hypothesis steps of scientific inquiry

What Are The Steps Of The Scientific Method?

Julia Simkus

Editor at Simply Psychology

BA (Hons) Psychology, Princeton University

Julia Simkus is a graduate of Princeton University with a Bachelor of Arts in Psychology. She is currently studying for a Master's Degree in Counseling for Mental Health and Wellness in September 2023. Julia's research has been published in peer reviewed journals.

Learn about our Editorial Process

Saul Mcleod, PhD

Editor-in-Chief for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MRes, PhD, University of Manchester

Saul Mcleod, PhD., is a qualified psychology teacher with over 18 years of experience in further and higher education. He has been published in peer-reviewed journals, including the Journal of Clinical Psychology.

Olivia Guy-Evans, MSc

Associate Editor for Simply Psychology

BSc (Hons) Psychology, MSc Psychology of Education

Olivia Guy-Evans is a writer and associate editor for Simply Psychology. She has previously worked in healthcare and educational sectors.

On This Page:

Science is not just knowledge. It is also a method for obtaining knowledge. Scientific understanding is organized into theories.

The scientific method is a step-by-step process used by researchers and scientists to determine if there is a relationship between two or more variables. Psychologists use this method to conduct psychological research, gather data, process information, and describe behaviors.

It involves careful observation, asking questions, formulating hypotheses, experimental testing, and refining hypotheses based on experimental findings.

How it is Used

The scientific method can be applied broadly in science across many different fields, such as chemistry, physics, geology, and psychology. In a typical application of this process, a researcher will develop a hypothesis, test this hypothesis, and then modify the hypothesis based on the outcomes of the experiment.

The process is then repeated with the modified hypothesis until the results align with the observed phenomena. Detailed steps of the scientific method are described below.

Keep in mind that the scientific method does not have to follow this fixed sequence of steps; rather, these steps represent a set of general principles or guidelines.

7 Steps of the Scientific Method

Psychology uses an empirical approach.

Empiricism (founded by John Locke) states that the only source of knowledge comes through our senses – e.g., sight, hearing, touch, etc.

Empirical evidence does not rely on argument or belief. Thus, empiricism is the view that all knowledge is based on or may come from direct observation and experience.

The empiricist approach of gaining knowledge through experience quickly became the scientific approach and greatly influenced the development of physics and chemistry in the 17th and 18th centuries.

Step 1: Make an Observation (Theory Construction)

Every researcher starts at the very beginning. Before diving in and exploring something, one must first determine what they will study – it seems simple enough!

By making observations, researchers can establish an area of interest. Once this topic of study has been chosen, a researcher should review existing literature to gain insight into what has already been tested and determine what questions remain unanswered.

This assessment will provide helpful information about what has already been comprehended about the specific topic and what questions remain, and if one can go and answer them.

Specifically, a literature review might implicate examining a substantial amount of documented material from academic journals to books dating back decades. The most appropriate information gathered by the researcher will be shown in the introduction section or abstract of the published study results.

The background material and knowledge will help the researcher with the first significant step in conducting a psychology study, which is formulating a research question.

This is the inductive phase of the scientific process. Observations yield information that is used to formulate theories as explanations. A theory is a well-developed set of ideas that propose an explanation for observed phenomena.

Inductive reasoning moves from specific premises to a general conclusion. It starts with observations of phenomena in the natural world and derives a general law.

Step 2: Ask a Question

Once a researcher has made observations and conducted background research, the next step is to ask a scientific question. A scientific question must be defined, testable, and measurable.

A useful approach to develop a scientific question is: “What is the effect of…?” or “How does X affect Y?”

To answer an experimental question, a researcher must identify two variables: the independent and dependent variables.

The independent variable is the variable manipulated (the cause), and the dependent variable is the variable being measured (the effect).

An example of a research question could be, “Is handwriting or typing more effective for retaining information?” Answering the research question and proposing a relationship between the two variables is discussed in the next step.

Step 3: Form a Hypothesis (Make Predictions)

A hypothesis is an educated guess about the relationship between two or more variables. A hypothesis is an attempt to answer your research question based on prior observation and background research. Theories tend to be too complex to be tested all at once; instead, researchers create hypotheses to test specific aspects of a theory.

For example, a researcher might ask about the connection between sleep and educational performance. Do students who get less sleep perform worse on tests at school?

It is crucial to think about different questions one might have about a particular topic to formulate a reasonable hypothesis. It would help if one also considered how one could investigate the causalities.

It is important that the hypothesis is both testable against reality and falsifiable. This means that it can be tested through an experiment and can be proven wrong.

The falsification principle, proposed by Karl Popper , is a way of demarcating science from non-science. It suggests that for a theory to be considered scientific, it must be able to be tested and conceivably proven false.

To test a hypothesis, we first assume that there is no difference between the populations from which the samples were taken. This is known as the null hypothesis and predicts that the independent variable will not influence the dependent variable.

Examples of “if…then…” Hypotheses:

• If one gets less than 6 hours of sleep, then one will do worse on tests than if one obtains more rest.
• If one drinks lots of water before going to bed, one will have to use the bathroom often at night.
• If one practices exercising and lighting weights, then one’s body will begin to build muscle.

The research hypothesis is often called the alternative hypothesis and predicts what change(s) will occur in the dependent variable when the independent variable is manipulated.

It states that the results are not due to chance and that they are significant in terms of supporting the theory being investigated.

Although one could state and write a scientific hypothesis in many ways, hypotheses are usually built like “if…then…” statements.

Step 4: Run an Experiment (Gather Data)

The next step in the scientific method is to test your hypothesis and collect data. A researcher will design an experiment to test the hypothesis and gather data that will either support or refute the hypothesis.

The exact research methods used to examine a hypothesis depend on what is being studied. A psychologist might utilize two primary forms of research, experimental research, and descriptive research.

The scientific method is objective in that researchers do not let preconceived ideas or biases influence the collection of data and is systematic in that experiments are conducted in a logical way.

Experimental Research

Experimental research is used to investigate cause-and-effect associations between two or more variables. This type of research systematically controls an independent variable and measures its effect on a specified dependent variable.

Experimental research involves manipulating an independent variable and measuring the effect(s) on the dependent variable. Repeating the experiment multiple times is important to confirm that your results are accurate and consistent.

One of the significant advantages of this method is that it permits researchers to determine if changes in one variable cause shifts in each other.

While experiments in psychology typically have many moving parts (and can be relatively complex), an easy investigation is rather fundamental. Still, it does allow researchers to specify cause-and-effect associations between variables.

Most simple experiments use a control group, which involves those who do not receive the treatment, and an experimental group, which involves those who do receive the treatment.

An example of experimental research would be when a pharmaceutical company wants to test a new drug. They give one group a placebo (control group) and the other the actual pill (experimental group).

Descriptive Research

Descriptive research is generally used when it is challenging or even impossible to control the variables in question. Examples of descriptive analysis include naturalistic observation, case studies , and correlation studies .

One example of descriptive research includes phone surveys that marketers often use. While they typically do not allow researchers to identify cause and effect, correlational studies are quite common in psychology research. They make it possible to spot associations between distinct variables and measure the solidity of those relationships.

Step 5: Analyze the Data and Draw Conclusions

Once a researcher has designed and done the investigation and collected sufficient data, it is time to inspect this gathered information and judge what has been found. Researchers can summarize the data, interpret the results, and draw conclusions based on this evidence using analyses and statistics.

Upon completion of the experiment, you can collect your measurements and analyze the data using statistics. Based on the outcomes, you will either reject or confirm your hypothesis.

Analyze the Data

So, how does a researcher determine what the results of their study mean? Statistical analysis can either support or refute a researcher’s hypothesis and can also be used to determine if the conclusions are statistically significant.

When outcomes are said to be “statistically significant,” it is improbable that these results are due to luck or chance. Based on these observations, investigators must then determine what the results mean.

An experiment will support a hypothesis in some circumstances, but sometimes it fails to be truthful in other cases.

What occurs if the developments of a psychology investigation do not endorse the researcher’s hypothesis? It does mean that the study was worthless. Simply because the findings fail to defend the researcher’s hypothesis does not mean that the examination is not helpful or instructive.

This kind of research plays a vital role in supporting scientists in developing unexplored questions and hypotheses to investigate in the future. After decisions have been made, the next step is to communicate the results with the rest of the scientific community.

This is an integral part of the process because it contributes to the general knowledge base and can assist other scientists in finding new research routes to explore.

If the hypothesis is not supported, a researcher should acknowledge the experiment’s results, formulate a new hypothesis, and develop a new experiment.

We must avoid any reference to results proving a theory as this implies 100% certainty, and there is always a chance that evidence may exist that could refute a theory.

Draw Conclusions and Interpret the Data

When the empirical observations disagree with the hypothesis, a number of possibilities must be considered. It might be that the theory is incorrect, in which case it needs altering, so it fully explains the data.

Alternatively, it might be that the hypothesis was poorly derived from the original theory, in which case the scientists were expecting the wrong thing to happen.

It might also be that the research was poorly conducted, or used an inappropriate method, or there were factors in play that the researchers did not consider. This will begin the process of the scientific method again.

If the hypothesis is supported, the researcher can find more evidence to support their hypothesis or look for counter-evidence to strengthen their hypothesis further.

In either scenario, the researcher should share their results with the greater scientific community.

Step 6: Share Your Results

One of the final stages of the research cycle involves the publication of the research. Once the report is written, the researcher(s) may submit the work for publication in an appropriate journal.

Usually, this is done by writing up a study description and publishing the article in a professional or academic journal. The studies and conclusions of psychological work can be seen in peer-reviewed journals such as  Developmental Psychology , Psychological Bulletin, the  Journal of Social Psychology, and numerous others.

Scientists should report their findings by writing up a description of their study and any subsequent findings. This enables other researchers to build upon the present research or replicate the results.

As outlined by the American Psychological Association (APA), there is a typical structure of a journal article that follows a specified format. In these articles, researchers:

• Supply a brief narrative and background on previous research
• Give their hypothesis
• Specify who participated in the study and how they were chosen
• Provide operational definitions for each variable
• Explain the measures and methods used to collect data
• Describe how the data collected was interpreted
• Discuss what the outcomes mean

A detailed record of psychological studies and all scientific studies is vital to clearly explain the steps and procedures used throughout the study. So that other researchers can try this experiment too and replicate the results.

The editorial process utilized by academic and professional journals guarantees that each submitted article undergoes a thorough peer review to help assure that the study is scientifically sound. Once published, the investigation becomes another piece of the current puzzle of our knowledge “base” on that subject.

This last step is important because all results, whether they supported or did not support the hypothesis, can contribute to the scientific community. Publication of empirical observations leads to more ideas that are tested against the real world, and so on. In this sense, the scientific process is circular.

The editorial process utilized by academic and professional journals guarantees that each submitted article undergoes a thorough peer review to help assure that the study is scientifically sound.

Once published, the investigation becomes another piece of the current puzzle of our knowledge “base” on that subject.

By replicating studies, psychologists can reduce errors, validate theories, and gain a stronger understanding of a particular topic.

Step 7: Repeat the Scientific Method (Iteration)

Now, if one’s hypothesis turns out to be accurate, find more evidence or find counter-evidence. If one’s hypothesis is false, create a new hypothesis or try again.

One may wish to revise their first hypothesis to make a more niche experiment to design or a different specific question to test.

The amazingness of the scientific method is that it is a comprehensive and straightforward process that scientists, and everyone, can utilize over and over again.

So, draw conclusions and repeat because the scientific method is never-ending, and no result is ever considered perfect.

The scientific method is a process of:

• Making an observation.
• Forming a hypothesis.
• Making a prediction.
• Experimenting to test the hypothesis.

The procedure of repeating the scientific method is crucial to science and all fields of human knowledge.

Further Information

• Karl Popper – Falsification
• Thomas – Kuhn Paradigm Shift
• Positivism in Sociology: Definition, Theory & Examples
• Is Psychology a Science?
• Psychology as a Science (PDF)

List the 6 steps of the scientific methods in order

• Make an observation (theory construction)
• Ask a question. A scientific question must be defined, testable, and measurable.
• Form a hypothesis (make predictions)
• Run an experiment to test the hypothesis (gather data)
• Analyze the data and draw conclusions
• Share your results so that other researchers can make new hypotheses

What is the first step of the scientific method?

The first step of the scientific method is making an observation. This involves noticing and describing a phenomenon or group of phenomena that one finds interesting and wishes to explain.

Observations can occur in a natural setting or within the confines of a laboratory. The key point is that the observation provides the initial question or problem that the rest of the scientific method seeks to answer or solve.

What is the scientific method?

The scientific method is a step-by-step process that investigators can follow to determine if there is a causal connection between two or more variables.

Psychologists and other scientists regularly suggest motivations for human behavior. On a more casual level, people judge other people’s intentions, incentives, and actions daily.

While our standard assessments of human behavior are subjective and anecdotal, researchers use the scientific method to study psychology objectively and systematically.

All utilize a scientific method to study distinct aspects of people’s thinking and behavior. This process allows scientists to analyze and understand various psychological phenomena, but it also provides investigators and others a way to disseminate and debate the results of their studies.

The outcomes of these studies are often noted in popular media, which leads numerous to think about how or why researchers came to the findings they did.

Why Use the Six Steps of the Scientific Method

The goal of scientists is to understand better the world that surrounds us. Scientific research is the most critical tool for navigating and learning about our complex world.

Without it, we would be compelled to rely solely on intuition, other people’s power, and luck. We can eliminate our preconceived concepts and superstitions through methodical scientific research and gain an objective sense of ourselves and our world.

All psychological studies aim to explain, predict, and even control or impact mental behaviors or processes. So, psychologists use and repeat the scientific method (and its six steps) to perform and record essential psychological research.

So, psychologists focus on understanding behavior and the cognitive (mental) and physiological (body) processes underlying behavior.

In the real world, people use to understand the behavior of others, such as intuition and personal experience. The hallmark of scientific research is evidence to support a claim.

Scientific knowledge is empirical, meaning it is grounded in objective, tangible evidence that can be observed repeatedly, regardless of who is watching.

The scientific method is crucial because it minimizes the impact of bias or prejudice on the experimenter. Regardless of how hard one tries, even the best-intentioned scientists can’t escape discrimination. can’t

It stems from personal opinions and cultural beliefs, meaning any mortal filters data based on one’s experience. Sadly, this “filtering” process can cause a scientist to favor one outcome over another.

For an everyday person trying to solve a minor issue at home or work, succumbing to these biases is not such a big deal; in fact, most times, it is important.

But in the scientific community, where results must be inspected and reproduced, bias or discrimination must be avoided.

When to Use the Six Steps of the Scientific Method ?

One can use the scientific method anytime, anywhere! From the smallest conundrum to solving global problems, it is a process that can be applied to any science and any investigation.

Even if you are not considered a “scientist,” you will be surprised to know that people of all disciplines use it for all kinds of dilemmas.

Try to catch yourself next time you come by a question and see how you subconsciously or consciously use the scientific method.

Scientific Method

Illustration by J.R. Bee. ThoughtCo. 

• Cell Biology
• Weather & Climate
• B.A., Biology, Emory University
• A.S., Nursing, Chattahoochee Technical College

The scientific method is a series of steps followed by scientific investigators to answer specific questions about the natural world. It involves making observations, formulating a hypothesis , and conducting scientific experiments . Scientific inquiry starts with an observation followed by the formulation of a question about what has been observed. The steps of the scientific method are as follows:

Observation

The first step of the scientific method involves making an observation about something that interests you. This is very important if you are doing a science project because you want your project to be focused on something that will hold your attention. Your observation can be on anything from plant movement to animal behavior, as long as it is something you really want to know more about.​ This is where you come up with the idea for your science project.

Once you've made your observation, you must formulate a question about what you have observed. Your question should tell what it is that you are trying to discover or accomplish in your experiment. When stating your question you should be as specific as possible.​ For example, if you are doing a project on plants , you may want to know how plants interact with microbes. Your question may be: Do plant spices inhibit bacterial growth ?

The hypothesis is a key component of the scientific process. A hypothesis is an idea that is suggested as an explanation for a natural event, a particular experience, or a specific condition that can be tested through definable experimentation. It states the purpose of your experiment, the variables used, and the predicted outcome of your experiment. It is important to note that a hypothesis must be testable. That means that you should be able to test your hypothesis through experimentation .​ Your hypothesis must either be supported or falsified by your experiment. An example of a good hypothesis is: If there is a relation between listening to music and heart rate, then listening to music will cause a person's resting heart rate to either increase or decrease.

Once you've developed a hypothesis, you must design and conduct an experiment that will test it. You should develop a procedure that states very clearly how you plan to conduct your experiment. It is important that you include and identify a controlled variable or dependent variable in your procedure. Controls allow us to test a single variable in an experiment because they are unchanged. We can then make observations and comparisons between our controls and our independent variables (things that change in the experiment) to develop an accurate conclusion.​

The results are where you report what happened in the experiment. That includes detailing all observations and data made during your experiment. Most people find it easier to visualize the data by charting or graphing the information.​

The final step of the scientific method is developing a conclusion. This is where all of the results from the experiment are analyzed and a determination is reached about the hypothesis. Did the experiment support or reject your hypothesis? If your hypothesis was supported, great. If not, repeat the experiment or think of ways to improve your procedure.

• Six Steps of the Scientific Method
• What Is an Experiment? Definition and Design
• Scientific Method Flow Chart
• Scientific Method Lesson Plan
• How To Design a Science Fair Experiment
• Science Projects for Every Subject
• How to Do a Science Fair Project
• What Are the Elements of a Good Hypothesis?
• How to Write a Lab Report
• What Is a Hypothesis? (Science)
• Biology Science Fair Project Ideas
• Understanding Simple vs Controlled Experiments
• Null Hypothesis Definition and Examples
• Stove Top Frozen Pizza Science Experiment
• Dependent Variable Definition and Examples
• What Is the Difference Between Hard and Soft Science?

• Science Notes Posts
• Contact Science Notes
• Todd Helmenstine Biography
• Anne Helmenstine Biography
• Free Printable Periodic Tables (PDF and PNG)
• Periodic Table Wallpapers
• Interactive Periodic Table
• Periodic Table Posters
• How to Grow Crystals
• Chemistry Projects
• Fire and Flames Projects
• Holiday Science
• Chemistry Problems With Answers
• Physics Problems
• Unit Conversion Example Problems
• Chemistry Worksheets
• Biology Worksheets
• Periodic Table Worksheets
• Physical Science Worksheets
• Science Lab Worksheets
• My Amazon Books

Steps of the Scientific Method 2

The scientific method is a system scientists and other people use to ask and answer questions about the natural world. In a nutshell, the scientific method works by making observations, asking a question or identifying a problem, and then designing and analyzing an experiment to test a prediction of what you expect will happen. It’s a powerful analytical tool because once you draw conclusions, you may be able to answer a question and make predictions about future events.

These are the steps of the scientific method:

• Make observations.

Sometimes this step is omitted in the list, but you always make observations before asking a question, whether you recognize it or not. You always have some background information about a topic. However, it’s a good idea to be systematic about your observations and to record them in a lab book or another way. Often, these initial observations can help you identify a question. Later on, this information may help you decide on another area of investigation of a topic.

• Ask a question, identify a problem, or state an objective.

