labor law presentation

Got any suggestions?

We want to hear from you! Send us a message and help improve Slidesgo

solar eclipse

25 templates

145 templates

biochemistry

37 templates

12 templates

sunday school

65 templates

education technology

181 templates

Labor Law: Workers' Rights

Labor law: workers' rights presentation, free google slides theme and powerpoint template.

Labor laws exist to protect workers’ rights and ensure that they are treated fairly and justly by their employers. Speak about safe working conditions with this template for the occasion. It’s clear and to the point with workers illustrations to go with your information. Cover any topic related to labor and employment, including wages, safety and health, discrimination or harassment. Give this topic the importance it needs and we need to keep in the workplace with an effective presentation.

Features of this template

100% editable and easy to modify
32 different slides to impress your audience
Contains easy-to-edit graphics such as graphs, maps, tables, timelines and mockups
Includes 500+ icons and Flaticon’s extension for customizing your slides
Designed to be used in Google Slides and Microsoft PowerPoint
16:9 widescreen format suitable for all types of screens
Includes information about fonts, colors, and credits of the resources used

How can I use the template?

Am I free to use the templates?

How to attribute?

Attribution required If you are a free user, you must attribute Slidesgo by keeping the slide where the credits appear. How to attribute?

How to Add, Duplicate, Move, Delete or Hide Slides in Google Slides

How to Change Layouts in PowerPoint

How to Change the Slide Size in Google Slides

Premium template

Unlock this template and gain unlimited access

Labor Law Thesis Defense Infographics presentation template

Register for free and start editing online

An official website of the United States government.

Here’s how you know

The .gov means it’s official. Federal government websites often end in .gov or .mil. Before sharing sensitive information, make sure you’re on a federal government site.

The site is secure. The https:// ensures that you are connecting to the official website and that any information you provide is encrypted and transmitted securely.

Misclassification
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA)
Pump at Work
Maternal Health
Retaliation
Government Contracts
Immigration
Child Labor
Agricultural Employment
Subminimum Wage
Employment of Workers With Disabilities
Lie Detector Tests
Davis Bacon Prevailing Wage Survey
WORKER RIGHTS
Resources For Employers
Regulatory Library

Interpretive Guidance

Industry-Specific Resources
Compliance Assistance
elaws Advisors
Fact Sheets
New and Small Businesses Resources

Presentations

External User Portal (EUP)
Compliance Assistance Toolkits
New and Small Business Resources
Publications By Language
FLSA Compliance Videos
Know Your Rights Video Series
Employer.gov
DOL Enforcement Database
Workers Owed Wages
Order Publications
Laws and Regulations
Field Handbook
Administrator Interpretations, Opinion and Ruling Letters
Field Bulletins
State Minimum Wage Laws
State Labor Law Topics
State Labor Offices
Resources for State and Local Governments
NEWS RELEASES

Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act

Minimum Wage
Overtime Pay
Hours Worked
Recordkeeping
Federal Wage Garnishments
Direct Care Workers

DOL-Timesheet App

Track your regular work hours, break time, and overtime hours.

NOTICE: On August 30, 2023, the Department of Labor (Department) announced issuance of a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM), Defining and Delimiting the Exemptions for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Outside Sales, and Computer Employees . The NPRM proposes to update and revise the regulations issued under section 13(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act implementing the exemption from minimum wage and overtime pay requirements for executive, administrative, and professional employees. Proposed revisions include increasing the standard salary level and the highly compensated employee total annual compensation threshold, as well as providing an automatic updating mechanism that would allow for the timely and efficient updating of all the thresholds to reflect current earnings data.

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting employees in the private sector and in Federal, State, and local governments. Covered nonexempt workers are entitled to a minimum wage of not less than $7.25 per hour effective July 24, 2009. Overtime pay at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay is required after 40 hours of work in a workweek.

FLSA Minimum Wage : The federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour effective July 24, 2009. Many states also have minimum wage laws. In cases where an employee is subject to both state and federal minimum wage laws, the employee is entitled to the higher minimum wage.
FLSA Overtime : Covered nonexempt employees must receive overtime pay for hours worked over 40 per workweek (any fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours – seven consecutive 24-hour periods) at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate of pay. There is no limit on the number of hours employees 16 years or older may work in any workweek. The FLSA does not require overtime pay for work on weekends, holidays, or regular days of rest, unless overtime is worked on such days.
Hours Worked : Hours worked ordinarily include all the time during which an employee is required to be on the employer’s premises, on duty, or at a prescribed workplace.
Recordkeeping : Employers must display an official poster outlining the requirements of the FLSA. Employers must also keep employee time and pay records.
Child Labor : These provisions are designed to protect the educational opportunities of minors and prohibit their employment in jobs and under conditions detrimental to their health or well-being.

On January 10, 2024, the U.S. Department of Labor published a final rule Employee or Independent Contractor Classification Under the Fair Labor Standards Act , effective March 11, 2024, revising the Department’s guidance on how to analyze who is an employee or independent contractor under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). This final rule rescinds the Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act rule ( 2021 IC Rule , 86 FR 1168), that was published on January 7, 2021. This guidance will be updated.

General Guidance

Guía Práctica Referente a la Ley de Normas Justas de Trabajo
Employment Law Guide: Minimum Wage and Overtime Pay
Questions and Answers about the FLSA
Information on Furloughs and Other Reductions in Pay
Break Time for Nursing Mothers
Spanish Version (PDF)
Chinese Version (PDF)
Korean Version (PDF)
Polish Version (PDF)
Tagalog Version (PDF)
Thai Version (PDF)
Russian Version (PDF)
Vietnamese Version (PDF)
Haitian Creole Version (PDF)
FLSA Resources for Puerto Rico
Misclassification of Employees as Independent Contractors
Minimum Wage and Overtime Pay for Direct Care Workers
Holiday Season Employment Information
COVID-19 or Other Public Health Emergencies and the FLSA
Spanish Version
Hmong Version (PDF)
Additional FLSA Posters
Administrator Interpretations
Opinion Letters
The Coverage and Employment Status Advisor helps identify which workers are employees covered by the FLSA.
The Hours Worked Advisor provides information to help determine which hours spent in work-related activities are considered FLSA “hours worked” and therefore must be paid.
The Overtime Security Advisor helps determine which employees are exempt from the FLSA minimum wage and overtime pay requirements under the Part 541 overtime regulations.
The Overtime Calculator Advisor computes the amount of overtime pay due in a sample pay period based on information from the user.
The Child Labor Rules Advisor answers questions about the FLSA’s youth employment provisions, including at what age young people can work and the jobs they can perform.
The Section 14(c) Advisor helps users understand the special minimum wage requirements for workers with disabilities.
Comprehensive FLSA Presentation (Microsoft PowerPoint)
Executive, Administrative, and Professional Exemption Presentation (Microsoft PowerPoint)

Applicable Laws and Regulations

Fair Labor Standards Act

Regulations

29 CFR Chapter V

Civil Money Penalty Inflation Adjustments

Starting in 2016, agencies across the federal government must adjust their penalties for inflation each year. Below is a table that reflects the adjustments that have occurred for penalties under this statute. For more information on the penalty adjustments, go here .

Labor Law Human Resource Management
Popular Categories

Powerpoint Templates

Icon Bundle

Kpi Dashboard

Professional

Business Plans

Swot Analysis

Gantt Chart

Business Proposal

Marketing Plan

Project Management

Business Case

Business Model

Cyber Security

Business PPT

Digital Marketing

Digital Transformation

Human Resources

Product Management

Artificial Intelligence

Company Profile

Acknowledgement PPT

PPT Presentation

Reports Brochures

One Page Pitch

Interview PPT

All Categories

Powerpoint Templates and Google slides for Labor Law Human Resource Management

Save your time and attract your audience with our fully editable ppt templates and slides..

Presenting Labor Laws Preparing Manage Human Resources In Powerpoint And Google Slides Cpb slide which is completely adaptable. The graphics in this PowerPoint slide showcase four stages that will help you succinctly convey the information. In addition, you can alternate the color, font size, font type, and shapes of this PPT layout according to your content. This PPT presentation can be accessed with Google Slides and is available in both standard screen and widescreen aspect ratios. It is also a useful set to elucidate topics like Labor Laws Preparing Manage Human Resources. This well-structured design can be downloaded in different formats like PDF, JPG, and PNG. So, without any delay, click on the download button now.

Presenting Labor Law Human Resource Management Ppt Powerpoint Presentation Infographic Template Maker Cpb slide which is completely adaptable. The graphics in this PowerPoint slide showcase four stages that will help you succinctly convey the information. In addition, you can alternate the color, font size, font type, and shapes of this PPT layout according to your content. This PPT presentation can be accessed with Google Slides and is available in both standard screen and widescreen aspect ratios. It is also a useful set to elucidate topics like Labor Law Human Resource Management. This well-structured design can be downloaded in different formats like PDF, JPG, and PNG. So, without any delay, click on the download button now.

Labour Laws

Sep 04, 2012

800 likes | 1.66k Views

Labour Laws.

Share Presentation

equitable distribution
miscellaneous provisions act
voluntary arbitration
iron ore mines
motor transport workers act

Presentation Transcript

Labour Laws While the employer has a fundamental right to run his business, his right has to be adjusted with the employees right to social justice. The former pertains to the realm of fundamental rights in our Constitution, the latter to the realm of the Directive Principles. The Ultimate aim is to have peace in industry so that production may increase and the national economy may grow. Social justice is an application in the field of labour laws of the basic principle of sociological jurisprudence of harmonising conflicting interests.

Labour law seeks to regulate the relations between an employer or a class of employers and their employees. The access of this law is the widest, in that it touches the lives of far more people, indeed millions of men & women as compared to any other branch of law • Law is a technique of regulation of social power

3.1.4 Principles of Social Justice, Social Equality, Social Security, National Economy and Labour Legislations • Labour Legislations contain the principles of social justice, social equity, social security and national economy in their concept. • Social justice implies two things. First, equitable distribution of profits and other benefits of industry between owner and workers. Second, providing protection to workers against harmful effect to their health, safety and morality. • Social equality provides the flexibility in labour legislations to adjust to the' need of the industrial society. • Social security envisages collective action against social risks which constitute the crux of the labour legislation. • National Economy provides the standards to be set for the labour legislations. • Human Rights principles and human dignity postulates provide the broader base for the concept of labour legislations. • Thus, these principles are the fundamentals for understanding the concept of Labour jurisprudence.

3.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE LABOUR LEGISLATIONS • Labour legislation in India has sought to achieve the following objectives: • (1) Establishment of justice- Social, Political and Economic • (2) Provision of opportunities to all workers, irrespective of caste, creed, religion, beliefs, for the development of their personality. • (3) Protection of weaker section in the community. • (4) Maintenance of Industrial Peace. • (5) Creation of conditons for economic growth. • (6) Protection and improvement of labour standards. • (7) Protect workers from exploitation: • (8) Guarantee right of workmen to combine and form association or unions. • (9) Ensure right of workmen to bargain collectively for the betterment of their service conditons. • (10) Make state interfere as protector of social well being rather than to remain an onlooker. • (11) Ensure human rights and human dignity.

THE CLASSIFICATION OF LABOUR LEGISLATIONS • (1) Regulative • (2) Protective • (3) Wage-Related • (4) Social Security • (5) Welfare both inside and outside the workplace • (6) Miscellaneous

The Regulative Labour Legislations • The main objective of the regulative legislations is to regulate the relations between employees and employers and to provide for methods and manners of settling industrial disputes. Such laws also regulate the relationship between the workers and their trade unions, the rights and obligations of the organisations of employers and workers as well as their mutual relationships. • The Trade Unions Act, 1926 • The Industrial Disputes Act,1947 • Industiral Relations Legislations enacted by states of Maharashtra, MP, Gujarat, UP etc. • Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.

The Protective Labour Legislations • Under this category come those legislations whose primary purpose is to protect labour standards and improve the working conditions. Laws laying down the minimum labour standards in the areas of hours of work, supply, employment of children and women etc. in the factories, mines, plantations, transport, shops and other establishments are included in this category. Some of these are the following : • Factories Act,1948 • The Mines Act,1952 • The Plantations Labour Act,1951 • The Motor Transport Workers Act,1961 • The Shops and Establishments Acts • Beedi and Cigar Workers Act 1966

Wage-Related Labour Legislations • Legislations laying down the methods and manner of wage payment as well as the minimum wages come under this category: • The Payment of Wages Act,1936 • The Minimum Wages Act, 1948 • The Payment of Bonus Act, 1965 • The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976

Social Security Labour Legislations • They cover those legislations which intend to provide to the workmen social security benefits under certain contingencies of life and work. • The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 • The Employees' State Insurance Act, 1948 • The Coal Mines PF Act, 1948. • The Employees PF and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 • The Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 • Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 Chapter V A of the Industrial Disputes Act 1947 is also, in a manner of speaking, of the character of social security in so far as its provides for payment or lay-off, retrenchment and closure compensation.

