuff?. Birth. 2006; 33:(3)246-7

Shetty A, Burt R, Rice P, Templeton A. Womens perceptions, expectations and satisfaction with induced labour—A questionnaire-based study. Eur J Obstet Gynecol Reprod Biol. 2005; 123:(1)56-61 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejogrb.2005.03.004

Skyrme L. Induction of labour for post-term pregnancy. British Journal of Midwifery. 2014; 22:(6)400-7 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2014.22.6.400

Stapleton H, Kirkham M, Curtis P, Thomas G. Framing information in antenatal care. British Journal of Midwifery. 2002; 10:(4)197-201 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.12968/bjom.2002.10.4.10330

Stewart P. Patients attitudes to induction and labour. BMJ. 1977; 2:(6089)749-52 https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.2.6089.749

Weaver J. Choice, control and decision-making in labour. In: Clement S (ed). London: Churchill Livingstone; 1998

Induction of labour: How do women get information and make decisions? Findings of a qualitative study

Annabel Jay

Principal lecturer (midwifery), University of Hertfordshire

View articles · Email Annabel

Hilary Thomas

Professor of Healthcare Research, University of Hertfordshire

View articles

Fiona Brooks

Professor of Public Health, Faculty of Health, University of Technology, Sydney Australia; and Professor of Adolescent and Child Health, University of Hertfordshire

Induction of labour is one of the most frequent interventions in pregnancy. While it is not always unwelcome, it is associated with increased labour pain and further interventions. Evidence from earlier studies suggests that induction is often commenced without full discussion and information, which questions the validity of women's consent. This study aimed to add depth and context to existing knowledge by exploring how first-time mothers acquire information about induction and give consent to the procedure.

A qualitative study into women's experiences of induction was undertaken, comprising 21 women, who were interviewed 3-6 weeks after giving birth following induction.

Information from midwives and antenatal classes was minimal, with family and friends cited as key informants. Midwives presented induction as the preferred option, and alternative care plans, or the relative risks of induction versus continued pregnancy, were rarely discussed. Women reported that midwives often appeared rushed, with little time for discussion.

Conclusions

Providers of maternity care need to devise more flexible ways of working to create time and opportunities for midwives to discuss induction in detail with women and to promote fully informed decision-making.

Induction of labour is one of the most frequently performed interventions in pregnancy, accounting for around 25% of all births in England (NHS Digital, 2017). Induction carries the risk of further interventions and is associated with increased pain in labour and an increased likelihood of instrumental delivery ( Shetty et al, 2005 ; National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE), 2008 ; Cheyne et al, 2012 ).

Epidemiological evidence from numerous studies in Europe, Israel and the USA ( National Collaborating Centre for Women's and Children's Health (NCC-WCH), 2008 ) has shown a gradually increasing risk of perinatal mortality in pregnancies exceeding 40 weeks, although the absolute risk remains very low. These studies suggest that the potential health benefits to women and babies of inducing labour after 41 weeks outweigh the additional costs to the maternity care provider ( NCC-WCH, 2008 ). Where medical conditions such as pre-eclampsia or Type 1 diabetes exist, the dangers of continuing the pregnancy may not be controversial ( Cheyne et al, 2012 ); however, approximately half of all inductions in the UK are performed for uncomplicated, post-date pregnancies, where the risk of perinatal death is low (2-3 per 1000 births). In these situations, the risk of maternal morbidity resulting from induction is relatively high, compared to spontaneous labour ( NCC-WCH, 2008 ; Cheyne et al, 2012 ). In keeping with the principles of woman-centred care ( Department of Health, 2007 ), the decision to induce labour or continue with the pregnancy rests with the woman. NICE guidelines state that:

‘Women who are having or being offered induction of labour should have the opportunity to make informed decisions about their care and treatment, in partnership with healthcare professionals’ ( NICE, 2008: 4 )

There is evidence that many women welcome the offer of induction for post-dates pregnancy, through concern for the baby's wellbeing, because of physical discomfort or for social reasons ( Shetty et al, 2005 ; Heimstad et al, 2007 ; Gammie and Key, 2014 ; Moore et al, 2014 ; Murtagh and Folan, 2014 ). For others, however, induction represents a significant and unwelcome change to their anticipated trajectory of pregnancy and labour onset ( Gatward et al, 2007 ).

Literature review

Early UK studies identified a need for more information and involvement in decision-making relating to induction ( Kitzinger, 1975 ; Lewis et al, 1975 ; Stewart, 1977 ). Cartwright's UK-wide study of more than 2000 women found that approximately 40% of participants would have liked more information ( Cartwright, 1977 ). Despite the growing discourse on informed choice since the 1970's, recent studies continue to highlight these issues. A comparative survey of 900 Scottish women by Shetty et al (2005) found that 34.7% of women who had their labour induced perceived information to be lacking and noted a disparity between expectations of induction and women's actual experiences, particularly in terms of duration, pain and interventions. This suggests that the information women received about induction did not enable them to build realistic expectations ( Shetty et al, 2005 ). A mixed-methods study involving secondary analysis of data from more than 5300 women from across England identified a lack of information and involvement in decision-making about induction ( Henderson and Redshaw, 2013 ). Overseas studies have noted similar findings ( Nuutila et al, 1999 ; Gatward et al, 2007 ; Moore et al, 2014 ). However, evidence from the UK remains scarce and is mostly derived from quantitative research, limiting the emergence of knowledge to that which falls within the parameters of closed-question surveys. The present study therefore set out to add depth and context to existing knowledge by delving into the ways in which first-time mothers acquire information about induction, how and why they consent to the procedure and how they experience it. Findings from this study relating to women's experiences of induced labour have been published elsewhere ( Jay et al, 2017 ). This paper focuses on information and decision-making.

The conceptual framework underpinning this study centred on the notion of informed choice in maternity care. A qualitative methodology was considered the most appropriate means of obtaining insight into women's perceptions of choice and how decisions were made. The face-to-face interview method of data collection is widely regarded as one of the key tools of the qualitative researcher ( Barbour, 2008 ), as it allows for both depth and breadth of data. A semi-structured approach was adopted, using a flexible schedule of open-ended questions (such as ‘Tell me about how you made the decision to go for induction’), which allowed participants to control the extent of disclosure ( Rogers, 2008 ; Rees, 2011 ). Ethical approval was granted by the Health Research Authority, England (NHS National Research Ethics Service Committee South Central, Oxford A) and the local Research and Development committee.