There are various forms of this step. Sometimes you may want to state an objective and a problem and then phrase it in the form of a question. The reason it’s good to state a question is because it’s easiest to design an experiment to answer a question. A question helps you form a hypothesis, which focuses your study.

• Research the topic.

You should conduct background research on your topic to learn as much as you can about it. This can occur both before and after you state an objective and form a hypothesis. In fact, you may find yourself researching the topic throughout the entire process.

• Formulate a hypothesis.

A hypothesis is a formal prediction. There are two forms of a hypothesis that are particularly easy to test. One is to state the hypothesis as an “if, then” statement. An example of an if-then hypothesis is: “If plants are grown under red light, then they will be taller than plants grown under white light.” Another good type of hypothesis is what is called a “ null hypothesis ” or “no difference” hypothesis. An example of a null hypothesis is: “There is no difference in the rate of growth of plants grown under red light compared with plants grown under white light.”

• Design and perform an experiment to test the hypothesis.

Once you have a hypothesis, you need to find a way to test it. This involves an experiment . There are many ways to set up an experiment. A basic experiment contains variables, which are factors you can measure. The two main variables are the independent variable (the one you control or change) and the dependent variable (the one you measure to see if it is affected when you change the independent variable).

• Record and analyze the data you obtain from the experiment.

It’s a good idea to record notes alongside your data, stating anything unusual or unexpected. Once you have the data, draw a chart, table, or graph to present your results. Next, analyze the results to understand what it all means.

• Determine whether you accept or reject the hypothesis.

Do the results support the hypothesis or not? Keep in mind, it’s okay if the hypothesis is not supported, especially if you are testing a null hypothesis. Sometimes excluding an explanation answers your question! There is no “right” or “wrong” here. However, if you obtain an unexpected result, you might want to perform another experiment.

• Draw a conclusion and report the results of the experiment.

What good is knowing something if you keep it to yourself? You should report the outcome of the experiment, even if it’s just in a notebook. What did you learn from the experiment?

How Many Steps Are There?

You may be asked to list the 5 steps of the scientific method or the 6 steps of the method or some other number. There are different ways of grouping together the steps outlined here, so it’s a good idea to learn the way an instructor wants you to list the steps. No matter how many steps there are, the order is always the same.

Related Posts

2 thoughts on “ steps of the scientific method ”.

You raise a valid point, but peer review has its limitations. Consider the case of Galileo, for example.

That’s a good point too. But that was a rare limitation due to religion, and scientific consensus prevailed in the end. It’s nowhere near a reason to doubt scientific consensus in general. I’m thinking about issues such as climate change where so many people are skeptical despite 97% consensus among climate scientists. I was just surprised to see that this is not included as an important part of the process.

Comments are closed.

Introduction to Biology

Scientific inquiry, learning outcomes.

• Understand the process of scientific inquiry
• Compare inductive reasoning with deductive reasoning

One thing is common to all forms of science: an ultimate goal “to know.” Curiosity and inquiry are the driving forces for the development of science. Scientists seek to understand the world and the way it operates. Two methods of logical thinking are used: inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning.

Inductive reasoning is a form of logical thinking that uses related observations to arrive at a general conclusion. This type of reasoning is common in descriptive science. A life scientist such as a biologist makes observations and records them. These data can be qualitative (descriptive) or quantitative (consisting of numbers), and the raw data can be supplemented with drawings, pictures, photos, or videos. From many observations, the scientist can infer conclusions (inductions) based on evidence. Inductive reasoning involves formulating generalizations inferred from careful observation and the analysis of a large amount of data. Brain studies often work this way. Many brains are observed while people are doing a task. The part of the brain that lights up, indicating activity, is then demonstrated to be the part controlling the response to that task.

Deductive reasoning or deduction is the type of logic used in hypothesis-based science. In deductive reasoning, the pattern of thinking moves in the opposite direction as compared to inductive reasoning. Deductive reasoning is a form of logical thinking that uses a general principle or law to forecast specific results. From those general principles, a scientist can extrapolate and predict the specific results that would be valid as long as the general principles are valid. For example, a prediction would be that if the climate is becoming warmer in a region, the distribution of plants and animals should change. Comparisons have been made between distributions in the past and the present, and the many changes that have been found are consistent with a warming climate. Finding the change in distribution is evidence that the climate change conclusion is a valid one.

Both types of logical thinking are related to the two main pathways of scientific study: descriptive science and hypothesis-based science. Descriptive (or discovery) science aims to observe, explore, and discover, while hypothesis-based science begins with a specific question or problem and a potential answer or solution that can be tested. The boundary between these two forms of study is often blurred, because most scientific endeavors combine both approaches. Observations lead to questions, questions lead to forming a hypothesis as a possible answer to those questions, and then the hypothesis is tested. Thus, descriptive science and hypothesis-based science are in continuous dialogue.

Hypothesis Testing

Figure 1. Sir Francis Bacon is credited with being the first to document the scientific method.

Biologists study the living world by posing questions about it and seeking science-based responses. This approach is common to other sciences as well and is often referred to as the scientific method. The scientific method was used even in ancient times, but it was first documented by England’s Sir Francis Bacon (1561–1626) (Figure 1), who set up inductive methods for scientific inquiry. The scientific method is not exclusively used by biologists but can be applied to almost anything as a logical problem-solving method.

The scientific process typically starts with an observation (often a problem to be solved) that leads to a question. Let’s think about a simple problem that starts with an observation and apply the scientific method to solve the problem. One Monday morning, a student arrives at class and quickly discovers that the classroom is too warm. That is an observation that also describes a problem: the classroom is too warm. The student then asks a question: “Why is the classroom so warm?”

Recall that a hypothesis is a suggested explanation that can be tested. To solve a problem, several hypotheses may be proposed. For example, one hypothesis might be, “The classroom is warm because no one turned on the air conditioning.” But there could be other responses to the question, and therefore other hypotheses may be proposed. A second hypothesis might be, “The classroom is warm because there is a power failure, and so the air conditioning doesn’t work.”

Once a hypothesis has been selected, a prediction may be made. A prediction is similar to a hypothesis but it typically has the format “If . . . then . . . .” For example, the prediction for the first hypothesis might be, “ If the student turns on the air conditioning, then the classroom will no longer be too warm.”

A hypothesis must be testable to ensure that it is valid. For example, a hypothesis that depends on what a bear thinks is not testable, because it can never be known what a bear thinks. It should also be falsifiable , meaning that it can be disproven by experimental results. An example of an unfalsifiable hypothesis is “Botticelli’s Birth of Venus is beautiful.” There is no experiment that might show this statement to be false. To test a hypothesis, a researcher will conduct one or more experiments designed to eliminate one or more of the hypotheses. This is important. A hypothesis can be disproven, or eliminated, but it can never be proven. Science does not deal in proofs like mathematics. If an experiment fails to disprove a hypothesis, then we find support for that explanation, but this is not to say that down the road a better explanation will not be found, or a more carefully designed experiment will be found to falsify the hypothesis.

Scientific inquiry has not displaced faith, intuition, and dreams. These traditions and ways of knowing have emotional value and provide moral guidance to many people. But hunches, feelings, deep convictions, old traditions, or dreams cannot be accepted directly as scientifically valid. Instead, science limits itself to ideas that can be tested through verifiable observations. Supernatural claims that events are caused by ghosts, devils, God, or other spiritual entities cannot be tested in this way.

Practice Question

Your friend sees this image of a circle of mushrooms and excitedly tells you it was caused by fairies dancing in a circle on the grass the night before. Can your friend’s explanation be studied using the process of science?

Each experiment will have one or more variables and one or more controls. A variable is any part of the experiment that can vary or change during the experiment. A control is a part of the experiment that does not change. Look for the variables and controls in the example that follows. As a simple example, an experiment might be conducted to test the hypothesis that phosphate limits the growth of algae in freshwater ponds. A series of artificial ponds are filled with water and half of them are treated by adding phosphate each week, while the other half are treated by adding a salt that is known not to be used by algae. The variable here is the phosphate (or lack of phosphate), the experimental or treatment cases are the ponds with added phosphate and the control ponds are those with something inert added, such as the salt. Just adding something is also a control against the possibility that adding extra matter to the pond has an effect. If the treated ponds show lesser growth of algae, then we have found support for our hypothesis. If they do not, then we reject our hypothesis. Be aware that rejecting one hypothesis does not determine whether or not the other hypotheses can be accepted; it simply eliminates one hypothesis that is not valid (Figure 2). Using the scientific method, the hypotheses that are inconsistent with experimental data are rejected.

Figure 2. The scientific method is a series of defined steps that include experiments and careful observation. If a hypothesis is not supported by data, a new hypothesis can be proposed.

In the example below, the scientific method is used to solve an everyday problem. Which part in the example below is the hypothesis? Which is the prediction? Based on the results of the experiment, is the hypothesis supported? If it is not supported, propose some alternative hypotheses.

• My toaster doesn’t toast my bread.
• Why doesn’t my toaster work?
• There is something wrong with the electrical outlet.
• If something is wrong with the outlet, my coffeemaker also won’t work when plugged into it.
• I plug my coffeemaker into the outlet.
• My coffeemaker works.

In practice, the scientific method is not as rigid and structured as it might at first appear. Sometimes an experiment leads to conclusions that favor a change in approach; often, an experiment brings entirely new scientific questions to the puzzle. Many times, science does not operate in a linear fashion; instead, scientists continually draw inferences and make generalizations, finding patterns as their research proceeds. Scientific reasoning is more complex than the scientific method alone suggests.

• Concepts of Biology. Provided by : OpenStax CNX. Located at : http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected] . License : CC BY: Attribution . License Terms : http://cnx.org/contents/[email protected]
• Practice Question (Scientific Inquiry). Provided by : Open Learning Initiative. Located at : https://oli.cmu.edu/jcourse/workbook/activity/page?context=434a5c2680020ca6017c03488572e0f8 . Project : Introduction to Biology (Open + Free). License : CC BY-NC-SA: Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike

Principles of Social Research Methodology pp 3–14 Cite as

Inquiry: A Fundamental Concept for Scientific Investigation

• M. Rezaul Islam   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0002-2217-7507 4 , 5  
• First Online: 27 October 2022

2132 Accesses

This chapter provides a brief description of ‘inquiry’, a very important but rarely includes in the research methodology books. Initially, the chapter explains the conceptual definition of inquiry with the phases that develop ideas about inquiry. Then the chapter discusses the different characteristics of inquiry. Then, it provides a brief description of the theories and sources of inquiry in social research. The processes, steps, and methods of inquiry are explained with ‘20 questions’ inquiry process. Then the chapter includes a brief description of the position of inquiry in education learning. Finally, the chapter explains the importance of inquiry in social research.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution .

Buying options

• Available as PDF
• Read on any device
• Instant download
• Own it forever
• Available as EPUB and PDF
• Compact, lightweight edition
• Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
• Free shipping worldwide - see info
• Durable hardcover edition

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

American Geosciences Foundation (2014). EarthComm professional development program–key concepts of EarthComm. Retrieved from http://www.americangeosciences.org/education/pd/earthcomm/resources/concepts

Cartwright, N. (1983). How the laws of Physics lie . Oxford University Press.

Book   Google Scholar  

Cartwright, N. (1988). The truth doesn’t explain much. In E. D. Klemke, R. Hollinger, & D. Kline (eds), Introductory readings in the philosophy of science. Buffalo, Prometheus Books.

Google Scholar  

Conburn, A. (2000). An Inquiry Primer. Science Scope, 23 (6), 42–49.

Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry . Heath & Co.

English Forum (2014). What is the difference between ‘inquiry’ and ‘enquiry’. Retrieved from http://www.englishforums.com/English/...Inquire/zgxlk/post.htm .

Hanauer, D., Hatful, G. F., & Jacobs-Sera, D. (2009). Active assessment: Assessing scientific inquiry . Springer.

Harris, W. (2021). How the scientific method works. Retrieved October 25, 2021 from https://science.howstuffworks.com/innovation/scientificexperiments/scientific-method.htm

Hebrank, M. (2000). Why inquiry-based teaching and learning in the middle school science classroom. Retrieved January 25, 2016 from http://www.biology.duke.edu/cibl/inquiry/why_inquiry_in_ms.htm

Hodson, D. (1996). Laboratory work as scientific method: Three decades of confusion and distortion. Journal of Curriculum Studies, 28 (2), 115–135.

Article   Google Scholar  

Just Science Now (2014). Implementing inquiry. Retrieved from http://www.justsciencenow.com/phases/index.htm . Accessed July 2014.

Justice, C., Rice, J., Warry, W., Inglis, S., Miller, S., & Sammon, S. (2007). Inquiry in higher education: Reflections and directions on course design and teaching methods. Innovative Higher Education, 31 (4), 201–214.

Littlejohn, S. (1992). Theories of human communication . Wadsworth Publishing Company.

National Research Council. (1996). National science education standards . National Academy Press.

Newfoundland Labrador (2011). Grade nine- social studies curriculum guide. Newfoundland Labrador.

New Los Angles Charter School (2014). Renewal petition . Charter School.

Oregon Department Education (2000). Scientific inquiry. http://www.ode.state.or.us/teachlearn/subjects/science/resources/inquiry.pdf .

Popper, K. (1988). Science: Conjectures and refutations. In E. D. Klemke, R. Hollinger, & A. D. Kline (Eds.), Introductory readings on the philosophy of science . Buffalo: Prometheus Books.

Prins, H., & Gordon, I. (2014). Testing hypothesis about biological invasions and Charles Darwin’s two creators rumination. In P. Herbert & I. Gordon (Eds.), Inversion biology and ecology theory insights from a continent in transformation . Cambridge University Press.

Stripling, B. (2003). Inquiry-based learning. In B. Stripling & S. Hughes-Hassell (Eds.), Curriculum connections through the library . Libraries Unlimited.

TechThought (2014). 20 Questions to guide inquiry-based learning. Retrieved from http://www.teachthought.com/learning/20-questions-guide-inquiry-based-learning/ .

Wyatt, S. (2005). Extending inquiry-based learning to include original experimentation. The Journal of General Education, 54 (2), 83–89.

Download references

Author information

Authors and affiliations.

Institute of Social Welfare and Research, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh

M. Rezaul Islam

Centre for Family and Child Studies, Research Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Corresponding author

Correspondence to M. Rezaul Islam .

Editor information

Editors and affiliations.

Department of Development Studies, University of Dhaka, Dhaka, Bangladesh

Niaz Ahmed Khan

Department of Social Work, School of Humanities, University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

Rajendra Baikady

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2022 The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd.

About this chapter

Cite this chapter.

Islam, M.R. (2022). Inquiry: A Fundamental Concept for Scientific Investigation. In: Islam, M.R., Khan, N.A., Baikady, R. (eds) Principles of Social Research Methodology. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5441-2_1

Download citation

DOI : https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-5441-2_1

Published : 27 October 2022

Publisher Name : Springer, Singapore

Print ISBN : 978-981-19-5219-7

Online ISBN : 978-981-19-5441-2

eBook Packages : Social Sciences

Share this chapter

Anyone you share the following link with will be able to read this content:

Sorry, a shareable link is not currently available for this article.

Provided by the Springer Nature SharedIt content-sharing initiative

• Publish with us

Policies and ethics

• Find a journal
• Track your research

• Bipolar Disorder
• Therapy Center
• When To See a Therapist
• Types of Therapy
• Best Online Therapy
• Best Couples Therapy
• Best Family Therapy
• Managing Stress
• Sleep and Dreaming
• Understanding Emotions
• Self-Improvement
• Healthy Relationships
• Student Resources
• Personality Types
• Guided Meditations
• Verywell Mind Insights
• 2023 Verywell Mind 25
• Mental Health in the Classroom
• Editorial Process
• Meet Our Review Board
• Crisis Support

Scientific Method Steps in Psychology Research

Steps, Uses, and Key Terms

Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

Emily is a board-certified science editor who has worked with top digital publishing brands like Voices for Biodiversity, Study.com, GoodTherapy, Vox, and Verywell.

Verywell / Theresa Chiechi

How do researchers investigate psychological phenomena? They utilize a process known as the scientific method to study different aspects of how people think and behave.

When conducting research, the scientific method steps to follow are:

• Observe what you want to investigate
• Ask a research question and make predictions
• Test the hypothesis and collect data
• Examine the results and draw conclusions
• Report and share the results 

This process not only allows scientists to investigate and understand different psychological phenomena but also provides researchers and others a way to share and discuss the results of their studies.

Generally, there are five main steps in the scientific method, although some may break down this process into six or seven steps. An additional step in the process can also include developing new research questions based on your findings.

What Is the Scientific Method?

What is the scientific method and how is it used in psychology?

The scientific method consists of five steps. It is essentially a step-by-step process that researchers can follow to determine if there is some type of relationship between two or more variables.

By knowing the steps of the scientific method, you can better understand the process researchers go through to arrive at conclusions about human behavior.

Scientific Method Steps

While research studies can vary, these are the basic steps that psychologists and scientists use when investigating human behavior.

The following are the scientific method steps:

Step 1. Make an Observation

Before a researcher can begin, they must choose a topic to study. Once an area of interest has been chosen, the researchers must then conduct a thorough review of the existing literature on the subject. This review will provide valuable information about what has already been learned about the topic and what questions remain to be answered.

A literature review might involve looking at a considerable amount of written material from both books and academic journals dating back decades.

The relevant information collected by the researcher will be presented in the introduction section of the final published study results. This background material will also help the researcher with the first major step in conducting a psychology study: formulating a hypothesis.

Step 2. Ask a Question

Once a researcher has observed something and gained some background information on the topic, the next step is to ask a question. The researcher will form a hypothesis, which is an educated guess about the relationship between two or more variables

For example, a researcher might ask a question about the relationship between sleep and academic performance: Do students who get more sleep perform better on tests at school?

In order to formulate a good hypothesis, it is important to think about different questions you might have about a particular topic.

You should also consider how you could investigate the causes. Falsifiability is an important part of any valid hypothesis. In other words, if a hypothesis was false, there needs to be a way for scientists to demonstrate that it is false.

Step 3. Test Your Hypothesis and Collect Data

Once you have a solid hypothesis, the next step of the scientific method is to put this hunch to the test by collecting data. The exact methods used to investigate a hypothesis depend on exactly what is being studied. There are two basic forms of research that a psychologist might utilize: descriptive research or experimental research.

Descriptive research is typically used when it would be difficult or even impossible to manipulate the variables in question. Examples of descriptive research include case studies, naturalistic observation , and correlation studies. Phone surveys that are often used by marketers are one example of descriptive research.

Correlational studies are quite common in psychology research. While they do not allow researchers to determine cause-and-effect, they do make it possible to spot relationships between different variables and to measure the strength of those relationships. 

Experimental research is used to explore cause-and-effect relationships between two or more variables. This type of research involves systematically manipulating an independent variable and then measuring the effect that it has on a defined dependent variable .

One of the major advantages of this method is that it allows researchers to actually determine if changes in one variable actually cause changes in another.

While psychology experiments are often quite complex, a simple experiment is fairly basic but does allow researchers to determine cause-and-effect relationships between variables. Most simple experiments use a control group (those who do not receive the treatment) and an experimental group (those who do receive the treatment).