Welfare Labour Legislations • The laws coming under this category have the specific aim of providing for the improvements in living conditions of workers. They also carry the term "Welfare" in their titles. • Limestone and Dolomite Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1972. • The Mica Mines Welfare Fund Act, 1946 • The Iron Ore Mines, Manganese Ore Mines and Chrome Ore Mines Labour Welfare Fund Act, 1976 • The Cine Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1981. • In addition, some state governments have also enacted legislations for welfare funds. • Beedi Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1976

Miscellaneous • Besides the above there are other kinds of labour laws which are very important. Some of these are : • The Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 • Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act 1986 • Building and other construction workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act 1996 • Apprentices Act 1961 • Emigration Act, 1983 • Employment Exchange (Compulsory Notification of Vacancies) Act, 1959 • Inter State Migrant Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Condition of Service) Act, 1979 • Sales Promotion Employees (Condition of Service) Act 1976 • Working Journalists and other Newspapers Employees (Condition of Service and Miscellaneous Provision) Act, 1955.

THE INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES ACT, 1947 • Based on the experiences of Trade Disputes Act, 1929 and usefulness of rule 81 (a) of the Defence of India Rules(refer to the bare act), the bill pertaining to Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 embodied the essential principles of rule 81 (a) which was acceptable to both employers and workers retaining most parts of the provisions of Trade Disputes Act, 1929. • This legislation is designed to ensure industrial peace by recourse to a given form of procedure and machinery for investigation and settlement of industrial disputes. Its main objective is to provide for a just and equitable settlement of disputes by negotiations, conciliation, voluntary arbitration and adjudication instead of by trial of strength through strikes and lock-outs. • As State Governments are free to have their own labour laws, States like UP.,MP., Gujarat and Maharashtra have their own legislation for settlement of disputes in their respective states. U.P. legislation is known as U.P. Industrial Distputes Act, while others have Industrial Relations Act more or less on the lines of 'Bombay Industrial Relations Act, 1946.

THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF THE ACT • Promotion of measures for securing amity and good relations between employer and workmen • Investigation and settlement of industrial disputes • Prevention of illegal strike and lock-outs • Relief to workmen in the matter of lay-off, retrenchment and closure of an undertaking • Promotion of Collective Bargaining

SCOPE AND COVERAGE • The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, extends to the whole of India, and is applicable to all industrial establishments employing one or more workmen. • As regards disputes, it covers only collective disputes or disputes supported by trade unions or by substantial number of workers and also individual disputes relating to termination of service.

Definitions • Section 2 (a) defining appropriate Government states, : (a) In relation to any industrial disputes concerning any industry carried on by or under the authority of Central Government or by a Railway or concerning any such controlled industry such as may, be specified or linking or insurance company or oil field or major part the Central Government, and (b) In relaltion to other industrial disputes the State Government: • In HEC Majdoor Union Vs. State of Bihar S.C. (1969), it was held that in respect of Central Public Sector Undertakings the State where the factory was situated was the appropriate Government. This decision was changed in Air India case S.C. 1997 where it was held that in resepct of Central Public Undertakings the appropriate Government is the Central Government. This definition of appropriate Government is applicable to contract labour (R&A) Act, 1970 and Payment of Bonus Act, 1965.

2j Industry • The term "Industry" includes not only manufacturing and commercial establishments but also professionals like that of the lawyers, medical practitioners, accountants, architects, etc., clubs, educational institutions like universities, cooperatives, research institutes, charitable projects and other kindred adventures, if they are being carried on as systematic activity organised by cooperation between employers and employees for the production and/or distribution of goods and services calculated to satisfy human wants and wishes. • It also includes welfare activities or economic adventures or projects undertaken by the government or statutory bodies, and, Government departments discharging sovereign functions if there are units which are industries and which are substantially severable units. (Judgement dated 21.2.78 in the civil appeals no. 753-754 in the matter of Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board etc. Vs. Rajappa & Sons, etc.).

2k-Industrial Dispute,2kkk,2l,2n,200,2ra,2rr,2s • For purposes of this act the term "dispute" is defined as dispute or difference between employers and employees, which is connected with the employment and non-employment or the terms of employment or with the condition of labour of any person.

Sec. 2 (s) defines "workman" as any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any skilled, unskilled manual, supervisory, operational, technical or clerical work for hire or reward. Whether the terms of employment be expressed or employed and for the purposes of any proceedings under this act in relation to an industrial dispute, includes any such person who has been dismissed, discharged, retrenched in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute but does not include any such person (i) who is subject to Air Force Act, Army Act or Navy Act or (ii) who is employed in police service or prison service, (iii) who is employed mainly in a managerial and advisory capacity or (iv) who being employed in supervisory capacity ity draws wages exceeding Rs.1600/- and exercises by the nature of the duties attached to the office or by means of powers vested in him, functions mainly of a managerial nature. • May and Baker India case S.C. (1976) which led to passing of Sales Promotion Employees Act, 1976, had been stipulated that sales /medical representatives are not workmen under Sec. 2(s) of ID Act. • The provisions of ID Act, 1947 will be applicable to certain class of working journalists as per section 3 of Working Journalists Act 1955.

MEASURES FOR PREVENTION OF CONFLICTS AND DISPUTES 12 The Act not only provides machinery for investigation and settlement of disputes, but also some measures for the containment and prevention of conflicts and disputes. Important preventive measures provided under the Act are: • 1. Setting up of Works Committees in establishments employing 100 or more persons, with equal number of representatives of workers and management for endeavouring to compose any differences of opinion in matters of common interest, and thereby promote measure for securing and preserving amity and cordial relations between the employer and workmen. The representatives of workmen will not be less than the representatives of employers and such representatives of workmen will be from among the workmen engaged in the establishment and in consultation with registered trade unions. The decision of the works committee carries weight but is not conclusive and binding; its duties is to smooth away friction then to alter conditions of services, etc. (Section 3).

2. Prohibition of changes in the conditions of service in respect of matters laid down in the Fourth Schedule of the Act (Appendix-1) (a) without giving notice to the workmen affected by such changes; and (b) within 21 days of giving such notice. • No such prior notice is required in case of (a) Changes affected as a result of any award or settlement; (b) Employees governed by Government. rules and regulations (see 9A). • 3. Prohibition of strikes and lock outs in a public utility service (a) without giving notice to other party within six weeks before striking or locking out, (b) within 14 days of giving such notice, (c) before the expiry, of the date of strike or lock-out specified in the notice and during the pendency of any conciliation proceedings before a conciliation office and seven days after the conclusion of such proceedings. In non-public utility services strikes and lock out are prohibited during the pendency of conciliation proceedings before the Board of Conciliation and seven days after the 'conclusion of such proceedings, during the pendency of proceedings before an arbitrator, labour court, and Industrial Tribunal and National Tribunal, during the operation of an award and settlement in respect of matters covered by the settlement or award. (Sections 22 and 23).

4. Prohibition of Unfair Labour Practices: Sec. 25 T and 25 U prohibit employers, employees and unions from committing unfair labour practices mentioned in the Schedule V of the Act (Appendix-In. Commission of such an offence is punishable with imprisonment upto six months and fine upto Rs.1000, or both. (Ch. V -C) • 5. Requiring employers to obtain prior permission of the authorities concerned before whom disputes are pending for conciliation, arbitration and adjudication, for changing working and employment conditions, or for dismissal or discharging employees and their union leaders. (Section 33). • 6. Regulation, of lay-off and retrenchment and closure of establishment: Sec. 25 and its' sub-sections require employers to • (a) pay lay-off compensation to employees (in establishments employing 50 or more) for the period that they are laid-off, at the rat of 50% of the salary or wages which they would have paid otherwise, • (b) give one month notice, and three months notice in case of establishments employing 100 or more persons or pay in lieu of notice, and also pay compensation at the rate of 15 days wages for every completed year of service for retrenchment and closing establishments • (c),-Retrench employees on the basis of first come last go, and • (d) obtain permission from the Government for retrenchment and laying off employees and closing, of establishments employing 100 or more persons. (Ch. VA, VB)

MACHINERIES FOR INVESTIGATION AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES • For Industrial; disputes which are not prevented or settled by, collective bargaining or Works Committees or by Bipartite negotiations, the following authorities are provided under the. Industrial Disputes Act for resolving the same. • Conciliation Officer and Board of Conciliation • Voluntary Arbitration • Adjudication by Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal, and National Tribunal

CONCILIATION • Conciliation in industrial disputes is a process by which representatives of management and employees and their unions are brought together before a third person or a body of persons with a view to induce or persuade them to arrive at some agreement to their satisfaction and in the larger interest of industry and community as a whole. • Both the Central and State Governments are -empowered under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to appoint such number of conciliation officers as may be considered necessary for specified areas or for specified industries in specified areas either permanently or for limited periods • . His role is only advisory and mediatory. He has no authority to make a final decision or to pass formal order directing the parties to act in a particular manner.

Process of Conciliation • Where any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended, and is brought to the notice of conciliation officer by the parties concerned, or is referred to him by the government, or he receives a notice of strike or lock-out, he is to hold conciliation proceedings in the prescribed manner (sec 12) • Conciliation proceedings are obligatory in case of public utility services, and in such cases conciliation proceedings have to be started immediately after receiving notice of strike or lock-out or reference from the Government. In such cases conciliation proceedings are deemed to have commenced from the time the notice of strike is received by the conciliation officer. • In other cases conciliation may be initiated at the discretion of the Government.(ie reference to boards have to be done by the govt.)

The conciliation officer' may send formal intimation to the parties concerned declaring his intention to commence conciliation proceedings with effect from the date he may specify. • He may hold meetings with the parties to the dispute either jointly or separately. A joint meeting saves time and also affords parties an opportunity to meet each other and put forward their respective view points and comments about the dispute. • Conciliation proceedings are to be conducted expeditiously in a manner considered fit by the conciliation officer for the discharge of his duties imposed on him by the Act, If a settlement is arrived at in the course of the conciliation proceedings, memorandum of settlement is worked out and signed by the parties concerned, and it becomes then binding on all parties concerned for a period agreed upon. • The conciliation officer is to send a report to the Government (within 14 days of the commencement of conciliation) giving full facts along with a copy of the settlement. • If no agreement is arrived at, the-conciliation- officer is required to submit a full report to the Government explaining the causes -of :failure.'

After considering the failure report the Government may refer the dispute to the Board of Conciliation, arbitration, or for adjudication to Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal. • If the Government does not make such a reference, it shall record and communicate to the. parties concerned the reasons thereof • The conciliation officer is not a judicial officer. After reporting that no settlement could be arrived at, he cannot be debarred from, making fresh effort to bring about a settlement. But he cannot take final decision by himself.

Powers of Conciliation Officer • Under the Act, conciliation is not a judicial activity. It is only administrative, since it is executed by the Government agency. Although conciliation officer is not a judicial officer, but to enable him to discharge his duties cast upon him under the Act, he has been empowered to enter the premises occupied by an establishment to which the dispute relates after giving reasonable notice for inspecting same, or any of its machinery, appliances or articles. He can also interrogate any person there in' respect of any thing situated therein or any matter relevant to the subject matter of conciliation. He can also call for any document which he has ground for considering relevant in the dispute, or to be., necessary for the purposes of verifying the implementation of any award or carrying out any other duty imposed on him under the Act. He is also empowered to enforce the attendance of any person for the purpose of examination of such persons. For all these purposes the conciliation officer shall have the same power as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. He is also deemed to be public servant within the meaning of Sec. 21 of the Indian Penal Code:

Settlements In and Ouside Conciliation • A settlement arrived at in proceedings under the Act is binding on all the parties to the dispute. It is also binding on other parties if they are summoned to appear in conciliation proceedings as parties to the dispute: In case' of employer such a settlement is also binding on his heirs, successors, assigns in respect of establishment to which these disput relate. In regard to employees, it is binding on all persons who were employed in establishment or part of the establishment to which the dispute' relates on the date of dispute, and to all persons who subsequently become employed in that establishment. • A settlement arrived at by agreement between the management and workers or their unions outside conciliation. proceedings is binding only on the parties to the agreement. (Section 18).