Variable
Age range
25–29	4
30–34	10
35–39	5
40–45	2
Reason for induction of labour
Post-date pregnancy	15
Pre-labour rupture of membranes	2
Pre-eclampsia	1
Reduced fetal movements	1
Gestational diabetes	1
Aged 40 or more	1
Self-declared ethnicity
White British	16
Asian British	1
White non-British	4
Occupation
Managerial/professional	15
Clerical, retail or service	5
Not in employment	1
Highest level of education
First degree or higher	15
Other post-‘A’ level qualification	2
‘A’ levels or equivalent	2
GCSE or equivalent	2

Interviews were conducted during the autumn/winter of 2012/13. Participants, who were identified from the postnatal ward of a maternity unit in the south of England, consisted of primiparous, English-speaking women over the age of 18, who had experienced induced labour at or close to term. Multiparous women were excluded, since they might be expected to have acquired a broader knowledge of induction through personal experience or their expanded peer network. No distinction was made in respect of the reason for induction, but all women had been classed as low-risk at the start of pregnancy and none had requested induction. All women were living with husbands or male partners. The first investigator visited the postnatal ward once per week for 6 months. All women who met the inclusion criteria were approached via a senior midwife who was fully apprised of the study. Access was denied to women who were deemed especially vulnerable (such as those whose babies were sick or going to foster care). An information leaflet was offered and, after reading it, women who expressed an interest in participating were asked for their written consent to be contacted again 3-4 weeks after discharge. Women were assured of their option to withdraw from the study at any time without consequences for their subsequent care.

‘Providing information and preparing women for what to expect during induction key to informed choice, particularly where the risks and benefits are not easily quantifiable’

A total of 33 women consented to be contacted; however 12 were lost to follow-up, as they either could not be reached or declined to participate. Except for one participant, who opted to be interviewed by telephone, all women were visited in their homes by the first investigator, where the purpose of the study was verbally reiterated, with reference to the participant information leaflet. Written consent was obtained before commencing interviews. Confidentiality and anonymity in all stored data and publications was assured. Interviews lasted 30-90 minutes and were audio-recorded.

A field diary was used to facilitate reflexivity, by recording impressions and feelings after each interview and reflecting on how the researcher's position as a midwife, teacher and/or mother might influence data interpretation. Transcripts of audio-recordings were re-read three times, while listening to the recordings, to check for accuracy of transcription. Data were initially organised using a priori categories formulated from the interview questions, with new categories added as they emerged. The software package NVivo10 was used to create a hierarchical structure of categories and sub-categories, which were then re-grouped into themes using an iterative process, until all identifiable themes were exhausted ( Barbour, 2008 ; Gibson and Brown, 2009 ). A form of framework analysis was also employed, in which numerical instances of particular aspects of data were counted, helping to identify the most frequently reported events, feelings or perceptions. All data were anonymised, in accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). In this paper all quotations are suffixed by pseudonyms and the reason for induction.

Key themes emerging from the findings of this study relate to the acquisition of information about labour induction, how women perceived choice and how they made the decision to accept induction.

Sources of information on induction

Family and friends were the most common sources of information, cited by two-thirds of participants. Impressions of induction were varied and sometimes contradictory. Increased pain in labour was most frequently mentioned, but there was little consensus on other aspects; for example, four women had heard that the onset of labour would be quicker than natural labour, while five believed it would take longer.

‘I just knew […] from having spoken to other mums and dads that it would artificially bring on the contractions … the one thing I did know was that it would all mean it would happen a lot quicker … and therefore it might be a good deal more painful.’

‘My mother had been induced … I didn't really know what it was, other than it was meant to be more painful than a natural birth and that they gave you something to make the baby come.’

Of the sample ( n =21), 14 participants had attended free antenatal classes led by midwives from the local hospital, while seven had attended fee-paying classes, chiefly those organised by the National Childbirth Trust (NCT), a national parents' charity. Some women had attended more than one type of class, but it was unlikely that any two women had attended the same class simultaneously. Several women were not sure whether their classes had covered induction and those who recalled information described it as not very memorable.

‘I don't remember a lot of detail though … nothing that really sticks in my mind.’

‘I don't think they did [mention induction] and if they did, I don't remember it … it wasn't memorable.’

There was no suggestion that information had not been comprehensible to any participant; however, some women reported that they had paid little attention, as they could not foresee induction happening to them. Midwife-led classes attracted less criticism than those run by the NCT:

‘NCT's very much “everyone has a perfect birth” and that's it … I mean, nobody had said that … inducing you actually makes the contractions more painful.’

‘In NCT … we spent half an hour drawing pictures of what we thought would help induce labour, so pineapple and raspberry leaf tea … Drawing pictures! We're all in our 30s, all professionals! […] I hadn't paid much attention, or the information wasn't there to be paid attention to.’

The maternity unit produced an information leaflet on induction, to be given out when induction was booked. Only 11 women reported reading the leaflet, while two stated that they had received it but not read it. It was not clear whether the remaining women had received a leaflet or not, but none reported having read it.

‘I've got so many leaflets I don't know what's what anymore! I don't remember reading one, but they might well have done, and I've missed it.’

Electronic media were mentioned by just seven women. Two women found helpful apps, whereas those who searched the internet often had trouble finding credible websites and relating the information to their own situation:

‘Obviously, you look on the Internet and there's so many … lots of horror stories … and other people were saying how it wasn't that bad … but it didn't really help me, because it was going to be my experience anyway!’

Several women consulted various sources:

‘A little bit from Google, a little bit from my sister […] because my midwife didn't explain a lot to me […] From, like, friends and family.

As in Tanya's case, information from midwives in the antenatal clinic was often perfunctory or limited to a leaflet, as midwives gave the appearance of being too busy to offer much explanation:

‘To be honest … I think she was quite busy, she always … just seemed a bit rushed, so we didn't really get to talk a lot but … yeah, I didn't really know anything!’

‘I think she assumed that I knew about it and I sort of didn't really get asked if I knew about it but … it was all quite a quick appointment, I think they had others waiting.’

Few women sought further information from midwives, as they saw no need at the time induction was first offered. With hindsight, however, many stated that they would have preferred to have known more, particularly regarding the duration and procedures.

Involvement in decision-making

Half of the women stated that they had been involved in the decision to induce labour; however, this tended to be little more than agreeing to a predetermined plan:

‘I was kind of part of the decision; I was there when she made the phone call to the hospital but it, other than that it was, “Oh, if you haven't gone into labour by this date then this is what's gonna happen” and that was, I was like, “Oh, OK.”’

‘[The doctor] told me to go to see the midwife at the desk who then gave me a leaflet to read while she went and booked it [the induction].’

Where induction was presented as an option, there appeared to be a bias towards compliance:

‘It was presented as a choice, but they were definitely encouraging me to strongly consider it rather than waiting.’

Nina, who had been planning a home birth, was highly resistant to the offer of induction for post-dates pregnancy and opted to defer the procedure, but found the stress of daily fetal monitoring overwhelming and eventually agreed:

‘They did say I could push my induction date back, but because I kept going in every day and all the stress […] when it came to it I was like, “Do you know what? Let's just do it, I can't deal with this stress any more.”’