Step 4. Examine the Results and Draw Conclusions

Once a researcher has designed the study and collected the data, it is time to examine this information and draw conclusions about what has been found.  Using statistics , researchers can summarize the data, analyze the results, and draw conclusions based on this evidence.

So how does a researcher decide what the results of a study mean? Not only can statistical analysis support (or refute) the researcher’s hypothesis; it can also be used to determine if the findings are statistically significant.

When results are said to be statistically significant, it means that it is unlikely that these results are due to chance.

Based on these observations, researchers must then determine what the results mean. In some cases, an experiment will support a hypothesis, but in other cases, it will fail to support the hypothesis.

So what happens if the results of a psychology experiment do not support the researcher's hypothesis? Does this mean that the study was worthless?

Just because the findings fail to support the hypothesis does not mean that the research is not useful or informative. In fact, such research plays an important role in helping scientists develop new questions and hypotheses to explore in the future.

After conclusions have been drawn, the next step is to share the results with the rest of the scientific community. This is an important part of the process because it contributes to the overall knowledge base and can help other scientists find new research avenues to explore.

Step 5. Report the Results

The final step in a psychology study is to report the findings. This is often done by writing up a description of the study and publishing the article in an academic or professional journal. The results of psychological studies can be seen in peer-reviewed journals such as  Psychological Bulletin , the  Journal of Social Psychology ,  Developmental Psychology , and many others.

The structure of a journal article follows a specified format that has been outlined by the  American Psychological Association (APA) . In these articles, researchers:

• Provide a brief history and background on previous research
• Present their hypothesis
• Identify who participated in the study and how they were selected
• Provide operational definitions for each variable
• Describe the measures and procedures that were used to collect data
• Explain how the information collected was analyzed
• Discuss what the results mean

Why is such a detailed record of a psychological study so important? By clearly explaining the steps and procedures used throughout the study, other researchers can then replicate the results. The editorial process employed by academic and professional journals ensures that each article that is submitted undergoes a thorough peer review, which helps ensure that the study is scientifically sound.

Once published, the study becomes another piece of the existing puzzle of our knowledge base on that topic.

Before you begin exploring the scientific method steps, here's a review of some key terms and definitions that you should be familiar with:

• Falsifiable : The variables can be measured so that if a hypothesis is false, it can be proven false
• Hypothesis : An educated guess about the possible relationship between two or more variables
• Variable : A factor or element that can change in observable and measurable ways
• Operational definition : A full description of exactly how variables are defined, how they will be manipulated, and how they will be measured

Uses for the Scientific Method

The  goals of psychological studies  are to describe, explain, predict and perhaps influence mental processes or behaviors. In order to do this, psychologists utilize the scientific method to conduct psychological research. The scientific method is a set of principles and procedures that are used by researchers to develop questions, collect data, and reach conclusions.

Goals of Scientific Research in Psychology

Researchers seek not only to describe behaviors and explain why these behaviors occur; they also strive to create research that can be used to predict and even change human behavior.

Psychologists and other social scientists regularly propose explanations for human behavior. On a more informal level, people make judgments about the intentions, motivations , and actions of others on a daily basis.

While the everyday judgments we make about human behavior are subjective and anecdotal, researchers use the scientific method to study psychology in an objective and systematic way. The results of these studies are often reported in popular media, which leads many to wonder just how or why researchers arrived at the conclusions they did.

Examples of the Scientific Method

Now that you're familiar with the scientific method steps, it's useful to see how each step could work with a real-life example.

Say, for instance, that researchers set out to discover what the relationship is between psychotherapy and anxiety .

• Step 1. Make an observation : The researchers choose to focus their study on adults ages 25 to 40 with generalized anxiety disorder.
• Step 2. Ask a question : The question they want to answer in their study is: Do weekly psychotherapy sessions reduce symptoms in adults ages 25 to 40 with generalized anxiety disorder?
• Step 3. Test your hypothesis : Researchers collect data on participants' anxiety symptoms . They work with therapists to create a consistent program that all participants undergo. Group 1 may attend therapy once per week, whereas group 2 does not attend therapy.
• Step 4. Examine the results : Participants record their symptoms and any changes over a period of three months. After this period, people in group 1 report significant improvements in their anxiety symptoms, whereas those in group 2 report no significant changes.
• Step 5. Report the results : Researchers write a report that includes their hypothesis, information on participants, variables, procedure, and conclusions drawn from the study. In this case, they say that "Weekly therapy sessions are shown to reduce anxiety symptoms in adults ages 25 to 40."

Of course, there are many details that go into planning and executing a study such as this. But this general outline gives you an idea of how an idea is formulated and tested, and how researchers arrive at results using the scientific method.

Erol A. How to conduct scientific research ? Noro Psikiyatr Ars . 2017;54(2):97-98. doi:10.5152/npa.2017.0120102

University of Minnesota. Psychologists use the scientific method to guide their research .

Shaughnessy, JJ, Zechmeister, EB, & Zechmeister, JS. Research Methods In Psychology . New York: McGraw Hill Education; 2015.

By Kendra Cherry, MSEd Kendra Cherry, MS, is a psychosocial rehabilitation specialist, psychology educator, and author of the "Everything Psychology Book."

• school Campus Bookshelves
• menu_book Bookshelves
• perm_media Learning Objects
• login Login
• how_to_reg Request Instructor Account
• hub Instructor Commons
• Download Page (PDF)
• Download Full Book (PDF)
• Periodic Table
• Physics Constants
• Scientific Calculator
• Reference & Cite
• Tools expand_more
• Readability

selected template will load here

This action is not available.

Lab 1 Principles of Scientific Inquiry and the Scientific Method in the Anatomy and Physiology Lab

• Last updated
• Save as PDF
• Page ID 53229

Learning Objectives. Completion of this lab exercise ensures that you will be able to…         1.      Describe the difference between a scientific observation and a non-scientific observation         2.      Outline the steps necessary to perform an experiment via the scientific method         3.      Write a hypothesis to explain an observation that you made about how the human body functions.

Pre-Lab Exercise:

• True/False: A hypothesis is the same as a guess as to what will happen in an experiment.                        
• All scientific experiment begins with either an                                                                                                  or a                                                 about a phenomenon.
• True/False: Being a scientist means following the scientific method of investigation to what is true and challenging your thoughts and assumptions about a topic through experimentation.
• Hypothesis should never:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   .
• One logical fallacy that you are aware of having made in the past is                                                                   .

Science and the Scientific Method

Science is a process of learning and acquiring knowledge, and any person that does science is a “scientist.” This means that at any point in time we can all be scientists.  The only separation between students learning about human anatomy and physiology, and those in lab coats working to discover the cure for a disease is the approach to understanding a phenomenon.  The person performing as a “scientist” will work through a problem in a methodical approach that follows the logical rules of science.  The most important part of the rules of science is to not have a prejudiced view of what will happen.  Yes, you will have an idea based on previous experience, but you must approach every problem as a new experience.  When you approach each problem that you wish to solve as a new experience then you are beginning to use the scientific approach and thus are using science.     There is no set way on how to do science beyond following the general rules of science. The rules of science, and the scientific method, are intended to make the process as objective as possible, and thereby gain some level of understanding that is as close to a “true reality” as possible.  One constant theme is that there is no certainty in science, only levels of probability and possibility for explaining the phenomenon being studied.   Because of this, scientific understanding can always be challenged, or even changed, with new observations, or different interpretations of previous observations. New tools and techniques have resulted in new observations, sometimes forcing revision of what had been taken as fact in the past.  With this ever-changing understanding and base of evidence there is only one certainty about science, which is, science does not “prove” it only allows for observations and explanations of those observations based on the assumptions that govern modern science.     Underlying the world of modern science are four major assumptions that must be held as being true for observations to accurate, valid and reliable.  First of these assumptions is that the world is real, and that the physical universe exists and is not just our imagination.  This is regardless of whether, or not, it is something that can be sensed.  Secondly, humans (or animals) can accurately perceive the real world, and that humans can express such understanding.  Thirdly, processes that occur in nature can sufficiently explain the existence of the physical universe that we live in.  Lastly, that the process being observed operates the same way, everywhere and at all times within the physical universe.     The way that we use these assumptions to study the human body and any other natural phenomenon is through the scientific method.  This method of learning follows a set of rules that leads to a process of asking and answering questions to search for cause-and-effect relationships in a phenomenon, or action, that we are examining.     There are several rules of science that must be followed at all times.  First, all explanations must be based on careful observations that come through testing a hypothesis to explain a phenomenon.  Second, any hypothesis has a possibility and probability of being disproven (evidence from observation does not support the hypothesis).  Third, conclusions cannot be based simply on one’s opinion or belief (popular or otherwise) about the phenomenon.  Fourth, any observations and explanations must be based on the natural physical universe that can be sensed and perceived by everyone, in the same way at all times.  Fifth, that the best hypothesis is the choice for explaining the phenomenon that has the greatest amount of factual support, is based on logical analysis and makes the least number of assumptions to “best fit” all of the facts from the observations.  Lastly, science is not democratically fair! It is based on empirical evidence (observations) that stem from the logical flow of critical thought and analysis following the rules of science.     It is very important to remember that the use of the scientific method is not developed to “prove” something “true”.  Instead, it is intended to test how, what, when, where, and why something occurred.  Because of this, we tend to think of the outcome of the use of the scientific method as leading to a contingent base of knowledge, rather than an absolute base of knowledge.  That understanding a phenomenon is based on what evidence can support our understanding at any given point in time.  This evidence changes over time and therefore our understanding of the phenomenon changes.     How do we do this investigation?  The scientific method is a logical process that can be viewed as a sequential step-wise process that follows these key steps:

• Observation 
• Question about Observation: What? When? Where? Why? How? for the observation
• Hypothesis: explanation of the observation that answers the question based on deductive reasoning and understanding of the principles of science and previous knowledge
• Experimentation and Recording of Results: Reproducible step-wise sequence of events based on the phenomenon and scientific principles that tests the validity of the hypothesis where observed responses are recorded objectively
• Analysis of Results: logical statistical analysis of results used to accept or refute hypothesis 
• Interpretation and Inference of Analysis: logical process using inductive reasoning and inferential thinking to explain how analysis of results and observations made during the experimentation fits within understanding of the phenomenon and expands our overall knowledge of the principles and laws governing the phenomenon. Used to indicate the support for the hypothesis being tested
• Conclusion: terminal argument of inductive reasoning based on the principles of logical thought referred to as Occam’s Razor (the most logical explanation with the fewest number of assumptions is the most likely to be true) that terminates one cycle of the scientific method and can serve as the next hypothesis in a reproduced experiment

How to Observe as a Scientist

In order to be a good scientist and follow the scientific method of experimentation, we must be good at making observations. The means of observing is based on how we develop and execute our experiment. This is done through defining and controlling for factors that might impact the phenomenon that is being studied.  When designing an experiment, it is important that we are changing very little in the overall factors that can impact the phenomenon so that we can indicate that changes to one item causes something else to vary in a predictable way that allows us to draw a conclusion. The factors that are being observed and controlled are called variables.       There are two primary categories that all variables will fall into based on the amount of control that you have on the variable at any point of time of the experiment.  Those that you are able to change, or manipulate, are termed independent variables .  This variable can sometimes be referred to as the test condition.  While those that you have no control over, unable to change, are termed dependent variables .  The dependent variables are the variables that are being measured in any experiments. Along with these variables, there are other factors that have the ability to impact our observations. Those factors that we attempt to ensure don’t change or impact our experimental observations are referred to as control variables . In the studying of the human body, control variables typically fall under what is called “environmental conditions'' that is where we set up the test environment to have the participants of the study seen under the same condition (temperature, time of day, humidity, food).  There are also factors that we might try to control but have no control over yet will impact the dependent variable by acting as a different test condition. The variables that act as second independent variables are called confounding variables . When we do analysis and interpretation, we will take into consideration these confounding variables, as their influence will impact the assumptions that are made during the interpretation of the results.     Underlying scientific observations are four major assumptions that must be held as being true for observations to be accurate, valid and reliable.  First of these assumptions is that the world is real, and that the physical universe exists and is not just our imagination.  This is regardless of whether, or not, it is something that can be sensed.  Secondly, humans (or animals) can accurately perceive the real world, and that humans can express such understanding.  Thirdly, processes that occur in nature can sufficiently explain the existence of the physical universe that we live in. Lastly, that the process being observed operates the same way, everywhere and at all times within the physical universe. The ability to ensure that your observations are valid and that the confounding variables are minimized makes for good experimental observations.  The ability to do this is through the constant recording of observations and journaling methods used to make the observations. The more thorough the notes you take during experimentation, the more controlled the experiment, the more likely your results are to be correct, and the more reproducible your experiment.

How to write a hypothesis

A hypothesis is your explanation of a phenomenon based on your understanding of the laws and principles of physiology. The statement is formed via a process known as deductive reasoning. A process that forces you to use what information you already know to explain why the observation that you are making has occurred.  It is not as many of you have learned previously a guess or a prediction. It is also not the explanation of observation based on the experimental outcome, that is the conclusion.  The conclusion can be seen as a possible hypothesis, but only for subsequent studies and experiments within the reproduction of the experimentation that is at the heart of scientific inquiry.  The hypothesis you have to view as your best explanation for why and how something occurs. 

    As such, it should be formulated and written in such a way so as to be supported or refuted by the evidence collected in the experiment. It is not a guess as to what might happen (that is a prediction) or an “if… then” statement (as this cannot be supported or refuted).  It is the explanation that you are going to test within the experiment. Being a good scientist means that your explanation will constantly undergo refinement and rewriting as new evidence and experimental analysis provides us with a greater understanding.

    What are the rules for writing the hypothesis?  When you write a hypothesis, there are a few key steps that need to be remembered for writing. First, there is never a “good” or a “bad” hypothesis, just one that is not well written. Second, there is never a “right” or a “wrong” hypothesis, just one that gets supported (shown to be possibly true) or refuted (shown to possibly be false). Third, a hypothesis is always written to be tested by evidence that can be seen and measured.

Writing and Developing Hypothesis:

• In order to develop the hypothesis, you need to develop the summary report (What am I studying? Why am I studying it? What am I going to do (what are the key steps I need to remember) in the experiment? What are my test conditions and measurements?
• Be sure to focus on the purpose or the question that serves as the foundation for the experiment.  
• The hypothesis needs to be written as a testable claim about the relationship between test condition (what you are doing) and measurements being collected (dependent variables). 
• Use “if…then…” thinking
• Form a tentative or conclusive claim
• Be written to be too general (or specific) for the stated question that is being studied
• Summarize the principle being studied
• Hypothesis never is written as the statement of the law or principle being studied, or a restatement of the purpose.
• Wording of the hypothesis must be open to interpretation that leads to it either being supported or refuted by the results of the experiment.

Poor Example : Individuals will breathe more when exercising. (Statement that summarizes the tri-phasic response)

Good Example : Females will have larger changes in tidal volumes than males of similar level of activity during and following a period of exercise.

References:

Clark, JE. 2010. Don’t Worry, It’s Only Science . TeachersPayTeachers. http://www.teacherspayteachers.com

ACTIVITY 1: Scientific Method and Hypothesis Testing

• Watch the video that your instructor shows the class
• Based on what you see, make a hypothesis that would explain what you just watched.

3. Share your hypothesis with your group and rewrite based on feedback provided

4. Have your instructor check your hypothesis and within your group agree on 1 hypothesis to use for testing through experimentation.

5. Develop the basic steps for your experiment.

ACTIVITY 2: Discussion and Interpretation and Analysis of Results

Discussion:

Discussions are written as well-organized paragraphs that allow you to discuss the meaning of your results from the experiment.  This is not a summary of what you did, that is the methods. The discussion involves using inductive reasoning and inferential thinking to formulate explain both what happened and why it happened.  This explanation involves using the principles to explain the observations and the observations to show how the principles hold to be true.  In performing your interpretation, you are linking your observed experimental results with the principles of human physiology.  This means you have to go back to what we already know about how the human body functions and then apply what do the results say about this understanding. You have to do this by limiting your assumptions and following a logical process of thinking. The logical process means that if you commit a fallacy in your thinking, then the entirety of your interpretation becomes nullified.  To make sure that you do not make these fallacies, be aware of these very common mistakes:

• Hasty Generalization:  This is a conclusion based on insufficient or biased evidence. In other words, you are rushing to a conclusion before you have all the relevant facts.
• Post hoc ergo propter hoc/Because it happened last it must be the cause:  This is a conclusion that assumes that if 'A' occurred after 'B' then 'B' must have caused 'A.' 
• Begging the Claim:  The conclusion provided is proven as being validated within the claim of the conclusion.
• Petitio principii /Circular Argument:  This restates the argument rather than actually proving it.
• Either/or:  This is a conclusion that oversimplifies the argument by reducing it to only two sides or choices.
• Ad populum/Bandwagon Appeal:  This is an appeal that presents what most people, or a group of people thinks, in order to persuade one to think the same way. 
• Ignoratio elenchi/Red Herring:  This diversionary tactic avoids the key issues, often by avoiding opposing arguments rather than addressing them.
• Straw Man:  This move oversimplifies an opponent's viewpoint and then attacks that hollow argument.
• Argumentum ad ignorantiam/Appeal to ignorance: A conclusion that offers no proof of anything except that you don’t know something
• False dilemma/False dichotomy: Conclusion that limits all options down to two supposed counter points and offers opinion that manipulates the argument into an either or statement
• Slippery slope: Conclusion offers argument that outcome will likely lead to further outcomes that do not logically flow due to lack of evidence
• Tu Quoque: conclusion does not provide argument but distracts from the argument due to a position that the opposite occurs from a hypocrisy in the opposing viewpoint
• Ambiguity/Equivocation: Conclusion that confuses and misleads by stipulating that one thing is equal to something else
• Non sequitur: a conclusion does  not  follow logically from what preceded it.
• Argumentum ad verecundiam/Appeal to Authority: Conclusion that is justified because of citation of an experiment that agrees with the conclusion
• Non causa pro causa/Causal Fallacy: any logical breakdown when identifying a cause based on argument revolving around unproven causal relationship

When writing your discussion, think about the following (do not answer them as individual questions, instead use them to guide your thinking about the data and the analysis):  What does the results of the statistical analysis tell you about the relationship between observations? What does the correlations tell you about the relationship between the observations ? (Think about: What is the importance of understanding the correlative values between measures (think about: What does the correlations tell me?  Does having a correlation between values mean anything about the change in one causing a change in the other?) ? How does the relationship determined by your analysis align with the hypothesis (is it supported or refuted)?  What are limitations that could interfere with your ability to infer or induce a conclusion? ( Think about: Where are the differences in the measures?  What does differences in measurements indicate?  What does the similarity between measures indicate? What errors might have occurred? How might errors in the experiment or analysis impact my results? How might accuracy impact the experimental conclusions that can be drawn?)

1. Use the following set of data from an experiment that tested the hypothesis: Males will be larger and thus stronger than females.

2. Working as a group and based on what you are given, develop a discussion (based on your understanding of human anatomy and physiology) to explain the findings.

• Table of Contents
• Random Entry
• Chronological
• Editorial Information
• About the SEP
• Editorial Board
• How to Cite the SEP
• Special Characters
• Advanced Tools
• Support the SEP
• PDFs for SEP Friends
• Make a Donation
• SEPIA for Libraries
• Entry Contents

Bibliography

Academic tools.