Board of Conciliation • This is a higher forum which is constituted for a specific dispute. It is not a permanent institution like the Conciliation Officer, The Government may, as occasion arises, constitute a Board of Conciliation for settlement of an industrial dispute with an independent chairman and equal representatives of the parties concerned as its members • The chairman who is appointed by the Government, is to be a person unconnected with the dispute or with any industry directly affected by such dispute. Other members are to be appointed on the recommendations of the parties concerned; and if any party fails to make recommendation, the Government shall appoint such persons as it thinks fit to represent that party. The Board cannot admit a dispute in conciliation on its own.-It can act only when reference is made to it by the Government. (Section 5).

As soon as a dispute is referred to a Board, it has to endeavour to bring about a settlement of the same.. For this purpose, it has to investigate the dispute and all matters affecting the merits and right settlement thereof, for the purpose of inducing the parties to come to a fair and amicable settlement. Procedure followed by the Board in this regard is almost the same as adopted by the conciliation officers. The Board is, however, required to submit its report within two months of the date on which the dispute was referred to it, or within such short period as the Government may fix in this behalf

The proceedings before the Board are to be held in public, but the Board may at any stage direct that any witness shall be examined or proceedings shall be held in camera. • If a settlement is arrived at, a report with a copy of the settlement is submitted, to the Government. • If the Board fails to bring about settlement, a report is submitted to the Government stating the facts and circumstances, the steps taken, reasons for failure along with its findings. • After considering its findings the Government may refer the dispute for voluntary arbitration if both the parties to the dispute agree for the same, or for 'Adjudication to Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal. • The period of submission of report may be extended by the Government beyond two months as agreed upon by the parties in writing. A member of the Board may record any minute of dissent from the report, or from any recommendation made therein. With the minute of dissent the report shall be published by, the Government within thirty days from the receipt • A Board of Conciliation can only try to bring about a settlement. It has no power to impose a settlement on the parties to the dispute. The Board has the power of a Civil Court for,(i) enforcing the attendance of any person and examining on oath; (ii) compelling the production of documents and material objects; (iii) issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses. The enquiry or investigation by the Board is regarded as judicial proceedings.

The Boards of conciliation are rarely appointed by the Government these days because of a long precedence of failure. • The conciliation officer is found to be more acceptable. This is more so when disputes relate to a whole industry, or important issues, and a senior officer of the Industrial Relations Machinery, i.e. a senior officer of the Directorate of Labour, is entrusted with the work of conciliation. The Chief Labour Commissioner (Central) or Labour Commissioner of the State Government generally intervene themselves in conciliation when important issues form the subject matters of the dispute. • Court of Inquiry may be constituted for inquiring about matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an I.D. The court may consist of one or more independent persons. It has to submit its report within six months on the matter referred to Units. (Sec. 6).

VOLUNTARY ARBITRATION • When Conciliation Officer or Board of Conciliation fail to resolve conflict/dispute, parties can be advised to agree to voluntary arbitration for settling their dispute. egPanchayati system • This was advocated by Mahatma Gandhi and encouraged by the government • In Code of discipline • The Government has set up a National Arbitration Board for making the measure popular in all the states, and all efforts are being made to sell this idea to management and employees and their unions.(1962) • In 1956 the Government decided to place voluntary arbitration as one of the measures for settlement of a dispute through third party intervention under the law. Sec. 10A was added to the Industrial Disputes Act, and it was enforced from 10th March, 1957.

Reference of Disputes for Arbitration • Where a dispute exists or is apprehended, it can be referred for arbitration if the parties to the dispute agree to do so by submitting a written agreement to that effect, mentioning the person acceptable to them as arbitrator and also the issues to. be decided in arbitration - proceedings, to the Government and the Conciliation Officer concerned before it is referred for adjudication to Labour Court or Tribunal. The Agreement must be signed by both the parties. Both under Sec. 10A and 10(2) reference is obligatory. • Where an agreement provides for even number of arbitrators, it will provide for the appointment of another person as an Umpire who shall decide upon the reference if the arbitrators are divided in their opinion • The award of the Umpire shall be deemed to be the arbitration award for the purposes of the Act.

The appropriate Government shall within one month from the date of the receipt of the copy of the arbitration agreement publish the same in the Official Gazette if the Government is satisfied that the parties who have signed the agreement for arbitration, represent majority of each party; otherwise it can reject the request for arbitration. • Where any such notification has been issued, the employer and workmen who are not parties to the arbitration agreement, but are concerned in the dispute, shall be given an opportunity to present their case before the arbitrator or arbitrators. • The arbitrator shall investigate the dispute and submit to the Government the Arbitration Award signed by him. • Where an industrial dispute has been referred for arbitration and notification has been issued, the Government may by order prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute, which may be in existence on the date of reference. • The arbitration award which is submitted to the Government and becomes enforceable, is binding on all parties to the agreement and all other parties summoned to appear in the proceedings as parties to 'dispute. Such an award is also binding on all, employees at the time of award, or to be employed subsequently even if they are not party to the initial agreement. If the arbitration agreement is not notified in the Official Gazette under Sec. 10-A, it is applicable only to the parties who have agreed to refer the dispute for arbitration.

Arbitration Award is enforceable in the same manner as the adjudication award of Labour Colt or Industrial Tribunal. • Arbitration is an alternative-to adjudication and the two cannot be used simultaneously. It is voluntary at the discretion of the parties to a dispute. Arbitrator is a quasi-judicial body. He is an independent person and has all the attributes of a statutory arbitrator. He has wide freedom, but he must function within the limit of his powers. He must follow due procedure of giving notice to parties, giving fair hearings, relying upon all available evidence and documents. There must be no violation of the principles of natural justice.

Evaluation of arbitration • During the last decade not even 1% of the disputes reported were referred for arbitration. The National, Commission on Labour examined the working of arbitration as a method of settling disputes, and found that it was yet to be accepted by the parties, particularly by the 'employers, unreservedly. The main hurdles noticed yet are: • Choice of suitable arbitrator acceptable to both parties. • Payment of-arbitration-fees-Unions can seldom afford to share such costs equally with management.

ADJUDICATION • Unlike conciliation and arbitration, adjudication is compulsory method of resolving conflict. Labour Court –can be constituted by central or state govt. • It consists of one person only, who is also called the Presiding Officer, and who is or has been a judge of a High Court, or he has been a district judge or an additional district judge for a period not less than three years, or has held any judicial office in India for not less than seven years. Industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in the Second Schedule of the Act (Appendix-III) may be referred for adjudication to the Labour Court. (Section 7). Industrial Tribunal -can be constituted by central or state govt • This is also one-man body (Presiding Officer). The Third Schedule of the Act mentions matters of industrial disputes which can be referred to it for adjudication (Appendix-IV). This Schedule shows that Industrial Tribunal has wider jurisdiction than the Labour Court. The Government concerned may appoint two assessors to advise the Presiding Officer in the proceedings. (Section 7A).

National Tribunal • This is the third adjudicatory body to be appointed by the Central Government under the Act .It can deal with any dispute mentioned in Schedule II and III of the Act or any matter which is not specified therein. This also consists of one person to be appointed by the Central Government, and he must have been a Judge of a High Court. He may also be assisted by two assessors appointed by the Government to advise him in adjudicating disputes. • The presiding officers of the above three adjudicatory bodies must be independent persons and should not have attained the age of 65 years. Again, these three bodies are not hierarchical. It is the prerogative of the Government to refer a dispute to these bodies. • They are under the control of the labour department of the respective State Government and the Central Government. The contending parties cannot refer any dispute for adjudication themselves, and the award of these bodies are binding on them. (Section 7B).

Reference of Dispute for Adjudication (Section 10) • If a dispute is not settled by direct negotiation, or conciliation, if the parties do not agree to get it settled by voluntary arbitration, the Government at its discretion may refer it to Labour Court, Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal, depending upon whether the matter of the dispute appears in the Second of Third Schedule of the Act. • However, if the parties to the dispute jointly or separately apply for a reference to Labour Court or Tribunal, the Government is obliged to make a reference accordingly if it is satisfied that the persons applying represent the majority of each party. Disputes which are considered vexatious or frivolous, are not referred to adjudication. The Government has also the power to refer disputes which have not taken place, but are only apprehended. After referring the dispute to adjudication the Government can prohibit the continuance of any strike or lock-out in connection with such dispute which may be in existence on the date of its reference.

An order referring a dispute to Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal or National Tribunal shall specify the period within which they shall submit their award on such dispute to the Government concerned. In case of individual disputes such a period shall not exceed three months. The period can, however, be extended if the parties concerned apply for such extension, or the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal may consider expedient to do so for the reason to be recorded. • The proceedings before these authorities shall not lapse on the Industrial Relations ground that the proceedings have not been completed' within the specified time or by reason of the death of any of the parties to dispute being a workman. In computing any period specified in the order of reference, the period if any, for which proceedings had been stayed by the injunction of the Civil Court, shall be excluded. • When the Central Government is the appropriate Government in relation to any industrial dispute, it can refer the dispute for adjudication to Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal appointed by the State Government instead of setting up its own Labour Court or Tribunal for that purpose. 18

AWARDS OF LABOUR COURTS AND INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS • Awards of Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals are binding on the parties concerned, on their heirs, successors and assignee of employers and on all persons employed subsequently. • On receipt of award, it is to be published by the appropriate Government within thirty days of the receipt. They become enforceable on the expiry of thirty days from the date of their publication in the Official Gazette • The normal period of operation of any award, as fixed under the Act, is one year. The Government has, however, the power to fix such period as it thinks fit. The Government can also extend the operation of the award up to one year at a time, but the total period of operation of any award cannot exceed three years from the date when it came into effect. • Even if it is not extended, the award remains binding on the parties till it is terminated by two months notice given by majority of one of the parties bound by the award to the other party, intimating its intention to terminate the award.

The appropriate Government may not accept or give effect to an award in relation to a dispute to which it is a party, or if the award is given by the National Tribunal, and if it is considered inexpedient on grounds of national economy or social justice. • In such a situation the Government may by notification in the Official Gazette declare that the award does not become enforceable on the expiry of the said period of thirty days. Within thirty days of its publication the Government may make an order, rejecting or modifying the award, and shall on the first available opportunity lay the award together with a copy of the order before the State Assembly or the Parliament, as the case may be, where the award may be modified or rejected. Such an award shall become enforceable on the expiry of 15 days from the date it is so laid. Where no order is made in pursuance of declaration, award becomes enforceable within 90 days of its publication. The award comes into operation from the date mentioned in the order, and where no date is mentioned, it operates from the date it becomes enforceable. (Sections 17, 17A, 19).

These awards are amenable to constitutional remedies provided by Articles 32,226 and 227 of the Constitution on grounds of defects of jurisdiction, violation of the principles of natural justice or any error of law. • Proceedings can be initiated against these awards both in the High Court and the Supreme Court. • But if an employer prefers any proceedings against an award which directs the reinstatement of any workman, in High Court or the Supreme Court, he is liable to pay to such workman during the pendency of such proceedings full wages last drawn by him, inclusive of any maintenance allowance admissible to him under any rule if the workman had not been employed in any establishment during such period. (Section 17B).

POWERS OF LABOUR COURT AND INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNALS • The proceedinds are judicial proceedings with powers of a civil court • Section 11A was inserted in the Act in 1971. It was sequel to IISCO case (S.C. 1958) and ILO's recommendation that worker aggrieved by his termination should be entitled for appeal against such termination to a neutral body such as arbitrator, a court, and arbitration committee, or a similar body.

EFFECTIVENESS OF ADJUDICATION MACHINERY • Initially trade unions affiliated to all political parties were enthusiastic in getting their disputes settled by conciliation and adjudication as provided under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947- but these methods were very time consuming • A few employers also started questioning the credibility of the presiding officers of the Labour Courts and Industrial Tribunals, who are generally retired persons engaged on yearly contract basis. • Record shows that the act is far from successful in resolving conflict effectively. This may be due to red-tapism and bureaucractic delays and complicated procedure which are inherent in the Government organisation. Such delays have encouraged militancy or violence in management and union relations. • The Industrial Disputes Act as amended recently (Act 46 of 1982), provides time limits for the disposal of disputes by Labour Courts and Tribunals, but these time limits are observed rarely. The amended Act also provides for setting up a machinery- within the establishment for prompt handling of grievances, but this amendment has yet to be given effect to.