The impression from most women was that, regardless of reason, induction was often presented as routine, with little or no opportunity for discussion and with compliance assumed.

Risk awareness

Many women alluded to the powerful influence that any mention of risk had on their decision to accept induction. Where medical conditions existed, women were generally clear about the reason for induction; conversely, in cases of post-dates pregnancy, perception of risk was often non-specific:

‘Um … no, basically it was … being induced really, because obviously I was that far overdue … they needed to get [baby] out I think.’

‘And it [an app] just says also about some of the risks if you are overdue, like past 42 weeks, about the baby's health and I think that's when I just thought, “Right, it needs to be now” and that was my paramount focus was [baby] being okay.

Trust in professional opinion appeared very strong, and risk was generally seen only in terms of dangers of prolonged pregnancy to the fetus, rather than risks to both the woman and fetus or neonate from proposed medical interventions.

‘I don't know anything about medicine; they're saying it's for my benefit and the baby's benefit, so I'll just go with whatever the medical people say.’

‘If medical professionals advise you that that's the best thing and the least risky thing, then, you know, you'd be very brave to do something different really.’

In all cases, concern for the unborn baby overrode women's previous aspirations for a natural birth experience, a phenomenon noted in earlier studies ( Roberts and Young, 1991 ; Heimstad et al, 2007 ; Moore et al, 2014 ; Murtagh and Folan, 2014 ). However, there was no apparent awareness of the statistical probability of harm.

Influence of partners

Partners were a significant influence on some women's decision to accept induction. Some reportedly viewed induction simply as a logical choice for the sake of safety and expediency, while others were impatient.

‘When I spoke to [partner], he was the one to sort of realise I needed a bit of a prod and, you know […] they're saying to you. “Baby is ready … so we need to do it.”’

‘I think my partner was more interested in it than me! I think he thought, … “Can we just like book it now?”’

The role of partners in the decision to accept induction has not been previously explored and is worthy of further study.

The NICE guideline and quality standards emphasise the need for a thorough explanation of the reasons for induction, the process, the relative risks and the alternative options ( NICE 2008 ; 2014 ). Evidence from this study indicates that women received very limited information during pregnancy and around the time that induction was booked—indeed many could recall little or nothing that was meaningful to them beyond anecdotes from friends and family. This contrasts with other UK studies that cite clinicians as the main information providers ( Shetty et al, 2005 ; Gammie and Key, 2014 ).

Only half of participants had reportedly read the Trust's information leaflet on induction. This lack of engagement may reflect information overload, which may also explain the apparent reluctance to seek information via the internet. However, it is possible that, having accepted induction as inevitable, women felt no need to enquire further, for fear of fuelling anxiety ( Hallgren et al, 1995 ; Levy, 1999 ). Moreover, it has been demonstrated that the high level of trust afforded to clinicians led many women to assume that whatever is offered must be in their best interests ( Kirkham, 2004 ; Sakala, 2006 ; Jomeen, 2007 ; Edwards, 2008 ). This may go some way towards explaining the apparent lack of enquiry.

The connection between knowledge and power is widely documented, and health professionals have power to control the release of information ( Johanson et al, 2000 ; Fahy, 2002 ; Bradbury-Jones et al, 2008 ). It has been argued that women without previous childbirth experience are unlikely to enquire about options that are not brought to their attention by clinical staff and are thus especially vulnerable to coercion ( DeVries et al, 2001 ; Newburn, 2003 ; Kirkham and Stapleton, 2004 ; Jomeen, 2007 ). Withholding information that may create dilemmas for women may be done for benevolent reasons (to avoid creating anxiety, for example) ( Levy, 2004 ). In this study, however, by failing to share knowledge about other options or to discuss the finer details of induction, midwives appeared to steer women towards induction and effectively suppressed autonomous choice.

It has been argued that too much information and responsibility for decision-making can have effects similar to those of insufficient choice, leading to a sense of anxiety and loss of control ( Green et al, 1998 ; Weaver, 1998 ). There were instances in this study of women (such as Rose) who chose not to seek information or opting to delegate decision-making to clinicians. This raises questions about the value that individual women place on information and decision-making, and whether they would have welcomed more information had it been offered.

Studies into the provision of childbirth information have highlighted the importance of appropriate timing of information-giving ( Stapleton et al, 2002 ; Maher, 2008 ; Cooper and Warland, 2011 ). Women's recall of detail about induction from antenatal classes suggests that they were unable to retain or assimilate that which did not seem relevant to them. In some cases, this may have been attributable to the presentation style of the class leader; however, by necessity, information given in antenatal classes is generalised and there may not be scope to address individual needs. Moreover, women typically attend classes early in the third trimester of pregnancy, well before the question of induction arises. This highlights a need for individualised and appropriately timed information in late pregnancy.

Only four women questioned the need for induction, and the majority agreed to the process without any discussion with health professionals, contrary to the recommendations of NICE ( 2008 ; 2014 ). Fear of harm to the fetus was cited as the chief influence; however, there was little evidence of risk evaluation having taken place, particularly where induction was offered for uncomplicated, post-dates pregnancy. Women need to be aware of the relatively low probability of mortality resulting from prolonged pregnancy, compared to the much higher probability of low-level of harm resulting from interventions following induction.

Poor understanding of probability is thought to be common among health professionals ( Furedi, 2006 ; Gigerenzer and Muir-Gray, 2011 ; Cheyne et al, 2012 ). Midwives need a deeper understanding of risk and probability, and the ability to convey this meaningfully to women ( Cheyne et al, 2012 ; Skyrme, 2014 ). Unless both sides of a risk argument are presented, any decisions made cannot be said to have been truly informed. Furthermore, midwives need to feel empowered to offer a balanced discussion of risk, safe in the knowledge that they will not be penalised if women choose not to comply with the expected norm ( Skyrme, 2014 ).

It is easy to attribute the lack of information and discussion to shortcomings in midwifery practice. However, in common with many UK maternity units, the system of care is based around short, task-oriented appointments, which compels midwives to control the agenda and limit discussion time to ensure that appointments do not overrun. This leads to a reactive, rather than proactive, approach to discussion ( Kirkham and Stapleton, 2004 ; Levy, 2004 ). It was noted that midwives often appeared busy and had others waiting, which may have inhibited women from asking questions.

Limitations

This study was conducted in a single NHS Trust. The sample was self-selecting and women from higher socioeconomic groups were over-represented: a factor common to studies of this nature ( Levine, 2008 ). For pragmatic and ethical reasons, women aged less than 18, those not fluent in English and those deemed vulnerable were excluded from the sample. There is a need for further studies to address the experiences of such women.

Conclusion and implications for practice

Midwives need to acknowledge that induction is often a disruption to women's expected trajectory of labour and birth. Providing information and preparing women for what to expect during induction is key to informed choice, particularly where the risks and benefits are not easily quantifiable. These findings suggest that a new approach is needed for the management of uncomplicated, post-dates pregnancy. Rather than steering women towards routine acceptance of induction, women should be given individualised information, taking account of their clinical status, social and cultural background and their desire for choice and information. Providers of maternity care may need to consider more flexible ways of working, allowing more contact time for women and midwives to discuss options in an unhurried and balanced manner. Additional measures could be considered, such as the use of decision aids, online resources or pre-induction classes. This may require the recruitment of more midwives or the adoption of alternative patterns of care provision, such as case-loading. Each will have budget implications for maternity units.

Midwives and doctors need to be able to engage with women in a balanced discussion of the relative risks of induction and expectant management. This implies a need for higher education institutions to emphasise the understanding and communication of risk and probability as part of their undergraduate curricula.

• This was a qualitative study that explored women's experiences of induction
• The women interviewed commented that family members and friends provided more meaningful information about induction than midwives
• Induction for post-dates pregnancy was presented as routine, with little or no discussion of other options
• To fulfil their duty to promote informed choice, providers of maternity care must therefore allow time and opportunity for a fully informed discussion of the options, risks and benefits of induction, taking account of women's individual needs.

CPD reflective questions

• Consider the women undergoing induction in your unit: do they mostly have a good understanding of the likely timescale and processes involved?
• Reflect on the last time you booked a woman for induction: what information did you offer? Do you think this was sufficient to enable a fully informed decision? If not, what was lacking?
• Consider the written information about induction that is provided by your unit. Do women read this? If not, why not? Would an alternative medium (such as an app) be more acceptable?
• How would you open a discussion about the relative risks and benefits of induction for post-dates pregnancy? What statistics might you need and where would you seek them?
• What further learning do you need to be able to confidently discuss risk and probability with your clients?

Sample details

Related topics.

• Cooperative learning
• Learning Disability
• Observational learning
• Social learning theory
• Lifelong Learning
• Questionnaire
• Experiential learning
• How to Write
• Hidden curriculum
• Language Learning
• Operant conditioning
• Learning English
• Learning styles
• Rogerian Argument

How to Create an Effective Induction Program

The article discusses the importance of creating an effective induction training program for new employees. It highlights the benefits of such a program, including increased retention, improved morale, and productivity. The author suggests that a proper induction plan can save time and money in the long run. The article outlines the ideal components of an induction program, including introductions to staff, a tour of the building, health and safety training, and instruction on day-to-day tasks. The author provides guidelines for induction trainers, including providing training materials and regularly checking on progress. The article concludes by recommending that feedback from new employees be solicited to improve the induction process for future staff.

The importance of creating a strong induction training program cannot be underestimated. Many workplaces fail to recognize the value of a comprehensive induction and instead expect new employees to quickly become productive without any guidance. However, induction training offers numerous benefits, such as increased employee retention, improved morale, and higher productivity. It is crucial to invest time and effort into developing an effective induction program that sets employees up for success from the start.

A well-designed induction plan can ultimately save both time and money that would otherwise be spent on covering absences and recruiting replacements. The induction process serves as the initial interaction between you and your new employee, making it crucial to invest in getting it right. Ideally, an induction should incorporate the following: a) Providing a comprehensive introduction to key personnel (rather than just a simple greeting, allow sufficient time for acquainting with their specific job roles). b) Conducting a tour of the premises, highlighting essential locations such as fire exits, restrooms, meeting rooms, boardrooms, and helpful offices like IT support and administration staff.

ready to help you now

Without paying upfront

Remember to guide them to the location of office stationery and photocopiers/faxes. Additionally, provide health and safety training as required, which may cover topics like manual handling and the whereabouts of the health and safety notice board. Moreover, instruct them on how to accomplish daily tasks and the whereabouts of essential folders/files. The fourth task is pivotal, yet it is frequently disregarded.

The induction training should be conducted over several days, depending on the availability of the staff responsible for it. Ideally, each task should be explained, allowing the trainee some time to practice. Afterward, the trainer should return to assess progress, clarify any misunderstandings, and proceed to the next task. Here are guidelines for induction trainers:

• Provide your contact details to the trainee so they can reach you through any preferred method (phone, email, in person).
• Supply training materials, including a quick reference guide and preferably a comprehensive manual that explains the task in detail.
• Regularly follow up with the trainee to monitor their progress. Lack of communication does not necessarily mean they are doing well; some individuals may simply avoid asking questions.
• Request sufficient time from your manager to carry out your training role effectively. Highlight the need for providing training materials and being available to answer questions on short notice.
• If you enjoy conducting induction training and wish to make it a bigger part of your role, consider attending a “train the trainer” course.

Once the employee has completed their induction training, ask them for feedback on the process and how they feel it went. This feedback will help improve the procedure for future staff members. To obtain a copy of our feedback form free of charge, please email us at [email protected] .

Source: http://ezinearticles.com/?How-To-Create-An-Effective-Induction-Training-Program&id=488620

Cite this page

https://graduateway.com/how-to-create-an-effective-induction-program/

You can get a custom paper by one of our expert writers

Check more samples on your topics

How to create an effective and high-performance team.

Team Building

Effective team A good manager is most important role in a group. Whether the manager can help a work group to function as an effective team is determining if the work will be successful. Following, the differences between group and team, what is called effective team, why groups sometimes fail and how to improve group and

Induction vs. deduction logic

Humans acquire knowledge through reasoning using guided principles of validity, known as logic. Logic helps us understand our surroundings and has two branches: inductive and deductive logic. Inductive logic allows us to obtain specific knowledge by applying general rules. It involves creating patterns of observation over time. We often use simple induction, such as assuming the

Induction Process Of Food Manufacturing

Human Resource Management

The research proposal aims to enhance the induction process in a food manufacturing company. The goal is to improve work quality, company performance, ethics, and the role of new academic staff and their head of department by modifying the existing induction program. Furthermore, the study will investigate employees' opinions on the current induction arrangements using

Electromagnetic Induction

Electricity

Current is produced in a conductor when it is moved through a magnetic field because the magnetic lines of force are applying a force on the free electrons in the conductor and causing them to move. This process of generating current in a conductor by placing the conductor in a changing magnetic field is called

Analysis on the Recruitment, Selection and Induction Procedures – CIC Holdings PLC

Recruitment

CIC HOLDINGS PLC Coursework Analysis on the Recruitment, Selection and Induction Procedures of the Executive Level Introduction Recruitment, Selection and Induction Procedures of the Executive Level Recruitment Choice Initiation Strengths and Failings of the Procedures Analyzed Recruitment Choice Initiation Decision Mentions Analysis on the Recruitment, Selection and Induction Procedures of the Executive Level of CIC Holdings PLC 1. Introduction This

Induction Training Course Assignment

On the other hand, personal relationship talks are as varied as the relation and one can see a wide picture of conversations in husband or wife or partner (same-sex or other sex) relationship. Professional relationship limits conversations to more business interactions and not emotional or private issues, politics and religion should not be involved as

Understanding Induction Assignment

Understanding

PHASES OF INDUCTION The new employee needs to have basic information about their terms and conditions of employment and immediate working environment. However, this is not enough, and as there is a great deal of information a new employee generally has to take on board, it is essential to break it down into 5 phases

Soap Opera Viewing Create Perceptions

A soap opera, often referred to simply as a soap, is a serial drama, on television or radio, that related story lines dealing with the lives of multiple characters. The stories in these series typically focus heavily on emotional relationships to the point of melodrama. [1] The name soap opera stems from the fact that

How Does Steven Spielberg Create Tension in the Film “Jaws”?

Steven Spielberg employs different methods in order to create a sense of suspense in his movie "JAWS". This horror/thriller, which was released in 1975, is based on Peter Benchley's novel. Spielberg, renowned for his skillful use of tension, effectively builds suspense throughout the entire film. The story takes place in the summer resort town of

Hi, my name is Amy 👋

In case you can't find a relevant example, our professional writers are ready to help you write a unique paper. Just talk to our smart assistant Amy and she'll connect you with the best match.

Discuss the Value and Importance of Employee Induction in the Modern Workplace

Introduction.

In the modern workplace, employee induction programs are very important.  The main reason why induction is important for an organization is that it helps to integrate new employees into the business and show them the procedures, systems, culture, and values of an organization. It also familiarizes them with the new environment. A well-performed induction communicates to employees that the business values and cares about them (Bornman, 2014). A proper induction reduces the number of accidents and mistakes at work and improves the quality of work and ensures that the customers are satisfied. However, various benefits arise from  employee inductions to the company.

Importance of Employee Induction in the Modern Workplace

Reduces Costs and Turnover

The well-structured induction training program is an important and natural development of a recruitment process. The programs are important to ensure the success of a worker, ensure that they adapt easily to their new obligations. Every business intends to get its return on investment. Therefore, someone leaving in a half a year is not a good business result and not proper for an organization’s culture, productivity and morale. While a business is keen to get through the backlog within the shortest time possible, the new member of staff requires some time to arrive at an organization’s specific culture. They should also know their obligation in the business and become conversant with ‘why’ and ‘how’ to do such things, and see their queries regarding the company being addressed (Patwardhan, 2020).

Reduces Risks and Ensures Efficiency

New workers need to be across any legal and compliance needs related to a business, and the procedures and processes of “how” to do business. They should understand the culture, mission, vision, and goals of an organization. For them to operate efficiently and be involved in their job, they should be educated on the organizational policies. This includes understanding their duties and responsibilities as employees. It is important if they sign off on such policies to ensure that they understand, which is a good practice for risk management for possible confusion down the track. It cannot be assumed that because they know where the organization’s manual is on the internet, they understood it (Patwardhan, 2020).

Leads to a Smooth Changeover

With the correct form of induction, employees can clearly understand an organization’s corporate prospects and ensure that the new hires do not pick up a second-hand partisan view. A good induction program does not have to be wide or huge, but it is organized and simply rolled out to every new worker. Induction increases a worker’s initial experience with the business. It reveals that they are maintained, cared for and that the business is devoted to their success. From a practical viewpoint, it ensures that the transition into a business is measured, smooth, and relaxed (Patwardhan, 2020).

Gives the New Members of a Team Confidence in their Business Practices 

Normally, new workers should feel anxious or insecure about the new responsibility and how they fit in the organization’s business practices and culture. The process of onboarding is a good business opportunity to make a perfect first impression. Induction enables new workers to clearly understand how an organization works, where it is, where it foresees itself in the future, and how they, as new workers can contribute to making such vision a reality. Inductees will have an understanding of the business’s background, values and culture, policies, learning and development, benefits, and health and safety guidelines, among others (Powers, 2019). Ultimately, the process of induction is a good opportunity to make the new workers proud of their new business. Inductees will feel included and valued because they will understand that their contributions to the business are valued.

Sets the Scene for New Role of Inductees

The induction process familiarizes the new workers with the organization and their main roles and responsibilities. After the induction process, the new staff should clearly understand their role in the business and have the information needed to prepare for the new role (Powers, 2019).

Shows the Professionalism of a Business 

Induction is a good opportunity for a business to build a good impression. The process needs careful preparation and is a formal way of welcoming new employees into the business. This shows an organization’s commitment to observing the professional values as far as performing its business and handling its existing workers and new employees (Powers, 2019).

Gives the New Members a Structure to Settle

Inducting new workers gives a way for the business to give a structure and help them settle in their role and make the process of integration seamless. Typically, it includes a road map for new employees, which includes relevant training and their long-term goals (Powers, 2019).

Makes Sure that the Vital Elements of Workers and Practices are Well-Defined 

Induction allows the new workers to meet and become familiar with other staff and the managerial team and socialize and begin to build relationships (Powers, 2019). Also, it ensures that inductees understand the rules and regulations, code of conduct, and employee expectations. A well-organized process of orientation is a witness to the business’s commitment to making its workers feel valued. Induction enables new employees to feel welcome and get rid of their worries and confusion. In the end, the business gains from a well-thought-out process of induction. This includes improved job satisfaction, performance, and improved employee retention.

Establishes Good Communication

Induction training helps new workers establish good communication with an organization. As part of the training program, the new workers are introduced to their direct supervisor, other workers, leads, and managers of an organization. This makes them calmer when communicating with them later (Antonacopoulou & Güttel, 2010).

Employer Brand Building Opportunity

Each organization wants to employ the best talent in the market. Brand building rotates on packaging a company to stimulate job applicants or potential workers to an organization. Each organization is looking for the best talent in the market and must prove that as an organization they have the best processes, systems, benefits/perks, employee development opportunities that might be employed in the organization. Induction makes a company excite the new worker about its products, systems, services, structures, growth opportunities, and line management support (Antonacopoulou & Güttel, 2010). Once new workers are excited, they would recommend such an organization to their friends, family, school mates, among other people, and endorse the brand of that specific organization. More people may apply to such an organization and then the business can recruit the very best talents.

Research by Brandon Hall Group recommends that firms with strong onboarding processes boost their new hire rate of retention by 82 percent and their worker productivity by over 70 percent. The need for employee induction cannot be overstated. Robert Half found out that 59 percent of hiring managers in Australia have had workers resign during their probation time because of poor processes for onboarding and 43 percent of managers lost new workers within one month of hiring them (Bryson, 2018). Despite such alarming statistics, it appears that managers are missing a beat regarding the efficiency of their induction efforts. The Robert Half survey above shows that 28 percent of employment managers believe their present onboarding process is ‘excellent’, 51percent consider their process as ‘good’, and 16 percent believe what they do in the induction space is ‘sufficient’ (Bryson, 2018). Such disparity in manager insight and retaining figures proposes there is an important detach between how managers believe they perform from an induction viewpoint and what is happening when a new worker joins an organization. The paradigm is just simple, to ensure the success and retention of new employees, an organization must ensure their induction experience is consistent, structured, and positive.

Organizations that do not value induction training often risk personnel having the feeling of being drowned. They may also feel that they are wasting their time learning about the systems, protocols, and processes that everybody else appears to know about, and are scared to ask others (everybody appears so busy, leaving them to feel unskilled and misused). New workers should instead focus on tasks with a stronger financial outcome (Edwards, 2005). Therefore, rather than consider inductions a wastage of time, it is important to view a good induction program as a process of helping people become more productive. A good program should comprise system training and if the system used by an organization is complex, then there should be a schedule for formal training. A good induction program should not necessarily be a long process but if the work is complex, possibly consider running it for some time to prevent information burden for the workers. Inductions are important for organizational employees and the health of an organization.

Each new worker must go through induction to get the right impression on the business. Induction can be an advantage for each organization to reduce turnover of employees, boost efficiency and help the organization to be an employer of choice for extremely skilled employees. Also, new workers will adjust and mix quickly into the company and perform to their best. A well-performed induction communicates to employees that the business values and cares about them. How a new worker fails or succeeds at work may depend on the process of induction.

Reference List

Antonacopoulou, E. P., & Güttel, W. H. (2010). Staff induction practices and organizational socialization: A review and extension of the debate.  Society and business review .

Bornman, L. (2014).  Exploring Realistic Job Previews in the modern workplace: an employee perspective  (Doctoral dissertation, University of Pretoria).

Bryson, A. (2018). Mutual gains? The role of employee engagement in the modern workplace. In  Rethinking Entrepreneurial Human Capital  (pp. 43-62). Springer, Cham.

Edwards, M. R. (2005). Employer and employee branding: HR or PR.  Managing human resources: personnel management in transition ,  4 , 266-286.

Patwardhan, S. (2020). Employee volunteering programs: an emerging dimension of modern workplaces.  Mandated Corporate Social Responsibility , 215-243.

Powers, K. (2019). Stress and the Modern Workplace.  Workplace Psychology .

Cite This Work

To export a reference to this article please select a referencing style below:

Related Essays

Health and safety issues within organization, a comparative study of five major us banks, the importance for service companies to consider their positioning, reverse logistics & logistics management, walmart issues and solutions, knowledge management systems in organizations: saudi aramco, popular essay topics.

• American Dream
• Artificial Intelligence
• Black Lives Matter
• Bullying Essay
• Career Goals Essay
• Causes of the Civil War
• Child Abusing
• Civil Rights Movement
• Community Service
• Cultural Identity
• Cyber Bullying
• Death Penalty
• Depression Essay
• Domestic Violence
• Freedom of Speech
• Global Warming
• Gun Control
• Human Trafficking
• I Believe Essay
• Immigration
• Importance of Education
• Israel and Palestine Conflict
• Leadership Essay
• Legalizing Marijuanas
• Mental Health
• National Honor Society
• Police Brutality
• Pollution Essay
• Racism Essay
• Romeo and Juliet
• Same Sex Marriages
• Social Media
• The Great Gatsby
• The Yellow Wallpaper
• Time Management
• To Kill a Mockingbird
• Violent Video Games
• What Makes You Unique
• Why I Want to Be a Nurse
• Send us an e-mail

Last updated 10th July 2024: Online ordering is currently unavailable due to technical issues. We apologise for any delays responding to customers while we resolve this. For further updates please visit our website https://www.cambridge.org/news-and-insights/technical-incident

We use cookies to distinguish you from other users and to provide you with a better experience on our websites. Close this message to accept cookies or find out how to manage your cookie settings .

Login Alert

• > Journals
• > Philosophy of Science
• > Volume 27 Issue 3
• > The Place of Induction in Science

Article contents

The place of induction in science.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2022

The place of induction in the framing and test of scientific hypotheses is investigated. The meaning of ‘induction’ is first equated with generalization on the basis of case examination. Two kinds of induction are then distinguished: the inference of generals from particulars (first degree induction), and the generalization of generalizations (second degree induction). Induction is claimed to play a role in the framing of modest empirical generalizations and in the extension of every sort of generalizations—not however in the invention of high-level hypotheses containing theoretical predicates. It is maintained, on the other hand, that induction by enumeration is essential in the empirical test of the lowest-level consequences of scientific theories, since it occurs in the drawing of “conclusions” from the examination of empirical evidence. But it is also held that the empirical test is insufficient, and must be supplemented with theorification, or the expansion of isolated hypotheses into theories. Refutation is not viewed as a substitute for confirmation but as its complement, since the very notion of unfavorable case is meaningful only in connection with the concept of positive instance. Although the existence of an inductive method is disclaimed, it is maintained that the various patterns of plausible reasoning (inductive inference included) are worth being investigated. It is concluded that scientific research follows neither the advice of inductivism nor the injunction of deductivism, but takes a middle course in which induction is instrumental both heuristically and methodologically, although the over-all pattern of research is hypothetico-deductive.

Access options

Slightly modified version of a paper read at the 6th Inter American Congress of Philosophy, Buenos Aires, August-September, 1959.

This article has been cited by the following publications. This list is generated based on data provided by Crossref .

• Google Scholar

View all Google Scholar citations for this article.

Save article to Kindle

To save this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about saving to your Kindle .

Note you can select to save to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be saved to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply.

Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.

• Volume 27, Issue 3
• Mario Bunge (a1)
• DOI: https://doi.org/10.1086/287745

Save article to Dropbox

To save this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Dropbox account. Find out more about saving content to Dropbox .

Save article to Google Drive

To save this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you used this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your Google Drive account. Find out more about saving content to Google Drive .

Reply to: Submit a response

- No HTML tags allowed - Web page URLs will display as text only - Lines and paragraphs break automatically - Attachments, images or tables are not permitted

Your details

Your email address will be used in order to notify you when your comment has been reviewed by the moderator and in case the author(s) of the article or the moderator need to contact you directly.

You have entered the maximum number of contributors

Conflicting interests.

Please list any fees and grants from, employment by, consultancy for, shared ownership in or any close relationship with, at any time over the preceding 36 months, any organisation whose interests may be affected by the publication of the response. Please also list any non-financial associations or interests (personal, professional, political, institutional, religious or other) that a reasonable reader would want to know about in relation to the submitted work. This pertains to all the authors of the piece, their spouses or partners.

• - Google Chrome

Intended for healthcare professionals

• My email alerts
• BMA member login
• Username * Password * Forgot your log in details? Need to activate BMA Member Log In Log in via OpenAthens Log in via your institution

Search form

• Advanced search
• Search responses
• Search blogs

The art of NHS induction

• Related content
• Peer review
• Emma Stanton , psychiatry specialist registrar, seconded to the chief medical officer 1 ,
• Claire Lemer , paediatric registrar 2
• 1 Department of Health
• dremmastanton{at}gmail.com

Emma Stanton and Claire Lemer look at how the NHS does induction, and how it should change

Induction to the NHS is a rite of passage for each of the 15 000 doctors starting new jobs every August. At present, induction is formulaic and uninspiring. A valuable opportunity is being lost to introduce new colleagues to the vision for the NHS, to develop insight into the local healthcare organisation and population health needs, and to create a sense of teamwork and institutional loyalty.

A review of hospital induction programmes in the Anglia region showed that trainees valued being given certain information when they started a new job. 1 Box 1 shows the topics that junior doctors wished to be included in the early stages of an induction programme.

Box 1: Topics to cover on day one of an induction programme 1

Service processes and procedures—Ordering investigations; hospital forms and notes; service departments; admission and transfer procedures; discharge drugs and procedures

Understanding hospital services—Bleeps; switchboard; car parking; ID; support staff

Personal and comfort requirements—Accommodation; housekeeping; catering facilities

Orientation to the new environment—Mess and hospital facilities; timetables; rota

Essential practical skills—Cardiopulmonary resuscitation; hospital computer

Professional and financial concerns—P45; contracts; indemnity.

A questionnaire completed by 107 consultants and 121 specialist registrars from two teaching hospitals in the East Midlands found junior doctors “were seen as not prepared for starting work, especially in regard to clinical and practical skills and the more challenging communication skills.” 2 The experiences of six foundation year doctors describing their first day at work in August 2009 suggests that there is more the NHS could do to improve the quality of induction. 3

This article reviews what induction means for Generation Y and presents the findings of an online survey comparing the induction experiences of junior doctors and NHS management trainees.

Generation Y style

Most junior doctors are from Generation Y (aged up to 28 years). Research on what “Gen Y” want from the workplace, from a 26 question survey of 2521 respondents, is shown in figure 1 ⇓ . 4 This suggests that Gen Y think differently to Generation X (aged up to 42 years) and the baby boomers (aged up to 62 years) about work, learning, and relationships. Up to 80% of Gen Y who were surveyed said that a good induction was important when starting a new job. Induction was considered more important than earning lots of money or fast promotion.

How Gen Y learn best is when it is fun or through mentoring or coaching (fig 2 ⇓ ). When considering redesigning induction programmes, it is important to note that computer based learning and classroom style learning are unpopular with Gen Y. The survey described below showed that 55% of junior doctors received online training as part of their induction. Negative comments received about this were that such modules were frequently “poorly written,” “irrelevant,” and “long winded and took up large amounts of personal time.”

• Download figure
• Open in new tab
• Download powerpoint

Junior doctors’ experiences of induction compared with NHS management trainees’

In September 2009, 42 junior doctors completed an online survey about their most recent experiences of induction (from BAMMbino, www.bamm.co.uk ). Sixty two NHS management trainees completed the same questions, shown in box 2, in November 2009.

Box 2: Induction survey questions

1. On a scale of 0 to 10, with 0 being the worst and 10 being the best, how would you score your most recent induction programme? Why?

2. What percentage of your most recent induction programme was spent on functional training such as fire safety?

3. Was patient safety discussed at your induction programme?

4. Please tick if you met either of these people during your induction programme?

Medical director

Chief executive

5. Did you receive any online training either before or as part of your induction programme? If yes, what did this consist of?

6. Did your induction programme teach you more about your organisation and the patients you will be working for so that you can work more effectively?

7. Do you feel part of a team as a result of your induction programme?

8. Do you feel more inspired about your job as a consequence of your induction programme? Why?

9. Does the organisation you are working for have a vision that was clearly stated during your induction programme?

10. Please state what you think the point of your most recent induction was.

The findings are stark—no attempts to inspire and create institutional loyalty; limited attempts to explore the local health organisation and population health needs; and an overall cynical reaction to induction. Of note, medical trainees seem more detached from the process than their managerial colleagues, perhaps because the managers are more likely to meet a senior executive face to face during induction. Only 19% of junior doctors met the chief executive of their trust at induction, whereas more than 50% of management trainees reported meeting the chief executive during their induction.

Figure 3 ⇓ shows that NHS management trainees are more positive about their most recent induction experiences when asked to score them out of 10, with 0 being the worst and 10 being the best. The most frequent score given by management trainees was 8 out of 10 (21% of responders), whereas the most frequent score given by junior doctors was 3 out of 10 (24% of responders). Induction for NHS graduate management trainees introduces participants to all aspects of the organisation. This includes acute and mental health care, primary care trusts, and the ambulance service. This provides new management trainees with an overview of the whole organisation, which is not currently part of junior doctors’ induction.

Forty nine per cent of junior doctors and 66% of management trainees spent less than one fifth of their induction on functional training, such as fire safety. Despite recent high profile cases of poor patient safety at Mid Staffordshire and Basildon and Thurrock Foundation Trusts, 40% of junior doctors surveyed did not recall patient safety being discussed at their most recent induction. More than 80% of management trainees, however, did discuss patient safety at their induction.

On the basis of the findings of this small survey, the majority of junior doctors (57%) were not taught about their organisation and the patients they would be working for, compared with only 21% of management trainees. Disappointingly, more than two thirds of junior doctors did not feel part of a team as a result of their induction programme. Nearly half of management trainees did not feel part of a team following their induction experience.

More than 80% of junior doctors and 47% of management trainees did not feel more inspired about their jobs after their induction programme. More than two thirds of junior doctors and management trainees were unable to recall a vision for the organisation they work for clearly stated during their induction. When asked about the point of induction, both sets of responses were infused with cynicism: “tick box exercise,” “to ‘protect’ the trust rather than to help patients or make me feel more welcome.” Online training was described as “very long winded and annoying induction modules.”

Onboarding: learning from other organisations

The NHS has yet to embrace the potential benefits of induction, although there are signs that this is changing. North Middlesex University Hospital is moving towards unified corporate induction, where all staff are inducted together rather than in professional silos.

Other industries have focused time and attention on this area because of the relationship between induction, absenteeism and staff retention, and employee productivity. The Aberdeen Group (a leading provider of research on global technology) found that “90 per cent of employees make their decision to stay at the company within the first 6 months.” 5 High performing companies turn these crucial months into a positive experience before the employee even sets foot in the company. The Aberdeen Group found that high performing organisations were 35% more likely to have a “new hire programme.” Within this programme there were four key components for success: beginning before day one (that is, the process of introducing the environment should begin before the doctor starts work); continuing for at least six months; making “socialisation” part of the process; and identifying the important business issues and making these part of the programme. The Aberdeen Group call this process of immersion and induction “onboarding.”

It is clear that there are key differences between this approach and induction into the NHS. Successful onboarding focuses on reaffirming an employee’s decision to join an organisation—the findings of the above survey show that the NHS appears to be having the opposite effect. Onboarding seeks to immerse the new recruit into the institutional culture—it is clear from the survey that those experiencing NHS induction, however, lack information about the corporate culture of the NHS. Furthermore, onboarding seeks to make process issues, such as paperwork, easy, and links induction to appraisal and assessment or personal development: both of which lack emphasis in NHS induction. 5

Achieving these core features does not need to rely on complex technology or expensive interventions. It requires a shift from a procedure driven process to one where the aim is to welcome new employees, to capture hearts and minds, and to enthuse.

Many organisations have made inroads into this with simple strategies such as issuing welcoming DVDs, providing books and information on the history of the organisation, ensuring access to executives, particularly in less formal settings, and, most importantly, celebrating the new recruits. Box 3 shows the experiences of a junior doctor’s induction to a secondment at McKinsey and Company management consultants.

Box 3: Induction to McKinsey and company

My induction to McKinsey and Company began in the board room. A small group of new arrivals spent over a week immersing ourselves in the corporate culture, being provided with the tools of the trade—a laptop, a BlackBerry, and a credit card—and learning about the values of the company alongside the practical skills needed to start work. At the end of long days spent grappling with Excel were opportunities to socialise, meet key individuals, and be made to feel welcome and special.

Recommendations for the future

The findings of this small survey suggest that induction programmes for junior doctors could learn from the induction programmes provided for NHS management trainees. The NHS could also look to other organisations to learn about successful approaches to engaging employees. The Gen Y research shows that induction is important and that Gen Y-ers learn best when it is fun and multisensory, and through their peers.

At the heart of improving induction is a shift towards a culture where institutional loyalty is sought. Following the example of corporate induction in other industries, the NHS could make a number of small alterations to achieve this.

Following the corporate example means starting induction early, as well as changing the language of job offers from a bureaucratic function to an enthusiastic welcome, and doing so as soon as possible to allow doctors to make the necessary changes to their lives.

Learning from John Lewis, the department store, one further practical suggestion for improving junior doctors’ engagement with the NHS, and to do so early on, is to create an induction DVD. This would introduce new employees to their organisation, clearly stating the background and aims of the NHS through brief interviews with key senior leaders such as David Nicholson, chief executive of the NHS; Bruce Keogh, medical director of the NHS; and Liam Donaldson, chief medical officer. Sending such a DVD before junior doctors’ induction would inspire them and help to develop a wider awareness of the environment in which they will be working. It also allows for the induction process to focus on core business issues, reminding doctors of what is important for the NHS.

Following the example of the North West Deanery, making the deanery the sole employer would reduce the unnecessary and time consuming paperwork, such as repeatedly filling out occupational health forms. This would considerably streamline the induction process.

Finally, following the lead of organisations such as the North Middlesex, integrating staff induction not only improves teamwork and a sense of belonging, but, by reducing the number of inductions required, means that there is possibly more likelihood of senior executives attending.

Too often, induction for junior doctors consists of a single day of formal didactic presentations that alienate our valuable workforce before they have set foot on the wards. This article presents the case for a radical overhaul of the way in which junior doctors are inducted into the NHS. There is a need to make induction fun, inspiring, and to cover crucial aspects of quality, including patient safety and teamwork, together with providing an opportunity to meet senior leaders within the local organisation, such as the medical director and the chief executive.

• ↵ Ward S. Improving quality in hospital induction programmes. BMJ 1998 ; 316 : 2 . OpenUrl FREE Full Text
• ↵ Matheson C, Matheson D. How well prepared are medical students for their first year as doctors? The views of consultants and specialist registrars in two teaching hospitals. Postgrad Med J 2009 ; 85 : 582 -9. OpenUrl Abstract / FREE Full Text
• ↵ Barbouti O, Ahmed NG, Vaughn C, Hassan A, Khandker TA, Akram Y. My first day as a doctor. BMJ Careers 2009 ; 339 : 69 -71. OpenUrl
• ↵ James J, Bibb S, Walker S. Tell it how it is. Summary research report. Talentsmoothie.. 2008. www.talentsmoothie.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/12/TIHIS-report-Summary-and-Conclusion.pdf .
• ↵ Martin K, Saba J. All aboard: effective onboarding techniques and strategies. The Aberdeen Group, 2008.

• Share full article

Advertisement

Supported by

Pat Williams, Charismatic N.B.A. Executive, Is Dead at 84

Known for his unorthodox marketing practices, Mr. Williams, a founder of the Orlando Magic, was sometimes called the P.T. Barnum of professional basketball.

By Harvey Araton

Pat Williams, who for 51 years was a charismatic executive with National Basketball Association teams in Chicago, Philadelphia, Atlanta and Orlando, Fla., and who was also a prolific author and motivational speaker, died on Wednesday in Orlando. He was 84.

The Orlando Magic, which he helped found and where he spent more than 30 years of his career, said the cause of his death, in a hospital, was complications of viral pneumonia. Mr. Williams was also diagnosed in 2011 with multiple myeloma, a cancer of plasma cells.

Known for his unorthodox marketing practices, Mr. Williams was sometimes called the P.T. Barnum of professional basketball. He began his front-office career not in the N.B.A. but in baseball’s minor leagues. He considered himself a protégé of Bill Veeck, the maverick owner of the Cleveland Indians, the St. Louis Browns and the Chicago White Sox.

Having read Mr. Veeck’s 1962 autobiography, “Veeck as in Wreck,” Mr. Williams sought a meeting with him while working for the minor league Miami Marlins, where he had been named business manager after two seasons as a catcher.

Bill Durney, Miami’s general manager, had worked for Mr. Veeck in St. Louis, where in 1951 the team sent Eddie Gaedel, who at 3 feet 7 inches was the smallest player ever to hit in a major league game, to the plate for one celebrated at-bat. (He walked.)

“I had devoured Veeck’s book and then, with Bill Durney connecting us, built a relationship with him for almost 25 years,” Mr. Williams said in an interview for this obituary in 2022. “He convinced me that you can’t guarantee wins, but you can guarantee fun.”

We are having trouble retrieving the article content.

Please enable JavaScript in your browser settings.

Thank you for your patience while we verify access. If you are in Reader mode please exit and  log into  your Times account, or  subscribe  for all of The Times.

Thank you for your patience while we verify access.

Already a subscriber?  Log in .

Want all of The Times?  Subscribe .