• Friends PDF Preview
• Author and Citation Info
• Back to Top

Scientific Method

Science is an enormously successful human enterprise. The study of scientific method is the attempt to discern the activities by which that success is achieved. Among the activities often identified as characteristic of science are systematic observation and experimentation, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the formation and testing of hypotheses and theories. How these are carried out in detail can vary greatly, but characteristics like these have been looked to as a way of demarcating scientific activity from non-science, where only enterprises which employ some canonical form of scientific method or methods should be considered science (see also the entry on science and pseudo-science ). Others have questioned whether there is anything like a fixed toolkit of methods which is common across science and only science. Some reject privileging one view of method as part of rejecting broader views about the nature of science, such as naturalism (Dupré 2004); some reject any restriction in principle (pluralism).

Scientific method should be distinguished from the aims and products of science, such as knowledge, predictions, or control. Methods are the means by which those goals are achieved. Scientific method should also be distinguished from meta-methodology, which includes the values and justifications behind a particular characterization of scientific method (i.e., a methodology) — values such as objectivity, reproducibility, simplicity, or past successes. Methodological rules are proposed to govern method and it is a meta-methodological question whether methods obeying those rules satisfy given values. Finally, method is distinct, to some degree, from the detailed and contextual practices through which methods are implemented. The latter might range over: specific laboratory techniques; mathematical formalisms or other specialized languages used in descriptions and reasoning; technological or other material means; ways of communicating and sharing results, whether with other scientists or with the public at large; or the conventions, habits, enforced customs, and institutional controls over how and what science is carried out.

While it is important to recognize these distinctions, their boundaries are fuzzy. Hence, accounts of method cannot be entirely divorced from their methodological and meta-methodological motivations or justifications, Moreover, each aspect plays a crucial role in identifying methods. Disputes about method have therefore played out at the detail, rule, and meta-rule levels. Changes in beliefs about the certainty or fallibility of scientific knowledge, for instance (which is a meta-methodological consideration of what we can hope for methods to deliver), have meant different emphases on deductive and inductive reasoning, or on the relative importance attached to reasoning over observation (i.e., differences over particular methods.) Beliefs about the role of science in society will affect the place one gives to values in scientific method.

The issue which has shaped debates over scientific method the most in the last half century is the question of how pluralist do we need to be about method? Unificationists continue to hold out for one method essential to science; nihilism is a form of radical pluralism, which considers the effectiveness of any methodological prescription to be so context sensitive as to render it not explanatory on its own. Some middle degree of pluralism regarding the methods embodied in scientific practice seems appropriate. But the details of scientific practice vary with time and place, from institution to institution, across scientists and their subjects of investigation. How significant are the variations for understanding science and its success? How much can method be abstracted from practice? This entry describes some of the attempts to characterize scientific method or methods, as well as arguments for a more context-sensitive approach to methods embedded in actual scientific practices.

1. Overview and organizing themes

2. historical review: aristotle to mill, 3.1 logical constructionism and operationalism, 3.2. h-d as a logic of confirmation, 3.3. popper and falsificationism, 3.4 meta-methodology and the end of method, 4. statistical methods for hypothesis testing, 5.1 creative and exploratory practices.

• 5.2 Computer methods and the ‘new ways’ of doing science

6.1 “The scientific method” in science education and as seen by scientists

6.2 privileged methods and ‘gold standards’, 6.3 scientific method in the court room, 6.4 deviating practices, 7. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

This entry could have been given the title Scientific Methods and gone on to fill volumes, or it could have been extremely short, consisting of a brief summary rejection of the idea that there is any such thing as a unique Scientific Method at all. Both unhappy prospects are due to the fact that scientific activity varies so much across disciplines, times, places, and scientists that any account which manages to unify it all will either consist of overwhelming descriptive detail, or trivial generalizations.

The choice of scope for the present entry is more optimistic, taking a cue from the recent movement in philosophy of science toward a greater attention to practice: to what scientists actually do. This “turn to practice” can be seen as the latest form of studies of methods in science, insofar as it represents an attempt at understanding scientific activity, but through accounts that are neither meant to be universal and unified, nor singular and narrowly descriptive. To some extent, different scientists at different times and places can be said to be using the same method even though, in practice, the details are different.

Whether the context in which methods are carried out is relevant, or to what extent, will depend largely on what one takes the aims of science to be and what one’s own aims are. For most of the history of scientific methodology the assumption has been that the most important output of science is knowledge and so the aim of methodology should be to discover those methods by which scientific knowledge is generated.

Science was seen to embody the most successful form of reasoning (but which form?) to the most certain knowledge claims (but how certain?) on the basis of systematically collected evidence (but what counts as evidence, and should the evidence of the senses take precedence, or rational insight?) Section 2 surveys some of the history, pointing to two major themes. One theme is seeking the right balance between observation and reasoning (and the attendant forms of reasoning which employ them); the other is how certain scientific knowledge is or can be.

Section 3 turns to 20 th century debates on scientific method. In the second half of the 20 th century the epistemic privilege of science faced several challenges and many philosophers of science abandoned the reconstruction of the logic of scientific method. Views changed significantly regarding which functions of science ought to be captured and why. For some, the success of science was better identified with social or cultural features. Historical and sociological turns in the philosophy of science were made, with a demand that greater attention be paid to the non-epistemic aspects of science, such as sociological, institutional, material, and political factors. Even outside of those movements there was an increased specialization in the philosophy of science, with more and more focus on specific fields within science. The combined upshot was very few philosophers arguing any longer for a grand unified methodology of science. Sections 3 and 4 surveys the main positions on scientific method in 20 th century philosophy of science, focusing on where they differ in their preference for confirmation or falsification or for waiving the idea of a special scientific method altogether.

In recent decades, attention has primarily been paid to scientific activities traditionally falling under the rubric of method, such as experimental design and general laboratory practice, the use of statistics, the construction and use of models and diagrams, interdisciplinary collaboration, and science communication. Sections 4–6 attempt to construct a map of the current domains of the study of methods in science.

As these sections illustrate, the question of method is still central to the discourse about science. Scientific method remains a topic for education, for science policy, and for scientists. It arises in the public domain where the demarcation or status of science is at issue. Some philosophers have recently returned, therefore, to the question of what it is that makes science a unique cultural product. This entry will close with some of these recent attempts at discerning and encapsulating the activities by which scientific knowledge is achieved.

Attempting a history of scientific method compounds the vast scope of the topic. This section briefly surveys the background to modern methodological debates. What can be called the classical view goes back to antiquity, and represents a point of departure for later divergences. [ 1 ]

We begin with a point made by Laudan (1968) in his historical survey of scientific method:

Perhaps the most serious inhibition to the emergence of the history of theories of scientific method as a respectable area of study has been the tendency to conflate it with the general history of epistemology, thereby assuming that the narrative categories and classificatory pigeon-holes applied to the latter are also basic to the former. (1968: 5)

To see knowledge about the natural world as falling under knowledge more generally is an understandable conflation. Histories of theories of method would naturally employ the same narrative categories and classificatory pigeon holes. An important theme of the history of epistemology, for example, is the unification of knowledge, a theme reflected in the question of the unification of method in science. Those who have identified differences in kinds of knowledge have often likewise identified different methods for achieving that kind of knowledge (see the entry on the unity of science ).

Different views on what is known, how it is known, and what can be known are connected. Plato distinguished the realms of things into the visible and the intelligible ( The Republic , 510a, in Cooper 1997). Only the latter, the Forms, could be objects of knowledge. The intelligible truths could be known with the certainty of geometry and deductive reasoning. What could be observed of the material world, however, was by definition imperfect and deceptive, not ideal. The Platonic way of knowledge therefore emphasized reasoning as a method, downplaying the importance of observation. Aristotle disagreed, locating the Forms in the natural world as the fundamental principles to be discovered through the inquiry into nature ( Metaphysics Z , in Barnes 1984).

Aristotle is recognized as giving the earliest systematic treatise on the nature of scientific inquiry in the western tradition, one which embraced observation and reasoning about the natural world. In the Prior and Posterior Analytics , Aristotle reflects first on the aims and then the methods of inquiry into nature. A number of features can be found which are still considered by most to be essential to science. For Aristotle, empiricism, careful observation (but passive observation, not controlled experiment), is the starting point. The aim is not merely recording of facts, though. For Aristotle, science ( epistêmê ) is a body of properly arranged knowledge or learning—the empirical facts, but also their ordering and display are of crucial importance. The aims of discovery, ordering, and display of facts partly determine the methods required of successful scientific inquiry. Also determinant is the nature of the knowledge being sought, and the explanatory causes proper to that kind of knowledge (see the discussion of the four causes in the entry on Aristotle on causality ).

In addition to careful observation, then, scientific method requires a logic as a system of reasoning for properly arranging, but also inferring beyond, what is known by observation. Methods of reasoning may include induction, prediction, or analogy, among others. Aristotle’s system (along with his catalogue of fallacious reasoning) was collected under the title the Organon . This title would be echoed in later works on scientific reasoning, such as Novum Organon by Francis Bacon, and Novum Organon Restorum by William Whewell (see below). In Aristotle’s Organon reasoning is divided primarily into two forms, a rough division which persists into modern times. The division, known most commonly today as deductive versus inductive method, appears in other eras and methodologies as analysis/​synthesis, non-ampliative/​ampliative, or even confirmation/​verification. The basic idea is there are two “directions” to proceed in our methods of inquiry: one away from what is observed, to the more fundamental, general, and encompassing principles; the other, from the fundamental and general to instances or implications of principles.

The basic aim and method of inquiry identified here can be seen as a theme running throughout the next two millennia of reflection on the correct way to seek after knowledge: carefully observe nature and then seek rules or principles which explain or predict its operation. The Aristotelian corpus provided the framework for a commentary tradition on scientific method independent of science itself (cosmos versus physics.) During the medieval period, figures such as Albertus Magnus (1206–1280), Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Robert Grosseteste (1175–1253), Roger Bacon (1214/1220–1292), William of Ockham (1287–1347), Andreas Vesalius (1514–1546), Giacomo Zabarella (1533–1589) all worked to clarify the kind of knowledge obtainable by observation and induction, the source of justification of induction, and best rules for its application. [ 2 ] Many of their contributions we now think of as essential to science (see also Laudan 1968). As Aristotle and Plato had employed a framework of reasoning either “to the forms” or “away from the forms”, medieval thinkers employed directions away from the phenomena or back to the phenomena. In analysis, a phenomena was examined to discover its basic explanatory principles; in synthesis, explanations of a phenomena were constructed from first principles.

During the Scientific Revolution these various strands of argument, experiment, and reason were forged into a dominant epistemic authority. The 16 th –18 th centuries were a period of not only dramatic advance in knowledge about the operation of the natural world—advances in mechanical, medical, biological, political, economic explanations—but also of self-awareness of the revolutionary changes taking place, and intense reflection on the source and legitimation of the method by which the advances were made. The struggle to establish the new authority included methodological moves. The Book of Nature, according to the metaphor of Galileo Galilei (1564–1642) or Francis Bacon (1561–1626), was written in the language of mathematics, of geometry and number. This motivated an emphasis on mathematical description and mechanical explanation as important aspects of scientific method. Through figures such as Henry More and Ralph Cudworth, a neo-Platonic emphasis on the importance of metaphysical reflection on nature behind appearances, particularly regarding the spiritual as a complement to the purely mechanical, remained an important methodological thread of the Scientific Revolution (see the entries on Cambridge platonists ; Boyle ; Henry More ; Galileo ).

In Novum Organum (1620), Bacon was critical of the Aristotelian method for leaping from particulars to universals too quickly. The syllogistic form of reasoning readily mixed those two types of propositions. Bacon aimed at the invention of new arts, principles, and directions. His method would be grounded in methodical collection of observations, coupled with correction of our senses (and particularly, directions for the avoidance of the Idols, as he called them, kinds of systematic errors to which naïve observers are prone.) The community of scientists could then climb, by a careful, gradual and unbroken ascent, to reliable general claims.

Bacon’s method has been criticized as impractical and too inflexible for the practicing scientist. Whewell would later criticize Bacon in his System of Logic for paying too little attention to the practices of scientists. It is hard to find convincing examples of Bacon’s method being put in to practice in the history of science, but there are a few who have been held up as real examples of 16 th century scientific, inductive method, even if not in the rigid Baconian mold: figures such as Robert Boyle (1627–1691) and William Harvey (1578–1657) (see the entry on Bacon ).

It is to Isaac Newton (1642–1727), however, that historians of science and methodologists have paid greatest attention. Given the enormous success of his Principia Mathematica and Opticks , this is understandable. The study of Newton’s method has had two main thrusts: the implicit method of the experiments and reasoning presented in the Opticks, and the explicit methodological rules given as the Rules for Philosophising (the Regulae) in Book III of the Principia . [ 3 ] Newton’s law of gravitation, the linchpin of his new cosmology, broke with explanatory conventions of natural philosophy, first for apparently proposing action at a distance, but more generally for not providing “true”, physical causes. The argument for his System of the World ( Principia , Book III) was based on phenomena, not reasoned first principles. This was viewed (mainly on the continent) as insufficient for proper natural philosophy. The Regulae counter this objection, re-defining the aims of natural philosophy by re-defining the method natural philosophers should follow. (See the entry on Newton’s philosophy .)

To his list of methodological prescriptions should be added Newton’s famous phrase “ hypotheses non fingo ” (commonly translated as “I frame no hypotheses”.) The scientist was not to invent systems but infer explanations from observations, as Bacon had advocated. This would come to be known as inductivism. In the century after Newton, significant clarifications of the Newtonian method were made. Colin Maclaurin (1698–1746), for instance, reconstructed the essential structure of the method as having complementary analysis and synthesis phases, one proceeding away from the phenomena in generalization, the other from the general propositions to derive explanations of new phenomena. Denis Diderot (1713–1784) and editors of the Encyclopédie did much to consolidate and popularize Newtonianism, as did Francesco Algarotti (1721–1764). The emphasis was often the same, as much on the character of the scientist as on their process, a character which is still commonly assumed. The scientist is humble in the face of nature, not beholden to dogma, obeys only his eyes, and follows the truth wherever it leads. It was certainly Voltaire (1694–1778) and du Chatelet (1706–1749) who were most influential in propagating the latter vision of the scientist and their craft, with Newton as hero. Scientific method became a revolutionary force of the Enlightenment. (See also the entries on Newton , Leibniz , Descartes , Boyle , Hume , enlightenment , as well as Shank 2008 for a historical overview.)

Not all 18 th century reflections on scientific method were so celebratory. Famous also are George Berkeley’s (1685–1753) attack on the mathematics of the new science, as well as the over-emphasis of Newtonians on observation; and David Hume’s (1711–1776) undermining of the warrant offered for scientific claims by inductive justification (see the entries on: George Berkeley ; David Hume ; Hume’s Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism ). Hume’s problem of induction motivated Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) to seek new foundations for empirical method, though as an epistemic reconstruction, not as any set of practical guidelines for scientists. Both Hume and Kant influenced the methodological reflections of the next century, such as the debate between Mill and Whewell over the certainty of inductive inferences in science.

The debate between John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and William Whewell (1794–1866) has become the canonical methodological debate of the 19 th century. Although often characterized as a debate between inductivism and hypothetico-deductivism, the role of the two methods on each side is actually more complex. On the hypothetico-deductive account, scientists work to come up with hypotheses from which true observational consequences can be deduced—hence, hypothetico-deductive. Because Whewell emphasizes both hypotheses and deduction in his account of method, he can be seen as a convenient foil to the inductivism of Mill. However, equally if not more important to Whewell’s portrayal of scientific method is what he calls the “fundamental antithesis”. Knowledge is a product of the objective (what we see in the world around us) and subjective (the contributions of our mind to how we perceive and understand what we experience, which he called the Fundamental Ideas). Both elements are essential according to Whewell, and he was therefore critical of Kant for too much focus on the subjective, and John Locke (1632–1704) and Mill for too much focus on the senses. Whewell’s fundamental ideas can be discipline relative. An idea can be fundamental even if it is necessary for knowledge only within a given scientific discipline (e.g., chemical affinity for chemistry). This distinguishes fundamental ideas from the forms and categories of intuition of Kant. (See the entry on Whewell .)

Clarifying fundamental ideas would therefore be an essential part of scientific method and scientific progress. Whewell called this process “Discoverer’s Induction”. It was induction, following Bacon or Newton, but Whewell sought to revive Bacon’s account by emphasising the role of ideas in the clear and careful formulation of inductive hypotheses. Whewell’s induction is not merely the collecting of objective facts. The subjective plays a role through what Whewell calls the Colligation of Facts, a creative act of the scientist, the invention of a theory. A theory is then confirmed by testing, where more facts are brought under the theory, called the Consilience of Inductions. Whewell felt that this was the method by which the true laws of nature could be discovered: clarification of fundamental concepts, clever invention of explanations, and careful testing. Mill, in his critique of Whewell, and others who have cast Whewell as a fore-runner of the hypothetico-deductivist view, seem to have under-estimated the importance of this discovery phase in Whewell’s understanding of method (Snyder 1997a,b, 1999). Down-playing the discovery phase would come to characterize methodology of the early 20 th century (see section 3 ).

Mill, in his System of Logic , put forward a narrower view of induction as the essence of scientific method. For Mill, induction is the search first for regularities among events. Among those regularities, some will continue to hold for further observations, eventually gaining the status of laws. One can also look for regularities among the laws discovered in a domain, i.e., for a law of laws. Which “law law” will hold is time and discipline dependent and open to revision. One example is the Law of Universal Causation, and Mill put forward specific methods for identifying causes—now commonly known as Mill’s methods. These five methods look for circumstances which are common among the phenomena of interest, those which are absent when the phenomena are, or those for which both vary together. Mill’s methods are still seen as capturing basic intuitions about experimental methods for finding the relevant explanatory factors ( System of Logic (1843), see Mill entry). The methods advocated by Whewell and Mill, in the end, look similar. Both involve inductive generalization to covering laws. They differ dramatically, however, with respect to the necessity of the knowledge arrived at; that is, at the meta-methodological level (see the entries on Whewell and Mill entries).

3. Logic of method and critical responses

The quantum and relativistic revolutions in physics in the early 20 th century had a profound effect on methodology. Conceptual foundations of both theories were taken to show the defeasibility of even the most seemingly secure intuitions about space, time and bodies. Certainty of knowledge about the natural world was therefore recognized as unattainable. Instead a renewed empiricism was sought which rendered science fallible but still rationally justifiable.

Analyses of the reasoning of scientists emerged, according to which the aspects of scientific method which were of primary importance were the means of testing and confirming of theories. A distinction in methodology was made between the contexts of discovery and justification. The distinction could be used as a wedge between the particularities of where and how theories or hypotheses are arrived at, on the one hand, and the underlying reasoning scientists use (whether or not they are aware of it) when assessing theories and judging their adequacy on the basis of the available evidence. By and large, for most of the 20 th century, philosophy of science focused on the second context, although philosophers differed on whether to focus on confirmation or refutation as well as on the many details of how confirmation or refutation could or could not be brought about. By the mid-20 th century these attempts at defining the method of justification and the context distinction itself came under pressure. During the same period, philosophy of science developed rapidly, and from section 4 this entry will therefore shift from a primarily historical treatment of the scientific method towards a primarily thematic one.