Over thirty years back, National Commission on Labour recommended setting up of a more independent machinery in the form of Industrial Relations Commissions, and this recommendation is still under the consideration of the Government.

Notice of change in employment conditions No change in service conditions in respect of matters in the 4 th schedule( s.9A) • Without giving notice • Within 21 days of giving such notice No notice in case of • Change due to award or settlement under this act • Employees governed by govt. rules and regulations Sec.9B gives the govt. power to exempt

Protection of workmen during pendency of proceedings( s.33,33A) During pendency of any proceedings under this act • Service conditions cant be altered to the prejudice of the workman concerned • Cant dismiss or punish workman without permission from the authority in writing ( and in this case 1 month’s wages have to be given before application for permission Protected workmen are also given the above protection Protected workman is an office bearer of a registered TU connected with the establishment and recognised as such under the ID act rules( cant be more than 1%, min 5 max 100)

Workers aggrieved due to non compliance of above can complain in writing directly to the authority concerned before whom dispute is pending • The authority will treat this complaint as an ID and dispose it off within 3 months ( period can be altered if parties want or authority thinks it fit) • The application from the employer , for changing the conditions of service or dismissal should also be dealt with in the same manner

More by User

Labour Laws In Pakistan

Labour Laws In Pakistan. Lecture Overview Labour Legislations Contract Appointment Working Hours and Conditions Leaves and Holidays Children Employment Labour Disputes Equal Employment Practices in Pakistan. Labour Laws The Constitution of Pakistan

1.49k views • 18 slides

COMPLIANCE UNDER LABOUR LAWS

COMPLIANCE UNDER LABOUR LAWS. Presented By: RSPH & Associates CA Hitesh Agrawal Baroda. (O) 02652342932/33 (M) 9998028737. (A) Contract Labour (Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970. The main objective of this act is to regulate the contract labour and abolish it in certain cases.

1.48k views • 57 slides

How to Prepare for the New Labour Laws

How to Prepare for the New Labour Laws. Greig Whitton Founder, Evergrow. Paul Cooley Founder, Workplace Strategies. Webinar outline. Umbrella sectoral determinations Minimum remuneration increases Temporary employment service providers Deemed full-time employment

309 views • 17 slides

Labour Laws of Pakistan

Labour Laws of Pakistan. Presented By: Muhammad Zubair. The Constitution of Pakistan provisions . Article 11 of the Constitution prohibits all forms of slavery, forced labour and child labour

2.59k views • 10 slides

ASETUC National Advocacy Workshop “ Labour Laws In Malaysia”

ASETUC National Advocacy Workshop “ Labour Laws In Malaysia”. Mustafar Maarof Vice President Malaysian Trades Union Congress. Asetuc National Advocacy Workshop. Employment Act 1955; Industrial Relations Act 1967; Trade Unions Act 1959; Children & Young Persons (Employment) Act 1966

198 views • 8 slides

Women Labour Force Participation, Social Protection and Labour Laws

Women Labour Force Participation, Social Protection and Labour Laws. An Overview of Pakistan. The Context: Labour Force Participation Trends in Pakistan. Overall Labour f orce participation rates in the last ten years: 1999-2000 – 50.4% 2006-2007 – 52.5% 2010 – 2011 - 53.4%

328 views • 15 slides

Effect of Labour Laws on Compensation Management

Effect of Labour Laws on Compensation Management. Presented by: Sumedha Rode (8106) Deepti Rokde (8119). Introduction. Compensation : the remuneration received by an employee in return for his/her contribution to the organization. An organized practice An integral part of HRM

988 views • 42 slides

Labour Laws in India COMPLAINCE AND DUE DILIGENCE

NIRC-ICSI. Labour Laws in India COMPLAINCE AND DUE DILIGENCE. By Anupam Malik Joint Labour Commissioner Haryana. ISSUES FOR AN INDUSTRY. Approval of factory/building plan for industrial safety, Health and Welfare Organization goals and culture Manpower planning and recruitment

703 views • 11 slides

New Labour Laws, Old Headaches

New Labour Laws, Old Headaches. Greig Whitton Founder, Evergrow. Paul Cooley Founder, Workplace Strategies. Kirsten Van Bever Donker Guy & Associates. Webinar outline. Why all the change? Changes to the Basic Conditions of Employment Act Changes to the Labour Relations Act

230 views • 14 slides

The Minimum Wages Act is to be amended with plans to set a national floor for minimum wages for workers across professions. The Centre is to amend labour laws - said the labour and employment minister to parliament on 16th July, 2014.

220 views • 6 slides

COMMERCIAL AND LABOUR LAWS

COMMERCIAL AND LABOUR LAWS. NATURE AND DEFINITION OF LAW OF CONTRACT. LAW – ITS DEFINITION According to SALMOND “Law is the body of principles recognised and applied by the state in the administration of justice.”

821 views • 18 slides

Labour Laws defines an outstanding workmanship

Complying with the Labour Laws is essential for organizations to maintain a productive working condition. Martand Law Firm, an award winning law firm, offers services for Labour Laws. With our years of experience, we assist organizations in drafting employment policies so a good working environment can be maintained. More Information Visit Web Site : http://www.martandlawfirm.com/labour-laws.aspx Contact No : 9111-4052-6047

296 views • 6 slides

Enforcing Service Contractor’s Compliance with Labour Laws

Enforcing Service Contractor’s Compliance with Labour Laws. Mrs. Jenny CHAN, JP Assistant Commissioner for Labour ( Rights & Benefits ) 30 June 2005. Outline of the Talk. Protection of Employees’ Rights and Benefits Existing Machinery to Provide Protection to Employees

421 views • 27 slides

Labour Laws checklist

LexCare provides Compliance checklist and Compliance audit checklist for labour and legal laws. For more information contact 91 20 69400480 http://compliancechecklist.in/

364 views • 6 slides

Know the Importance of Labour Laws in India

Labour laws are very important aspect of running any business organization and also it is very important that the company or the business follows the labour compliance.

299 views • 3 slides

Effective Enforcement of Labour Laws

Effective Enforcement of Labour Laws. The Experience of Trinidad and Tobago in Occupational Safety and Health Ministry of Labour and Small and Micro Enterprise Development Trinidad and Tobago First Meeting of the Working Groups of the XV IACML April 17, 2008 Montevideo, Uruguay.

232 views • 21 slides

Training Module On Labour Laws Applicable to Manufacturing Industries

Training Module On Labour Laws Applicable to Manufacturing Industries. Various Acts. The Factories Act The Contract Labour (R&A) Act The Payment of Wages Act The Minimum Wages Act The Payment of Bonus Act The Employment Exchanges Act The Provident Fund Act The Profession Tax Act

491 views • 42 slides

270 views • 18 slides

LABOUR LAWS AMENDMENT BILL

ACDP Says attack on Afghan Parliament is attack on democracy and an attempt to disregard the will of the people * commends Afghan people who stand firm in face of terrorism * welcomes IPU attempt to gain global support to enable MP's to safely carry out their work 23 June 2015.

297 views • 28 slides

Benefits of labour laws for your organization

For every organization, the need for people is inevitable as multiple operations need various people to handle them.

70 views • 4 slides

Karl Marx Works 1844

Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 [1]

Written: Between April and August 1844; First Published: 1932; Source: Marx. Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844; Publisher: Progress Publishers, Moscow 1959; Translated: by Martin Mulligan; Transcribed: for marxists.org by Andy Blunden in 2000; Proofed: and corrected by Matthew Carmody 2009; See alternate translation .

Management Team

LinkedIn Group
Facebook Group

Join Our Club

What They Say About Us

"The wonderful thing about entrepreneurs is that their passion for starting new companies transcends languages and geographic boundaries."

Ron Conway, Founder and Managing Partner of the Angel Investors LP funds, early stage investor in Google and PayPal

"Networking is very important for start-ups. The challenge for them is often not money: it is mentoring and finding people who can give good advice from experience."

Esther Dyson, Founder, EDventure Holdings

"This conference is clearly a labor of love for a group of dedicated professionals who care deeply about the Eastern European entrepreneurs. From the value-packed educational panels, to the star-studded key note speakers' line up, to an amazing quantity of venture capitalists – this is a not to be missed event for any high tech entrepreneur,"

Richard Guha, President of the Marketing Executives Network and Managing Partner at MaxBrandEquity

"As Stanford MBA students, we were exposed to a lot of VC firms both from the Valley and abroad. It is at Stanford that we met Anna Dvornikova, an absolutely amazing business leader and (by our big luck) our friend, who was the center of the Russian Silicon Valley professional community, and was doing a huge work to connect Russia and the Valley. Anna helped us a lot with kick-starting Wikimart, put us to our first-ever conference, introduced us to most of Russian VCs. And all that happened in a very short time span! It was the beginning of a six-month journey that despite the particularly tough times resulted in an extraordinarily group of investors backing our start-up."

Maxim Faldin and Kamil Kurmakayev, co-CEOs, Wikimart

MIA > Archive > Pashukanis

Evgeny Pashukanis

Marksistskaia teoriia gosudarstva i prava , pp.9-44 in E. B. Pashukanis (ed.), Uchenie o gosudarstve i prave (1932), Partiinoe Izd., Moscow. From Evgeny Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (eds. P. Beirne & R. Sharlet), London & New York 1980, pp.273-301. Translated by Peter B. Maggs . Copyright © Peter B. Maggs. Published here by kind permission of the translator. Downloaded from home.law.uiuc.edu/~pmaggs/pashukanis.htm Marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for the Marxists’ Internet Archive .

Introductory Note

In the winter of 1929-1930, during the first Five Year Plan, the national economy of the USSR underwent dramatic and violent ruptures with the inauguration of forced collectivization and rapid heavy industrialization. Concomitantly, it seemed, the Party insisted on the reconstruction and realignment of the appropriate superstructures in conformity with the effectuation of these new social relations of production. In this spirit Pashukanis was no longer criticized but now overtly attacked in the struggle on the “legal front”. In common with important figures in other intellectual disciplines, such as history, in late 1930 Pashukanis undertook a major self-criticism which was qualitatively different from the incremental changes to his work that he had produced earlier. During the following year, 1931, Pashukanis outlined this theoretical reconstruction in his speech to the first conference of Marxist jurists, a speech entitled Towards a Marxist-Leninist Theory of Law . The first results appeared a year later in a collective volume The Doctrine of State and Law .

Chapter I of this collective work is translated below, The Marxist Theory of State and Law , and was written by Pashukanis himself It should be noted that this volume exemplifies the formal transformations which occurred in Soviet legal scholarship during this heated period. Earlier, Pashukanis and other jurists had authored their own monographs; the trend was now towards a collective scholarship which promised to maximize individual safety. The source of authority for much of the work that ensued increasingly became the many expressions of Stalin’s interpretation of Bolshevik history, class struggle and revisionism, most notably his Problems of Leninism . Last, but not least, the language and vocabulary of academic discourse in the 1920s had been rich, open-ended and diverse, and varied tremendously with the personal preferences of the individual author; this gave way to a standardized and simplified style of prose devoid of nuance and ambiguity, and which was very much in keeping with the new theoretical content which comprised official textbooks on the theory of state and law. The reader will perhaps discover that The Marxist Theory of State and Law is a text imbued with these tensions. Pashukanis’ radical reconceptualization of the unity of form and content, and of the ultimate primacy of the relations of production, is without doubt to be preferred to his previous notions. But this is a preference guided by the advantages of editorial hindsight, and we feel that we cannot now distinguish between those reconceptualizations which Pashukanis may actually have intended and those which were produced by the external pressures of political opportunism.

CHAPTER I Socio-economic Formations, State, and Law

1. the doctrine of socio-economic formations as a basis for the marxist theory of state and law.

The doctrine of state and law is part of a broader whole, namely, the complex of sciences which study human society. The development of these sciences is in turn determined by the history of society itself, i.e. by the history of class struggle.

It has long since been noted that the most powerful and fruitful catalysts which foster the study of social phenomena are connected with revolutions. The English Revolution of the seventeenth century gave birth to the basic directions of bourgeois social thought, and forcibly advanced the scientific, i.e. materialist, understanding of social phenomena.

It suffices to mention such a work as Oceana – by the English writer Harrington, and which appeared soon after the English Revolution of the seventeenth century – in which changes in political structure are related to the changing distribution of landed property. It suffices to mention the work of Barnave – one of the architects of the great French Revolution – who in the same way sought explanations of political struggle and the political order in property relations. In studying bourgeois revolutions, French restorationist historians – Guizot, Mineaux and Thierry – concluded that the leitmotif of these revolutions was the class struggle between the third estate (i.e. the bourgeoisie) and the privileged estates of feudalism and their monarch. This is why Marx, in his well-known letter to Weydemeyer, indicates that the theory of the class struggle was known before him. “As far as I am concerned”, he wrote,

no credit is due to me for discovering the existence of classes in modern society, or the struggle between them. Long before me bourgeois historians had described the historical development of this class struggle, and bourgeois economists the economic anatomy of the classes.

What I did that was new was to prove: (1) that the existence of classes is only bound up with particular historical forms of struggle in the development of production ...; (2) that the class struggle inevitably leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat; (3) that this dictatorship itself only constitutes the transition to the abolition of all classes and the establishment of a classless society. [1]

[ Section 2 omitted – eds. ]

Top of the page

3. The class type of state and the form of government

The doctrine of socio-economic formations is particularly important to Marx’s theory of state and law, because it provides the basis for the precise and scientific delineation of the different types of state and the different systems of law.

Bourgeois political and juridical theorists attempt to establish a classification of political and legal forms without scientific criteria; not from the class essence of the forms, but from more or less external characteristics. Bourgeois theorists of the state, assiduously avoiding the question of the class nature of the state, propose every type of artificial and scholastic definition and conceptual distinction. For instance, in the past, textbooks on the state divided the state into three “elements”: territory, population and power.

Some scholars go further. Kellen – one of the most recent Swedish theorists of the state – distinguishes five elements or phenomena of the state: territory, people, economy, society and, finally, the state as the formal legal subject of power. All these definitions and distinctions of elements, or aspects of the state, are no more than a scholastic game of empty concepts since the main point is absent: the division of society into classes, and class domination. Of course, the state cannot exist without population, or territory, or economy, or society. This is an incontrovertible truth. But, at the same time, it is true that all these “elements” existed at that stage of development when there was no state. Equally, classless communist society – having territory, population and an economy – will do without the state since the necessity of class suppression will disappear.

The feature of power, or coercive power, also tells one exactly nothing. Lenin, in his polemic of the 1890s with Struve asserted that: “he most incorrectly sees the distinguishing feature of the state as coercive power. Coercive power exists in every human society – both in the tribal structure and in the family, but there was no state.” And further, Lenin concludes: “The distinguishing feature of the state is the existence of a separate class of people in whose hands power is concentrated. Obviously, no one could use the term ‘State’ in reference to a community in which the ‘organization of order’ is administered in turn by all of its members.” [2]

Struve’s position, according to which the distinguishing feature of a state is coercive power, was not without reason termed “professorial” by Lenin. Every bourgeois science of the state is full of conclusions on the essence of this coercive power. Disguising the class character of the state, bourgeois scholars interpret this coercion in a purely psychological sense. “For power and subordination”, wrote one of the Russian bourgeois jurists (Lazarevsky), “two elements are necessary: the consciousness of those exercising power that they have the right to obedience, and the consciousness of the subordinates that they must obey.”

From this, Lazarevsky and other bourgeois jurists reached the following conclusion: state power is based upon the general conviction of citizens that a specific state has the right to issue its decrees and laws. Thus, the real fact-concentration of the means of force and coercion in the hands of a particular class-is concealed and masked by the ideology of the bourgeoisie. While the feudal landowning state sanctified its power by the authority of religion, the bourgeoisie uses the fetishes of statute and law. In connection with this, we also find the theory of bourgeois jurists-which now has been adopted in its entirety by the Social Democrats whereby the state is viewed as an agency acting in the interests of the whole society. “If the source of state power derives from class”, wrote another of the bourgeois jurists (Magaziner), “then to fulfil its tasks it must stand above the class struggle. Formally, it is the arbiter of the class struggle, and even more than that: it develops the rules of this struggle.”

It is precisely this false theory of the supra-class nature of the state that is used for the justification of the treacherous policy of the Social Democrats. In the name “of the general interest”, Social Democrats deprive the unemployed of their welfare payments, help in reducing wages, and encourage shooting at workers’ demonstrations.

Not wishing to recognize the basic fact, i.e. that states differ according to their class basis, bourgeois theorists of the state concentrate all their attention on various forms of government. But this difference by itself is worthless. Thus, for instance, in ancient Greece and ancient Rome we have the most varied forms of government. But all the transitions from monarchy to republic, from aristocracy to democracy, which we observe there, do not destroy the basic fact that these states, regardless of their different forms, were slave-owning states. The apparatus of coercion, however it was organized, belong to the slave-owners and assured their mastery over the slaves with the help of armed force, assured the right of the slave-owners to dispose of the labour and personality of the slaves, to exploit them, to commit any desired act of violence against them.

Distinguishing between the form of rule and the class essence of the state is particularly important for the correct strategy of the working class in its struggle with capitalism. Proceeding from this distinction, we establish that to the extent that private property and the power of capital remain untouchable, to this extent the democratic form of government does not change the essence of the matter. Democracy with the preservation of capitalist exploitation will always be democracy for the minority, democracy for the propertied; it will always mean the exploitation and subjugation of the great mass of the working people. Therefore theorists of the Second International such as Kautsky, who contrast “democracy” in general with “dictatorship”, entirely refuse to consider their class nature. They replace Marxism with vulgar legal dogmatism, and act as the scholarly champions and lackeys of capitalism.

The different forms of rule had already arisen in slave-owning society. Basically, they consist of the following types: the monarchic state with an hereditary head, and the republic where power is elective and where there are no offices which pass by inheritance. In addition, aristocracy, or the power of a minority (i.e. a state where participation in the administration of the state is limited by law to a definite and rather narrow circle of privileged persons) is distinguished from democracy (or, literally, the rule of the people), i.e. a state where by law all take part in deciding public affairs either directly or through elected representatives. The distinction between monarchy, aristocracy and democracy had already been established by the Greek philosopher Aristotle in the fourth century. All the modern bourgeois theories of the state could add little to this classification.

Actually the significance of one form or another can be gleaned only by taking into account the concrete historical conditions under which it arose and existed, and only in the context of the class nature of a specific state. Attempts to establish any general abstract laws of the movement of state forms – with which bourgeois theorists of the state have often been occupied – have nothing in common with science.

In particular, the change of the form of government depends on concrete historical conditions, on the condition of the class struggle, and on how relationships are formed between the ruling class and the subordinate class, and also within the ruling class itself

The forms of government may change although the class nature of the state remains the same. France, in the course of the nineteenth century, and after the revolution of 1830 until the present time, was a constitutional monarchy, an empire and a republic, and the rule of the bourgeois capitalist state was maintained in all three of these forms. Conversely, the same form of government (for instance a democratic republic) which was encountered in antiquity as one of the variations of the slave-owning state, is in our time one of the forms of capitalist domination.

Therefore, in studying any state, it is very important primarily to examine not its external form but its internal class content, placing the concrete historical conditions of the class struggle at the very basis of scrutiny.

The question of the relationship between the class type of the state and the form of government is still very little developed. In the bourgeois theory of the state this question not only could not be developed, but could not even be correctly posed, because bourgeois science always tries to disguise the class nature of all states, and in particular the class nature of the capitalist state. Often therefore, bourgeois theorists of the state, without analysis, conflate characteristics relating to the form of government and characteristics relating to the class nature of the state.

As an example one may adduce the classification which is proposed in one of the newest German encyclopaedias of legal science.

The author [Kellreiter] distinguishes: (a) absolutism and dictatorship, and considers that the basic characteristic of these forms is that state powers are concentrated in the hands of one person. As an example, he mentions the absolute monarchy of Louis XIV in France, tsarist autocracy in Russia and the dictatorial power which was invested by the procedure of extraordinary powers in the one person, for instance the president of the German Republic on the basis of Art.48 of the Weimar Constitution; (b) constitutionalism, characterized by the separation of powers, their independence and their checks and balances, thereby weakening the pressure exerted by state power on the individual (examples: the German Constitution before the 1918 revolution, and the USA, where the President and Congress have independent powers); (c) democracy, whose basic premise is monism of power and a denial in principle of the difference between power and the subject of power (popular sovereignty, exemplified by the German Republic); and (d) the class-corporative state and the Soviet system where as opposed to formal democracy, the people appear not as an atomized mass of isolated citizens but as a totality of organized and discrete collectives. [3]

This classification is very typical of the confusion which bourgeois scholars consciously introduce into the question of the state. Starting with the fact that the concept of dictatorship is interpreted in the formal legal sense, deprived of all class content, the bourgeois jurist deliberately avoids the question: the dictatorship of which class and directed against whom ? He blurs the distinction between the dictatorship of a small group of exploiters and the dictatorship of the overwhelming majority of the working people; he distorts the concept of dictatorship, for he cannot avoid defining it without a relevant law or paragraph, while “the scientific concept of dictatorship means nothing less than power resting directly upon force, unlimited by laws, and unconstricted by absolute rules”. [4] Further it is sufficient to indicate, for instance, that under the latter heading the author includes: (a) a new type of state, never encountered before in history, where power belongs to the proletariat; (b) the reactionary dreams of certain professors and so-called guild socialists, about the return to the corporations and shops of the Middle Ages; and, finally (c) the fascist dictatorship of capital which Mussolini exercises in Italy.

This respected scholar consciously introduces confusion, consciously ignores the concrete historical conditions under which the working people actually can exercise administration of the state, acting as organized collectives. But such conditions are only the proletarian revolution and the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

4. The class nature of law

Bourgeois science confuses the question of the essence of law no less than the question of the state. Here, Marxism-Leninism opposes the diverse majority of bourgeois, petit bourgeois and revisionist theories which, proceeding from the explanation of the historical and class nature of law, consider the state as a phenomenon essential to every human society. They thus transform law into a supra-historical category.

It is not surprising, therefore, that bourgeois philosophy of law serves as the main source for introducing confusion both into the concept of law and into the concept of state and society.

The bourgeois theory of the state is 90% the legal theory of the state. The unattractive class essence of the state, most often and most eagerly, is hidden by clever combinations of legal formalism, or else it is covered by a cloud of lofty philosophical legal abstractions.

The exposure of the class historical essence of law is not, therefore, an unimportant part of the Marxist-Leninist theory of society, of the state and of law.

The most widespread approach of bourgeois science to the solution of the question of the essence of law consists in the fact that it strives to embrace, through the concept of law, the existence of any consciously ordered human relationships, of any social rules, of any phenomenon of social authority or social power. Thus, bourgeois scholars easily transfer law to pre-class society, find it in the pre-state life of primitive tribes, and conclude that communism is unthinkable without law. They turn law as an empty abstraction into a universal concept devoid of historical content. Law, for bourgeois sociologists, becomes an empty form which is unconnected with concrete reality, with the relationships of production, with the antagonistic character of these relationships in class society, [and] with the presence of the state as a particular apparatus of power in the hands of the ruling class.

Representatives of idealist philosophy of law go still further. They begin with “the idea of law”, which stands above social history as something eternal, immutable and independent of space and time.

Here, for example, is the conclusion of one of the most important representatives of the ideological neo-Kantian philosophy of law – Stammler:

Through all the fates and deeds of man there extends a single unitary idea, the idea of law. All languages have a designation for this concept, and the direction of definitions and judgements expressed by it amount, upon careful study, to one and the same meaning.

Having made this discovery, it cost Stammler nothing “to prove” that regardless of the difference between the “life and activity of nations” and “the objects of legal consideration”, we observe the unity of the legal idea and its equal appearance and intervention.

This professorial rubbish is presented without the least attempt at factual proof In actuality it would be rather difficult to explain how this “unity of the legal idea and its equal appearance” gave birth to the laws of the Twelve Tablets of slave-owning Rome, the serf customs of the Middle Ages, the declarations of rights of capitalist democracies, and our Soviet Constitution.

But Stammler is not embarrassed by the scantiness of factual argument. He deals just as simply with the proof of the eternity of law. He begins from those legendary Cyclops described in the Odyssey; even these mythical wonders were the fathers of families and, according to Stammler, could not do without law. On the other hand, however, while Stammler is ready to admit that the pigmy tribes of Africa and the Eskimos did not know the state, he simply denies as deceptive all reports about peoples not knowing law. Moreover, Stammler immediately replaces the concrete historical consideration of the question with scholastic formal-logical tightrope walking, which among bourgeois professors is presented as a methodological precision. We present these conclusions, for they typify the whole trend and, moreover, are most fashionable in the West.