Advances in logic and probability held out promise of the possibility of elaborate reconstructions of scientific theories and empirical method, the best example being Rudolf Carnap’s The Logical Structure of the World (1928). Carnap attempted to show that a scientific theory could be reconstructed as a formal axiomatic system—that is, a logic. That system could refer to the world because some of its basic sentences could be interpreted as observations or operations which one could perform to test them. The rest of the theoretical system, including sentences using theoretical or unobservable terms (like electron or force) would then either be meaningful because they could be reduced to observations, or they had purely logical meanings (called analytic, like mathematical identities). This has been referred to as the verifiability criterion of meaning. According to the criterion, any statement not either analytic or verifiable was strictly meaningless. Although the view was endorsed by Carnap in 1928, he would later come to see it as too restrictive (Carnap 1956). Another familiar version of this idea is operationalism of Percy William Bridgman. In The Logic of Modern Physics (1927) Bridgman asserted that every physical concept could be defined in terms of the operations one would perform to verify the application of that concept. Making good on the operationalisation of a concept even as simple as length, however, can easily become enormously complex (for measuring very small lengths, for instance) or impractical (measuring large distances like light years.)

Carl Hempel’s (1950, 1951) criticisms of the verifiability criterion of meaning had enormous influence. He pointed out that universal generalizations, such as most scientific laws, were not strictly meaningful on the criterion. Verifiability and operationalism both seemed too restrictive to capture standard scientific aims and practice. The tenuous connection between these reconstructions and actual scientific practice was criticized in another way. In both approaches, scientific methods are instead recast in methodological roles. Measurements, for example, were looked to as ways of giving meanings to terms. The aim of the philosopher of science was not to understand the methods per se , but to use them to reconstruct theories, their meanings, and their relation to the world. When scientists perform these operations, however, they will not report that they are doing them to give meaning to terms in a formal axiomatic system. This disconnect between methodology and the details of actual scientific practice would seem to violate the empiricism the Logical Positivists and Bridgman were committed to. The view that methodology should correspond to practice (to some extent) has been called historicism, or intuitionism. We turn to these criticisms and responses in section 3.4 . [ 4 ]

Positivism also had to contend with the recognition that a purely inductivist approach, along the lines of Bacon-Newton-Mill, was untenable. There was no pure observation, for starters. All observation was theory laden. Theory is required to make any observation, therefore not all theory can be derived from observation alone. (See the entry on theory and observation in science .) Even granting an observational basis, Hume had already pointed out that one could not deductively justify inductive conclusions without begging the question by presuming the success of the inductive method. Likewise, positivist attempts at analyzing how a generalization can be confirmed by observations of its instances were subject to a number of criticisms. Goodman (1965) and Hempel (1965) both point to paradoxes inherent in standard accounts of confirmation. Recent attempts at explaining how observations can serve to confirm a scientific theory are discussed in section 4 below.

The standard starting point for a non-inductive analysis of the logic of confirmation is known as the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) method. In its simplest form, a sentence of a theory which expresses some hypothesis is confirmed by its true consequences. As noted in section 2 , this method had been advanced by Whewell in the 19 th century, as well as Nicod (1924) and others in the 20 th century. Often, Hempel’s (1966) description of the H-D method, illustrated by the case of Semmelweiss’ inferential procedures in establishing the cause of childbed fever, has been presented as a key account of H-D as well as a foil for criticism of the H-D account of confirmation (see, for example, Lipton’s (2004) discussion of inference to the best explanation; also the entry on confirmation ). Hempel described Semmelsweiss’ procedure as examining various hypotheses explaining the cause of childbed fever. Some hypotheses conflicted with observable facts and could be rejected as false immediately. Others needed to be tested experimentally by deducing which observable events should follow if the hypothesis were true (what Hempel called the test implications of the hypothesis), then conducting an experiment and observing whether or not the test implications occurred. If the experiment showed the test implication to be false, the hypothesis could be rejected. If the experiment showed the test implications to be true, however, this did not prove the hypothesis true. The confirmation of a test implication does not verify a hypothesis, though Hempel did allow that “it provides at least some support, some corroboration or confirmation for it” (Hempel 1966: 8). The degree of this support then depends on the quantity, variety and precision of the supporting evidence.

Another approach that took off from the difficulties with inductive inference was Karl Popper’s critical rationalism or falsificationism (Popper 1959, 1963). Falsification is deductive and similar to H-D in that it involves scientists deducing observational consequences from the hypothesis under test. For Popper, however, the important point was not the degree of confirmation that successful prediction offered to a hypothesis. The crucial thing was the logical asymmetry between confirmation, based on inductive inference, and falsification, which can be based on a deductive inference. (This simple opposition was later questioned, by Lakatos, among others. See the entry on historicist theories of scientific rationality. )

Popper stressed that, regardless of the amount of confirming evidence, we can never be certain that a hypothesis is true without committing the fallacy of affirming the consequent. Instead, Popper introduced the notion of corroboration as a measure for how well a theory or hypothesis has survived previous testing—but without implying that this is also a measure for the probability that it is true.

Popper was also motivated by his doubts about the scientific status of theories like the Marxist theory of history or psycho-analysis, and so wanted to demarcate between science and pseudo-science. Popper saw this as an importantly different distinction than demarcating science from metaphysics. The latter demarcation was the primary concern of many logical empiricists. Popper used the idea of falsification to draw a line instead between pseudo and proper science. Science was science because its method involved subjecting theories to rigorous tests which offered a high probability of failing and thus refuting the theory.

A commitment to the risk of failure was important. Avoiding falsification could be done all too easily. If a consequence of a theory is inconsistent with observations, an exception can be added by introducing auxiliary hypotheses designed explicitly to save the theory, so-called ad hoc modifications. This Popper saw done in pseudo-science where ad hoc theories appeared capable of explaining anything in their field of application. In contrast, science is risky. If observations showed the predictions from a theory to be wrong, the theory would be refuted. Hence, scientific hypotheses must be falsifiable. Not only must there exist some possible observation statement which could falsify the hypothesis or theory, were it observed, (Popper called these the hypothesis’ potential falsifiers) it is crucial to the Popperian scientific method that such falsifications be sincerely attempted on a regular basis.

The more potential falsifiers of a hypothesis, the more falsifiable it would be, and the more the hypothesis claimed. Conversely, hypotheses without falsifiers claimed very little or nothing at all. Originally, Popper thought that this meant the introduction of ad hoc hypotheses only to save a theory should not be countenanced as good scientific method. These would undermine the falsifiabililty of a theory. However, Popper later came to recognize that the introduction of modifications (immunizations, he called them) was often an important part of scientific development. Responding to surprising or apparently falsifying observations often generated important new scientific insights. Popper’s own example was the observed motion of Uranus which originally did not agree with Newtonian predictions. The ad hoc hypothesis of an outer planet explained the disagreement and led to further falsifiable predictions. Popper sought to reconcile the view by blurring the distinction between falsifiable and not falsifiable, and speaking instead of degrees of testability (Popper 1985: 41f.).

From the 1960s on, sustained meta-methodological criticism emerged that drove philosophical focus away from scientific method. A brief look at those criticisms follows, with recommendations for further reading at the end of the entry.

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) begins with a well-known shot across the bow for philosophers of science:

History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed. (1962: 1)

The image Kuhn thought needed transforming was the a-historical, rational reconstruction sought by many of the Logical Positivists, though Carnap and other positivists were actually quite sympathetic to Kuhn’s views. (See the entry on the Vienna Circle .) Kuhn shares with other of his contemporaries, such as Feyerabend and Lakatos, a commitment to a more empirical approach to philosophy of science. Namely, the history of science provides important data, and necessary checks, for philosophy of science, including any theory of scientific method.

The history of science reveals, according to Kuhn, that scientific development occurs in alternating phases. During normal science, the members of the scientific community adhere to the paradigm in place. Their commitment to the paradigm means a commitment to the puzzles to be solved and the acceptable ways of solving them. Confidence in the paradigm remains so long as steady progress is made in solving the shared puzzles. Method in this normal phase operates within a disciplinary matrix (Kuhn’s later concept of a paradigm) which includes standards for problem solving, and defines the range of problems to which the method should be applied. An important part of a disciplinary matrix is the set of values which provide the norms and aims for scientific method. The main values that Kuhn identifies are prediction, problem solving, simplicity, consistency, and plausibility.

An important by-product of normal science is the accumulation of puzzles which cannot be solved with resources of the current paradigm. Once accumulation of these anomalies has reached some critical mass, it can trigger a communal shift to a new paradigm and a new phase of normal science. Importantly, the values that provide the norms and aims for scientific method may have transformed in the meantime. Method may therefore be relative to discipline, time or place

Feyerabend also identified the aims of science as progress, but argued that any methodological prescription would only stifle that progress (Feyerabend 1988). His arguments are grounded in re-examining accepted “myths” about the history of science. Heroes of science, like Galileo, are shown to be just as reliant on rhetoric and persuasion as they are on reason and demonstration. Others, like Aristotle, are shown to be far more reasonable and far-reaching in their outlooks then they are given credit for. As a consequence, the only rule that could provide what he took to be sufficient freedom was the vacuous “anything goes”. More generally, even the methodological restriction that science is the best way to pursue knowledge, and to increase knowledge, is too restrictive. Feyerabend suggested instead that science might, in fact, be a threat to a free society, because it and its myth had become so dominant (Feyerabend 1978).

An even more fundamental kind of criticism was offered by several sociologists of science from the 1970s onwards who rejected the methodology of providing philosophical accounts for the rational development of science and sociological accounts of the irrational mistakes. Instead, they adhered to a symmetry thesis on which any causal explanation of how scientific knowledge is established needs to be symmetrical in explaining truth and falsity, rationality and irrationality, success and mistakes, by the same causal factors (see, e.g., Barnes and Bloor 1982, Bloor 1991). Movements in the Sociology of Science, like the Strong Programme, or in the social dimensions and causes of knowledge more generally led to extended and close examination of detailed case studies in contemporary science and its history. (See the entries on the social dimensions of scientific knowledge and social epistemology .) Well-known examinations by Latour and Woolgar (1979/1986), Knorr-Cetina (1981), Pickering (1984), Shapin and Schaffer (1985) seem to bear out that it was social ideologies (on a macro-scale) or individual interactions and circumstances (on a micro-scale) which were the primary causal factors in determining which beliefs gained the status of scientific knowledge. As they saw it therefore, explanatory appeals to scientific method were not empirically grounded.

A late, and largely unexpected, criticism of scientific method came from within science itself. Beginning in the early 2000s, a number of scientists attempting to replicate the results of published experiments could not do so. There may be close conceptual connection between reproducibility and method. For example, if reproducibility means that the same scientific methods ought to produce the same result, and all scientific results ought to be reproducible, then whatever it takes to reproduce a scientific result ought to be called scientific method. Space limits us to the observation that, insofar as reproducibility is a desired outcome of proper scientific method, it is not strictly a part of scientific method. (See the entry on reproducibility of scientific results .)

By the close of the 20 th century the search for the scientific method was flagging. Nola and Sankey (2000b) could introduce their volume on method by remarking that “For some, the whole idea of a theory of scientific method is yester-year’s debate …”.

Despite the many difficulties that philosophers encountered in trying to providing a clear methodology of conformation (or refutation), still important progress has been made on understanding how observation can provide evidence for a given theory. Work in statistics has been crucial for understanding how theories can be tested empirically, and in recent decades a huge literature has developed that attempts to recast confirmation in Bayesian terms. Here these developments can be covered only briefly, and we refer to the entry on confirmation for further details and references.

Statistics has come to play an increasingly important role in the methodology of the experimental sciences from the 19 th century onwards. At that time, statistics and probability theory took on a methodological role as an analysis of inductive inference, and attempts to ground the rationality of induction in the axioms of probability theory have continued throughout the 20 th century and in to the present. Developments in the theory of statistics itself, meanwhile, have had a direct and immense influence on the experimental method, including methods for measuring the uncertainty of observations such as the Method of Least Squares developed by Legendre and Gauss in the early 19 th century, criteria for the rejection of outliers proposed by Peirce by the mid-19 th century, and the significance tests developed by Gosset (a.k.a. “Student”), Fisher, Neyman & Pearson and others in the 1920s and 1930s (see, e.g., Swijtink 1987 for a brief historical overview; and also the entry on C.S. Peirce ).

These developments within statistics then in turn led to a reflective discussion among both statisticians and philosophers of science on how to perceive the process of hypothesis testing: whether it was a rigorous statistical inference that could provide a numerical expression of the degree of confidence in the tested hypothesis, or if it should be seen as a decision between different courses of actions that also involved a value component. This led to a major controversy among Fisher on the one side and Neyman and Pearson on the other (see especially Fisher 1955, Neyman 1956 and Pearson 1955, and for analyses of the controversy, e.g., Howie 2002, Marks 2000, Lenhard 2006). On Fisher’s view, hypothesis testing was a methodology for when to accept or reject a statistical hypothesis, namely that a hypothesis should be rejected by evidence if this evidence would be unlikely relative to other possible outcomes, given the hypothesis were true. In contrast, on Neyman and Pearson’s view, the consequence of error also had to play a role when deciding between hypotheses. Introducing the distinction between the error of rejecting a true hypothesis (type I error) and accepting a false hypothesis (type II error), they argued that it depends on the consequences of the error to decide whether it is more important to avoid rejecting a true hypothesis or accepting a false one. Hence, Fisher aimed for a theory of inductive inference that enabled a numerical expression of confidence in a hypothesis. To him, the important point was the search for truth, not utility. In contrast, the Neyman-Pearson approach provided a strategy of inductive behaviour for deciding between different courses of action. Here, the important point was not whether a hypothesis was true, but whether one should act as if it was.

Similar discussions are found in the philosophical literature. On the one side, Churchman (1948) and Rudner (1953) argued that because scientific hypotheses can never be completely verified, a complete analysis of the methods of scientific inference includes ethical judgments in which the scientists must decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong or that the probability is sufficiently high to warrant the acceptance of the hypothesis, which again will depend on the importance of making a mistake in accepting or rejecting the hypothesis. Others, such as Jeffrey (1956) and Levi (1960) disagreed and instead defended a value-neutral view of science on which scientists should bracket their attitudes, preferences, temperament, and values when assessing the correctness of their inferences. For more details on this value-free ideal in the philosophy of science and its historical development, see Douglas (2009) and Howard (2003). For a broad set of case studies examining the role of values in science, see e.g. Elliott & Richards 2017.

In recent decades, philosophical discussions of the evaluation of probabilistic hypotheses by statistical inference have largely focused on Bayesianism that understands probability as a measure of a person’s degree of belief in an event, given the available information, and frequentism that instead understands probability as a long-run frequency of a repeatable event. Hence, for Bayesians probabilities refer to a state of knowledge, whereas for frequentists probabilities refer to frequencies of events (see, e.g., Sober 2008, chapter 1 for a detailed introduction to Bayesianism and frequentism as well as to likelihoodism). Bayesianism aims at providing a quantifiable, algorithmic representation of belief revision, where belief revision is a function of prior beliefs (i.e., background knowledge) and incoming evidence. Bayesianism employs a rule based on Bayes’ theorem, a theorem of the probability calculus which relates conditional probabilities. The probability that a particular hypothesis is true is interpreted as a degree of belief, or credence, of the scientist. There will also be a probability and a degree of belief that a hypothesis will be true conditional on a piece of evidence (an observation, say) being true. Bayesianism proscribes that it is rational for the scientist to update their belief in the hypothesis to that conditional probability should it turn out that the evidence is, in fact, observed (see, e.g., Sprenger & Hartmann 2019 for a comprehensive treatment of Bayesian philosophy of science). Originating in the work of Neyman and Person, frequentism aims at providing the tools for reducing long-run error rates, such as the error-statistical approach developed by Mayo (1996) that focuses on how experimenters can avoid both type I and type II errors by building up a repertoire of procedures that detect errors if and only if they are present. Both Bayesianism and frequentism have developed over time, they are interpreted in different ways by its various proponents, and their relations to previous criticism to attempts at defining scientific method are seen differently by proponents and critics. The literature, surveys, reviews and criticism in this area are vast and the reader is referred to the entries on Bayesian epistemology and confirmation .

5. Method in Practice

Attention to scientific practice, as we have seen, is not itself new. However, the turn to practice in the philosophy of science of late can be seen as a correction to the pessimism with respect to method in philosophy of science in later parts of the 20 th century, and as an attempted reconciliation between sociological and rationalist explanations of scientific knowledge. Much of this work sees method as detailed and context specific problem-solving procedures, and methodological analyses to be at the same time descriptive, critical and advisory (see Nickles 1987 for an exposition of this view). The following section contains a survey of some of the practice focuses. In this section we turn fully to topics rather than chronology.

A problem with the distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification that figured so prominently in philosophy of science in the first half of the 20 th century (see section 2 ) is that no such distinction can be clearly seen in scientific activity (see Arabatzis 2006). Thus, in recent decades, it has been recognized that study of conceptual innovation and change should not be confined to psychology and sociology of science, but are also important aspects of scientific practice which philosophy of science should address (see also the entry on scientific discovery ). Looking for the practices that drive conceptual innovation has led philosophers to examine both the reasoning practices of scientists and the wide realm of experimental practices that are not directed narrowly at testing hypotheses, that is, exploratory experimentation.

Examining the reasoning practices of historical and contemporary scientists, Nersessian (2008) has argued that new scientific concepts are constructed as solutions to specific problems by systematic reasoning, and that of analogy, visual representation and thought-experimentation are among the important reasoning practices employed. These ubiquitous forms of reasoning are reliable—but also fallible—methods of conceptual development and change. On her account, model-based reasoning consists of cycles of construction, simulation, evaluation and adaption of models that serve as interim interpretations of the target problem to be solved. Often, this process will lead to modifications or extensions, and a new cycle of simulation and evaluation. However, Nersessian also emphasizes that

creative model-based reasoning cannot be applied as a simple recipe, is not always productive of solutions, and even its most exemplary usages can lead to incorrect solutions. (Nersessian 2008: 11)

Thus, while on the one hand she agrees with many previous philosophers that there is no logic of discovery, discoveries can derive from reasoned processes, such that a large and integral part of scientific practice is

the creation of concepts through which to comprehend, structure, and communicate about physical phenomena …. (Nersessian 1987: 11)

Similarly, work on heuristics for discovery and theory construction by scholars such as Darden (1991) and Bechtel & Richardson (1993) present science as problem solving and investigate scientific problem solving as a special case of problem-solving in general. Drawing largely on cases from the biological sciences, much of their focus has been on reasoning strategies for the generation, evaluation, and revision of mechanistic explanations of complex systems.

Addressing another aspect of the context distinction, namely the traditional view that the primary role of experiments is to test theoretical hypotheses according to the H-D model, other philosophers of science have argued for additional roles that experiments can play. The notion of exploratory experimentation was introduced to describe experiments driven by the desire to obtain empirical regularities and to develop concepts and classifications in which these regularities can be described (Steinle 1997, 2002; Burian 1997; Waters 2007)). However the difference between theory driven experimentation and exploratory experimentation should not be seen as a sharp distinction. Theory driven experiments are not always directed at testing hypothesis, but may also be directed at various kinds of fact-gathering, such as determining numerical parameters. Vice versa , exploratory experiments are usually informed by theory in various ways and are therefore not theory-free. Instead, in exploratory experiments phenomena are investigated without first limiting the possible outcomes of the experiment on the basis of extant theory about the phenomena.