Stammler proposes that the concrete study of legal phenomena is entirely unable to provide anything in the understanding of the essence of law. For if we assign any phenomenon to the list of legal ones, this means that we already know that this is law and what its characteristics are. The definition of law which precedes the facts presupposes knowledge of what is law and what is not law. Accordingly, in the opinion of Stammler, in considering the concept of law, it is necessary to exclude all that is concrete and encountered in experience and to understand “that the legal idea is a purely methodological means for the ordering of spiritual life”.

This conclusion, which confronts one with its scholasticism, is nothing other than a Kantian ideological thesis embodied in the context of Stammler’s legal stupidity. It shows that the so-called forms of knowledge do not express the objective characteristics of matter, are determined a priori, and precede all human experience and its necessary conditions.

Having turned law into a methodological idea, Stammler tries to locate it not in the material world where everything is subordinate to the law of cause and effect, but in the area of goals. Law, according to Stammler, is a definition which proceeds not from the past (from cause to effect), but from the future (from goal to means). Finally, adding that law deals not with the internal procedure of thoughts as such, but with human interaction, Stammler gives this agonizing and thoroughly scholastic definition:

The concept of law is a pure form of thought. It methodically divides the endlessly differentiated material of human desires apprehended by the senses, and defines it as an inviolable and independent connecting will.

This professorial scholasticism has the attractive feature for the bourgeoisie that verbal and formalistic contrivances can hide the ugly reality of [their] exploiting society and exploiting law.

If law is “a pure form of thought”, then it is possible to avoid the ugly fact that the capitalist law of private property means the misery of unemployment, poverty and hunger for the proletarian and his family; and that in defence of this law stand police armed to the teeth, fascist bands, hangmen and prison guards; and that this law signifies a whole system of coercion, humiliation and oppression in colonies.

Such theories allow the disguising of the fact that the class interest of the bourgeoisie lies at the basis of bourgeois law. Instead of class law, philosophers such as Stammler dream up abstractions, “pure forms”, general human “ideas”, “whole and durable bonds of will” – and other entirely shameless things.

This philosophy of law is calculated to blunt the revolutionary class consciousness of the proletariat, and to reconcile it with bourgeois society and capitalist exploitation.

It is not without reason that the social fascists speak out as such zealous exponents of neo-Kantianism; it is not without reason that Social Democratic theorists on questions of law largely subscribe to neo-Kantian philosophy and re-hash the same Stammler in different ways.

In our Soviet legal literature, a rather wide dissemination has been achieved by bourgeois legal theories. In particular, there have been attempts to spread the idealist teaching of Stammler in the works of Pontovich and Popov-Ladyzhensky. The criticism and unmasking of this eructation is necessary for the purpose of eradicating this bourgeois ideological infection.

Thus, we know that the state is an historical phenomenon limited by the boundaries of class society. A state is a machine for the maintenance of the domination of one class over another. It is an organization of the ruling class, having at its disposal the most powerful means of suppression and coercion. Until the appearance of classes the state did not exist. In developed communism there will be no state.

In the same way as the state, law is inseparably tied to the division of society into classes. Every law is the law of the ruling class. The basis of law is the formulation and consolidation of the relationship to the means of production, owing to which in exploitative society, one part of the people can appropriate to itself the unpaid labour of another.

The form of exploitation determines the typical features of a legal system. In accordance with the three basic socio-economic formations of class society, we have three basic types of legal superstructure: slave-owning law, feudal law and bourgeois law. This of course does not exclude concrete historical national differences between each of the systems. For instance, English law is distinguished by many peculiarities in comparison with French bourgeois law as contained in the Napoleonic Code . Likewise, we do not exclude the presence of survivals of the past – transitional or mixed forms – which complicate the concrete picture.

However, the essential and basic – that which provides the guiding theme for the study of different legal institutions – is the difference between the position of the slave, the position of the serf and the position of the wage labourer. The relationship of exploitation is the basic lynchpin, around which all other legal relationships and legal institutions are arranged. From this it follows that the nature of property has decisive significance for each system of law. According to Lenge, the brilliant and cynical reactionary of the eighteenth century, the spirit of the laws is property.

5. Law as an historical phenomenon: definition of law

The appearance and withering away of law, similar to the appearance and withering of the state, is connected with two extremely important historical limitations. Law (and the state) appears with the division of society into classes. Passing through a long path of development, full of revolutionary leaps and qualitative changes, law and the state will wither away under communism as a result of the disappearance of classes and of all survivals of class society.

Nevertheless, certain authors, who consider themselves Marxists, adopt the viewpoint that law exists in pre-class society, that in primitive communism we meet with legal forms and legal relationships. Such a point of view is adopted for instance by Reisner. Reisner gives the term “law” to a whole series of institutions and customs of tribal society: marriage taboos and blood feud, customs regulating relationships between tribes, and customs relating to the use of the means of production belonging to a tribe. Law in this manner is transformed into an eternal institution, inherent to all forms of human society. From here it is just one step to the understanding of law as an eternal idea; and Reisner in essence leans towards such an understanding.

This viewpoint of course fundamentally contradicts Marxism. The customs of a society not knowing class divisions, property inequality and exploitation, differ qualitatively from the law and the statutes of class society. To categorize them together means to introduce an unlikely confusion. Every attempt to avoid this qualitative difference inevitably leads to scholasticism, to the purely external combination of phenomena of different types, or to abstract idealist constructs in the Stammlerian spirit.

We should not be confused by the fact that Engels, in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State , uses the expression “the eternal law”; or, that he cites, without particular qualification, Morgan’s description of the member of a tribal community as having “equality of rights”, and of a person violating tribal customs as having placed himself “outside the law”.

It is clear that the terms “right” and “law” are used here not in their direct sense, but by analogy. This does not mean, however, that in classless society we will be dealing only with purely technical rules. Such an argument was put forward by Stuchka in his dispute with Reisner. To assign the customs and the norms of pre-class society to the area of technology would mean to give the concept of technology a very extended and undefined sense. Marriage prohibitions, customs relating to the organization of the tribe, the power of the elders, blood feud etc. – all this of course is not technology and not technical methods, but the customs and norms of social order. The content and character of these customs corresponded of course to the level of productive forces and the production relationships erected on it. These social forms should be considered as a superstructure upon the economic base. But the basic qualitative difference between this superstructure and the political and legal superstructures of class society, consists in the absence of property inequality, exploitation, and organized class coercion.

While Marxism strives to give a concrete historical meaning to law, the characteristic feature of bourgeois philosophers of law is, on the contrary, the conclusion that law in general is outside classes, outside any particular socio-economic formation. Instead of deriving a concept of law from the study of historical facts, bourgeois scholars are occupied with the concoction of theories and definitions from the empty concept or even the word “law”.

We already saw how Stammler, with the help of scholastic contrivances, tries to show that concrete facts have no significance for the definition of law. We, however, say the opposite. It is impossible to give a general definition of law without knowing the law of slave-owning, feudal and capitalist societies. Only by studying the law of each of these socio-economic formations can we identify those characteristics which are in fact most general and most typical. In doing so we must not forget Engels’ warning to those who tend to exaggerate the significance of these general definitions.

For example, in Chapter VI of the first part of Anti-Dühring , having given a definition of life, Engels speaks of the inadequacy of all definitions because they are necessarily limited to the most general and simplistic areas. In the preface to Anti-Dühring , Engels formulated this thought still more clearly, indicating that “the only real definition is the development of the essence of the matter, and that is not a definition”. However, Engels at once states that for ordinary practical use, definitions which indicate the most general and characteristic features of a category are very convenient. We cannot do without them. It is also wrong to demand more from a definition than it can give; it is wrong to forget the inevitability of its insufficiency.

These statements by Engels should be kept in mind in approaching any general definition, including a definition of law. It is necessary to remember that it does not replace, and cannot replace, the study of all forms and aspects of law as a concrete historical phenomenon. In identifying the most general and characteristic features we can define law as the form of regulation and consolidation of production relationships and also of other social relationships of class society; law depends on the apparatus of state power of the ruling class, and reflects the interests of the latter.

This definition characterizes the role and significance of law in class society. But it is nevertheless incomplete. In contradistinction to all normative theories – which are limited to the external and formal side of law (norms, statutes, judicial positions etc.) – Marxist-Leninist theory considers a law as a unity of form and content. The legal superstructure comprises not only the totality of norms and actions of agencies, but the unity of this formal side and its content, i.e. of the social relationships which law reflects and at the same time sanctions, formalizes and modifies. The character of formalization does not depend on the “free will of the legislator”; it is defined by economics, but on the other hand the legal superstructure, once having arisen, exerts a reflexive effect upon the economy.

This definition stresses three aspects of the matter. First is the class nature of law: every law is the law of the ruling class. Attempts to consider law as a social relationship which transcends class society, lead either to superficial categorization of diverse phenomena, or to speculative idealistic constructs in the spirit of the bourgeois philosophy of law. Second is the basic and determinant significance of production relationships in the content that is implemented by law. Class interests directly reflect their relationship to the means of production. Property relationships occupy the prominent place in the characterization of a specific legal order. Communist society, where classes disappear, where labour becomes the primary want, where the effective principle will be from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs: this does not require law. The third aspect consists of the fact that the functioning of a legal superstructure demands a coercive apparatus. When we say that social relationships have assumed a legal expression, this means inter alia that they have been given a coercive nature by the state power of the ruling class. Withering away of the law can only occur simultaneously with the withering away of the state.

Relationships which have received legal expression are qualitatively different from those relationships which have not received this expression. The form of this expression may be different, as was indicated by Engels [5] ; it may sometimes be good and sometimes be bad. It may support the progressive development of these relationships or, on the contrary, retard them. Everything depends on whether power is in the hands of a revolutionary or a reactionary class. Here the real significance of the legal superstructure appears. However, the degree of this reality is a question of fact; it can be determined only by concrete study and not by any a priori calculations. Bourgeois jurists characteristically concentrate their attention on form, and utterly ignore content. They turn their backs on life and actual history. As Engels showed, “they consider public and private law as independent areas, which have their own independent development and which must and may be subjected to independent systematic elaboration by the consistent elimination of all internal contradictions.” [6]

Bourgeois jurists usually define law as the totality of norms to which a state has given coercive power. This view of law typifies so-called legal positivism. The most consistent representatives of this trend are the English jurists: of the earliest Blackstone (eighteenth century), and thereafter Austin. In other European countries legal positivism also won itself a dominant position in the nineteenth century, because the bourgeoisie either gained state power or everywhere achieved sufficient influence in the state so as not to fear the identification of law with statute. At the same time nothing was better for legal professionals, for judges, [and] for defence counsel since this definition fully satisfied their practical needs. If law in its entirety was the complex of orders proceeding from the state, and consolidated by sanction in the case of disobedience, then the task of jurisprudence was defined with maximum clarity. The work of the jurist, according to the positivists, did not consist in justifying law from some external point of view – philosophers were occupied with this; the task of the jurists did not include explaining from where a norm emerged, and what determined its content – this was the task of political scientists and sociologists. The role of the jurist remained the logical interpretation of particular legal provisions, the establishment of an internal logical connection between them, combining them into larger systematic units in legal institutions, and finally in this way the creation of a system of law.

The definition of law as the totality of norms is the starting point for supporting the so-called dogmatic method. This consists of using formal logical conclusions in order to move from particular norms to more general concepts and back, proceeding from general positions to propose the solution of concrete legal cases or disputes. It is obvious that the practical part of this role developing especially luxuriantly in the litigious circumstances of bourgeois society – has nothing in common with a scientific theory of law. Applications of so-called legal logic are not only theoretically fruitless, they are not only incapable of revealing the essence of law and thus of showing its connection with other phenomena-with economics, with politics, with class struggle – but they are also harmful and impermissible in the practice of our Soviet courts and other state institutions. We need decisions of cases, not formally, but in their essence; the state of the working people, as distinct from the bourgeois state, does not hide either its class character or its goal – the construction of socialism. Therefore, the application of norms of Soviet law must not be based on certain formal logical considerations, but upon the consideration of all the concrete features of the given case, of the class essence of those relationships to which it becomes necessary to apply a general norm, and of the general direction on of the policy of Soviet power at the given moment. In the opposite case a result would be obtained which Lenin defined as: “Correct in form, a mockery in substance.”

The denial of formal legal logic cultivated by the bourgeoisie does not mean a denial of revolutionary legality, does not mean that judicial cases and questions of administration must be decided chaotically in the Soviet state, systematically on the basis of the random whims of individuals, or on the basis of local influences. The struggle for revolutionary legality is a struggle on two fronts: against legal formalism and the transfer to Soviet soil of bourgeois chicanery, and against those who do not understand the organizational significance of Soviet decrees as one of the methods of the uniform conduct of the policy of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Thus, the law is the means of formulating and consolidating the production relationships of class society and the social relationships which are connected with them. In the legal superstructure, these relationships appear as property relations and as relations of domination and subordination. They appear, in particular, as relations of an ideological nature, i.e. as relations which are formed in connection with certain views and are supported by the conscious will of the people.

We shall not touch upon the question of the degree to which the legal ideology of the exploiting classes is capable of correctly reflecting reality, and in what measure it inevitably distorts it (representing the interest of the exploiting class as the social interest in order, legality, freedom etc.). Here, we merely emphasize the fact that without the work of legislators, judges, police and prison guards (in a word, of the whole apparatus of the class state), law would become a fiction. “Law is nothing without an apparatus capable of enforcing observation of the norms of law” (Lenin).

The conscious will – towards the formulation and consolidation of production and other relationships – is the will of the ruling class which finds its expression in custom, in law, in the activity of the court and in administration. The legal superstructure exists and functions because behind it stands an organization of the ruling class, namely the apparatus of coercion and power in the form of the army, the police, court bailiffs, prison guards and hangmen. This does not mean that the ruling class has to use physical force in every case. Much is achieved by simple threat, by the knowledge of helplessness and of the futility of struggle, by economic pressure, and finally by the fact that the working classes are in the ideological captivity of the exploiters. It is sufficient to mention the narcotic of the religious ideology of humility and meekness, or the genuflection before the idol of bourgeois legality preached by the reformist.

But the ultimate argument for, and the basis of, the legal order is always the means of physical force. Only by depending on them could the slaveowner of antiquity or the modern capitalist enjoy his right.

The attempts by certain bourgeois jurists to separate law from the state, or to contrast “law” and “force”, are dictated by the attempt to hide and conceal the class essence of law.

Often these proofs that law is independent of the state bear a truly laughable character. Thus, for instance, Stammler claims that he has proved this thesis relying on the fact that on a dirigible which flies over the North Pole, i.e. outside the sphere of action of any state power, the emergence of legal relationships is possible.

By such empty dogmatic chicanery the scientific question of the relationship of state and law is decided. Can one be surprised at Lenin’s sharp reaction to Stammler when he says that: “From stupid arguments, Stammler draws equally stupid conclusions.”

The dependence of law on the state, however, does not signify that the state creates the legal superstructure by its arbitrary will. For the state itself, as Engels says, is only a more or less complex reflection of the economic needs of the dominant class in production.

The proletariat, having overthrown the bourgeoisie and consolidated its dictatorship, had to create Soviet law in conformity with the economy, in particular the existence of many millions of small and very small peasant farms. After the victory of the proletarian revolution the realization of socialism is not an instantaneous act but a long process of construction under the conditions of acute class struggle.

From the policy of limiting its exploitative tendencies and the elimination of its front ranks, we moved to the policy of liquidating the kulaks as a class by widespread collectivization. A successful fulfilment of the first Five Year Plan; the creation of our own base for the technical reconstruction of the whole national economy; the transfer of the basic mass of the peasantry to collectivization; these events enabled the basic task of the second Five Year Plan to be:

the final liquidation of capitalist elements and classes in general, the full elimination of the causes of class differences and exploitation, the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in the economy and the consciousness of the people, the transformation of the whole working population of the country into conscious and active builders of a classless society. [7]

At each of these stages Soviet law regulated and formulated production relationships differently.

Soviet law in each of the stages was naturally different from the law of capitalist states. For law under the proletarian dictatorship has always had the goal of protecting the interest of “the working majority, the suppression of class elements hostile to the proletariat, and the defence of socialist construction. Those individual Soviet jurists who considered law as the totality of norms (i.e. externally and formally) are not in a position to understand this. Finding identically formulated norms in the system of bourgeois and Soviet law, these jurists began to speak of the similarity between bourgeois and Soviet law, to search out “general” institutions, and to trace the development of certain “general” bases for bourgeois and Soviet law. This tendency was very strong in the first years of NEP. The identification of Soviet with bourgeois law derived from an understanding of NEP as a return to capitalism, which found expression in the Marxist ranks.

If NEP, as the Zinoviev opposition asserted at the XIVth Party Congress, is “capitalism which holds the proletarian state on a chain”, then Soviet law must be presented as bourgeois law, in which certain limitations are introduced, to the extent in the period of imperialism that the capitalist state also regulates and limits the freedom of disposition of property, contractual freedom etc.

Such a distortion in the description of NEP led directly to an alliance with bourgeois reformists in the understanding of Soviet law.

In fact, NEP “is a special policy of the proletarian state intended to permit capitalism while the commanding heights are held by the proletarian state, intended for the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements, intended for the growth of the role of the socialist elements at the expense of the capitalist elements, intended for the victory of the socialist elements over the capitalist elements, intended for the elimination of classes and for the construction of the foundation of a socialist economy.” [8]

Soviet law as a special form of policy followed by the proletariat and the proletarian state, was intended precisely for the victory of socialism. As such, it is radically different from bourgeois law despite the formal resemblance of individual statutes.

Juridicial formalism, which conceives of nothing other than the norm and reduces law to the purely logical operation of these norms, appears as a variety of reformism, as a Soviet “juridical socialism”. By confining themselves only to the norm and the purely juridical (i.e. formal ideas and concepts), they ignored the socio-economic and political essence of the matter. As a result, these jurists arrive at the conclusion that the transformation of property from an arbitrary and unrestricted right into a “social function” (i.e. a tendency which is “peculiar to the law of the advanced”, that is, capitalist, countries), finds its “fullest” expression in Soviet legislation. Making this contention, the Jurists “forgot” such a trifle as the October Revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is not only important to “read” the norm, but also to know what class, what state, and what state apparatus is applying this norm.

6. Law and production relationships

Production relationships form the basis of society. It is necessary to begin with these relationships in order to comprehend the complex picture presented by the history of mankind.

To search for the basic characteristic of society and social relations in an area other than production relationships means to deprive oneself of the possibility of a scientific understanding of the laws of development of social formations. However, it by no means follows from this that, according to Marx, only relations of production and exchange are social relations. Such a concept is a caricature of Marxism. The equation of social relations with production relations in this case is understood purely mechanically. However, a number of times Lenin noted that Marx’s great service was that he did not limit himself to the description of the economic “skeleton” of capitalist society, but that:

in explaining the construction and development of a definite social formation “exclusively” by production relations, he nonetheless thoroughly and constantly studied the superstructure corresponding to these production relations, which clothed the skeleton with flesh and blood. The reason that Das Kapital had such enormous success was that this book (“by a German economist”) showed the capitalist social formation as a living thing-with its everyday aspects, with the actual social phenomena essential to the production relations between antagonistic classes, with the bourgeois political superstructure protecting the domination of the capitalist class, with the bourgeois ideas of freedom, equality etc., with bourgeois family relations. [9]

Stuchka looks differently at the matter. In his opinion, Marx considered only relations of production and exchange to be social relations. But this would mean affirming that Marx limited himself to the “skeleton” alone, as if having indicated the basic and eventually determinant in social life and social relations he then passed by that which is derivative and requires explanation. However, more than once Marx directly points out the existence of social relationships which are not production relations but which merely derive from them and correspond to them. Characterizing revolutionary proletarian socialism in France in 1848, Marx wrote:

This socialism is the proclamation of the permanence of the revolution , a proclamation of the class dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary transition toward the elimination of class differences altogether, toward the elimination of all production relations upon which these differences are based, toward the elimination of all social relationships corresponding to these production relations, toward a revolution in the entire world of ideas arising from these relationships. [10]

Nevertheless, Comrade Stuchka firmly defends his understanding of the term “social relationships”:

We proceed from social relationships; I emphasize the word “social”, for here my critics are desperately confused. I thus selected the word “social” and a whole chapter in my first book was dedicated to it only in the sense of relations of production and exchange (as Marx and every Marxist understands this). [11]

Proceeding from the equation of production and social relationships, Stuchka defined law as a “system (or order) of social relations corresponding to the interests of the ruling class and protected by its organized force”. In this definition, as he himself indicated, there was room only for the law of property and the law of obligations.

As earlier, so even now [he wrote] I consider basic law , law in general, to be civil law , understanding thereby the form of organization of social relationships in the narrow and specific sense of the word (i.e. relations of production and exchange). I consider that all the remaining areas of law are either of a subordinate or derivative character, and that only bourgeois law (subjecting to its influence all the remaining areas of law) created a legal state, or state law and criminal law, as an equivalent norm for crime and punishment, not even mentioning administrative, financial etc., and finally international law or even the law of war. [12]

The positions outlined in this excerpt contain a series of mistakes. There is no doubt that the formulation and conformation of social relationships to the means of production is basic to law. Proceeding from the economic basis, from different forms of exploitation, we differentiate slaveowning, feudal and capitalist systems of law. But, in the first place, it is incorrect to subsume the property relations of slaveowning or feudal society under the concept of civil, i.e. bourgeois, law as “law in general”. In the second place, state law may not be equated with the so-called Rechtsstaat of the bourgeoisie. If one takes this point of view then one must either deny the existence of a distinctive feudal state law, or show that despite the existence of a Soviet state we do have Soviet state law. At the same time, in other places in his textbook, Stuchka proceeds from the existence of different class systems of law: feudal, bourgeois, Soviet. Here he argues for a “general law” which is equated with the civil law of bourgeois society. At the same time state law is equated with the theory of bourgeois jurists of the so-called Rechtsstaat , and criminal law (i.e. formalized class repression) with the ideology of equivalent retribution.

The basic question – do relationships exist that enter into the content of law, which are not, however, relations of production and exchange? – is avoided by Stuchka; he cites the subsidiary, derivative etc. character of state, criminal etc. law. However, it is clear that the structure of family relationships, the formalization of class domination in the state organization, the formalization of class repression, all this is embraced by the different branches of law (family, state and criminal).

The content of this legal intermediary is the social and political relationships which, in the final analysis, are reducible to the same production relationships, but by no means correspond to them.

Stuchka’s subsequent definition of law suffers from the shortcoming that he limits the area of law merely to production relations. This definition also introduces confusion because it confuses law with economics. Proceeding from the indisputable position that not all which is stated in a norm (in a statute) is realized in fact, Stuchka has made the incorrect conclusion that law is indeed the very relation of production and exchange. Stuchka has therefore declared Marx’s teaching – that law is an ideological superstructure to be a tribute to the “volitional theory” of the old jurists.

Whoever has mastered the form of theorizing of Marx and Engels that capital, money etc., are social relationships, will at once understand my views on the system of social relationships. This will be hardest of all for a jurist for whom law is a purely technical and artificial superstructure, strangely enough, holding sway over its base. Even Karl Marx gave a small tribute to this concept when he spoke of law as an ideological superstructure. But Marx was raised on Roman law and in general on the juridic concepts of the 1830s, considering it an expression “of the general will” ( Volkswillen ), and he was [therefore] accustomed to its terminology. [13]

In conducting the struggle with the narrow, formal legal concept of law as a totality of norms, we cannot deny the real existence of the legal superstructure, i.e. of relationships formulated and consolidated by the conscious will of the ruling class. Only to the extent that this process of formulation and consolidation proceeds may one speak of law. To study law only as totality of norms means to follow the path of formalism and dogmatism. But to study law only as relationships of production and exchange means to confuse law with economics, to retard the understanding of the reciprocal action of the legal superstructure and its active role. At the same time as production relations are imposed on people regardless of their will, legal relationships are impossible without the participation of the conscious will of the ruling class. The teaching of Marx, Engels and Lenin on law as an ideological superstructure needs no correction. Law cannot be understood unless we consider it as the basic form of the policy of the ruling class. In the later editions of The Revolutionary Role of State and Law , Stuchka supplemented his definition of law, developing the theory of the so-called three forms of law. The first, or in Stuchka’s words, the concrete form of law, is a legal relationship which corresponds to a production relationship and, with it, constitutes the base [or] reality. On the contrary, the two “abstract” forms – statute and legal ideology as Stuchka expresses it – are the essence of “the manifest superstructure”. [14]

This approach is also incorrect and non-dialectical. A legal relationship is a form of production relations because the active influence of the class organization of the ruling class transforms the factual relationship into a legal one, gives it a new quality, and thus includes it in the construction of the legal superstructure. This result is not achieved automatically by laissez faire , in the same way that prices are established under free competition. Even in the case of so-called customary law, the ruling class – through its special agencies, through the courts – ensures that the relations correspond to obligatory rules. This is all the more true with respect to the legislative creation of norms.

In particular, the revolutionary role of the legal superstructure is enormous in the transitional period when its active and conscious influence upon production and other social relationships assumes exceptional significance. Soviet law, like any law, will cease to exist if it is not applied. But the application of law is an active and conscious process by which the state apparatus plays the decisive role as a powerful weapon of class struggle. Would it be possible, for instance, to speak of Soviet law which did not somehow recognize the Soviet state, the Soviet agencies of power, Soviet courts etc.? It is clear that while an individual statute may be removed from the real legal order and remain a pious wish, concrete legal relationships may never be removed from the consciousness and will of the ruling class, may never be transferred from the superstructure to the base without parting from the heart of historical materialism.

From all that has been said above it is clear that the definition of law as a formal intermediary of the economy must be recognized as insufficient and incorrect. The different branches of law are connected differently with the economy; this must never be forgotten, and this is not expressed in the above-mentioned definition. On the contrary it can lead to the notion that the area of law is limited to property relationships alone. Then all the other types of law must be declared non-existent. Stuchka would, in fact, have had to reach this conclusion. But he speaks of criminal and state law, not entirely consistently with his other position, i.e. by referring to them he recognizes their existence.

There is no doubt that economics is at the base of political, familial and all other social relations. [15] But the election law of any capitalist country facilitates the economy differently from civil law or the Criminal Code. To try to force all the varied branches of law into one formula is to give preference to empty abstractions.

Law as a formal facilitation of social and (primarily) production relationships must be studied concretely. This study may not be replaced with ready citations from Hegel with respect to the “transformation of form into substance and substance into form”. The dialectical method, which teaches that every truth is concrete, becomes in this instance its own opposite-dead scholasticism, barren arguments and disputes on the theme that “form is not without content and content not without form”. However, the matter really consists of showing the role and character of law as form in specific and concrete branches of law and concrete historial conditions with a relation to concrete content. Only in this manner can the real relation of form and content be established and can one be convinced that it is far from identical in different instances. Often legal form hides economic content directly contrary to it (thus in the period when we conducted the policy of restricting the kulak, the leasing of a horse or tools by a poor peasant to a rich one often hid the sale of the first’s labour power to the second). A transaction of purchase and sale can hide the most diverse economic content. The same could be said about any other relationships within the so-called law of obligations. Here we meet with a phenomenon whose form is relatively indifferent to its content, but it is improper to conclude from this that in civil law we have a “faceless instrumentality” which must be used independently of the economic class content of the relationships which it implements. On the contrary, the significance of form is recognized only through content, through economics, through politics and through relations between classes.

Therefore, it is a flagrant error to equate law as an historical phenomenon – including various class systems – with the totality of those features of bourgeois law that derive from the exchange of commodities of equal value. [16] Such a concept of law minimizes the class coercion essential to bourgeois law, essential to feudal law and to all law. Law in bourgeois society serves not only the facilitation of exchange, but simultaneously and mainly supports and consolidates the unequal distribution of property and the monopoly of the capitalist in production. Bourgeois property is not exhausted by the relationships between commodity owners. These [owners – eds. ] are tied by exchange and the contractual relationship is the form of this exchange. Bourgeois property includes in a masked form the same relationship of domination and subordination which, in feudal property, appears chiefly as personal subordination.

This methodological mistake was related to the relegation of the class repressive role of law, and to an incorrect presentation of the relation between state and law (the state as the guarantor of exchange), and to mistakes in questions of morality (the denial of proletarian morality) and in questions of criminal law.

The attempts to distinguish between formal characteristics and abstract legal concepts expressing the relationship between commodity owners, and to proclaim this “form of law” as the subject of the Marxist theory of law, should be recognized as grossly mistaken. This paves the way to the separation of form and content, and diverts theory from the task of socialist construction to scholasticism.

The immediate relation, in practice, between the proletariat (as the ruling class) and law (as a weapon with whose help the tasks of class struggle at any given stage are decided) is in this case replaced by the abstract theoretical denial of the “narrow horizons of bourgeois law” in the name of developed communism.

From this perspective Soviet law is seen exclusively as a legacy of class society imposed on the proletariat and which haunts it until the second phase of communism. The abstract theoretical exposure of “bourgeois” law hides the task of the concrete analysis of Soviet law at different stages of the revolution. Accordingly, it gives insufficient concrete indication of the practical struggle against bourgeois influences, and against opportunist distortions of the Party’s general line on Soviet law.

The theoretical mistake of exaggerating the importance of market relations can be the basis for right opportunist conclusions about always preserving the bourgeois forms of law corresponding to private exchange. Conversely, to ignore exchange in considering the problems of Soviet law leads to “leftist” positions about the withering away of law which is now in the process of socializing the means of production, and about the withering away of economic accountability and the principle of payment according to labour, i.e. to the defence of the elimination of individual responsibility and wage egalitarianism.

Top of the page

1. K. Marx, Letter to Weydemeyer (March 5, 1852), MESW , vol.1, p.528.

2. V. I. Lenin, The Economic Content of Narodnism (1895), LCW , vol.1, p.419.

3. See Kellreiter’s article The State ;, in D. Elster et al. (eds), Handwörterbuch der Rechtswissenschaft (1923), Fischer, Jena, p.599.

4. V.I. Lenin, A Contribution to the History of the Question of Dictatorship (1920), LCW , vol.31, p.353.

5. F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1888), MESW , vol.3, p.371.

6. ibid. , p.371.

7. From a resolution of the XVIIth Party Conference (1932).

8. J. Stalin, The Fourteenth Congress of the CPSU (1925), Stalin: Works, Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow (1954), vol.7, p.374.

9. V.I. Lenin, What the “Friends of the People” Are (1894), LCW , vol.1, pp.141-42.

10. K. Marx, The Class Struggles in France (1850), MESW , vol.1, p.282.

11. P.I. Stuchka, A Course on Soviet Civil Law (1927), Communist Academy, vol.1, p.13.

12. ibid. , pp.78-79.

13. P.I. Stuchka, The Revolutionary Role of Law and State (1921), Moscow, p.15.

14. ibid. (3rd edition); and P.I. Stuchka’s article Law in Encyclopaedia of State and Law, (1925-1927), vol.3, pp.415-430.

15. “The state and law are determined by economic relations. Of course, the same must be said of civil law whose role in essence consists of the legislative clarification of the existing economic relations between individuals which are normal in the given circumstances” F. Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1888), op. cit. p.370.

16. This erroneous conception was developed in E.B. Pashukanis, The General Theory of Law and Marxism (1927), 3rd edition. See also E.B. Pashukanis, The Situation on the Legal Theory Front , Soviet State and the Revolution of Law (1930), no.11-12; and For a Marxist-Leninist Theory of State and Law (1931) Moscow, where a critique of this mistaken conception is given.

Last updated on 13.5.2004

IMAGES

Labour Laws PPT
Concept labor law PowerPoint Template
PPT
Labour Law- PPT (1)
Printable Labor Law Posters
Labor Law Posters

VIDEO

Case Law Presentation
Child Labour (PPT) Project
Labor Law & Industrial Relation (1) CHRP
Workers & Employee| labour & industrial law
Principle of law.presentation
PRE-WEEK LECTURE IN LABOR LAW FOR THE BEST BAR EVER

COMMENTS

Labor Law: Workers' Rights
Labor laws exist to protect workers' rights and ensure that they are treated fairly and justly by their employers. Speak about safe working conditions with this template for the occasion. It's clear and to the point with workers illustrations to go with your information. Cover any topic related to labor and employment, including wages ...
PowerPoint Presentations
Pump at Work Protections under the Fair Labor Standards Act (PDF) Child Labor. Child Labor Presentation for Teens (PowerPoint) Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) Family and Medical Leave Act (PowerPoint) H-1B. The Employment of Non-Immigrants on H-1B Visas (PowerPoint) H-2A. H-2A Final Rule Public Rollout WHD 2010 (PowerPoint) H-2B
PDF employment law overview usa 2021-2022
employment law overview an alliance of employers counsel worldwide 2021-2022 / usa i. general overview 2. Key Points • The laws governing employment relationships in the U.S. come from federal, state and local statutes, agency regulations, and case law. • Under United States law, there are no minimum requirements for an employment contract.
PDF Labor and Employment Law: A Career Guide
determines whether or not they are regarded as components of "labor law" or "employment law." Given the distinguishable set of issues encompassed in each field, labor law and employment law remain discrete areas of practice. However, these two fields have, over time, become increasingly symbiotic.
PDF Basic Employment Law Manual
FEDERAL LAWS. Key federal employment laws that managers and supervisors should know about include the following: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). Title VII prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA).
Wages and the Fair Labor Standards Act
The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) establishes minimum wage, overtime pay, recordkeeping, and youth employment standards affecting employees in the private sector and in Federal, State, and local governments. Covered nonexempt workers are entitled to a minimum wage of not less than $7.25 per hour effective July 24, 2009.
6 Best Labor Law-Themed Templates for PowerPoint & Google Slides
6 Best Labor Law-Themed Templates. CrystalGraphics creates templates designed to make even average presentations look incredible. Below you'll see thumbnail sized previews of the title slides of a few of our 6 best labor law templates for PowerPoint and Google Slides. The text you'll see in in those slides is just example text.
Labor Law PPT (TH2019)
Labor Law PPT (TH2019) - Free download as Powerpoint Presentation (.ppt / .pptx), PDF File (.pdf), Text File (.txt) or view presentation slides online. labor law
Labor law PowerPoint Presentation Templates and Google Slides
This is a governmental regulations filings and compliance with laws ppt powerpoint presentation infographics graphics design. This is a five stage process. The stages in this process are plan documentation, plan operations, government reporting and filing government documents, non discrimination testing results.
Trends in the Development of Labor Law in the Russian Federation
We will not undertake to predict exactly what changes will take place in Russian labor law in the near future; however, in this brief overview we shall attempt to identify certain trends that have ...
Employment Law PowerPoint Presentation Slides
Business leaders and government officials can leverage these Powerpoint slides to illustrate the federal and state laws against unlawful workplace practices, like discrimination, wrongful termination, unequal pay, unfair biases, etc. You can also use the deck to demonstrate what employment law covers, its services, needs, and benefits.
PPT
Objective 3.01 Understand employment law. Employment Law Basics. Employment law Division of law that governs the relationship between employers and employees Employment law stems from various forms of law including tort, criminal, contract, and labor law. Download Presentation. fair employment practice.
Labor Law Human Resource Management PowerPoint Presentation and Slides
This PPT presentation can be accessed with Google Slides and is available in both standard screen and widescreen aspect ratios. It is also a useful set to elucidate topics like Labor Law Human Resource Management. This well-structured design can be downloaded in different formats like PDF, JPG, and PNG. So, without any delay, click on the ...
PPT
Presentation Transcript. Labour Laws While the employer has a fundamental right to run his business, his right has to be adjusted with the employees right to social justice. The former pertains to the realm of fundamental rights in our Constitution, the latter to the realm of the Directive Principles. The Ultimate aim is to have peace in ...
Marx's Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844
Moreover, the wealth and diversity of the subjects to be treated could have been compressed into one work only in a purely aphoristic style; whilst an aphoristic presentation of this kind, for its part, would have given the impression of arbitrary systematism. I shall therefore publish the critique of law, ethics, politics, etc., in a series of ...
Management Team
Mr.Khirman is a founder of "TEC - The Entrepreneur Club" - an international multi-ethnic network of several thousand high-tech entrepreneurs, executives and other professionals started in 2003. Mr. Khirman is a serial entrepreneur and co-founder of three Silicon Valley Startup. He currently serves as a CTO of ChooChee Inc - leader of ...
Evgeny Pashukanis: Marxist Theory of State and Law (1932)
1. The doctrine of socio-economic formations as a basis for the Marxist theory of state and law. The doctrine of state and law is part of a broader whole, namely, the complex of sciences which study human society. The development of these sciences is in turn determined by the history of society itself, i.e. by the history of class struggle.