The development of high throughput instrumentation in molecular biology and neighbouring fields has given rise to a special type of exploratory experimentation that collects and analyses very large amounts of data, and these new ‘omics’ disciplines are often said to represent a break with the ideal of hypothesis-driven science (Burian 2007; Elliott 2007; Waters 2007; O’Malley 2007) and instead described as data-driven research (Leonelli 2012; Strasser 2012) or as a special kind of “convenience experimentation” in which many experiments are done simply because they are extraordinarily convenient to perform (Krohs 2012).

5.2 Computer methods and ‘new ways’ of doing science

The field of omics just described is possible because of the ability of computers to process, in a reasonable amount of time, the huge quantities of data required. Computers allow for more elaborate experimentation (higher speed, better filtering, more variables, sophisticated coordination and control), but also, through modelling and simulations, might constitute a form of experimentation themselves. Here, too, we can pose a version of the general question of method versus practice: does the practice of using computers fundamentally change scientific method, or merely provide a more efficient means of implementing standard methods?

Because computers can be used to automate measurements, quantifications, calculations, and statistical analyses where, for practical reasons, these operations cannot be otherwise carried out, many of the steps involved in reaching a conclusion on the basis of an experiment are now made inside a “black box”, without the direct involvement or awareness of a human. This has epistemological implications, regarding what we can know, and how we can know it. To have confidence in the results, computer methods are therefore subjected to tests of verification and validation.

The distinction between verification and validation is easiest to characterize in the case of computer simulations. In a typical computer simulation scenario computers are used to numerically integrate differential equations for which no analytic solution is available. The equations are part of the model the scientist uses to represent a phenomenon or system under investigation. Verifying a computer simulation means checking that the equations of the model are being correctly approximated. Validating a simulation means checking that the equations of the model are adequate for the inferences one wants to make on the basis of that model.

A number of issues related to computer simulations have been raised. The identification of validity and verification as the testing methods has been criticized. Oreskes et al. (1994) raise concerns that “validiation”, because it suggests deductive inference, might lead to over-confidence in the results of simulations. The distinction itself is probably too clean, since actual practice in the testing of simulations mixes and moves back and forth between the two (Weissart 1997; Parker 2008a; Winsberg 2010). Computer simulations do seem to have a non-inductive character, given that the principles by which they operate are built in by the programmers, and any results of the simulation follow from those in-built principles in such a way that those results could, in principle, be deduced from the program code and its inputs. The status of simulations as experiments has therefore been examined (Kaufmann and Smarr 1993; Humphreys 1995; Hughes 1999; Norton and Suppe 2001). This literature considers the epistemology of these experiments: what we can learn by simulation, and also the kinds of justifications which can be given in applying that knowledge to the “real” world. (Mayo 1996; Parker 2008b). As pointed out, part of the advantage of computer simulation derives from the fact that huge numbers of calculations can be carried out without requiring direct observation by the experimenter/​simulator. At the same time, many of these calculations are approximations to the calculations which would be performed first-hand in an ideal situation. Both factors introduce uncertainties into the inferences drawn from what is observed in the simulation.

For many of the reasons described above, computer simulations do not seem to belong clearly to either the experimental or theoretical domain. Rather, they seem to crucially involve aspects of both. This has led some authors, such as Fox Keller (2003: 200) to argue that we ought to consider computer simulation a “qualitatively different way of doing science”. The literature in general tends to follow Kaufmann and Smarr (1993) in referring to computer simulation as a “third way” for scientific methodology (theoretical reasoning and experimental practice are the first two ways.). It should also be noted that the debates around these issues have tended to focus on the form of computer simulation typical in the physical sciences, where models are based on dynamical equations. Other forms of simulation might not have the same problems, or have problems of their own (see the entry on computer simulations in science ).

In recent years, the rapid development of machine learning techniques has prompted some scholars to suggest that the scientific method has become “obsolete” (Anderson 2008, Carrol and Goodstein 2009). This has resulted in an intense debate on the relative merit of data-driven and hypothesis-driven research (for samples, see e.g. Mazzocchi 2015 or Succi and Coveney 2018). For a detailed treatment of this topic, we refer to the entry scientific research and big data .

6. Discourse on scientific method

Despite philosophical disagreements, the idea of the scientific method still figures prominently in contemporary discourse on many different topics, both within science and in society at large. Often, reference to scientific method is used in ways that convey either the legend of a single, universal method characteristic of all science, or grants to a particular method or set of methods privilege as a special ‘gold standard’, often with reference to particular philosophers to vindicate the claims. Discourse on scientific method also typically arises when there is a need to distinguish between science and other activities, or for justifying the special status conveyed to science. In these areas, the philosophical attempts at identifying a set of methods characteristic for scientific endeavors are closely related to the philosophy of science’s classical problem of demarcation (see the entry on science and pseudo-science ) and to the philosophical analysis of the social dimension of scientific knowledge and the role of science in democratic society.

One of the settings in which the legend of a single, universal scientific method has been particularly strong is science education (see, e.g., Bauer 1992; McComas 1996; Wivagg & Allchin 2002). [ 5 ] Often, ‘the scientific method’ is presented in textbooks and educational web pages as a fixed four or five step procedure starting from observations and description of a phenomenon and progressing over formulation of a hypothesis which explains the phenomenon, designing and conducting experiments to test the hypothesis, analyzing the results, and ending with drawing a conclusion. Such references to a universal scientific method can be found in educational material at all levels of science education (Blachowicz 2009), and numerous studies have shown that the idea of a general and universal scientific method often form part of both students’ and teachers’ conception of science (see, e.g., Aikenhead 1987; Osborne et al. 2003). In response, it has been argued that science education need to focus more on teaching about the nature of science, although views have differed on whether this is best done through student-led investigations, contemporary cases, or historical cases (Allchin, Andersen & Nielsen 2014)

Although occasionally phrased with reference to the H-D method, important historical roots of the legend in science education of a single, universal scientific method are the American philosopher and psychologist Dewey’s account of inquiry in How We Think (1910) and the British mathematician Karl Pearson’s account of science in Grammar of Science (1892). On Dewey’s account, inquiry is divided into the five steps of

(i) a felt difficulty, (ii) its location and definition, (iii) suggestion of a possible solution, (iv) development by reasoning of the bearing of the suggestions, (v) further observation and experiment leading to its acceptance or rejection. (Dewey 1910: 72)

Similarly, on Pearson’s account, scientific investigations start with measurement of data and observation of their correction and sequence from which scientific laws can be discovered with the aid of creative imagination. These laws have to be subject to criticism, and their final acceptance will have equal validity for “all normally constituted minds”. Both Dewey’s and Pearson’s accounts should be seen as generalized abstractions of inquiry and not restricted to the realm of science—although both Dewey and Pearson referred to their respective accounts as ‘the scientific method’.

Occasionally, scientists make sweeping statements about a simple and distinct scientific method, as exemplified by Feynman’s simplified version of a conjectures and refutations method presented, for example, in the last of his 1964 Cornell Messenger lectures. [ 6 ] However, just as often scientists have come to the same conclusion as recent philosophy of science that there is not any unique, easily described scientific method. For example, the physicist and Nobel Laureate Weinberg described in the paper “The Methods of Science … And Those By Which We Live” (1995) how

The fact that the standards of scientific success shift with time does not only make the philosophy of science difficult; it also raises problems for the public understanding of science. We do not have a fixed scientific method to rally around and defend. (1995: 8)

Interview studies with scientists on their conception of method shows that scientists often find it hard to figure out whether available evidence confirms their hypothesis, and that there are no direct translations between general ideas about method and specific strategies to guide how research is conducted (Schickore & Hangel 2019, Hangel & Schickore 2017)

Reference to the scientific method has also often been used to argue for the scientific nature or special status of a particular activity. Philosophical positions that argue for a simple and unique scientific method as a criterion of demarcation, such as Popperian falsification, have often attracted practitioners who felt that they had a need to defend their domain of practice. For example, references to conjectures and refutation as the scientific method are abundant in much of the literature on complementary and alternative medicine (CAM)—alongside the competing position that CAM, as an alternative to conventional biomedicine, needs to develop its own methodology different from that of science.

Also within mainstream science, reference to the scientific method is used in arguments regarding the internal hierarchy of disciplines and domains. A frequently seen argument is that research based on the H-D method is superior to research based on induction from observations because in deductive inferences the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. (See, e.g., Parascandola 1998 for an analysis of how this argument has been made to downgrade epidemiology compared to the laboratory sciences.) Similarly, based on an examination of the practices of major funding institutions such as the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the Biomedical Sciences Research Practices (BBSRC) in the UK, O’Malley et al. (2009) have argued that funding agencies seem to have a tendency to adhere to the view that the primary activity of science is to test hypotheses, while descriptive and exploratory research is seen as merely preparatory activities that are valuable only insofar as they fuel hypothesis-driven research.

In some areas of science, scholarly publications are structured in a way that may convey the impression of a neat and linear process of inquiry from stating a question, devising the methods by which to answer it, collecting the data, to drawing a conclusion from the analysis of data. For example, the codified format of publications in most biomedical journals known as the IMRAD format (Introduction, Method, Results, Analysis, Discussion) is explicitly described by the journal editors as “not an arbitrary publication format but rather a direct reflection of the process of scientific discovery” (see the so-called “Vancouver Recommendations”, ICMJE 2013: 11). However, scientific publications do not in general reflect the process by which the reported scientific results were produced. For example, under the provocative title “Is the scientific paper a fraud?”, Medawar argued that scientific papers generally misrepresent how the results have been produced (Medawar 1963/1996). Similar views have been advanced by philosophers, historians and sociologists of science (Gilbert 1976; Holmes 1987; Knorr-Cetina 1981; Schickore 2008; Suppe 1998) who have argued that scientists’ experimental practices are messy and often do not follow any recognizable pattern. Publications of research results, they argue, are retrospective reconstructions of these activities that often do not preserve the temporal order or the logic of these activities, but are instead often constructed in order to screen off potential criticism (see Schickore 2008 for a review of this work).

Philosophical positions on the scientific method have also made it into the court room, especially in the US where judges have drawn on philosophy of science in deciding when to confer special status to scientific expert testimony. A key case is Daubert vs Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92–102, 509 U.S. 579, 1993). In this case, the Supreme Court argued in its 1993 ruling that trial judges must ensure that expert testimony is reliable, and that in doing this the court must look at the expert’s methodology to determine whether the proffered evidence is actually scientific knowledge. Further, referring to works of Popper and Hempel the court stated that

ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge … is whether it can be (and has been) tested. (Justice Blackmun, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals; see Other Internet Resources for a link to the opinion)

But as argued by Haack (2005a,b, 2010) and by Foster & Hubner (1999), by equating the question of whether a piece of testimony is reliable with the question whether it is scientific as indicated by a special methodology, the court was producing an inconsistent mixture of Popper’s and Hempel’s philosophies, and this has later led to considerable confusion in subsequent case rulings that drew on the Daubert case (see Haack 2010 for a detailed exposition).

The difficulties around identifying the methods of science are also reflected in the difficulties of identifying scientific misconduct in the form of improper application of the method or methods of science. One of the first and most influential attempts at defining misconduct in science was the US definition from 1989 that defined misconduct as

fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted within the scientific community . (Code of Federal Regulations, part 50, subpart A., August 8, 1989, italics added)

However, the “other practices that seriously deviate” clause was heavily criticized because it could be used to suppress creative or novel science. For example, the National Academy of Science stated in their report Responsible Science (1992) that it

wishes to discourage the possibility that a misconduct complaint could be lodged against scientists based solely on their use of novel or unorthodox research methods. (NAS: 27)

This clause was therefore later removed from the definition. For an entry into the key philosophical literature on conduct in science, see Shamoo & Resnick (2009).

The question of the source of the success of science has been at the core of philosophy since the beginning of modern science. If viewed as a matter of epistemology more generally, scientific method is a part of the entire history of philosophy. Over that time, science and whatever methods its practitioners may employ have changed dramatically. Today, many philosophers have taken up the banners of pluralism or of practice to focus on what are, in effect, fine-grained and contextually limited examinations of scientific method. Others hope to shift perspectives in order to provide a renewed general account of what characterizes the activity we call science.

One such perspective has been offered recently by Hoyningen-Huene (2008, 2013), who argues from the history of philosophy of science that after three lengthy phases of characterizing science by its method, we are now in a phase where the belief in the existence of a positive scientific method has eroded and what has been left to characterize science is only its fallibility. First was a phase from Plato and Aristotle up until the 17 th century where the specificity of scientific knowledge was seen in its absolute certainty established by proof from evident axioms; next was a phase up to the mid-19 th century in which the means to establish the certainty of scientific knowledge had been generalized to include inductive procedures as well. In the third phase, which lasted until the last decades of the 20 th century, it was recognized that empirical knowledge was fallible, but it was still granted a special status due to its distinctive mode of production. But now in the fourth phase, according to Hoyningen-Huene, historical and philosophical studies have shown how “scientific methods with the characteristics as posited in the second and third phase do not exist” (2008: 168) and there is no longer any consensus among philosophers and historians of science about the nature of science. For Hoyningen-Huene, this is too negative a stance, and he therefore urges the question about the nature of science anew. His own answer to this question is that “scientific knowledge differs from other kinds of knowledge, especially everyday knowledge, primarily by being more systematic” (Hoyningen-Huene 2013: 14). Systematicity can have several different dimensions: among them are more systematic descriptions, explanations, predictions, defense of knowledge claims, epistemic connectedness, ideal of completeness, knowledge generation, representation of knowledge and critical discourse. Hence, what characterizes science is the greater care in excluding possible alternative explanations, the more detailed elaboration with respect to data on which predictions are based, the greater care in detecting and eliminating sources of error, the more articulate connections to other pieces of knowledge, etc. On this position, what characterizes science is not that the methods employed are unique to science, but that the methods are more carefully employed.

Another, similar approach has been offered by Haack (2003). She sets off, similar to Hoyningen-Huene, from a dissatisfaction with the recent clash between what she calls Old Deferentialism and New Cynicism. The Old Deferentialist position is that science progressed inductively by accumulating true theories confirmed by empirical evidence or deductively by testing conjectures against basic statements; while the New Cynics position is that science has no epistemic authority and no uniquely rational method and is merely just politics. Haack insists that contrary to the views of the New Cynics, there are objective epistemic standards, and there is something epistemologically special about science, even though the Old Deferentialists pictured this in a wrong way. Instead, she offers a new Critical Commonsensist account on which standards of good, strong, supportive evidence and well-conducted, honest, thorough and imaginative inquiry are not exclusive to the sciences, but the standards by which we judge all inquirers. In this sense, science does not differ in kind from other kinds of inquiry, but it may differ in the degree to which it requires broad and detailed background knowledge and a familiarity with a technical vocabulary that only specialists may possess.

• Aikenhead, G.S., 1987, “High-school graduates’ beliefs about science-technology-society. III. Characteristics and limitations of scientific knowledge”, Science Education , 71(4): 459–487.
• Allchin, D., H.M. Andersen and K. Nielsen, 2014, “Complementary Approaches to Teaching Nature of Science: Integrating Student Inquiry, Historical Cases, and Contemporary Cases in Classroom Practice”, Science Education , 98: 461–486.
• Anderson, C., 2008, “The end of theory: The data deluge makes the scientific method obsolete”, Wired magazine , 16(7): 16–07
• Arabatzis, T., 2006, “On the inextricability of the context of discovery and the context of justification”, in Revisiting Discovery and Justification , J. Schickore and F. Steinle (eds.), Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 215–230.
• Barnes, J. (ed.), 1984, The Complete Works of Aristotle, Vols I and II , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Barnes, B. and D. Bloor, 1982, “Relativism, Rationalism, and the Sociology of Knowledge”, in Rationality and Relativism , M. Hollis and S. Lukes (eds.), Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 1–20.
• Bauer, H.H., 1992, Scientific Literacy and the Myth of the Scientific Method , Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
• Bechtel, W. and R.C. Richardson, 1993, Discovering complexity , Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Berkeley, G., 1734, The Analyst in De Motu and The Analyst: A Modern Edition with Introductions and Commentary , D. Jesseph (trans. and ed.), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
• Blachowicz, J., 2009, “How science textbooks treat scientific method: A philosopher’s perspective”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 60(2): 303–344.
• Bloor, D., 1991, Knowledge and Social Imagery , Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2 nd edition.
• Boyle, R., 1682, New experiments physico-mechanical, touching the air , Printed by Miles Flesher for Richard Davis, bookseller in Oxford.
• Bridgman, P.W., 1927, The Logic of Modern Physics , New York: Macmillan.
• –––, 1956, “The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts”, in The Foundations of Science and the Concepts of Science and Psychology , Herbert Feigl and Michael Scriven (eds.), Minnesota: University of Minneapolis Press, pp. 38–76.
• Burian, R., 1997, “Exploratory Experimentation and the Role of Histochemical Techniques in the Work of Jean Brachet, 1938–1952”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences , 19(1): 27–45.
• –––, 2007, “On microRNA and the need for exploratory experimentation in post-genomic molecular biology”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences , 29(3): 285–311.
• Carnap, R., 1928, Der logische Aufbau der Welt , Berlin: Bernary, transl. by R.A. George, The Logical Structure of the World , Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
• –––, 1956, “The methodological character of theoretical concepts”, Minnesota studies in the philosophy of science , 1: 38–76.
• Carrol, S., and D. Goodstein, 2009, “Defining the scientific method”, Nature Methods , 6: 237.
• Churchman, C.W., 1948, “Science, Pragmatics, Induction”, Philosophy of Science , 15(3): 249–268.
• Cooper, J. (ed.), 1997, Plato: Complete Works , Indianapolis: Hackett.
• Darden, L., 1991, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics , Oxford: Oxford University Press
• Dewey, J., 1910, How we think , New York: Dover Publications (reprinted 1997).
• Douglas, H., 2009, Science, Policy, and the Value-Free Ideal , Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
• Dupré, J., 2004, “Miracle of Monism ”, in Naturalism in Question , Mario De Caro and David Macarthur (eds.), Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, pp. 36–58.
• Elliott, K.C., 2007, “Varieties of exploratory experimentation in nanotoxicology”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences , 29(3): 311–334.
• Elliott, K. C., and T. Richards (eds.), 2017, Exploring inductive risk: Case studies of values in science , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Falcon, Andrea, 2005, Aristotle and the science of nature: Unity without uniformity , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Feyerabend, P., 1978, Science in a Free Society , London: New Left Books
• –––, 1988, Against Method , London: Verso, 2 nd edition.
• Fisher, R.A., 1955, “Statistical Methods and Scientific Induction”, Journal of The Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) , 17(1): 69–78.
• Foster, K. and P.W. Huber, 1999, Judging Science. Scientific Knowledge and the Federal Courts , Cambridge: MIT Press.
• Fox Keller, E., 2003, “Models, Simulation, and ‘computer experiments’”, in The Philosophy of Scientific Experimentation , H. Radder (ed.), Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press, 198–215.
• Gilbert, G., 1976, “The transformation of research findings into scientific knowledge”, Social Studies of Science , 6: 281–306.
• Gimbel, S., 2011, Exploring the Scientific Method , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Goodman, N., 1965, Fact , Fiction, and Forecast , Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill.
• Haack, S., 1995, “Science is neither sacred nor a confidence trick”, Foundations of Science , 1(3): 323–335.
• –––, 2003, Defending science—within reason , Amherst: Prometheus.
• –––, 2005a, “Disentangling Daubert: an epistemological study in theory and practice”, Journal of Philosophy, Science and Law , 5, Haack 2005a available online . doi:10.5840/jpsl2005513
• –––, 2005b, “Trial and error: The Supreme Court’s philosophy of science”, American Journal of Public Health , 95: S66-S73.
• –––, 2010, “Federal Philosophy of Science: A Deconstruction-and a Reconstruction”, NYUJL & Liberty , 5: 394.
• Hangel, N. and J. Schickore, 2017, “Scientists’ conceptions of good research practice”, Perspectives on Science , 25(6): 766–791
• Harper, W.L., 2011, Isaac Newton’s Scientific Method: Turning Data into Evidence about Gravity and Cosmology , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Hempel, C., 1950, “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning”, Revue Internationale de Philosophie , 41(11): 41–63.
• –––, 1951, “The Concept of Cognitive Significance: A Reconsideration”, Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences , 80(1): 61–77.
• –––, 1965, Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays in the philosophy of science , New York–London: Free Press.
• –––, 1966, Philosophy of Natural Science , Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
• Holmes, F.L., 1987, “Scientific writing and scientific discovery”, Isis , 78(2): 220–235.
• Howard, D., 2003, “Two left turns make a right: On the curious political career of North American philosophy of science at midcentury”, in Logical Empiricism in North America , G.L. Hardcastle & A.W. Richardson (eds.), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 25–93.
• Hoyningen-Huene, P., 2008, “Systematicity: The nature of science”, Philosophia , 36(2): 167–180.
• –––, 2013, Systematicity. The Nature of Science , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Howie, D., 2002, Interpreting probability: Controversies and developments in the early twentieth century , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Hughes, R., 1999, “The Ising Model, Computer Simulation, and Universal Physics”, in Models as Mediators , M. Morgan and M. Morrison (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 97–145
• Hume, D., 1739, A Treatise of Human Nature , D. Fate Norton and M.J. Norton (eds.), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
• Humphreys, P., 1995, “Computational science and scientific method”, Minds and Machines , 5(1): 499–512.
• ICMJE, 2013, “Recommendations for the Conduct, Reporting, Editing, and Publication of Scholarly Work in Medical Journals”, International Committee of Medical Journal Editors, available online , accessed August 13 2014
• Jeffrey, R.C., 1956, “Valuation and Acceptance of Scientific Hypotheses”, Philosophy of Science , 23(3): 237–246.
• Kaufmann, W.J., and L.L. Smarr, 1993, Supercomputing and the Transformation of Science , New York: Scientific American Library.
• Knorr-Cetina, K., 1981, The Manufacture of Knowledge , Oxford: Pergamon Press.
• Krohs, U., 2012, “Convenience experimentation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and BiomedicalSciences , 43: 52–57.
• Kuhn, T.S., 1962, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions , Chicago: University of Chicago Press
• Latour, B. and S. Woolgar, 1986, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts , Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2 nd edition.
• Laudan, L., 1968, “Theories of scientific method from Plato to Mach”, History of Science , 7(1): 1–63.
• Lenhard, J., 2006, “Models and statistical inference: The controversy between Fisher and Neyman-Pearson”, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 57(1): 69–91.
• Leonelli, S., 2012, “Making Sense of Data-Driven Research in the Biological and the Biomedical Sciences”, Studies in the History and Philosophy of the Biological and Biomedical Sciences , 43(1): 1–3.
• Levi, I., 1960, “Must the scientist make value judgments?”, Philosophy of Science , 57(11): 345–357
• Lindley, D., 1991, Theory Change in Science: Strategies from Mendelian Genetics , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Lipton, P., 2004, Inference to the Best Explanation , London: Routledge, 2 nd edition.
• Marks, H.M., 2000, The progress of experiment: science and therapeutic reform in the United States, 1900–1990 , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Mazzochi, F., 2015, “Could Big Data be the end of theory in science?”, EMBO reports , 16: 1250–1255.
• Mayo, D.G., 1996, Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• McComas, W.F., 1996, “Ten myths of science: Reexamining what we think we know about the nature of science”, School Science and Mathematics , 96(1): 10–16.
• Medawar, P.B., 1963/1996, “Is the scientific paper a fraud”, in The Strange Case of the Spotted Mouse and Other Classic Essays on Science , Oxford: Oxford University Press, 33–39.
• Mill, J.S., 1963, Collected Works of John Stuart Mill , J. M. Robson (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press
• NAS, 1992, Responsible Science: Ensuring the integrity of the research process , Washington DC: National Academy Press.
• Nersessian, N.J., 1987, “A cognitive-historical approach to meaning in scientific theories”, in The process of science , N. Nersessian (ed.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 161–177.
• –––, 2008, Creating Scientific Concepts , Cambridge: MIT Press.
• Newton, I., 1726, Philosophiae naturalis Principia Mathematica (3 rd edition), in The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy: A New Translation , I.B. Cohen and A. Whitman (trans.), Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999.
• –––, 1704, Opticks or A Treatise of the Reflections, Refractions, Inflections & Colors of Light , New York: Dover Publications, 1952.
• Neyman, J., 1956, “Note on an Article by Sir Ronald Fisher”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society. Series B (Methodological) , 18: 288–294.
• Nickles, T., 1987, “Methodology, heuristics, and rationality”, in Rational changes in science: Essays on Scientific Reasoning , J.C. Pitt (ed.), Berlin: Springer, pp. 103–132.
• Nicod, J., 1924, Le problème logique de l’induction , Paris: Alcan. (Engl. transl. “The Logical Problem of Induction”, in Foundations of Geometry and Induction , London: Routledge, 2000.)
• Nola, R. and H. Sankey, 2000a, “A selective survey of theories of scientific method”, in Nola and Sankey 2000b: 1–65.
• –––, 2000b, After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend. Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method , London: Springer.
• –––, 2007, Theories of Scientific Method , Stocksfield: Acumen.
• Norton, S., and F. Suppe, 2001, “Why atmospheric modeling is good science”, in Changing the Atmosphere: Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance , C. Miller and P. Edwards (eds.), Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 88–133.
• O’Malley, M., 2007, “Exploratory experimentation and scientific practice: Metagenomics and the proteorhodopsin case”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences , 29(3): 337–360.
• O’Malley, M., C. Haufe, K. Elliot, and R. Burian, 2009, “Philosophies of Funding”, Cell , 138: 611–615.
• Oreskes, N., K. Shrader-Frechette, and K. Belitz, 1994, “Verification, Validation and Confirmation of Numerical Models in the Earth Sciences”, Science , 263(5147): 641–646.
• Osborne, J., S. Simon, and S. Collins, 2003, “Attitudes towards science: a review of the literature and its implications”, International Journal of Science Education , 25(9): 1049–1079.
• Parascandola, M., 1998, “Epidemiology—2 nd -Rate Science”, Public Health Reports , 113(4): 312–320.
• Parker, W., 2008a, “Franklin, Holmes and the Epistemology of Computer Simulation”, International Studies in the Philosophy of Science , 22(2): 165–83.
• –––, 2008b, “Computer Simulation through an Error-Statistical Lens”, Synthese , 163(3): 371–84.
• Pearson, K. 1892, The Grammar of Science , London: J.M. Dents and Sons, 1951
• Pearson, E.S., 1955, “Statistical Concepts in Their Relation to Reality”, Journal of the Royal Statistical Society , B, 17: 204–207.
• Pickering, A., 1984, Constructing Quarks: A Sociological History of Particle Physics , Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
• Popper, K.R., 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery , London: Routledge, 2002
• –––, 1963, Conjectures and Refutations , London: Routledge, 2002.
• –––, 1985, Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography , La Salle: Open Court Publishing Co..
• Rudner, R., 1953, “The Scientist Qua Scientist Making Value Judgments”, Philosophy of Science , 20(1): 1–6.
• Rudolph, J.L., 2005, “Epistemology for the masses: The origin of ‘The Scientific Method’ in American Schools”, History of Education Quarterly , 45(3): 341–376
• Schickore, J., 2008, “Doing science, writing science”, Philosophy of Science , 75: 323–343.
• Schickore, J. and N. Hangel, 2019, “‘It might be this, it should be that…’ uncertainty and doubt in day-to-day science practice”, European Journal for Philosophy of Science , 9(2): 31. doi:10.1007/s13194-019-0253-9
• Shamoo, A.E. and D.B. Resnik, 2009, Responsible Conduct of Research , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Shank, J.B., 2008, The Newton Wars and the Beginning of the French Enlightenment , Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
• Shapin, S. and S. Schaffer, 1985, Leviathan and the air-pump , Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Smith, G.E., 2002, “The Methodology of the Principia”, in The Cambridge Companion to Newton , I.B. Cohen and G.E. Smith (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 138–173.
• Snyder, L.J., 1997a, “Discoverers’ Induction”, Philosophy of Science , 64: 580–604.
• –––, 1997b, “The Mill-Whewell Debate: Much Ado About Induction”, Perspectives on Science , 5: 159–198.
• –––, 1999, “Renovating the Novum Organum: Bacon, Whewell and Induction”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , 30: 531–557.
• Sober, E., 2008, Evidence and Evolution. The logic behind the science , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Sprenger, J. and S. Hartmann, 2019, Bayesian philosophy of science , Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Steinle, F., 1997, “Entering New Fields: Exploratory Uses of Experimentation”, Philosophy of Science (Proceedings), 64: S65–S74.
• –––, 2002, “Experiments in History and Philosophy of Science”, Perspectives on Science , 10(4): 408–432.
• Strasser, B.J., 2012, “Data-driven sciences: From wonder cabinets to electronic databases”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences , 43(1): 85–87.
• Succi, S. and P.V. Coveney, 2018, “Big data: the end of the scientific method?”, Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society A , 377: 20180145. doi:10.1098/rsta.2018.0145
• Suppe, F., 1998, “The Structure of a Scientific Paper”, Philosophy of Science , 65(3): 381–405.
• Swijtink, Z.G., 1987, “The objectification of observation: Measurement and statistical methods in the nineteenth century”, in The probabilistic revolution. Ideas in History, Vol. 1 , L. Kruger (ed.), Cambridge MA: MIT Press, pp. 261–285.
• Waters, C.K., 2007, “The nature and context of exploratory experimentation: An introduction to three case studies of exploratory research”, History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences , 29(3): 275–284.
• Weinberg, S., 1995, “The methods of science… and those by which we live”, Academic Questions , 8(2): 7–13.
• Weissert, T., 1997, The Genesis of Simulation in Dynamics: Pursuing the Fermi-Pasta-Ulam Problem , New York: Springer Verlag.
• William H., 1628, Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus , in On the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals , R. Willis (trans.), Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1993.
• Winsberg, E., 2010, Science in the Age of Computer Simulation , Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Wivagg, D. & D. Allchin, 2002, “The Dogma of the Scientific Method”, The American Biology Teacher , 64(9): 645–646

How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up topics and thinkers related to this entry at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Blackmun opinion , in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92–102), 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
• Scientific Method at philpapers. Darrell Rowbottom (ed.).
• Recent Articles | Scientific Method | The Scientist Magazine

al-Kindi | Albert the Great [= Albertus magnus] | Aquinas, Thomas | Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, disciplines in: natural philosophy and natural science | Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: Greek sources | Arabic and Islamic Philosophy, historical and methodological topics in: influence of Arabic and Islamic Philosophy on the Latin West | Aristotle | Bacon, Francis | Bacon, Roger | Berkeley, George | biology: experiment in | Boyle, Robert | Cambridge Platonists | confirmation | Descartes, René | Enlightenment | epistemology | epistemology: Bayesian | epistemology: social | Feyerabend, Paul | Galileo Galilei | Grosseteste, Robert | Hempel, Carl | Hume, David | Hume, David: Newtonianism and Anti-Newtonianism | induction: problem of | Kant, Immanuel | Kuhn, Thomas | Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm | Locke, John | Mill, John Stuart | More, Henry | Neurath, Otto | Newton, Isaac | Newton, Isaac: philosophy | Ockham [Occam], William | operationalism | Peirce, Charles Sanders | Plato | Popper, Karl | rationality: historicist theories of | Reichenbach, Hans | reproducibility, scientific | Schlick, Moritz | science: and pseudo-science | science: theory and observation in | science: unity of | scientific discovery | scientific knowledge: social dimensions of | simulations in science | skepticism: medieval | space and time: absolute and relational space and motion, post-Newtonian theories | Vienna Circle | Whewell, William | Zabarella, Giacomo

Copyright © 2021 by Brian Hepburn < brian . hepburn @ wichita . edu > Hanne Andersen < hanne . andersen @ ind . ku . dk >

• Accessibility

Support SEP

Mirror sites.

View this site from another server:

• Info about mirror sites

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy is copyright © 2023 by The Metaphysics Research Lab , Department of Philosophy, Stanford University

Library of Congress Catalog Data: ISSN 1095-5054

Define Hypothesis: Unveiling the First Step in Scientific Inquiry

Master Scientific Data Visualization. Learn how to make data easier, unlock insights and captivate audiences effectively.

Welcome to the world of research, where you’ll journey through a universe brimming with questions and curiosity. In this cosmos, a hypothesis is one celestial object you can’t miss! Today’s expedition invites you on board an exploration to ‘Define Hypothesis.’ Hop in; it wouldn’t be hyperbole to state we’re about to unlock the nucleus behind every ever scientific theory and inquiry!

Definition of Hypothesis

Introduction to the concept of hypothesis.

Picture yourself as a detective solving a case. Right from inspecting clues, formulating potential theories on whodunit, putting these theories under rigorous tests until finally reaching that elusive conclusive evidence – exciting, isn’t it?

Now replace detective with researcher and voila – here comes our heavyweight term: Hypothesis. Much like how any plausible theory drives detectives’ investigations, scientific hypotheses are vital navigational compasses guiding researchers in their quest for scientific evolutions.

Explanation of What a Hypothesis Is in The Context of Research and Scientific Inquiry

A hypothesis – popularly known as an educated guess or predictive statement – represents an initial supposition or proposed explanation made on limited information but founded on validation-grounded knowledge. It forms the basis for preliminary exploration into a specific set of circumstances or natural phenomena beyond.

Formulated prior to conducting research, scientists employ hypotheses as testable conjectures to explain an observed behavior or event. Confused? Fret not. To put it simply and by example: “If I increase the frequency of watering my plants twice daily (instead of solely relying upon weather conditions), then they will grow faster.” Now that’s what we call an everyday-life hypothesis!

Remember, hypotheses are not wild guesses plucked out of thin air but rather preconceived assertions open to empirical verification. They mark the inception point for any scientific investigation and serve as cornerstones for further experiments.

Characteristics and Components of a Hypothesis

Key characteristics of a hypothesis.

Before plunging into the deep end to define a hypothesis, let’s brush up on the features that contribute to effective hypotheses. For starters, a strong hypothesis is testable. This means it must be possible for empirical evidence to either support the word hypothesis or contradict it. The proposal should also be logically consistent and grounded firmly in existing knowledge.

Further down the line, another salient feature is specificity. Good hypotheses are not broad statements but instead focus on a specific aspect or phenomenon within the intended research field. Moreover, they are typically succinct and easily understandable ensuring information isn’t lost in translation among researchers.

Moreover, any well-structured hypothesis connects the independent and dependent variables together – typically, there’s at least one independent and one dependent variable involved. These elements form a relationship where changes instigated in the independent variable affect the values observed for the dependent variable.

Lastly but importantly, a solid hypothesis often carries potential implications for future research areas and can potentially lead to further tests and studies if verified.

Elements that make up a well-formulated hypothesis

Delving deeper into what shapes up a robust hypothesis, we realize that certain crucial components determine its effectiveness.

Firstly, every good hypothesis or test has clear variables which essentially refer to specific aspects of the study subject matter being measured or manipulated during research. These aspects are segregated as:

• Independent Variable (IV): This component relates directly to what you have control over in your study.
• Dependent Variable (DV): This component consists of outcomes affected by alterations made in IV

Next comes ‘Predicted Outcome’ – what you anticipate happening as repercussions due to modification of two or more variables under scrutiny.

The ‘Testability’ factor also holds veritable importance comprising experimental procedures capable enough to refute or accept your claims.

The last element circles the argument around presenting a capacity called ‘Relationship’ correlating IV with DV believed to either causing some effect or showcasing an association.

Hence, these prime facets further accentuate your endeavor to adequately define the hypothesis.

Importance and Purpose of a Hypothesis

Understanding the Role of a Hypothesis in Research

First, let’s delve into the overarching role that hypothesis plays within research scenarios. As we define the hypothesis, you should view this as an underlying pillar or guiding star for your investigation. A well-articulated hypothesis steers your exploration by providing clarity on what specifically you aim to examine.

A meaningful analogy would be considering a hypothesis as a compass during a voyage. If research is the vast ocean where confusing whirlpools of data and evidence abound, then it can guide us in our direction rather than letting us drift aimlessly. Furthermore, the formulation of a quality hypothesis inherently demands clarity about your objectives upfront – this essentially sets your research vessel on course bearing towards effective outcomes.

Exploring Why Formulating A Hypothesis is Crucial in Scientific Investigations

So why precisely is nurturing such a detailed forecast vital?

• Structural Advantage: By proposing potential answers to posed questions via hypotheses, researchers streamline their methods and techniques. The approach undertaken depends significantly on what the suggested outcome or phenomenon might be.
• Generate Preliminary Expectations: Even if they’re proven wrong, making observations and developing models based on hypotheses often lead to more interesting inquiries or turn up unexpected findings.
• Quantifiable Predictions: More than simple conjectures, strong hypotheses are testable; they propose results expressed in measurable terms.

In essence, remember that formulating hypotheses smoothes the path towards solid conclusions by being the architect’s blueprints of robust investigations. Never underestimate the forward thrust they provide for progress within scientific inquiry!

Types of Hypotheses

Once we understand to define a hypothesis, we’ll find that hypotheses come in several types. Different classifications of plural hypotheses depend on their formulations and the nature of predictions or assumptions they lead towards – simple, complex, directional, non-directional, null, associative and causal. Let’s explore some of these.

Simple Hypothesis: Definition and Examples

A simple hypothesis is a type of prediction or an educated guess that carries one independent variable and one dependent variable. In essence, it creates a relationship between two singular entities; for instance, ‘Exercise improves memory.’ This suggests that there’s an impact (of improvement) on the ‘memory’ (dependent variable) by ‘exercise’ (independent variable).

Complex Hypothesis: Definition and Examples

On the contrary to its name mate – a simple hypothesis – a complex hypothesis involves more than just two variables. It points out multiple variables and how they interlink with each other. The effects aren’t just limited to cause-and-effect but can be interactive or combined impact-dependent variables too – for instance,’Diet and exercise affect weight loss and heart health.’ Here, diet and exercise are your independent factors influencing multifold aspects like weight loss (a dependent variable) alongside heart health(another dependent variable).

Directional Hypothesis: Definition and Examples

One might argue that the path laid by a directional hypothesis is less twisted as it predicts the directionality of an effect – whether one variable will increase or decrease another variable. An example here could be “Cutting down on alcohol will reduce liver disorders.” Here a reduction in ‘drinking alcohol’ implicitly identifies fewer occurrences of ‘liver disorders.’

Non-directional Hypothesis: Definition and Examples

Sometimes science requires open-ended answers; henceforth comes into play our non-directional hypothesis which merely stipulates that there’s going to be an impact without specifying its course – good, bad or otherwise. For example, “Exposure to secondhand smoke influences lung health.” It infers that there’s an effect on ‘lung health’ due to ‘secondhand smoke,’ without indicating if it’s an improvement or deterioration.

Null Hypothesis: Definition and Examples

The null hypothesis, often symbolized as H0, makes things pretty straight with assumptions; basically, it purports no existence of a relationship between the variables. Researchers utilize this hypothesis chiefly for statistical testing. In lay terms – “Smoking is not linked to lung cancer.” Here a nonexistence of association is suggested between ‘smoking’ and ‘lung cancer.’

Associative and Causal Hypothesis: Explanation and Examples

Now leaving the train station named Null-ville we enter into quite associative terrain where the associative hypothesis foretells ‘relationships’ but are shy when it comes to cause-effects. An instance could be “Students scoring high also tend to play chess.” These fellows here don’t claim that playing chess outrightly shoots up scores yet suggests a specific pattern.

On another spectrum brightful cause-effect claims jump in bravely shouting out not just relationships but boldly stating their causes too – “Consumption of fast food leads to obesity” is being so certain about fast food consumption (cause) escalating obesity levels(effect).

Navigating through these alternative hypotheses and variants allows us to step into researchers’ shoes better while also helps defining complex constructions bit by bit, making them simple outcomes anyone can interpret.

Developing and Testing a Hypothesis

In the world of research, it’s not uncommon to hear someone say “Let’s define hypothesis!” This term may seem complex at first glance, but its essence falls within our natural instinct to question and learn. To give structure to this innate curiosity, we form hypotheses and navigate through the rigorous process of testing them.

Process of Formulating a Hypothesis

Forming an effective hypothesis is both an art and a science. It involves finding a perfect blend between creativity and logical reasoning. Here are some simple yet essential steps you’d want to follow:

• Identify Your Research Question – The first step towards formulating a hypothesis is defining your research question based on preliminary observations or literature review.
• Conduct Thorough Literature Review – Once your question is in place, an extensive read about what has already been studied can help refine it further.
• Create Tentative Explanation – Develop a preliminary answer based on your knowledge and understanding which will serve as your tentative explanation or hypothesis.
• Refine Your Hypothesis : Refine this initial guess considering available resources for empirical testing, ethical implications, and potential outcomes.

Remember that the key is formation clarity in statement-making; overly complex language might obscure rather than clarify your central idea.

Importance of Testing a Hypothesis Through Empirical Research Methods

Testing a hypothesis isn’t simply about proving it right or wrong; it’s much more refined than that – it’s about validation and advancement of human knowledge. By applying empirical methods such as observation or experimentation, logic meets practice in real-world scenarios.

These hands-on approaches afford us precious insights into how our theories hold up under scrutiny outside the confines of abstract thought alone.

• Validity Confirmation : Empirical testing helps confirm if our predictions were correct or not, providing validation for our presumptions.
• Understanding Relationships : Testing allows us to assess the relational dynamics between variables under investigation.
• Promotes Scientific Inquiry : Empirical testing encourages a systematic and objective approach to understanding phenomena, which lies at the heart of scientific inquiry.

Consider this: hypotheses are our best-educated guesses – smart hunches rooted in what we know so far. To move beyond guessing and into knowledgeable assertion, we define hypothesis structure as one that can be empirically tested. Only then do we truly start to shape our understanding with any level of certainty.

Examples of Hypotheses in Different Fields

Indeed, it’s fundamental to understand that hypotheses are not confined to a single discipline but span across numerous fields. To better illuminate this, let’s delve into various examples.

Examples of Hypotheses in Scientific Research Studies

In the realm of scientific research studies, hypotheses play a pivotal role in shaping the basis for investigations research hypotheses and experiments. Let’s consider an elementary example: studying plant growth. A researcher might formulate the hypothesis – “If a specific type of fertilizer is used, then plants will grow more rapidly.” This hypothesis aims to validate or refute the assumption that given fertilizer perceptibly affects plant growth rate.

Another common example arises from investigating causal relationships between physical activity and heart health. The scientist may hypothesize that “Regular aerobic exercise decreases the risk of heart disease.”

Examples of Hypotheses in Social Sciences

When we transition towards social sciences, which deals with human behavior and its relation to societal constructs, our formative definitions undergo a change as well.

Imagine researchers examining how socioeconomic status influences educational attainment rates. They could pose a hypothesis saying, “High socioeconomic status positively correlates with higher levels of formal education.” This hypothesis attempts to tie economic background directly to education outcomes.

The correlation between gender diversity within workplace teams and improved business performance presents another illustration. A possible hypothesis could be – “Teams comprising diverse genders exhibit superior business performance than homogenous teams.”

Examples of Hypotheses in Psychology

Within psychology – the study dedicated to how individuals think, feel, and behave; clearly stated hypotheses serve as essential stepping stones for meaningful findings and insights.

Take, for instance, predicting performance under pressure: psychologists may propose an assumption like – “Stress triggers increased errors on complex tasks”. Or when researching cognitive development in children – they may hypothesize – “Language acquisition accelerates once children start attending school”.

Examples of Hypotheses in Medical Research

Lastly but importantly, in medical research, well-articulated hypotheses help probe pressing healthcare questions and identify effective treatments.

For instance: “Patients receiving chemotherapy experience significant weight loss”. Or regarding disease transmission during pandemics – they might propose “Regular hand sanitation reduces the risk of COVID-19 infection.”

In conclusion, these examples hopefully underline the importance and versatility of a hypothesis in scientific inquiry. Irrespective of its utilization within various research fields, a scientific hypothesis still essentially remains an educated assumption that offers direction and purpose to the investigation. Interestingly enough, each study’s defined hypothesis sets forth a path leading towards a better comprehension of our world and life within it.

Common Mistakes to Avoid when Formulating a Hypothesis

Identifying errors that researchers often make when developing a hypothesis.

Many researchers, especially those new in the field, may sometimes falter while crafting their hypotheses. Here are some frequently observed mistakes:

• Framing Vague Hypotheses : Clarity is vital when defining your hypothesis. A common pitfall involves creating an ambiguous statement which leaves room for multiple interpretations. This hinders precise data collection and analysis.
• Formulating Unfalsifiable Hypotheses : These are statements that cannot be proven false because they don’t connect to observable or measurable variables.
• Targeting Unachievable Results : Often, there is an inclination to develop complex hypotheses expecting groundbreaking findings. However, it’s crucial to limit the scope according to practical constraints and possibilities.
• Ignoring Null Hypothesis : The null hypothesis provides a means of contradiction to the alternative hypothesis being tested, making it essential for any research study.

Tips for avoiding these mistakes

After identifying the commonly made errors when forming a hypothesis, let’s now consider some proactive measures you can adopt:

• Crystallize Your Thoughts : Before you articulate your hypothesis, refine and clarify your ideas first. Define the parameters of your study clearly and ensure your proposition directly aligns with them.
• Keep It Simple : Stick with simplicity as much as possible in describing expected relationships or patterns in your research subject area. Remember: A simpler hypothesis often leads to effective testing.
• Embrace Falsifiability . To avoid making unfalsifiable claims, learn how to craft ‘If – Then’ statements articulately in your define hypothesis process.
• Remember the Null Hypothesis : Always formulate and account for a null hypothesis—a statement that negates the relationship between variables—for robust results validation.

In truth, it takes practice to strike the right balance and formulate a solid, practical hypothesis for your research. With these tips in mind, you’re better equipped to avoid common pitfalls that can compromise the quality of your investigation as they guide your approach when you define hypotheses.

Evaluating and Refining a Hypothesis

Laying out a hypothesis is merely the first stage of an intricate journey. Testing and refining this conjecture is equally pivotal in perfecting your next scientific method of undertaking. This pathway comprises evaluation for validity, and relevance, followed by refinement through research findings.

Methods for Assessing the Validity and Relevance of a Hypothesis

To define a hypothesis of meticulosity, we need to subject it to rigorous scrutiny. Utilizing statistical tests enables you to judge the validity of your hypothesis. Here’s a brief look at some key methods that can assist in assessing your theory:

• Empirical Testing : Conduct experiments or surveys as per the requirements of your study.
• Consistency Check : The hypothesis should remain consistent with other established theories and laws within its field.
• Falsifiability principle : Proposed by Karl Popper, a valid hypothesis must be capable of being proven wrong.

Let me reemphasize here, that relevance plays an integral part too especially when defining hypotheses linked with pragmatics like social sciences or business studies.

A relevant hypothesis will hold significance to not just existing knowledge but also pave the way for future work within the particular area of expertise. It should address gaps in current scientific theories while shedding light on possible solutions.

Ways to Refine and Modify a Hypothesis Based on Research Findings

Our job doesn’t end up on developing an initial proposition; it’s crucial to use findings from our research to refine that preliminary conception further. This essential process breathes life into what was once purely speculative.

While refining your conjecture can sound daunting initially, I assure you it’s nothing more complicated than diagnosing any missing links between your original theory and novel evidence you’ve discovered along this research journey.

If H0 (null hypothesis) contradicts your empirical results, then getting back onto the drafting board becomes necessary for crafting H1 (alternative hypothesis). This scientific cycle of formulating, testing then reformulating the hypotheses can continue till we eventually reach statistically significant results.

Remember, it’s important to be open-minded and responsive towards indications from your research findings. They will guide you intuitively in tweaking your working hypothesis in sync with your target goals.

Hence we must embrace this intricate art of defining a hypothesis while simultaneously embracing its dynamic nature which requires periodic refinement based upon insightful feedback from meticulous research.

Summarizing the Key Points About the Definition and Characteristics of a Hypothesis

Having delved into the concept extensively, we can confidently define a hypothesis as an informed and testable guess or prediction that acts as a guiding light in research studies and scientific investigations. When formulated correctly, it comprises two essential elements: clarity and specificity. It should be free from ambiguity, allowing other researchers to easily understand its proposed idea and the direction the study is heading.

In addition, a robust hypothesis exhibits predictability. As a researcher, you’re not only stating what you think will happen but also defining the variables in your experiment – your assumption confines your investigation’s parameters to make it manageable. Lastly, remember that any meaningful hypothesis must be verifiable — capable of being supported or refuted through data collection and analysis.

Reiterating the Importance of Hypotheses in Scientific Inquiry and Research

This discourse wouldn’t be complete without reaffirming how indispensable hypotheses are within scientific explorations and research inquiries. A conceptualized hypothesis serves as a foundational block upon which every aspect of a research project is built. It directs your observations along assumed patterns, thereby saving time during investigations.

We also need to note that formulating hypotheses promotes critical thinking skills among researchers because they require logical reasoning backed by empirical evidence rather than just empty conjectures.

Henceforth, whether you’re treading through unchartered waters of complex scientific endeavors or conducting social science research with less strict rules for predictions – keeping these insights on “define hypothesis” at hand would surely enhance your journey towards revealing valuable truths.

In essence, cultivating a comprehensive understanding of what constitutes a well-formed hypothesis not only lends credibility to our investigative ventures but also enables us to bring precision, focus, and relevance to our chosen field of exploration. The power lies in its simplistic yet profound ability to guide us from uncertainty towards concrete evidential findings – truly embodying scientific inquiry’s spirit!

Unlock the Power of Visualization with Mind the Graph: Elevate Your Hypothesis to New Heights

As a scientist, your hypothesis is the cornerstone of your research journey. But what if you could take it beyond mere words and equations, and transform it into a visual masterpiece that captivates your audience? Enter Mind the Graph , your ultimate ally in scientific visualization. With our intuitive platform, you can seamlessly translate complex hypotheses into stunning graphs, charts, and illustrations that speak volumes. Whether you are presenting at a conference, publishing a paper, or simply sharing your findings with the world, Mind the Graph empowers you to convey your hypotheses with clarity, precision, and undeniable impact. Join the scientific revolution today and let your hypotheses shine like never before with Mind the Graph.

Subscribe to our newsletter

Exclusive high quality content about effective visual communication in science.

Unlock Your Creativity

Create infographics, presentations and other scientifically-accurate designs without hassle — absolutely free for 7 days!

About Fabricio Pamplona

Fabricio Pamplona is the founder of Mind the Graph - a tool used by over 400K users in 60 countries. He has a Ph.D. and solid scientific background in Psychopharmacology and experience as a Guest Researcher at the Max Planck Institute of Psychiatry (Germany) and Researcher in D'Or Institute for Research and Education (IDOR, Brazil). Fabricio holds over 2500 citations in Google Scholar. He has 10 years of experience in small innovative businesses, with relevant experience in product design and innovation management. Connect with him on LinkedIn - Fabricio Pamplona .

Content tags

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• 16 April 2024

US COVID-origins hearing puts scientific journals in the hot seat

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Brad Wenstrup (right), a Republican from Ohio who chairs the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, speaks with Raul Ruiz (left), a Democrat from California who is ranking member of the subcommittee. Credit: Al Drago/Bloomberg/Getty

During a public hearing in Washington DC today, Republicans in the US House of Representatives alleged that government scientists unduly influenced the editors of scientific journals and that, in turn, those publications stifled discourse about the origins of the COVID-19 pandemic. Democrats clapped back, lambasting their Republican colleagues for making such accusations without adequate evidence and for sowing distrust of science.

US congressional hearing produces heat but no light on COVID-origins debate

The session is the latest in a series of hearings held by the Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic to explore where the SARS-CoV-2 coronavirus came from, despite a lack of any new scientific evidence. Scientists have for some time been arguing over whether the virus spread naturally, from animals to people, or whether it leaked from a laboratory in Wuhan, China. Some have alleged that in the early days of the pandemic, government scientists Anthony Fauci, former director of the US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, and Francis Collins, former director of the US National Institutes of Health (NIH), steered the scientific community, including journals, to dismiss the lab-leak hypothesis.

During the pandemic, “rather than journals being a wealth of information”, they instead “put a chilling effect on scientific research regarding the origins of COVID-19”, Brad Wenstrup, a Republican representative from Ohio who is chair of the subcommittee, said at the hearing. Raul Ruiz, a Democratic representative from California who is the ranking member of the subcommittee, shot back: “Congress should not be meddling in the peer-review process, and it should not be holding hearings to throw around baseless accusations.”

Holden Thorp, editor-in-chief of the Science family of journals in Washington DC, appeared before the committee to deny the suggestion that he had been coerced or censored by government scientists.

The subcommittee also invited Magdalena Skipper, Nature ’s editor-in-chief, and Richard Horton, editor-in-chief of the medical journal The Lancet , to appear, but neither was present. Skipper was absent owing to scheduling conflicts, but a spokesperson for Springer Nature says the company is “committed to remaining engaged with the Subcommittee and to assisting in its inquiry”. ( Nature ’s news team is editorially independent of its journals team and of its publisher, Springer Nature.) The Lancet did not respond to requests for comment.

Academic influence?

This is not the first time that Republicans have accused members of the scientific community of colluding with Fauci and Collins. Evolutionary biologist Kristian Andersen and virologist Robert Garry appeared before the same subcommittee on 11 July last year to deny allegations that the officials prompted them to publish a commentary in Nature Medicine 1 in March 2020 concluding that SARS-CoV-2 showed no signs of genetic engineering. They wrote in the journal that they did not “believe that any type of laboratory-based scenario is plausible” for the virus’s origins.

Holden Thorp became editor-in-chief of the Science family of journals in 2019. Credit: Steve Exum

Some lab-leak proponents have suggested, without evidence, that the pandemic began because the NIH funded risky coronavirus research at a lab in Wuhan, offering a motive for Collins and Fauci to promote a natural origin for COVID-19.

During the latest hearing, Republicans went a step further to suggest that not only did Collins and Fauci influence prominent biologists, but that they also encouraged journals to publish research supporting the natural-origin hypothesis. This accusation is based on e-mails that Wenstrup says the subcommittee obtained showing communication between top journal editors and government scientists. Thorp forcefully denied this line of questioning. “No government officials prompted or participated in the review or editing” of two key papers 2 , 3 on COVID-19’s origins published in Science , he testified. “Any papers supporting the lab-origin theory would go through the very same processes” of peer review as any other paper, he said.

Thorp otherwise spent much of the 80-minute hearing answering questions about how a scientific manuscript is prepared for publication, what a preprint is and how peer review works. In a tense moment, Wenstrup questioned a social-media post on Thorp’s personal X (formerly Twitter) page, in which he downplayed the lab-leak hypothesis. Thorp called the post “flippant” and apologised.

Communication queries

Correspondence between journal editors and government scientists is to be expected, Deborah Ross, a Democratic representative from North Carolina, said at the hearing. “Government actors querying academia on issues that are academic in nature isn’t malpractice or unlawful — it’s just doing their jobs.”

Anita Desikan, a senior analyst at the Union of Concerned Scientists who is based in Washington DC and focuses on scientific integrity, tells Nature’ s news team that it is customary for government agencies to reach out to stakeholders to inform policy decisions. Even if a government scientist suggests an idea for a journal paper, “that doesn’t mean it will be published or receive praise from the scientific community”.

Roger Pielke Jr, a science-policy researcher at the University of Colorado Boulder, who was originally slated to testify before the subcommittee until his invitation was rescinded owing to logistical reasons, disagrees. He thinks that Fauci and Collins still shaped the Nature Medicine COVID-19 origins paper by recommending that specific scientists investigate and by offering advice along the way. Nevertheless, the hearing was a “dud”, Pielke Jr says, because Thorp was the wrong witness. Instead, a more relevant witness would have been a government scientific-integrity officer who is more knowledgeable about what constitutes an ethical breach, he adds.

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-01129-x

Andersen, K. G., Rambaut, A., Lipkin, W. I., Holmes E. C. & Garry, R. F. et al. Nature Med. 26 , 450–452 (2020).

Article   PubMed   Google Scholar  

Worobey, M. et al. Science 377 , 951–959 (2022).

Pekar, J. E. et al. Science 377 , 960–966 (2022).

Download references

Reprints and permissions

Related Articles

What toilets can reveal about COVID, cancer and other health threats

News Feature 17 APR 24

Long COVID still has no cure — so these patients are turning to research

News Feature 02 APR 24

Google AI could soon use a person’s cough to diagnose disease

News 21 MAR 24

Canadian science gets biggest boost to PhD and postdoc pay in 20 years

News 17 APR 24

How India can become a science powerhouse

Editorial 16 APR 24

What the India election means for science

News 10 APR 24

Londoners see what a scientist looks like up close in 50 photographs

Career News 18 APR 24

Researchers want a ‘nutrition label’ for academic-paper facts

Nature Index 17 APR 24

Structure peer review to make it more robust

World View 16 APR 24

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies