an essay on justice

Essays About Justice: Top 5 Examples and 7 Prompts

Discover our guide with examples of essays about justice and prompts for your essay writing and discuss vital matters relating to a person’s or nation’s welfare. 

Justice, in general, refers to the notion that individuals get what they deserve. It includes fundamental moral values ​​in law and politics and is considered an act of fairness, equality, and honesty. Four types of justice deal with how victims can solicit a verdict. They are procedural, distributive, retributive, and restorative. There are many pieces with justice as the subject. It’s because justice is a broad subject encompassing many human values.

5 Essay Examples

1. juvenile justice system of usa essay by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 2. wrongful convictions in criminal justice system by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 3. racial profiling within the criminal justice system by anonymous on papersowl.com, 4. criminal justice: the ban-the-box law by anonymous on ivypanda.com, 5. the special needs of the criminal justice on mental illness cases by anonymous on gradesfixer.com, 1. what is justice, 2. is justice only for the rich and powerful, 3. the importance of justice, 4. the justice system in mainstream media, 5. justice: then vs. now, 6. justice system around the world, 7. obstructions to justice.

“No doubt, familiarity about the nature of juvenile crimes and how juvenile justice structures function across the world will offer an insight to policy makers, social scientists and for gullible citizens. Thus, a comparative analysis will throw light on how well or how poorly one nation is exercising relative to other nations.”

The essay delves into the justice system process for teenagers who are 18 years and below who commit wrongful acts. Most teenagers involved in juvenile crimes do not have a strong foundation or parental support. The author also talks about the treatments, boot camps, and retreat houses available for teenagers serving in juvenile prisons.

The ever-increasing number of juvenile crimes in the world reflects the mismanagement and lack of juvenile courts, sentencing programs, rehabilitation, and age-appropriate treatment. The writer believes that if mistrials remain in the juvenile system, the problem will continue. They suggest that the government must initiate more system reforms and provide juvenile offenders with proper ethical education.

“The justice system is composed of various legal groups and actors, making a miscarriage possible at any stage of the legal process, or at the hands of any legal actor. Eyewitness error, police misconduct, or falsification of evidence are examples of factors that may lead to a wrongful conviction.”

In this essay, the author uses various citations that show the justice system’s flaws in the process and criteria of its rulings. It further discusses the different instances of unfair judgments and mentions that at least 1% of all convicts serving prison time were wrongfully accused. 

The writer believes that changing the way of addressing different cases and ensuring that all legal professionals do their assigned duties will result in fair justice. You might also be interested in these essays about choice .

“Here in the 21st century, we don’t exactly have ‘Black Codes’ we have what is known as Racial Profiling. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) defines racial profiling as ‘the discriminatory practice by law enforcement officials of targeting individuals for suspicion of crime based on the individual’s race ethnicity, religion or national origin.’”

This essay investigates the involvement of race in the criminal justice system, whether they are victims or perpetrators. The author claims that some law enforcement officers mistreat and misjudge people because of their race and presents various cases as evidence of these discriminatory actions. One example is the case of an unarmed black teenager, Jordan Edwards , who was shot because former officer Roy Oliver thought his partner was in danger.

Unfortunately, law enforcement officials use their power and position in society to deny any act of racial profiling, rendering the said law useless. The author declares that while their paper may not prove racial bias in the criminal justice system, they can prove that a person’s color plays a role and can cause harm.

“I think the Ban-the-Box law is the best way of creating employment opportunities for ex-convicts without discrimination. Criminal offenses vary in the degree of the crime, making it unfair to treat all ex-convicts the same. Moreover, some felons learn from their mistakes during detention and parole, creating a better and law-abiding citizen with the ability to work faithfully.”

The essay explains how ex-convicts or current convicts are consistently discriminated against. This discrimination affects their lives even after serving their sentence, especially in their rights to vote and work. 

Regarding job hunting, the author believes the Ban-the-Box law will effectively create more employment opportunities. The law allows employers to see an ex-convict’s skills rather than just their record.  The essay concludes with a reminder that everyone is entitled to a civil right to vote, while private enterprises are free to run background checks. 

“Case management focuses on incorporating key elements that focus on improving the wellbeing of individuals that are being assessed. Mental illness within the criminal justice system is treated as a sensitive issue that requires urgent intervention in order to ensure that an inmate is able to recover.”

This essay pries into one of the most delicate areas of ruling in the justice system, which is leading mentally ill convicts. Offenders who were deemed mentally ill should be able to receive particular treatments for their health while serving time. 

The author mentions that every country must be able to provide mental health services for the inmates to prevent conflicts inside the prison. In conclusion, they suggest that reviewing and prioritizing policies related to mental illness is the best solution to the issue.

Are you interested in writing about mental illnesses? Check out our guide on how to write essays about depression.

7 Prompts for Essays About Justice

Justice is a vast subject, and its literal meaning is the quality of being just. This process often occurs when someone who has broken the law gets what they should, whether freedom or punishment. Research and discuss everything there is to know about justice so your readers can fully understand it. Include a brief history of its origins, types, and uses.

Several situations prove that justice is only for the rich. One of the main reasons is the expensive court fees. Research why victims settle outside the court or just let their abusers get away with crimes.

Include data that proves justice is a luxury where the only ones who can ask for equal treatment are those with resources—present situations or well-known cases to support your statements. On the other hand, you can also provide counter-arguments such as government programs that help financially-challenged individuals.

Every citizen has the right to be protected and treated fairly in court. Explain the importance of justice to a person, society, and government. Then, add actual cases of how justice is applied to encourage reform or chaos. Include relevant cases that demonstrate how justice impacts lives and legal changes, such as the case of Emmett Till .

Talk about how justice is usually depicted on screen and how it affects people’s expectations of how the justice system works. Popular television shows such as Suits and Law and Order are examples of the justice system being portrayed in the media. Research these examples and share your opinion on whether movies or television portray the justice system accurately or not.

In this essay, research how justice worldwide has changed. This can include looking at legal systems, human rights, and humanity’s ever-changing opinions. For instance, child labor was considered normal before but is viewed as an injustice today. List significant changes in justice and briefly explain why they have changed over time. You might also be interested in these essays about violence .

Countries have different ways of instilling justice within their societies. For this prompt, research and discuss the countries you think have the best and worst legal systems. Then, point out how these differences affect the country’s crime rates and quality of life for its citizens.

Examine why people tend to take justice into their hands, disobey legal rules, or give up altogether. It can be because seeking justice is an arduous process resulting in emotional and financial burdens. Often, this occurs when a person feels their government is not providing the support they need. Take a look at this social issue, and discuss it in your essay for a strong argumentative. 

If you are interested in learning more, check out our essay writing tips !

Maria Caballero is a freelance writer who has been writing since high school. She believes that to be a writer doesn't only refer to excellent syntax and semantics but also knowing how to weave words together to communicate to any reader effectively.

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Home — Essay Samples — Law, Crime & Punishment — Judiciary — Justice

Essays on Justice

Hook examples for justice essays, anecdotal hook.

Step into a courtroom, where the pursuit of justice unfolds before our eyes. As the gavel strikes and decisions are made, the impact of justice reverberates through society. Join me on a journey to explore the complexities and significance of justice.

Quotation Hook

""Justice delayed is justice denied."" These words, attributed to William E. Gladstone, emphasize the importance of timely and fair justice. Let's delve into the profound implications of justice in our world.

Justice and Human Rights Hook

Justice and human rights are inextricably linked. Explore how the concept of justice intersects with the protection of fundamental human rights, shaping our understanding of justice on a global scale.

Historical Perspectives on Justice Hook

Justice has evolved over centuries, often in response to historical events and societal changes. Delve into the historical context of justice, from ancient legal systems to pivotal moments in the fight for civil rights.

Justice in the Legal System Hook

Justice is a cornerstone of the legal system. Analyze the principles and mechanisms that underpin justice in legal proceedings, from the presumption of innocence to the role of juries in delivering verdicts.

Social Justice and Equity Hook

Justice extends beyond legal proceedings to issues of social justice and equity. Investigate how societies address inequality, discrimination, and the pursuit of a more just and equitable world.

Modern Challenges in Justice Hook

Justice remains a pressing concern in the modern world. Explore contemporary challenges and debates surrounding justice, including issues related to criminal justice reform, restorative justice, and access to justice.

Justice in Antigone: Divine Law Versus Human Authority

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Lather and Nothing Else Summary

What is the true definition of justice, different types of justice and ways that the term might be defined, justice: what’s the right thing to do by michael j. sandel, let us write you an essay from scratch.

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Poverty and The Existing Gap Between The Rich and Poor

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Injustice in Treatment of Disabled People in Society

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Justice, in its broadest sense, is the principle that people receive that which they deserve, with the interpretation of what then constitutes "deserving" being impacted upon by numerous fields, with many differing viewpoints and perspectives, including the concepts of moral correctness based on ethics, rationality, law, religion, equity and fairness.

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Justice as a Virtue

The notion of justice as a virtue began in reference to a trait of individuals, and to some extent remains so, even if today we often conceive the justice of individuals as having some (grounding) reference to social justice. But from the start, the focus on justice as a virtue faced pressures to diffuse, in two different ways.

First, “justice as a virtue” is ambiguous as between individual and social applications. Rawls and others regard justice as “the first virtue of social institutions” (1971, p. 3), but Rawls is not the first to think of justice as a virtue of social institutions or societies — Plato was there long before him. However, justice as a virtue of societies, polities, and their institutions is addressed elsewhere , so the focus in this essay will be on justice as a virtue in individuals. That said, individuals typically live as members of political communities, so the societal dimension of justice as a virtue will never be long out of view (Woodruff 2018).

Second, from the start the effort to analyze the virtue of justice has led to attempts to formalize the requirements (or norms) of justice, and at times the latter project has threatened to swallow the first in ways that make thinking of a virtue of justice gratuitous or otiose. We might be tempted to think that the virtue of justice consists simply in compliance with the norms of justice our theory specifies: a just person will be one who complies with the norms of justice, whether those are narrowly interpersonal or more broadly social or political in scope. In this way the virtue becomes subsidiary to norms of justice independently specified (Anderson 2010, p. 2; LeBar 2014). Doing so threatens to lose the force that the notion of virtue had in the earliest thinking about justice.

A further complication is that even the idea of justice as a virtue of individuals seems ambiguous in regard to scope. Plato in the Republic treats justice as an overarching virtue of both individuals and societies, so that almost every issue he (or we) would regard as ethical comes in under the notion of justice. But in later usages justice covers only part of individual morality, and we don’t readily think of someone as unjust if they lie or neglect their children — other epithets more readily spring to mind. Individual justice first and most readily regards moral issues having to do with distributions of goods or property. It is, we say, unjust for someone to steal from people or not to give them what he owes them, and it is also unjust if someone called upon to distribute something good (or bad or both) among members of a group uses an arbitrary or unjustified basis for making the distribution. Discussion of justice as an individual virtue often centers on questions, therefore, about property and other distributable goods, though the broader sense broached by Plato never entirely disappears. Still there is disagreement over whether the broader distributive questions associated with political morality have subordinated or obscured the earlier Greek concerns with justice as a virtue of individual character (Hursthouse 1999, pp. 5–6; Coope 2007; Lu 2017).

1.1 Ancient

1.2 medieval and modern, 2. social psychology and justice, 3. justice as a virtue of societies.

• 4. Justice and other Virtues

5. Recent Developments

6. conclusion, other internet resources, related entries.

Philosophical discussion of justice begins with Plato, who treats the topic in a variety of dialogues, most substantially in Republic . There Plato offers the first sustained discussion of the nature of justice ( dikaiosune ) and its relation to happiness, as a departure from three alternatives receiving varying degrees of attention. First, there is a traditionalist conception of justice (speaking the truth and paying your debts). Second, Plato has Socrates rebut the Sophist conception of justice which built on a distinction between nature ( phusis ) and convention ( nomos ) As Plato has this conception articulated by Thrasymachus in Book I, justice is simply the “advantage of the stronger,” not tracking anything like the sort of value attributed to it by traditionalists. Finally, Plato has Socrates confront a conventionalist conception of justice that anticipates modern contractarian views, in which justice — forbearing preying on others in exchange for not being preyed on by them — is a “second-best alternative,” not as good as being able to prey at will upon others, but better than being the prey of others. These last two challenges give rise to the central question of the book: to whose advantage is justice? Would we really be better off being unjust if we could get away with it? Plato’s negative answer to that question is the project of the balance of the work.

Plato’s method involves the provocative idea that justice in the city ( polis ) is the same thing as justice in the individual, just “writ large.” There are good reasons to worry about that assumption (Williams 1973; Keyt 2006). But in Plato’s sociology of the city, there are three classes engaged in a kind of division of labor. There is a guardian class which rules, a class of “auxiliaries” that provide the force behind the ruling, and the class of merchants that produce to satisfy the needs and desires of the city. Similarly, the psyche of the individual has three parts: a reasoning part to rule, a “spirited” part to support the rule of reason, and an appetitive part. Plato finds justice in the city to consist in each part “having and doing its own,” and since the smaller is just like the larger, justice in the individual consists in each part of the psyche doing its own work. (This grounds the idea, later enshrined by Justinian, that justice is “giving every man his due;” Justinian I.i). Further, Plato argues, justice is a master virtue in a sense, because in both the city and the psyche, if each part is doing its own job, both city and psyche will also have wisdom, courage, and moderation or self-discipline. This conception of justice sustains the contrast with the conventionalist view advocated by the Sophists. On the other hand, at least initially it leaves it an open question whether the just individual refrains from such socially proscribed actions as lying, killing, and stealing. Plato eventually seeks to show that someone with a healthy, harmonious soul wouldn’t lie, kill, or steal, but it is not clear that argument succeeds, nor, if it does, that that is the right understanding of why we ought not to lie, kill, or steal (Sachs 1963; LeBar 2013, ch. XII).

Plato gives a somewhat different treatment of justice in Crito , in which Socrates’ eponymous friend attempts to persuade Socrates to accept his (Crito’s) offer to bribe a way out of the death sentence Socrates is waiting to have executed. Here Plato’s arguments first associate the just life with the good life, thus the life Socrates has most reason to live. And justice, he then argues, requires not only not inflicting wrong or injury on others, even in response to wrongs from them, but fulfilling one’s agreements, and — in particular — abiding by one’s (tacit or explicit) agreement to abide by the laws of the city unless one can persuade it to change them. Of course, justice cannot require one to abide by laws that require one to act unjustly, as Socrates’ own case (as characterized in Apology ) shows (Kraut 1984).

It is worth noting (as Johnston 2011 observes) that even if Plato’s is the first philosophical discussion of justice, a concern with what an individual is due as a matter of justice is a driving issue in Homer’s Iliad , though there is no counterpart concern there with justice as a property of a society or tribe. So even Plato’s philosophical concerns are building on well-established questions about what justice requires of us in our treatment of one another.

Aristotle does not see the virtue of justice in quite the comprehensive sense Plato does; he treats it as a virtue of character (in the entirety of one of the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics , also common to the Eudemian Ethics ), and as a virtue of constitutions and political arrangements (in Politics ). The question naturally arises as to the relation between these forms of justice. Aristotle seems to think they are closely related, without being synonymous applications of the same concept. As the latter is a conception of political justice, we will focus here on the former. Justice as a personal virtue follows Aristotle’s model for virtues of character, in which the virtue lies as an intermediate or mean between vices of excess and defect ( Nicomachean Ethics V). While he grants that there is a “general” sense of justice in which justice is coincident with complete virtue, there is a “particular” sense in which it is concerned with not overreaching ( pleonexia ). It is not clear, however, exactly how Aristotle understands this arrangement, or the nature of the vices of excess and defect which this “particular” justice is to counteract. One very plausible reading has it that justice is opposed to a desire for maldistribution of “goods of fortune” such as money, fame, or honor (Williams 1980; Curzer 1995). On another it is opposed to an insufficient attention to others’ rights (Foot 1988, p. 9). On still another it focuses on the goods of others, or common goods (O’Connor 1988; Miller 1995).

These issues remain open in part because Aristotle seems most interested in establishing a conception of the formal structure of “particular” justice, which seems to reflect a conception of desert. He distinguishes between justice in distribution and justice in rectification. The former, he claims, adheres to a kind of proportionality, in which what each deserves is proportional to the relationship between the contributions. If A contributes twice as much as B (of whatever the metric of merit is relevant in some particular case), then A’s return ought also to be twice B’s. This conception of distributive justice obviously lends itself to “goods of fortune” — and to some goods, like wealth, more obviously than others — but it need not in principle be confined to such goods, although the examples Aristotle provides suggest such applications. Similarly, justice in rectification involves a sort of “arithmetical proportion.” If C defrauds D by amount X, then justice requires depriving C of X and restoring X to D, as a matter of reestablishing a kind of equality between them. These structural devices are elegant and attractive, but they leave open a number of questions (LeBar, forthcoming). First, as indicated, to what are we to suppose they apply? Second, in what way do they figure into the nature of the person who is just in the particular sense? (That is, how are they related to justice as a virtue?) Does a model of particular justice as a virtue fit the general model of virtue as a mean, and if so, what sort of mean is it? Aristotle seems torn between a conception of justice as a virtue in his distinctive understanding of what a virtue is — with a requirement that one have all the virtues to have any ( Nicomachean Ethics VI.13), and rooted in the doctrine of the mean — and justice as having the form of a formal normative structure, to which the virtue threatens to become subsidiary. All this is to leave aside questions of the relation between this “particular” sense of justice and political justice, and the role of the virtue of justice in the individual as it contributes to justice in the polis.

Epicurus’ conception of the role of justice was more central to his eudaimonism perhaps than its counterpart in Plato and Aristotle, but that reflects in part his distinctive understanding of eudaimonia , or happiness. For Epicurus this consisted in ataraxia — tranquility, or freedom from disturbance. Given that the good life is the life without disturbance, justice plays a key instrumental role. One might, Epicurus thinks, withdraw entirely from human society to avoid disturbance, but the alternative is to live socially under terms which secure the avoidance of disturbance. This is the structure of the ideal Epicurean community, in which each forbears aggression (Armstrong 1997, Thrasher 2013). Justice is a matter of keeping agreements generally, and in particular the agreement not to harm or transgress social norms.

In this way Epicurus offers a conception of the virtue of justice that harmonizes both its personal and its political dimensions. The personal virtue consists in the motivation to abide by a contract not to aggress or harm others. The political virtue inheres in a polity in which such norms regulate the conduct of its citizens, and these two dimensions of justice as a virtue reinforce each other.

The other great ethical tradition of antiquity (Stoicism) had remarkably little to say about justice (Annas 1993, p. 311), so we pass on to the medieval and modern periods.

The legacy of the ancients — Aristotle in particular — continued into the medieval period, notably in the work of Thomas Aquinas, who appropriated much of Aristotle’s philosophy while setting it into a Christian theological framework. As in Aristotle, virtue and virtues are prominent parts of his ethical theory. And, like Aristotle justice is an important virtue, though for Aquinas it less important than the virtue of charity, a Christian virtue that did not appear among the virtues recognized by Aristotle. There are other elements of his account that situate it in an interesting way in the transition from ancient eudaimonist accounts of virtue, to virtue as it appears in the modern era, before it recedes from prominence in ethical theory.

But to the extent Christian writers allied themselves with Plato and Aristotle, they were downplaying another central element in Christian thought and morality, the emphasis on agapic love. Such love seems to be a matter of motivationally active feeling rather than of being rational, and some writers on morality (eventually) allowed this side of Christianity to have a major influence on what they had to say about virtue.

Significant elements of the Aristotelian account of justice reappear in Aquinas’. First, justice is first and foremost a virtue of character rather than institutions, although Aquinas draws a distinction among such virtues not found in Aristotle. For Aquinas, justice as a virtue is a matter of perfection of the will, rather than the passions (ST II-II 58.4). Aquinas offers no account of justice as a virtue of societies or institutions, though he interprets the “general” sense of justice he borrows from Aristotle as being a matter of individual willing and action for the common good. “Particular” justice, which as in Aristotle’s account is most of his focus, has to do with relationships -- in particular but not limited to exchange -- between individuals as individuals (ST II-II 58.8).

Second, Aquinas grounds the norms for these exchanges in the ancient formula of Justinian, which hearkens back to Plato: justice is giving each his own. But his interpretation of this formula situates him astride a deep but subtle divide between ancient and modern thought. To some extent this effect is an upshot of his inheriting not only the Greek eudaimonist tradition, but also a Roman jurisprudential tradition in which notions like standing and right as claim (rather than, say, fairness) had begun to emerge (Porter 2016, p. 143). As a result, Aquinas’ synergistic account has some novel complications.

One major complication, relative to the ancient accounts, is that what is ours by right is a recognition of a kind of status, as an effect of the order among people ordained by God ( ST I-II 100.8). As Jean Porter points out, this establishes a normative standard for justice that does not grow out of the agent’s own perfection or eudaimonia (Porter 2016, p. 157). There are two significant follow-on implications.

First, the fabric of the eudaimonist approach to practical reasoning and life — inherited from the Greeks — begins to fray. For better or worse, on the Greek eudaimonist views (including here Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Epicurus) our reasons for action arise from our interest in a happy life. If the reason-giving nature of others arises from a different source, as this reading of Aquinas suggests, then practical reason seems to have a duality of ultimate sources, with the complications that kind of duality brings.

Second, this is the first step in the diminution of the theoretical significance of the virtues — a process that will not begin to be reversed until the middle of the 20th century. On Aristotle’s view, for example, the virtuous person sees reasons for acting that the non-virtuous do not (and that arguably are not there to be seen absent the effects of virtue — LeBar 2013; Berryman 2019). Virtue is no longer the normative epicenter of the theory, as it was for the Greeks. To the extent that this aspect of Aquinas’s view has virtue responsive to value or reasons that is accounted for in some way other than the work of virtue, it is the leading edge of process that will result in a much-reduced role for virtue in later ethical accounts

Hume is an excellent exemplar of this point, in both the Treatise and the Enquiries . Virtue, Hume maintains, is a matter of “some quality or character,” produced in one by “durable principles of the mind” ( T III.iii.I, p. 575). We deem such qualities virtues not, as on the ancient Greek view, because they conduce to the happiness of the person who has them, but because they have a “tendency to the good of mankind” or society. ( T III.iii.I). This service renders them pleasing to our “moral tastes:” our approbation, Hume tells us, has its source in “view of a character, which is naturally fitted to be useful to others, or to the person himself, or which is agreeable to others, or to the person himself” ( T III.iii.I, 591). We can think of that as the criterion some quality of character must have to be deemed a virtue. In consequence, what counts as virtuous is an upshot of, and not the source of, the normative foundations of this view.

By Hume’s time the content of justice as a virtue has shifted as well. In Hume’s treatment, the focus of justice is property — relations of “mine and thine.” It is a “cautious, jealous” virtue in the sense that it is focused on the sorts of exclusionary powers that are characteristic of property rules and relations. We may always be aspiring for more but justice aims at the preservation and security of what one has already ( E III.1, p. 184). So the virtue of justice, as Hume thinks of it, will in the main consist of a quality in one which disposes one to observe and uphold these rules.

What Hume wants to show is, first, that we can have such a disposition or quality (that is, that it is possible for us to have a quality or character to observe the rules of justice), and, second, that such a quality would count as a virtue, given his criteria. His approach to these questions in the Treatise is framed by a problem he has set up himself. To appreciate that problem, we have to step back to Hume’s broader view about moral motivation. Hume had argued that moral principles “are not conclusions of our reason” ( T III.i.I); instead, they are “more properly felt than judg’d of” ( T III.i.II). Morality, and virtue, is a matter of sentiments or passions. Why? Hume marshals a number of arguments to this effect which are not relevant to our purposes. The basic reason is that the functional roles of reason and the passions are markedly different, in Hume’s view. The task of reason is to discover truth or falsehood, in “relations of ideas” or “matters of facts” ( T III.i.I); as such, it utterly lacks the capacity to move us to action. Only the passions can do that ( T II.iii.III). The passions, on the other hand, have no representational content whatsoever; they are “original existences” ( T II.iii.III; III.i.I). Virtue is paradigmatically a practical matter: it is a property of what we do, and to act we must be motivated. That means any successful account of virtue must find it in our passions, not in any aspect of our reason ( T III.i.I). So far so good.

However, when we come to justice, we look in vain for a passion that can supply motive power for us to act justly. If anything, our natural motives move us away from justice ( T III.ii.II). Self-love requires “correcting and restraining” ( T III.ii.I). And only a passion can do that. But which? Hume himself dismisses the possibilities of public or private beneficence or universal love. In the end he concludes that there is no natural passion to explain it. Instead, it is in a certain crucial sense artificial ( T III.ii.VI). Under certain conditions, given that we are sensible of the advantages of living in human society, our self-love or self-interest may be given an “alteration of its direction,” and induce us to respect the rules of justice. These Hume thinks of primarily as involving honesty and “particular” property rules ( T III.ii.II). That “alteration” needs explanation.

Two facts about the conditions in which we act — one about us, one about our environment — set this alteration in motion. First, Hume maintains, we are limited in our generosity or benevolence. And second, we live in conditions of scarcity ( T III.ii.II). We have to work to make a go of it, and we cannot count on others to do so for us. We need control of our world to meet our needs, but we are vulnerable to the selfishness and predation of others.

The solution, Hume argues, is that we naturally fall into a “convention” by which we observe that rules of property — the observance of which is key to the virtue of justice — is good for all of us. This convention is no formal agreement; Hume argues that it cannot be something like the product of promise or compact ( T III.ii.II). Instead, “it arises gradually, and acquires force by a slow progression, and by our repeated experience of the inconveniences of transgressing it” ( T III.ii.II, p. 490). Much as two men pulling the oars in a boat together need no explicit agreement to find they prosper by such an arrangement, so do we generally. (Wilson 2018 explores support for Hume’s hypothesis through work in experimental economics.) So in the end it is self-interest that drives us to comply with the requirements of justice, though Hume adds that sympathy with the public interest induces our endorsement of it once justice has become established. This endorsement, however, is reserved for a scheme of property rules taken generally; as Hume observes, individual instances of compliance may frequently be “contrary to public interest,” though such compliance is still required of us. Hume believes the benefit of the system overall, both to society and to individual, requires that rules not admit of exceptions ( T III.ii.II, E Appendix III, §256). Self-interest accounts for the possibility of our being motivated to act as the virtue of justice requires, and both the utility and the agreeableness, both to ourselves and others, of a resulting social order with respected property rules, leads to our approbation of that motivation as a virtue.

In fact, this point — that “public utility is the sole origin of justice” — is the point of Hume’s discussion of justice in the Enquiries (III.I, ¶145). Scarcity imposes a need for us to distinguish mine from thine, and we have not sufficient generosity in our natures to do without property rules (as we might, say, in our families). And once again Hume argues that our recognition of the utility and necessity of justice provides “entire command over our sentiments” ( E III.II, ¶163).As David Johnston observes (Johnston 2011, p. 138), Hume’s understanding of the value of justice as instrumental in the promotion of utility marks a sharp shift from earlier understandings which invoked various forms of reciprocity in understanding that value.

Such a sentimentalist account of justice is also found in Adam Smith; in fact, a focus on the sentiments almost completely swamps concern for virtue. Our judgments of virtue and vice, he says, are compounded by consideration of two different “relations” in a sentiment: “the cause or object which excites or causes it, and … the end which it proposes” (TMS II.i.introduction). His focus on those two “relations” obviates any independent discussion of virtue per se. He does however explicitly countenance a virtue of justice, developed in contrast with the virtue of beneficence. In Smith, even more clearly than in Hume, one can see that this virtue consists in conformity to “rules” or “laws” of justice that appear to exist antecedently to the realization of the virtue itself, unlike ancient accounts. Smith indicates that justice merits resentment when absent, that it may be “extorted by force,” and that in the main it requires forbearing from harming others.. Smith calls justice a “negative virtue” in this respect: often all it requires is that we sit still and do nothing (Smith 1759, II.ii.I.5, 9). It is essential to the subsistence of society, Smith tells us (Smith 1759, II.ii.3.3-4), but — in contrast to Hume — is not reducible in its motivational basis to regard for society. Instead, our just concern for “multitudes” is compounded of our concern for individuals, which arises from “fellow-feeling,” which is yet short of “love, esteem, and affection” (Smith 1759, II.ii.3.7).

In Kant, finally, along with a movement away from sentimentalism we see the completion of the distinction between justice as a virtue and justice as a norm to which a virtue may or may not correspond. While Kant has a theory (or “doctrine”) of virtue, he distinguishes that theory precisely against a counterpoised theory of justice. The two are complementary elements in the “metaphysics of morals.” Moreover, the doctrine of justice itself has two parts, roughly corresponding to the distinction present since Plato’s work, between the role of justice in the individual and the role of justice in the state. Kant calls these “private right” and “public right,” respectively. But right in either case is not how Kant at least conceives of virtue; instead, right is a “condition” that can obtain between the moral agents comprising a moral or legal community, in virtue of their principles of choice in acting (Kant 1797). Little remains here of the notion of justice as a virtue of individuals as it began with the ancient Greeks.

20th-century developmental psychology drew deeply on the Kantian legacy. Piaget (1932/1948) treated moral development as principally involving increasing cognitive sophistication. More particularly, Piaget saw that sophistication as a matter of taking more and more general or universal views of moral issues, and endorsed the Kantian and rationalist idea that morality rests on and can be justified in terms of considerations of justice. Piaget saw a “law of evolution” in moral development, from an understanding of rules (including moral rules) as being “heteronomous” impositions of authority, to which one is objectively responsible, to a grounding in mutual respect, accompanied by subjective responsibility to others (Piaget 1932/1948, p. 225). This transition is fostered through social interaction, and attention to norms of equality and reciprocity replace those of mere obedience.

Educational psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg was inspired by Piaget to propose a conception of moral development that postulated six stages of human moral development. In his earliest work, Kohlberg identified the highest stage of such development with a concern for justice and human rights based on universal principles. Concern for relationships and for individual human well-being was embedded in a framework of conformity to social norms, at lower stages of the process. Moreover, he saw the ordering of the different stages in Piagetian fashion as basically reflecting differences in rational understanding: those whose moral thinking involved the invoking of universal principles of justice and rights were thought to show a more advanced cognitive development than those whose moral thought appeals primarily to the importance of relationships and of human well-being or suffering. The paradigm of moral development involves judgments that are “reversible,” in the sense that each party to the issue can accept the correct judgment by reversing his or her perspective and taking up the viewpoint of the other (Kohlberg 1981). The sophisticated moral reasoner will engage in a process of “moral musical chairs,” taking up the positions of the parties to the conflict successively. It is, on this version of Kohlberg’s thought, that formal feature of the deliberative process that is characteristic of greatest moral development. As his research and thought progressed, however, Kohlberg increasingly acknowledged that these formal features were less characteristic of overall moral development and thought than of the deployment of specifically justice-based concepts. In fact, Kohlberg was impressed by the work of Rawls, and thought that the nature of Rawls’ “original position of equality” exemplified the kind of reversibility that is paradigmatic of the highest form of moral thought (Kohlberg 1981, p. 204). However, his approach treats utilitarianism as less cognitively advanced (more primitive) than rationalist views like Kant’s, and utilitarians (like R.M. Hare) naturally called into question the objectivity and intellectual fairness of Kohlberg’s account.

More significantly, perhaps, the evidence for Kohlberg’s stage sequence was drawn from studies of boys, and when one applies the sequence to the study of young girls, it turns out that girls on average end up at a less advanced stage of moral development than boys do. In her 1982 book In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development , Carol Gilligan responded to Kohlberg’s views by questioning whether a theory of moral development based solely on a sample of males could reasonably be used to draw conclusions about the inferior moral development of women. Gilligan argued that her own studies of women’s development indicated that the moral development of girls and women proceeds and ends in a different fashion from that of boys and men, but that that proves nothing about inferiority or superiority: it is merely a fact of difference. In particular, Gilligan claimed that women tend to think morally in terms of connection to others (relationships) and in terms of caring about (responsibility for) those with whom they are connected; men, by contrast and in line with Kohlberg’s studies, tend to think more in terms of general principles of justice and of individual rights against (or individual autonomy from) other people. But Jean Hampton, among others, responded that Gilligan’s critique was itself a distortion, and that concerns for justice and individual rights are as significant for and in the moral lives of women as for men (Hampton 1993).

In recent years, a variety of social sciences have intensified investigation into aspects of our natures that are plausibly important for a virtue of justice. For example, Widlok 2018 surveys cross-cultural anthropological work examining the development of “ethical skill” in rightful and just sharing practices.

For a variety of reasons, many ethical thinkers have thought that justice cannot be based in sentiment but requires a more intellectually constructive rational(ist) basis, and in recent times this view of the matter seems to have been held, most influentially, by John Rawls in A Theory of Justice . Rawls makes clear his belief in the inadequacy of benevolence or sympathetic human sentiment in formulating an adequate conception of social justice. He says in particular that sentiment leaves unanswered or indeterminate various important issues of justice that a good theory of justice ought to be able to resolve.

Rawls’s positive view of justice is concerned primarily with the justice of institutions or (what he calls) the “basic structure” of society: justice as an individual virtue is derivative from justice as a social virtue defined via certain principles of justice. The principles, famously, are derived from an “original position” in which (very roughly) rational contractors under a “veil of ignorance” decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives. Rawls deliberately invokes Kantian rationalism (or anti-sentimentalism) in explaining the intellectual or theoretical motivation behind his construction, and the two principles of justice that he argues would be agreed upon under the contractual conditions he specifies represent a kind of egalitarian political liberalism. Roughly, those principles stress (equality of) basic liberties and opportunities for self-advancement over considerations of social welfare, and the distribution of opportunities and goods in society is then supposed to work to the advantage of all (especially the worst-off members of society). He also says that the idea of what people distributively deserve or merit is derivative from social justice rather than (as with Aristotle and/or much common-sense thinking) providing the basis for thinking about social justice.

According to Rawls, individual justice is theoretically derivative from social justice because the just individual is to be understood as someone with an effective or “regulative” desire to comply with the principles of justice. However, it is not merely social justice that Rawls understands in (predominantly) rationalist fashion. When he explains how individuals (within a just society) develop a sense and/or the virtue of justice, he invokes the work of Piaget. Rawls lays more stress than Piaget does on the role our affective nature (sympathy and the desire for self-mastery) plays in the acquisition of moral virtue. But, like Piaget, he stresses the need for a sufficiently general appreciation and rational understanding of social relations as the grounding basis of a sense of duty or of justice and he explicitly classifies his account of moral development as falling within the “rationalist tradition.”

4. Justice and Other Virtues

Few would doubt that justice is a virtue of character. But there are other moral virtues. How is justice related to them? Is it more important? Even in Republic , in which Plato makes justice a “master virtue” of sorts, there are other virtues (wisdom, courage, and self-discipline), and elsewhere (notably Gorgias ) Plato makes self-discipline ( sophrosune ) the “master virtue,” so it is not clear that justice has any sort of priority over these other virtues. Likewise, though the texts we have show Aristotle devoting more space to justice, it is not clear that the particular form of the virtue of justice has any sort of pre-eminence. On the other hand, Cicero claims that justice is the “crowning glory” of the virtues ( De Officiis I.7). If we take virtue of character to have the moral centrality the ancients (perhaps in contrast to the moderns), how much importance should we accord to justice among the virtues?

Aquinas cites Cicero as a target in developing a sophisticated view of the relationships among the virtues ( ST II-II 58.12). On Aquinas’ view, Cicero is half right, for Aquinas distinguishes between virtues as responsive to appetites of our animal nature (moral virtues) and as responsive to appetites of our intellect (virtues of the will). He takes it that justice is preeminent over the moral virtues because it inheres in the rational part of the soul, and because its object is more noble (the good of others, or the common good, rather than the individual good). On that point he can agree with Cicero. However, these virtues themselves are not as excellent as the theological virtues, of which the greatest is love (or charity -- caritas; ST II-II 23.6). There are several arguments for this claim but it is grounded in Paul’s admonition to the Corinthians, that love is the greatest among the virtues of faith and hope (1 Corinthians 13:13).

In recent decades there have been secular challenges to the primacy of justice among virtues. Recall that Carol Gilligan had argued for a “different voice” for women in coming to grips with moral problems. Instead of a rights-based understanding of morality that gave special consideration to the individual, women saw relationships between people as primary (Gilligan 1983, pp. 19, 29). Kohlberg had offered a thought experiment about a man (“Heinz”) tempted to steal a life-saving drug to save his sick wife (Kohlberg 1981, p. 12). Whereas boys are more likely to think of Heinz’ dilemma in terms of what is the right thing to do, girls, Gilligan argues, see the world as “a world of relationships and psychological truths where an awareness of the connection between people gives rise to a recognition of responsibility for one another” (Gillian 1983, p. 30). Gilligan carefully frames this contrast as one between voices, not a matter of ranking of dispositions or virtues, but her work can and did provide a basis for making that sort of assessment between virtues, one on which (as in Aquinas’ case) love and care for others turns out to be more important than considerations of justice.

In some ways, Nel Nodding’s pioneering work in laying out an “ethic of care” takes such a step. Following Gilligan, she sees much ethical theory as missing a feminine voice, one which grounds moral concern for the concrete other in caring for them and their needs, and thus as relational rather than individualistic (Noddings 1983, 1999). Yet some caution is required before seeing her as taking up something like a Thomistic stance on the priority of love over justice. For one thing, to a significant degree she wants to emphasize the importance of the concrete and particular as opposed to the abstract and general (or the reliance on universal principles) in thinking and acting morally. But that is an emphasis which animates some particularistic forms of virtue ethics, and does not distinguish justice from love or other virtues. Moreover, where she explicitly argues that care “‘picks up’ where justice leaves off” (Noddings 1999, p. 12), she is thinking of justice as a property of institutions (e.g. Rawls’ theory of justice as fairness), and institutional implementations of those theories, not a virtue of character. She is clearly concerned about the limits of “rights-talk,” but that at least historically has not been a prominent part in thinking about justice as a virtue of character. Thus she does not clearly take a side in this matter.

Like Noddings, Virginia Held frames much of the point of the ethics of care against a historical theoretical backdrop of attention to justice (Held 1995, 2004, 2006). To some extent, like Noddings, for Held the relevant notion of justice is not a virtue of character but a concern with fairness, equality, and individual rights, or perhaps more generally impartial universal principles (Held 2004, p. 144; 2006, p. 14). In fact, Held more clearly poses an ethics of care as an alternative to virtue ethics (Held 2004, 143; 2006, 14). This is for two reasons. First, virtue ethical theories focus on dispositions and traits of individuals, whereas an ethics of care focuses on relations between individuals. Second, an ethics of care sees people as partially constituted by their relations with others, as opposed to the individualism characteristic of virtue ethics. Held does not think an ethics of care can do without a concern for justice as a value, however (Held 1995, 129). More generally, she believes, caring provides a “wider network” within which concerns for justice and virtue (as well as utility) should be fitted (2004, 147; 2006, 72). Margaret McLaren (2001), on the other hand, responds on the basis of commonalities between care ethics and virtue ethics that care ethics actually is most attractive when situated as an ethics of virtue. Marilyn Friedman (1987) similarly seems accepting of the general framework of virtue ethics, and of crucial places for virtues of both caring and justice within such a framework, responsive to different degrees and in different ways to gender differences she believes actually do hold, though not falling along a caring/justice fault line.

Michael Slote also accepts care ethics as well-situated as a virtue ethical theory, but argues for the necessity of conceiving such a theory as “agent-based” -- holding that motivation or motives are “the ultimate bases for evaluation of action, institutions, laws, and societies” (Slote 1998, p. 173). As he has developed his view, empathic motivation has come to take an increasing role (Slote 2010, p. 124). As with Noddings and Held, for Slote the relevant questions about justice are about forms of social organization, the allocation of rights, and so on. If there is a vestige of the Platonic/Justinian model of justice as a virtue, it would appear to figure in only as a rationale for the shape of some social policies reflecting e.g. social (or perhaps global) distributive justice. But empathy is the focal normative concern throughout. The justice of a society constitutively depends on the motives of the individuals who make it up (Slote 1998, p. 187; 2010, p. 128). If the relevant motives are caring or empathic ones, then Slote’s analysis would seem to collapse the distinction between caring and justice as virtues of individual character (or motivation). That is, individuals would count as just exactly to the degree that their motivations are empathic, and they thus contribute to the laws, policies, institutions, and so on in ways that are reflective of similar motivations across society. But that is just to say that they are caring motivations as well.

A somewhat different feminist critique of a focus on a virtue of justice comes from Robin Dillon. Like Slote, her concern is more with social institutions, structures, and hierarchies than with traits of character, and in fact these priorities lead her to be critical of virtue ethical theories which, she believes, cannot ask the right questions about virtues and vices (Dillon 2012, p. 86). However, she does accept the point that character traits matter, though she believes attending to the vices that allow and support social structures that allow for oppression and domination is more pertinent to feminist moral philosophy.

Lisa Tessman, on the other hand, accepts the basic framework of Aristotelian thinking about virtues of character, and with it the virtue of justice (Tessman 2005). However, she argues that oppressive social conditions can interfere in ways Aristotle did not anticipate with the formation of virtues of character and consequently (given Aristotle’s framework) with prospects for happiness (eudaimonia). One point of amendment, then, to Aristotelian thought is to recognize that oppressive social conditions may make other traits — traits that are important for liberatory struggle — into virtues. Another, congruent with other lines of feminist critique, is that Aristotle is insufficiently appreciative of the need for sensitivity to and response to suffering, so that something like the kind of supplementation recommended by care ethics is appropriate. A different model of response to the development of the virtue of justice specifically under non-ideal or unjust social conditions, one modeled on Kohlberg’s original architectonic understanding of the virtue, is defended by Jon Garthoff (Garthoff 2018).

Finally, in recent work Talbot Brewer has argued that a “revisionist” version of Aristotelian virtue ethics does a better job than competitors (including Kantian and contractualist theories) at recognizing the “irreplaceable value” of each human being (Brewer 2018). Brewer believes that a robust conception of the virtue of justice does important work for such a theory, not just focusing on distribution and allocation, but more generally establishing the space for virtuous recognition of ways that others can demand that we treat them (Brewer 2018, p. 25). Still, Brewer invokes Aquinas to argue that such justice is not enough, that that what is required is a recognition of a virtue of love to unify and perfect the other virtues of character.

While Rawls’ work has sparked an explosion of work in distributive justice and social justice more generally, in recent years a variety of strategies to return to a focus on justice as a personal virtue has emerged. These strategies vary across both dimensions we have considered, taking with various degrees of seriousness the connection between institutional and personal forms of justice, and focusing on the latter as a virtue, among (and like) other virtues.

One such strategy is that of Jon Drydyk, who builds on the “capability approach” to human welfare to make a case for a capabilities-based account of the justice of individual agents, in particular as against an “Aristotelian” approach that stresses justice as a matter of response to merit. Acting justly involves “striving to reduce and remove inequalities in people’s capabilities to function in ways that are elemental” to a truly human life (Drydyk 2012, pp. 31, 33). This is a “subsidiary” virtue account, in that we begin with a prior conception of the content of the requirements of justice, and conform the virtue to this conception. However, Drydyk emphasizes justice as a virtue of individuals, rather than institutions or societies. Drydyk’s strategy offers a counterpoint both to the Rawlsian way of thinking about just societies and to the ancient Greek way of thinking about justice as a virtue of individuals.

John Hacker-Wright argues that what is needed to replace a “legalistic” concern with moral status (as on modern liberal conceptions of justice) is instead an ethic of virtue with a different conception of the virtue of justice. Instead of a concern for the resolution of claims in something like reciprocal, contractual relations, Hacker-Wright’s conception of the virtue of justice is a matter of sensitivity to “vulnerability of value” in things, animate and otherwise. Thus, the threat of unjust — vicious -- wronging hangs not only over people who are sufficiently cognitively impaired so as not to perceive insults, but also corpses, animals, and even rare and valuable rock formations (p. 463). This counts as a sense of justice in that, on Hacker-Wright’s view it is not merely that we can act wrongly or viciously toward such entities, but (following Midgley 1983) that they can be wronged by us by our doing so. However, while Hacker-Wright claims that on a virtue ethic “The character of the agent is recognized as ineliminable in picking out facts as they figure in our moral deliberation,” this does not strictly speaking seem to be true, as prior to virtue there is value which it is up to the just or virtuous person to respond with sensitivity (Hacker-Wright 2007, pp. 461, 463, 464).

David Schmidtz and John Thrasher suggest rethinking the relationship between social justice and individual justice (Schmidtz and Thrasher 2014). Turning Plato’s account of justice in Republic on its head, they depict justice as a bridge between a virtue of the soul and of the polis : because we are essentially social, we need community, and justice is a matter of harmony with the community. On their view this is (largely) a matter of compliance with rules and institutions that enable people to live in harmony and flourish together.

An alternative proposal for thinking of the justice as a personal virtue ties it intimately to the experiences we have as emotional creatures. On this approach, instead of justice standing as distinct from “natural virtues” motivated by passions (as on Hume’s account), or needing to be replaced by sentimentally-driven attitudes such as care or compassion, justice is to be seen as a virtue largely constituted by emotion (Solomon 1994, Roberts 2010). The virtue amounts to a stable disposition of character to respond in the relevant ways to instances of injustice, perhaps consisting in those occasions in which one does not receive his or her due, and on the other hand to be disposed to a “will to give each his due” (Roberts 2010, p. 38). For Roberts, this is a will to realize “objective justice,” and as on other recent accounts, the virtue (and the passion) are theoretically subsidiary to this primary notion of “objective justice.”

There are also recent ventures in the spirit of the ancient Greek thinking about the individual virtue of justice. Rasmussen and Den Uyl (2005) argue for two interpersonal senses of justice (pp. 160-63). One is the familiar Aristotelian virtue. The second is a “metanormative” principle governing the institutions and legal frameworks in which individual agents (just and otherwise) live their lives and exercise their practical agency. The second of these senses of interpersonal justice does not draw its content from the exercise of virtue, but rather makes a place for it. The former does depend on virtue overall (including the exercise of practical wisdom) for its demands, but these are construed broadly in the traditional way of rendering to each his due. Bloomfield (2011) similarly suggests extending the Aristotelian virtue of justice, but in an inward direction, arguing that self-respect is necessary for happiness, and treating oneself fairly requires treating oneself fairly, as one treats others fairly, as a property of justice as individuals.

On the other hand, Wolterstorff (2008) argues that the eudaimonism of Greek thought prevents a proper appreciation for the nature and significance of justice and rights. Whether there is theoretical space remaining for a virtue of justice is not a question Wolterstorff considers, but he does believe there is no hope for an adequate grip on justice in an Aristotelian or Stoic framework.

Recent thinkers have grappled with the question of priority between formal principle and virtue that vexed Aristotle, and offered solutions that for the most part subordinate the virtue of justice to the prior notion of the justice of distributions, as Aristotle himself seems to have suggested. Bernard Williams claims explicitly that this is so (Williams 1980, p. 197), as does David Wiggins, in an attempt to bring a “pre-liberal,” Aristotelian conception of justice to bear on modern liberal conceptions, a la Kant and Rawls (Wiggins 2004). To do so, Wiggins distinguishes three senses of justice: (A) a matter of outcomes or states of affairs in which each gets what is due; (B) a disposition to promote justice (A); (C) a condition of the polis in virtue of which (A) is realized. Wiggins claims that the proper outcome of this collision of conceptions is one that recognizes a form of logical priority of justice (A) over justice (B) (p. 489). At the same time, against Williams he insists that the normative demands of justice (A) are “comprehensible” only within the perspective of a person with justice (B). And in fact he claims that a necessary condition on acts and outcomes satisfying the norms of justice (A) is that they be recognized to be so by those with the virtue of justice (B). Wiggins’ thinking here is not transparent, but perhaps the thought is that the logical point is purely formal: someone with justice (B) must, in act or judging justly, be responding to some norm which counts as justice (A). But, as merely formal, that tells us nothing about the substantive content of that norm. To get that, we have ineliminable need to refer to the judgment of the person with justice (B). That marks a way perhaps of restoring Aristotle’s focus on virtue in coming to understand the virtue of justice.

LeBar (2013, 2014) takes a similar tack in attempting to incorporate Kantian and post-Kantian insights into just demands on the treatment of others into an Aristotelian virtue framework. On his view, there is no way to specify the contents of the demands of justice, or to spell out its norms, independently of the wider possession and exercise of the virtues, including the virtue of practical wisdom. At the same time, what the virtuous and just person sees, in inhabiting a social world with equals in moral standing, are the norms which have become associated with the liberal conception: the standing to obligate others and hold them accountable, for example.

Finally, all of these are Western treatments of an individual virtue of justice. May Sim (Sim 2007, 2018) makes the case that there are informative parallels between the Confucian treatment of the virtues (in particular, yi) and the virtue of justice as adumbrated in Plato and Aristotle.

There are many different conceptions of the virtue of justice, and only some of them are distinctively virtue ethical. Many non-virtual ethical approaches put forward theories of virtue, and what distinguishes them from virtue ethics is that the given theory of virtue comes later in the order of explanation, rather than itself serving as the basis for understanding (all of) morality. This is especially the case with justice, where (as we have seen) it is naturally tempting to account for the norms of justice first and derive an account of the virtue in light of those norms. The question of the priority of norms of justice or the virtue of justice is likely to continue to generate exploration and debate, as is the question of how our lives as social and political animals contributes to understanding the virtue of justice. These vexed questions have inspired a profusion of views and no doubt will continue to do so.

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• McLaren, Margaret. 2001, “Feminist Ethics: Care as a Virtue,” in DesAutels and Waugh (eds.), Feminists doing Ethics , New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 87–98.
• Miller, Fred, 1995, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristotle’s Politics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Noddings, Nel, 1984, Caring: a Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education , Berkeley: University of California Press.
• O’Connor, David K., 1988, “Aristotelian Justice as a Personal Virtue,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy , 13: 417–27.
• O’Neill, Onora, 1996, Towards Justice and Virtue: A Constructive Account of Practical Reasoning , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Piaget, Jean, 1932, The Moral Judgment of the Child , translated by M. Gabain, Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1948.
• Plato, Republic , translated and with intro by R.E. Allen, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006.
• Porter, Jean, 2016, Justice as a Virtue: A Thomistic Perspective , Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing.
• Rasmussen, Douglas B and Douglas J. Den Uyl, 2005, Norms of Liberty , University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
• Rawls, John, 1971, A Theory of Justice , Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
• Roberts, Robert C., 2010, “Justice as an Emotion Disposition,” Emotion Review , 2(1): 36–43.
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• Schmidtz, David 2006, Elements of Justice , New York: Cambridge University Press.
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• Sim, May, 2007, Remastering Morals with Aristotle and Confucius , New York: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2018, “Confucian Values and Resources for Justice,” in LeBar 2018, 237–60.
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• –––, 2010, Moral Sentimentalism , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Smith, Adam, 1759, The Theory of Moral Sentiments , Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1984.
• Solum, Lawrence B., 2008, “Natural Justice: An Aretaic Account of the Virtue of Lawfulness,” C. Farrelly and L. Solum (eds.), Virtue Jurisprudence , New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 167–192.
• Tessman, Lisa, 2005, Burdened Virtues: Virtue Ethics for Liberatory Struggles , New York: Oxford University Press.
• Thrasher, John, 2013, “Reconciling Justice and Pleasure in Epicurean Contractarianism,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice , 16(2): 423–36.
• Widlok, Thomas, 2018, “Learning How to Share,” in LeBar 2018, 93–118.
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• Williams, Bernard, 1980, “Justice as a Virtue,” in A. E. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics , Berkeley: University of California Press, 189–99.
• Wilson, Bart J. “Becoming Just by Eliminating Injustice: The Emergence of Property in Virtual Economies,” in LeBar 2018, 67–92.
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• Woodruff, Paul, 2018, “Growing toward Justice,” in LeBar 2018, 13–38.

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1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology

Philosophy, One Thousand Words at a Time

John Rawls’ ‘A Theory of Justice’

Author:  Ben Davies Category:  Social and Political Philosophy , Ethics Word Count: 999

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Some people are multi-billionaires; others die because they are too poor to afford food or medications. In many countries, people are denied rights to free speech, to participate in political life, or to pursue a career, because of their gender, religion, race or other factors, while their fellow citizens enjoy these rights. In many societies, what best predicts your future income, or whether you will attend college, is your parents’ income.

To many, these facts seem unjust . Others disagree: even if these facts are regrettable , they aren’t issues of justice. [1] A successful theory of justice must explain why clear injustices are unjust and help us resolve current disputes. [2] John Rawls (1921-2002) was a Harvard philosopher best known for his A Theory of Justice (1971), which attempted to define a just society. Nearly every contemporary scholarly discussion of justice references A Theory of Justice . This essay reviews its main themes. [3]

1. The ‘Original Position’ and ‘Veil of Ignorance’

Reasonable people often disagree about how to live, but we need to structure society in a way that reasonable members of that society can accept. [4] Citizens could try to collectively agree on basic rules. We needn’t decide every detail: we might only worry about rules concerning major political and social institutions, like the legal system and economy, which form the ‘basic structure’ of society.

A collective agreement on the basic structure of society is an attractive ideal. But some people are more powerful than others: some may be wealthier, or part of a social majority. If people can dominate negotiations because of qualities that are, as Rawls puts it, morally arbitrary , that is wrong. People don’t earn these advantages: they get them by luck. For anyone to use these unearned advantages to their own benefit is unfair, and the source of many injustices.

This inspires Rawls’ central claim that we should conceive of justice ‘as fairness.’ To identify fairness, Rawls develops two important concepts: the original position and the veil of ignorance.

The original position is a hypothetical situation: Rawls asks what social rules and institutions people would agree to, not in an actual discussion, but under fair conditions, [5] where nobody knows whether they are advantaged by luck. Fairness is achieved through the veil of ignorance , an imagined device where the people choosing the basic structure of society (‘deliberators’) have morally arbitrary features hidden from them: since they have no knowledge of these features, any decision they make can’t be biased in their own favor.

Deliberators aren’t ignorant about everything though. They know they are self-interested, i.e., want as much as possible of what Rawls calls primary goods (things we want, no matter what our ideal life looks like). They are also motivated by a minimal ‘sense of justice’: they will abide by rules that seem fair, if others do too. They also know basic facts about science and human nature. [6]  

2. Rawls’s Principles of Justice

Rawls thinks a just society will conform to rules that everyone would agree to in the original position. Since they are deliberating behind the veil of ignorance, people don’t know their personal circumstances, or even their view of the good life. This affects the kinds of outcomes they will endorse: e.g., it would be irrational for deliberators to agree to a society where only Christians have property rights since if, when the veil is ‘lifted,’ they turn out not to be Christian, that will negatively affect their life prospects. Similarly, deliberators presumably won’t choose a society with racist, sexist, or other unfairly discriminatory practices, since beyond the veil, they might end up on the wrong side of these policies. [7]

This gives rise to Rawls’ first principle of justice:

all people have equal claims to as much freedom as is consistent with everyone else having the same level of freedom. [8]

Rawls further claims that, because their ignorance includes an ignorance of probabilities, deliberators would be extremely cautious , and apply what he calls a ‘maximin’ principle: they will aim to ensure that the worst possible position they could end up in is as good as possible in terms of primary goods.

If we imagine ourselves as deliberators, we might be tempted by the idea of total equality in primary goods. This ensures, at least, that nobody will be better off than you for arbitrary reasons. However, some inequality might be useful: the possibility of earning more might incentivize people to work harder, growing the economy and so increasing the total amount of available wealth.

This isn’t a wholehearted endorsement of capitalism, as Rawls’ second principle , which addresses social and economic inequalities, makes clear. The second principle has two parts:

First, people in the original position will tolerate inequalities only if the jobs that pay more aren’t assigned unfairly. This gives us the ideal of fair equality of opportunity : inequalities are allowed only if they arise through jobs that equally talented people have equal opportunity to get. This requires, for instance, that young people receive roughly equal educational opportunities; otherwise, a talented individual might be held back by a lack of basic knowledge, either about their own talents, or about the world.

Second, since their reasoning is governed by the ‘maximin’ principle, deliberators will only tolerate inequalities that benefit the worst off: [9] since, as far as they know, they might be the worst off, this maximizes the quality of their worst possible outcome. This is called the difference principle .

These principles are ordered, which tells us what to do if they clash: equal liberty is most important, then fair opportunity , and finally the difference principle . So, neither freedoms nor opportunity are governed by the difference principle. [10]

3. Conclusion

We can now see how Rawls’ theory might evaluate the issues raised earlier. At least within specific societies, each seems to violate his basic principles of justice, and so would be condemned as unjust. So, even if we ultimately reject Rawls’ approach, it at least seems to offer intuitively correct answers in several important cases, and for plausible reasons.  

[1] For instance, some think that if someone’s money is fairly earned, it is not unjust that she does what she wants with it, such as spending it to increase her children’s opportunities (e.g., Nozick, 1974; Narveson, 2001). Others will say that there are no genuine ‘rights’, and a society should permit or restrict various activities depending on what will promote the ‘common good’: this charge has been made with considerable force against utilitarianism, though it is not one that all utilitarians accept (see Glover (1990), Section 3).

[2] Rawls’ basic view has been importantly extended to several areas which he either did not explicitly comment on: e.g., Daniels’ (2007) extension of the view to healthcare justice, and Rowlands’ (1997) extension to animal rights; or in ways with which he would have himself explicitly disagreed: compare Beitz’s (1979) ‘Rawlsian’ approach to global justice with Rawls’ (1999a) own published views.

[3] A Theory of Justice is a work of considerable length and detail, and this essay omits many elements of interest. For instance, this essay does not review Rawls’ discussion of his intellectual debt to the work of Immanuel Kant, e.g., in his criticism of utilitarian theory as failing to respect the ‘separateness of persons’ (191), and his reliance on the idea of grounding justice in a contract that is understood not as a historical event, but as a theoretical constraint (see Kant, 1793). 

In the discussion below, Rawls’ discussion of qualities that are “morally arbitrary” is found in Rawls (1971, 72-75) and the development of the original position and the veil of ignorance is found in Rawls (1971, 120).

[4] A Theory of Justice focuses on ‘domestic’ justice, i.e., justice within a particular society. Rawls (1999a) addresses the distinct question of global or international justice. Rawls suggests that justice at the global level exists between peoples (groups bound by, e.g. a common culture, language, or history) not individuals, since there is no common global structure equivalent to the ‘basic structure’ of a society. While international justice is also developed by reference to a veil of ignorance, the deliberators are representatives of societies. As such, Rawls believes that their concerns would be very different, including a strong emphasis on respect for national sovereignty, with exceptions only in cases of severe human rights violations. In addition, so long as all peoples or nations have institutions that enable their members to live decent lives, any remaining inequality is not morally troubling. As outlined below, this is in stark contrast to his theory of domestic justice.

[5] Rawls’ view is therefore a ‘hypothetical contract’ theory (i.e. it rests on what would be agreed under certain idealized assumptions), as opposed to the ‘actual contract’ view (e.g. Gauthier, 1986; Gilbert, 2006).

[6] One further condition that deliberators know, which Rawls borrows from David Hume (1738: Book 3, Part 2, Section 2), is that they exist in a condition of ‘moderate scarcity’, which according to both authors is a ‘circumstance’ of justice. The basic idea is that justice is only necessary where there are potential conflicts (i.e., when we do not have an abundance of goods), but if there is not enough even to meet everyone’s basic needs (i.e., ‘extreme scarcity’), those who lose out cannot be expected to abide by the rules. So society – and with it our system of justice – will break down.

[7] In fact, though, Rawls’ is remarkably silent on racial injustice, and there has been considerable debate about whether his system of thought has the space to properly address such issues. See e.g., Mills (2009); Shelby (2013). Related critiques have also been made with respect to other forms of injustice, such as gender-related injustice (e.g. Okin, 1989) and injustice against people with disabilities (e.g. Sen (1980); Nussbaum (2006)).

[8] This was later revised to a weaker requirement: that people have access to a “fully adequate” set of basic rights and liberties (2001: 42-3): these rights cannot be overridden by appeals to the common good.

[9] However, the ‘worst off’ here are to be understood only in reference to “social and economic inequalities” (Rawls, 1999b: 53). Inequalities of ‘natural’ goods (which includes health) are not included because they are not things we can directly redistribute between people, unlike social goods such as money and opportunity.

[10] However, there is some apparent inconsistency across Rawls’ work here. Later (2001: 266), he seems to suggest that some inequalities of opportunity are inevitable, and that they must therefore be turned to the benefit of those with the least opportunity: this view looks remarkably like a difference principle for opportunity.

Daniels, Norman (2007), Just Health: Meeting Health Needs Fairly Cambridge University Press

Gauthier, David (1986) Morals by Agreement Oxford University Press

Gilbert, Margaret (2006) ‘ Reconsidering Actual Contract Theory ’ in A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society . Oxford University Press. 215-238

Glover, Jonathan (1990) Utilitarianism and its Critics Macmillan Publishing

Hume, David (1738) A Treatise of Human Nature

Mills, Charles (2009) ‘ Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls ’ The Southern Journal of Philosophy (2009): 161-184

Moller Okin, Susan (1989) Justice, Gender and the Family New York: Basic Books

Narveson, Jan (2001) The Libertarian Idea Broadview Press

Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State and Utopia Wiley-Blackwell

Nussbaum, Martha, (2006), Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership , Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Rawls, John (1971) A Theory of Justice  Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rawls, John (1999a) The Law of Peoples Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rawls, John (1999b) A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rawls, John (2001) Justice as Fairness: A Restatement Erin Kelly ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Rowlands, Mark (1997) ‘ Contractarianism and Animal Rights ’ Journal of Applied Philosophy 14 (3):235–247

Shelby, Tommie (2013) ‘ Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills ’ Critical Philosophy of Race 1(2): 145-162.

Sen, Amartya, (1980), ‘ Equality of What? ’ in Tanner Lectures on Human Values , S. MacMurrin (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

For Further Reading

Beitz, Charles (1979) ‘ Bounded Morality: Justice and the State in World Politics ’  International Organization , 33: 405–424.

Harsanyi, John (1975) ‘ Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory ’ America Political Science Review 69(2): 594-606

Kant, Immanuel (1793) ‘ On the common saying: this may be true in theory but it does not apply in practice ’ in Kant’s Political Writings (1970), edited by Hans Reiss, translated by H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge University Press (61-93)

Rawls, John (2002) The Cambridge Companion to Rawls edited by Samuel Freeman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Rawls, John (2005) Political Liberalism : Expanded Edition Columbia University Press

Sandel, Michael (1998) Liberalism and the Limits of Justice Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

Sen, Amartya (1992) Inequality Re-examined Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Taylor, Charles (1985). ‘ The nature and scope of distributive justice ’ in  Philosophy and the Human Sciences: Philosophical Papers 2 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 289-317

Wenar, Leif, (2017) ‘ John Rawls ’,  The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy  (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)

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About the Author

Ben completed his PhD in Philosophy at King’s College London in 2015. He is currently a Lecturer in Political Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. His research is mostly in the ethics and politics of health care, including resource allocation, professional ethics, discrimination, and democracy. He also has interests in animal ethics; death; and well-being. sites.google.com/view/ben-davies-philosophy

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Essay on Justice

Every living thing has life. But the lives of humans are much different and advance as compared to other living things. However, the lives of humans are not that easy. The main thing that makes human life easy and peaceful is Justice. Justice is essential for maintaining a fair and equitable society and is an important part of human life.

On an individual level, justice ensures that everyone is treated fairly and has access to the same rights and privileges. To understand the necessity of justice, let us have a look at justice in detail.

Short and Long Justice Essay in English

Here, we are presenting long and short essays on Justice in English for students under word limits of 100 – 150 Words, 200 – 250 words, and 500 – 600 words. This topic is useful for students of classes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 in English. Also it will be helpful for students preparing for various competitive exams. These provided essays will help you to write effective essays, paragraphs, and speeches on Justice.

Justice Essay 10 Lines (100 – 120 Words)

1) Justice is a concept of fairness.

2) It ensures that people are treated equally.

3) Justice is considered to be the foundation of a secular society.

4) It is a fundamental right of every individual.

5) It is a complex concept that can often require difficult decisions.

6) Justice is an important part of a democratic country.

7) Justice should be encouraged in all areas of life.

8) It is a balance between rights and obligations.

9) Justice should work to resolve conflicts peacefully.

10) Justice should ensure that all people have access to equal opportunities.

Short Essay on Justice (250 – 300 Words)

Introduction

Justice is a concept of fairness that must be based on ethics, rationality, law, religion, and equality. It is a concept that upholds the equality of all people and treats everyone fairly.

Justice is not only an idea but an action that requires understanding the right and wrong of decisions to make sure everyone is treated fairly.

Advantages of Justice

Justice is essential for a healthy and functioning society. It is the foundation of democracy and laws. It is also essential for safeguarding individual rights and freedoms. It ensures that individuals are treated fairly and with respect, and that everyone has access to the same rights and privileges. People are afraid to commit crimes in a country where the law is followed. Additionally, justice offers voice to the weak and the impoverished, preventing the wealthy and powerful from taking advantage of them.

Disadvantages of Justice

One of the main disadvantages of justice is that it can be slow and inefficient. Additionally, with legal costs and court fees, people have to pay huge amount. Moreover, justice systems have been known to be biased against certain groups especially the powerful peoples, leading to unequal outcomes. Many people are afraid of the process of justice systems and end up losing their hope.

Justice is an essential element of a healthy society and is fundamental to the maintenance of a peaceful world. Justice should be applied equally to all people, regardless of their race, gender, or social class. Every citizen should follow law and promote equality to enjoy a healthy living.

Long Essay on Justice (500 Words)

“Justice” is not only a small word, it is a sentiment. For many people justice is not only their fundamental right but it is their need. It’s challenging to define what justice means. It has broad meaning varying from person to person. Justice should be seen as both a reward for doing good deeds and a means of punishing bad behavior.

What Is Justice?

Justice is the concept of treating all people with respect, regardless of social or economic status. When justice is applied, it ensures that individuals receive fair treatment and that their rights are protected. This includes access to resources and opportunities, as well as the right to a fair trial and equal protection under the law.

Types of Justice

There are three types of justice: retributive justice, restorative justice, and distributive justice. Retributive justice is the idea that those who commit wrongs should be punished as a way of getting revenge. While restorative justice is focused on repairing the harm caused by wrongdoing and restoring relationships between offenders and victims. Distributive justice is concerned with ensuring that resources are shared equally.

Importance of Justice

Justice is important for a number of reasons. It helps to maintain order in society and to ensure that laws are followed. Justice also helps to protect the rights of individuals and to ensure that people are treated same. It also helps to promote respect for the law and to create a sense of trust between citizens and the government. Justice is a cornerstone of democracy and is essential to the preservation of social order. Justice is an essential element of a healthy society.

The Black Side of Justice

Justice is an important part of society, but it has some disadvantages as well. Justice can be slow and expensive, as it often takes a long time for justice to be served. People may have to wait a long time for their case to go through the court system, and they may have to pay a lot of money for lawyers or court fees. Additionally, justice can be subjective, as judges and juries may interpret the law differently and come to different conclusions. This can lead to unfair results, which can be very frustrating and disappointing for involved.

How Justice can be maintained in society?

There are many ways through which justice can be maintained in a society. Some of them are listed below:

1. All citizens should follow by the laws, regardless of their social or economic status.

2. No one should be given special privileges or be discriminated on the basis of their race, gender, religion, or any other characteristic.

3. Everyone has basic human rights that should be respected by others.

4. People should be held accountable for their actions and any wrongdoings should be punished accordingly.

5. Governments and other institutions should be transparent about their decisions and actions.

Justice is an essential concept in a functioning society. It is a fundamental human right that should be respected and upheld by all nations. We must work together to create a fairer and more equal society.

I hope the above-provided essay on Justice will be helpful to you in understanding the advantages, disadvantages, and role of Justice in our society.

FAQs: Frequently Asked Questions on Justice

Ans. India celebrated 20 February every year as World Day of Social Justice.

Ans. Lady Justice is generally represented holding a set of scales in one hand, on which she balances the act and its effects in order to reach equilibrium and, thus, justice.

Ans. The justice system works by having two sides present their case to a judge or jury. Based on the evidence, the judge then makes a fair decision.

Ans. The role of the police in the justice system is to investigate crimes, gather evidence, and arrest the criminal.

Ans. As justice is impartial and shouldn’t be dependent on a person’s appearance or other external factors, the statue of justice is blindfolded.

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John Rawls’ Theory of Justice Essay

Introduction, rawls’ theories of justice, reference list.

John Rawls, in his work A Theory of Justice, considers how application of logic in justice system would save the society from common problems like designing societal systems, distributing social and economic advantages, and allotting duties to people in society among other issues. Rawls shares Immanuel Kant’s thoughts arguing that people should do unto others as they expect them to be done; the principle of nature.

Rawls uses what he calls ‘the Difference Principle’ and ‘the Principle of Equal Liberty’ to explain his theory; moreover, he expounds this principle by introducing what he calls, ‘the original position,’ and, ‘the veil of ignorance.’ If only people made justice decisions that would be ideal to them were they to be judged by the same decisions, then justice would be even for everyone.

Rawls starts by introducing the ‘original position.’ At the original position, the involved people would make pass judgment covered by a ‘veil of ignorance.’ According to Rawls, when people are in the ‘original position’, “no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like.

I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance.” 1 Therefore, at this position, the society would be void of things like talents, status or any other form of societal social distinction.

The aim of this ‘original position’ is to do away with prejudices or any other form of personal issues that pervert justice; it introduces neutrality, allowing people to pass judgment as if they were passing it to themselves. Simply put, the ‘original position’ calls for people to pass the kind of decisions that they would wish to get if they were in the position of the one facing justice.

Naturally, “people want the best things for themselves; therefore, they would come up with structures that are best for themselves and because they do not know where they would be in future, the overall judgment would be ‘best’ for them and ‘fair’ to everyone else.” 2 Veil of ignorance is the situation whereby, people ignore or assume theirs status in society and make judgments as if they were equal to everybody else.

‘The Principle of Equal Liberty’ states that, “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.” 1 This is a classless principle calling for justice equality promoting mutual understanding; nevertheless, taken the way it is, this principle would confuse people on some issues and this is why Rawls compliments it with his second principle; the Difference Principle.’

The Difference Principle states that, “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that; they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society, and offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” 1

Rawls divides this second principle into two parts. The first part pushes for distribution of, “economic and social disparities in a way that, they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.” 1 This first part addresses the problems presented by the egalitarian nature of the first principle.

In this case, some people in society would enjoy some social status; however, this difference in class would be for the benefit of the less fortunate in the society. For instance, talented would be allowed to realize and practice their talents, which of course would give them some class in society.

Nevertheless, these talents should not be for personal gain but for the benefit of the less fortunate in the society. The second part of the Difference Principle states that, “economic and social disparities should be distributed in a way that, offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity.” 1

These disparities would exist under given considerations only if they benefit largely the least disadvantaged people in society. For instance, paying a manager millions of dollars a year would be allowed if these millions were to benefit the least disadvantaged in society.

Disparities are not the problem; the problem lies in the outcome of the disparities and if they are for personal gains then they are not allowed. “Rawls puts forward two conditions; one, these disparities would be allowed if their outcome have direct or indirect positive effects in empowering the least advantaged in society; two, as long as the procedure of accessing high posts in society is free and fair, void of irrelevant criteria and discrimination, then it is all right.” 2

Rawls theory is persuasive. Since time immemorial, justice ahs been littered with personal issues and prejudices making it unfair. For instance, those administering justice may do it harshly because after all, they are not subject to it. Considering Rawls principles, they advocate for equity and this is laudable.

Majority of people in society today are least disadvantaged with few individuals enjoying most of economic and social advantages. If only people would do unto others the way they would expect to be done, then the world would be a better place to live in. unfortunately, the real situation is far from this with delayed or twisted justice taking precedence over fair or Rawls justice.

Considering the first principle, people would be equal and passing justice from the ‘original position’ would allow fair justice for all. The first bit of the second principle concerns itself with improving the livelihood of the least disadvantaged in society and this is praiseworthy.

The least disadvantaged people in the society have suffered all forms of injustices and this principle would act in the best interest of this group of poor individuals. The second bit of the second principle calls for equal opportunities in accessing offices and other life opportunities. For many years, people have been hired on basis of who knows whom in a given institution; this is unfair and Rawls’ principles would restore some ‘fairness’ in such situations.

By referring to the ‘original position’, Rawls intends to eliminate any form of bias that might stain justice administration. This original position would allow equitability in justice administration and since justice administrators make decision from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, which covers personal issues or status, then justice made would be fair to everyone.

From the ‘original position’ acting from behind a ‘veil of ignorance’, “people would make judgments and decisions that are fair to everyone because these decision makers do not know where they would belong in future; therefore, they would pass judgments that are ‘best’ for themselves thus making the judgments fair to everyone.” 2

Rawls principles are persuasive for they would restore equitability in justice administration; promote the least advantaged and allow equal chances to accessing life opportunities like holding offices. Majority of people in society are disadvantaged and logically, they form the greatest number of justice consumers; therefore improving their livelihood would be tantamount to boosting happiness in the whole society.

• Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press; 1971.
• Perry J, Bratman M, & Fisher M. Introduction to Philosophy: Classical And Contemporary Readings. New York; Oxford University Press; 2006.
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IvyPanda. (2023, December 18). John Rawls’ Theory of Justice. https://ivypanda.com/essays/john-rawls-theory-of-justice/

"John Rawls’ Theory of Justice." IvyPanda , 18 Dec. 2023, ivypanda.com/essays/john-rawls-theory-of-justice/.

IvyPanda . (2023) 'John Rawls’ Theory of Justice'. 18 December.

IvyPanda . 2023. "John Rawls’ Theory of Justice." December 18, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/john-rawls-theory-of-justice/.

1. IvyPanda . "John Rawls’ Theory of Justice." December 18, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/john-rawls-theory-of-justice/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "John Rawls’ Theory of Justice." December 18, 2023. https://ivypanda.com/essays/john-rawls-theory-of-justice/.

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In this publication from the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the contributors explore one of the most fundamental and essential human rights: the rights of women. From the perspective of the United Nations, this publication is a comprehensive overview of the issue of human rights, including the international human rights laws and UN practices related to the topic. Additionally, it talks about specific issues relating to women’s rights, such as reproductive health, standard of living, conflict, violence against women, access to justice, and more. Through each of these specific areas, this report gives examples of the human rights framework in action through real-life cases.

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Another important historical piece in the human and civil rights movements is Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from Birmingham Jail.” In addition to defending the practice of nonviolent protest, the letter also serves as a call to action for people to take direct action against unjust laws rather than to rely or wait on the courts to serve justice. King’s letter is a reminder for all human rights professionals that the road to human rights practice is not easy and is not always black and white. As an essay addressing one of the most fundamental and long-standing human rights issues, racial inequality, this letter is an inspiring and historical reminder for all human rights professionals.

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About the author, allison reefer.

Allison Reefer is a young professional living in Pittsburgh, PA. She works with a refugee resettlement agency to help refugees and immigrants in the city, and she volunteers with a local shelter for human trafficking victims. She obtained her Master in International Development from the University of Pittsburgh and a BA in Writing from Geneva College, focusing most of her academic work on human trafficking and migration in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. In her free time, she loves to write, read, sing and play bass guitar, practice Russian, and explore her city.

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15 On Law and Justice

• Published: January 2007
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This chapter argues that law is necessarily geared to some conception of justice, taking account of distributive, retributive, and corrective aspects of justice, to all of which respect for the rule of law is, in the context of the state's capability for coercion, essential. It is ‘necessarily geared’ to it in the sense that anyone engaged in its administration, whether in a legislative, executive, or judicial capacity, can only be justified in implementing, amending, or interpreting provisions of the system given a certain condition. This is that they can give grounds for holding that some reasonable conception of justice is satisfied by the provision in question, or that it pursues some element of a reasonably assessed common good in a way that is reasonably coherent with the relevant conception of justice.

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Essay on Justice And Fairness

Students are often asked to write an essay on Justice And Fairness in their schools and colleges. And if you’re also looking for the same, we have created 100-word, 250-word, and 500-word essays on the topic.

Let’s take a look…

100 Words Essay on Justice And Fairness

What is justice.

Justice is like a rule that everyone should be treated the right way. It means making sure people get what they deserve. If someone does something good, they should get a reward. If they do something bad, they should get a fair punishment. Justice is important for peace and to make sure people trust each other.

Understanding Fairness

Fairness is about being equal. It means nobody gets more or less than they should. In a game, fairness would mean that all players follow the same rules. In life, it means giving everyone the same chance, no matter who they are.

Justice and Fairness Together

Justice and fairness often go hand in hand. When a teacher grades papers, they must be fair, giving each student the grade they deserve. This is also justice. When everyone is treated fairly and justly, people feel safe and happy because they know what to expect.

250 Words Essay on Justice And Fairness

Justice is like a set of rules that helps people live together peacefully. Imagine you are playing a game. For the game to be fun, everyone must follow the rules. If someone cheats, it’s not fair to the others. Justice is like the referee that makes sure no one cheats and everyone gets a fair chance.

What is Fairness?

Fairness is sharing and treating everyone equally. Think of it as cutting a cake. If you cut one big piece for yourself and give smaller ones to your friends, that’s not fair. Fairness means everyone gets an equal slice.

Why are Justice and Fairness Important?

Justice and fairness are important because they make sure everyone is treated right. In school, if a student gets punished for something they didn’t do, that’s not justice. Fairness means the teacher listens to all sides before deciding. When people feel treated fairly, they are happier and get along better.

Justice and Fairness in Everyday Life

Every day, you see justice and fairness. When you wait in line for your turn on the swing, that’s fairness. If someone cuts in front, that’s not fair. Teachers use justice when they grade tests. They look at the answers and give marks based on who got them right, not who they like the most.

Justice and fairness help everyone know what is right and what is wrong. They are like the glue that holds people together, making sure everyone is respected and gets what they deserve.

500 Words Essay on Justice And Fairness

Understanding justice and fairness.

Justice and fairness are two words that often come up when we talk about treating people right. Think of justice as the rules that make sure things are fair for everyone. Fairness is when everyone gets what they deserve, not more or less.

Why Justice Matters

Imagine a classroom where some students get more time to finish a test just because they are friends with the teacher. That would not be fair, right? Justice is important because it makes sure everyone has the same chance, no matter who they are or where they come from. It helps us live in peace with each other, knowing that everyone is treated equally.

The Different Types of Justice

There are a few kinds of justice. ‘Legal justice’ is when laws are used to make sure people do the right thing. If someone breaks a rule, they might have to go to court where a judge decides what happens to them. ‘Social justice’ is about making sure all groups of people, like different races or the rich and poor, are treated the same. Then there’s ‘personal justice,’ which is about being fair in your own actions with friends and family.

Fairness in Everyday Life

Fairness is not just in big things like laws; it’s also in small things like taking turns on the playground or sharing snacks with your classmates. When you play a game, fairness means following the rules and not cheating to win. At home, it might mean doing your share of the chores.

Justice and Fairness in School

In school, fairness is key. Teachers try to grade everyone’s work in the same way, so it’s fair. If someone cheats on a test, they might get a zero because it’s not fair to the students who studied hard. Schools also have rules to stop bullying, so everyone feels safe and respected.

Challenges to Justice and Fairness

Sometimes, even with rules, things aren’t fair. Some people might not have enough money, which makes life harder for them. Others might be treated badly because of how they look or what they believe. It’s important to stand up for fairness and help fix these problems when we see them.

What We Can Do

We can all help make things more just and fair. We can be honest, treat others well, and speak up when we see something wrong. We can also learn about people who are different from us and understand their views. By doing this, we can help make the world a better place for everyone.

Justice and fairness are like the rules of a game that everyone in the world is playing. They help us know what is right and what is wrong, and they give everyone the same chance to have a good life. When we all work together to be fair and just, we make our homes, schools, and communities happier and safer for everyone.

That’s it! I hope the essay helped you.

If you’re looking for more, here are essays on other interesting topics:

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For the sake of all of us, Sonia Sotomayor needs to retire from the US supreme court

She’s been described as the ‘conscience of the supreme court’. That’s why it pains me to write this

F orget Ruth Bader Ginsburg. It is Sonia Sotomayor who is the greatest liberal to sit on the supreme court in my adult lifetime. The first Latina to hold the position of justice, she has blazed a relentlessly progressive trail on the highest bench in the land.

Whether it was her lone dissent in a North Carolina voting rights case in 2016 (“the court’s conclusion … is a fiction”); her ingenious referencing of Ta-Nehisi Coates, James Baldwin and WEB DuBois in another 2016 dissent over unreasonable searches and seizures; or her withering observation at the Dobbs oral argument in 2021 (“Will this institution survive the stench that this creates in the public perception that the constitution and its reading are just political acts?”), Sotomayor has stood head and shoulders above both her liberal and conservative colleagues on the bench for the past 15 years.

And so it is with good reason that she has been called the “conscience of the supreme court” ( the Nation ), “the truth teller of the supreme court” ( New York Times ) and “the real liberal queen of the court” ( Above the Law ).

I happen to agree 100% with all of those descriptions. But – and it pains me to write these words – I also believe it is time for Sotomayor to retire.

Okay, now it is time to remember Ruth Bader Ginsburg. To recall how RBG, who had survived two bouts of cancer, refused to quit the court despite calls to do so from leading liberals during Barack Obama’s second term office. To hark back to her insistence, in multiple interviews, that it was “ misguided ” to insist she retire and that she would only stand down “ when it’s time ”. To recollect how, on her deathbed in 2020, she told her granddaughter that her “most fervent wish is that I will not be replaced until a new president is installed” – and how it made no difference whatsoever! Donald Trump nominated Amy Coney Barrett as RBG’s replacement just eight days after her death, and Senate Republicans confirmed Barrett to RBG’s vacant seat just eight days before election day.

With Joe Biden trailing Trump in several swing states and Democrats also in danger of losing their razor-thin majority in the Senate, are we really prepared for history to repeat itself? Sotomayor will turn 70 in June. Of course, only Sotomayor knows the full status of her health, still it is public knowledge that she has had type 1 diabetes since she was seven ; had paramedics called to her home ; and is the only sitting justice to have, reportedly , traveled with a medic. To be clear: she could easily – and God willing – survive a potential Trump second term and still be dishing out dissents from the bench come 2029.

But why take that risk? Why not retire now? Why not quit the bench at the same age that justices in Belgium, Australia and Japan are forced to do so?

Let’s deal with the three most obvious objections.

First, wouldn’t a replacement for Sotomayor that Senator Joe Manchin has to approve be less progressive, and more centrist, than our sole Latina, super-progressive justice? Perhaps. But, again, consider the alternative. Would we rather Biden replace Sotomayor with a centrist in 2024 … or Trump replace her with a far-right Federalist Society goon in 2025? Or, what if Trump doesn’t win but the Republican party takes control of the Senate and blocks a second-term Biden from replacing her between 2025 and 2028?

Second, is there really any difference between a 6-3 conservative majority on the court and a 7-2 majority? Isn’t all lost already? Not quite. The damage to our democracy from a 7-2 hard-right court would be on a whole other and existential level. Yes, 6-3 has been a disaster for our progressive priorities ( Dobbs! Bruen! Kennedy! ) but there have also been a handful of key 5-4 victories ( Redistricting ! Razor wire at the border ! Ghost guns !) in cases where Roberts plus one other conservative have come over from the dark side. None of that happens in a 7-2 court. The hard-right conservatives win not just most of the time but every single time.

Third, how can anyone on the left dare ask the first, and only, Latina justice to quit the supreme court?

It’s simple. Women in general, and Latinas especially, will suffer most from a 7-2 supreme court. It is because I am so worried about the future of minority rights in this country that I – reluctantly – want Sotomayor to step aside.

This has nothing to do with her race or her gender. Forget RBG (again). Consider Stephen Breyer. You remember Breyer, right? The bookish and bespectacled liberal justice who quit the supreme court in 2022, at the age of 83, in part because of an intense pressure campaign from the left.

The fact that he was a white man didn’t shield him from criticism – or from calls for him to stand down. In 2021, the progressive group Demand Justice sent a billboard truck to circle the supreme court building with the message: “ Breyer, retire .” I joined in, too. “Retire, retire, retire,” I said in a monologue for my Peacock show in 2021. “Or history may end up judging you, Justice Breyer.”

So why is it okay to pressure Breyer to retire but not Sotomayor? This time round, Demand Justice isn’t taking a position on whether an older liberal justice should quit while a Democratic president and Senate can still replace them and, as HuffPost reports, “on the left, there is little open debate about whether she should retire.”

Democrats, it seems, still don’t seem keen on wielding power or influence over the highest court in the nation. In 2013, Barack Obama met with RBG for lunch and tried to nudge her into retiring, but as the New York Times later reported, Obama “did not directly bring up the subject of retirement to Justice Ginsburg”.

Compare and contrast with Donald Trump. The finance journalist David Enrich, in his book Dark Towers, reveals how the Trump family carried out a “ coordinated White House charm offensive ” to persuade Justice Anthony Kennedy to retire in 2018. Trump himself, according to Vanity Fair , “worked for months to assure Kennedy his legacy would be in good hands”.

The offensive was a success. Out went self-styled moderate Kennedy, in came the hard-right political operative Brett Kavanaugh.

If there is to be a change to the supreme court in 2024, Biden and the Senate majority leader, Chuck Schumer, have only a few months left to make it happen. And yet they don’t seem too bothered about Sotomayor’s age or health. Last week, the White House press secretary, Karine Jean-Pierre, called it “a personal decision for her to make”.

A personal decision? The prospect of a 7-2 conservative supreme court, with a far-right Federalist Soceity apparatchik having taken “liberal queen” Sotomayor’s seat on the bench, should fill us all with dread.

Biden, elected Democrats , and liberals and progressives across the board should be both publicly and privately encouraging Sotomayor to consider what she wants her legacy to be, to remember what happened with RBG, and to not take any kind of gamble with the future of our democracy.

If insanity is doing the same thing again and again and expecting different results, then I’m sorry but a liberal supreme court justice about to enter her 70s and refusing to retire on a Democratic president and Democratic Senate’s watch is nothing short of insane.

Mehdi Hasan is the CEO and editor-in-chief of Zeteo

• Sonia Sotomayor
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Re-setting special education for justice: An essay on the logics and infrastructure enabling deep change in the COVID-19-era

• Published: 03 May 2023

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• Sarah L. Woulfin   ORCID: orcid.org/0000-0003-2883-3859 1 &
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COVID-19 shocked the education system, disrupting the policies and practices of special education over multiple school years. This essay brings together the institutional logics perspective and racialized organization theory to first examine aspects of special education and then describe how leaders and teachers can improve special education to target inequities. We illustrate features of three logics of special education: compliance, intervention, and equity. We explain how these logics are racialized structures in the special education field. Applying an agentic stance, we portray how leaders and teachers draw on multiple, competing logics of special education. Next, we highlight how infrastructure enables leaders and teachers to enact the equity model of special education. In sum, this essay encourages improving infrastructural elements and confronting racism and ableism to re-envision special education in the face of COVID-disruptions.

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Schools shuttered in March 2020, resulting in major changes within educational organizations around the globe. The shocks of COVID-19 disrupted the policies and practices of special education (SpEd), detrimentally affecting millions of students with disabilities (SWDs) (Breen, 2021 ; Fernandez, 2020 ). In the U.S., districts pivoted to remote learning and modified their approaches to SpEd implementation, including waiving supports for SWDs (Tuchman & McKittrick, 2020 ; Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ). During this period, educational leaders and teachers operated on shaky ground and faced novel challenges in implementing SpEd (Fernández, 2020 ). Further, parents and caregivers of SWDs reported gaps in SpEd services, delays in diagnosis processes, and regression in children’s skills (Chung, 2020 ; Fernández, 2020 ). These issues of SpEd implementation raise the question: How should districts and schools re-set SpEd to confront longstanding challenges and ameliorate outcomes for SWDs and schools in the Covid-era?

Critically, however, numerous barriers for implementing SpEd existed prior to the pandemic. As noted by several researchers and practitioners, the impact of ableism and racism pervade elements of SpEd (Annamma, 2016 ). Now more than ever, with the intersection of racism, ableism, and COVID-19, there is a pressing need to change structures and practices of SpEd to recuperate from pandemic schooling and attain justice for SWDs, families, and communities. Based upon this, it is vital to apply lenses of educational change and racialized organizations to blaze a more just path for SpEd implementation.

The U.S. education system has entered an important window for engaging in a hard re-set of SpEd (Ladson-Billings, 2021 ). The rockiness of remote schooling for SWDs amidst White backlash in policing, housing, politics, and schooling (Cohn & Quealy, 2020 ; Ishimaru & Galloway, 2014 ; McLaughlin, 2010 ; Skiba et al., 2008 ), has made the insufficiencies and inequities inherent in the pre-existing approaches to SpEd glaringly evident. The time is now for educational organizations, leaders, and teachers to more fully implement equity-oriented SpEd (de Royston et al., 2020 ). This will require modifying the structures, conceptualizations, and practices of SpEd to serve students and families in a just, sustaining manner.

Building on Fullan’s ( 2020 ) notion that change will happen, yet will be complex in the Covid-era, we demonstrate the structures and systems vital to deepen equity and justice in SpEd and for SWDs. This conceptual essay applies the institutional logics perspective and racialized organization theory to shed light on the ways leaders and teachers can change SpEd to better center equity (Ray, 2019 ). To do so, this essay operationalizes three dominant logics of SpEd. We first portray how educators draw on the compliance, intervention, and equity logics while implementing SpEd. Next, we point to racialized dimensions of SpEd structures and activities. We then delve into the role of infrastructure in providing conditions for deeply changing aspects of SpEd to serve SWDs in a just manner.

As part of our insistence on a hard-re-set of the education system (Ladson-Billings, 2021 ), we show how district and school leaders should elevate equity while designing and implementing SpEd. We direct particular attention to the organizational structures and leadership practices shaping change in the domain of special education. Further, we offer recommendations for addressing the complexities of reforming SpEd during this challenging period (Fullan, 2020 ). These implications hold utility for reformers, advocates, and researchers in varied nations seeking to improve educational experiences and outcomes for students with disabilities. Thus, our application of concepts from institutional logics and racialized organizations provides insights for re-setting SpEd at this socio-cultural moment.

Relevant literature on the policies and practices of special education

More than 7 million U.S. public school students receive special education services, ranging from in-classroom accommodations to significant supports for medically complex children. There is diversity within the SpEd student population, since it includes children categorized in thirteen widely ranging disabilities—from speech/language impairments and intellectual disability to autism and specific learning disability (e.g., dyslexia, dyscalculia, dysgraphia). Moreover, there exists diversity in the racial and gender identities and the English Learner status of students within each category (Morgan et al., 2015 ).

Students of color are overidentified for some disabilities, but they are underidentified for other types of disabilities (e.g., autism) (Ladson-Billings, 2021 ; Morgan et al., 2015 ). Racist systems and racial biases influence multiple steps of the disability diagnosis process as well as facets of the delivery of SpEd services. Additionally, Black and Brown children receiving SpEd services are more likely to be suspended or encounter other disciplinary measures as compared to White children. Appallingly, over 75% of children in juvenile detention facilities are disabled; this overrepresentation of disabled children is grounded in both ableism and racism (Ladson-Billings, 2021 ; McInerney, 2018 ). Given such inequities, policymakers, practitioners, and researchers must attend to what occurs within the black box of SpEd, how leaders guide SpEd implementation to disrupt deep seated patterns of racism and ableism, and potential levers for re-setting SpEd to justly serve SWDs with intersecting identities.

Inclusion reform

The 1990 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) pressed for inclusion to reduce segregation between special and general education (Bakken & Obiakor, 2016 ; Lipsky & Gartner, 1997 ). Thus, inclusion reform—promoting integrating disabled children in schools to improve SWDs’ educational experiences and life outcomes (Gottfried, 2014 ; Stelitano et al., 2020 )—is not new. However, numerous challenges remain for district and school leaders striving to adopt inclusion and for teachers attempting to enact inclusive approaches (Bray & Russell, 2016 ; Theoharis & Causton, 2014 ). Many of these challenges are even greater in underresourced districts and schools which oftentimes enroll high proportions of Black and Brown students (Connor et al., 2019 ). For instance, there are staffing challenges, including a shortage of highly qualified special educators and skilled paraprofessionals. Students who have been marginalized at the intersection of race and ability status need solutions that are not only equitable, but also appropriate (Losen & Welner, 2001 ). We note this requires recognition of students’ unique circumstances and then the provision of tailored, responsive solutions.

Legislation formally couples special education to broader civil rights as well as social justice forces and issues (Blanchett, 2009 ; Causton-Theoharis et al., 2011 ). First, components of special education are linked to legal rights. IDEA delineates the rights of families and students in technical and legalistic ways (Voulgarides, 2018 ). Second, the disability justice movement continually elevates issues of social justice (Berne et al., 2018 ); this includes foregrounding how ableism is coupled with other systems of oppression. In particular, the disability justice stance hones in on intersectionality, sustainability, and collective liberation.

Upon closer examination, however, students with disabilities “experience inequities inherent in the special education system, including segregated classrooms, limited access to the general education curriculum, and poor post-school outcomes” (Blanchett, 2009 , p. 392). Such gaps are extensive in schools serving high proportions of students of color. Therefore, ableism and racism permeate multiple aspects of SpEd and weigh heavily on disabled students’ educational experiences and outcomes. In particular, there are racialized patterns in who obtains which type of disability diagnosis (e.g., lower proportion of students of color diagnosed with autism) and racialized patterns in the SpEd-to-prison pipeline (Annamma et al., 2014 ; Fish, 2019a , 2019b ). This underscores the need for a critical lens that recognizes—and magnifies—aspects of SpEd policy and practice perpetuating such inequity.

Current research on special education policy implementation

Scholars have interrogated special education from multiple analytic levels and with varying degrees of attention to racism and ableism. Macro-level studies document historical and legal trends in educating disabled children (Skiba et al., 2008 ). One branch of this work addresses inequities in SpEd implementation. Specifically, scholars have applied DisCrit to illuminate how overlapping forces of ableism and racism shape the experiences and outcomes of marginalized SWDs (Annamma et al., 2017 ; Connor et al., 2019 ). In contrast, micro-level studies examine the impact of interventions on SWDs’ academic and non-academic outcomes (Elbaum et al., 2000 ; Vaughn et al., 2003 ). Additionally, some micro-level scholarship interrogates how educators’ beliefs, dispositions, and/or biases, including those associated with racism and ableism, shape their enactment of SpEd (Bray & Russell, 2016 ; Fish, 2019a ).

Although macro and micro-level studies have revealed much about the structures, activities, and outcomes of SpEd, there are gaps in our understanding of the organizational factors promoting equity-oriented SpEd. Indeed, there is limited meso-level research on SpEd implementation. Many questions remain regarding organizational factors (e.g., working conditions and leadership) enabling the implementation of equity-oriented SpEd. Further, there exists limited research on the interplay of macro-forces (e.g., racism, ableism, federal and state policies), meso-conditions, and micro-processes (e.g., leaders’ conceptualizations, teachers’ work, families’ experiences) in SpEd implementation. As such, it is unclear how to reshape institutional and organizational structures to improve the daily work of educators and daily experiences of SWDs.

Leaders as implementers

District and school administrators influence SpEd implementation (Brunsting et al., 2014 ; DeMatthews et al., 2021 ; Theoharis & Causton, 2014 ). District administrators interpret and respond to federal and state special education regulations, and they make decisions about resources for SpEd. (Billingsley & McLeskey, 2004 ; DeMatthews & Mawhinney, 2013 ). In many cases, district leaders also hire, supervise, and support SETs (Woulfin & Jones, 2021 ). Turning to the school level, principals design systems shaping the delivery of SpEd services within their sites (DeMatthews et al., 2021 ; Theoharis & Causton, 2014 ). They are responsible, for instance, for creating schedules that shape the delivery of interventions and professional development on inclusion (Theoharis & Causton, 2014 ).

Teachers as implementers

Teachers play a central role in the daily, ground-level implementation of SpEd (Bray & Russell, 2018 ). Depending on district and school conditions, SETs may prioritize, adapt, or reject elements of SpEd. Over 40 years ago, Weatherly and Lipsky ( 1977 ) deemed special education teachers (SET) to be street-level bureaucrats who “find ways to accommodate the demands placed on them and confront the reality of resource limitations” (p. 172). Aligned to this, SETs carry out bureaucratic tasks, such as tracking minutes of provided services and collecting information on student progress from other teachers and service providers.

SETs are responsible for implementing multiple facets of SpEd. That is, while striving to reach equity-oriented goals by integrating students with disabilities, SETs balance the demands of intervention (e.g., teaching students) and compliance (e.g., completing aforementioned bureaucratic tasks) (Bray & Russell, 2018 ). Notably, SETs navigate facets of SpEd while working under considerable constraints, such as limited time, funding, and staffing (Bettini et al., 2017 ; Brunsting et al., 2014 ; Tyler & Brunner, 2014 ). The pressures of pandemic schooling have placed even greater burdens on SETs (Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ).

Institutional logics of special education

Numerous constraints exist for deeply changing the structures, routines, and practices of SpEd to achieve justice. These constraints tie to several deeply institutionalized aspects of SpEd, including: regulations on credentials for special versus general education teachers, using legal language in IEP meetings, and paperwork tracking minutes of services (Bray & Russell, 2018 ). Rather than justly serving students and families, many taken-for-granted aspects of SpEd reinforce ableism and racism (Annamma et al., 2013 ; Voulgarides et al., 2021 ). To elucidate how to disrupt aspects of SpEd—and implement equity-oriented SpEd—we apply the institutional logics perspective. Because it directs explicit attention toward “how cultural rules and macro systems of meaning affect practice and organizational dynamics at the meso and micro level of analysis” (Micelotta et al., 2017 , p. 1894), the institutional logics perspective has utility for interrogating the structures, conditions, and activities enabling substantive change in SpEd.

Scholars have drawn on the logics perspective to analyze societal and field-specific logics in multiple domains—from healthcare and dentistry to criminal justice and the recycling industry (McPherson & Sauder, 2013 ; Scott et al., 2000 ). Educational researchers have applied the logics perspective to analyze deep-seated conceptualizations affecting organizations and their actors (Coburn, 2016 ; Hallett, 2010 ). For example, Russell ( 2011 ) documented the ascendance of the academic logic of kindergarten over a 30 year period. And Rigby ( 2014 ) unearthed and defined three logics of instructional leadership: prevailing/managerial, entrepreneurial, and social justice. In these cases, scholars concentrated on characterizing the nature of field-specific logics, and they showcased how the work of leaders and teachers reflected these institutional structures.

The logics perspective embraces the complexities of organizational change. First, this perspective permits researchers to consider how multiple, competing logics structure a field, influence organizational elements (e.g., organizational structures, allocation of resources, and norms, and routines), and, in turn, actors’ work (Durand & Thornton, 2018 ). Thus, this perspective attends to how logics stretch across the macro, meso, and micro analytic levels. Second, this perspective permits examining how shifting logics contribute to organizational change (Russell, 2011 ; Scott et al., 2000 ). Therefore, the logics perspective provides lenses for understanding the dynamics of institutional and organizational change.

Importantly, as stipulated by Binder ( 2007 ):

Real people, in real contexts, with consequential past experiences of their own, play with them [logics], question them, combine them with institutional logics from other domains, take what they can use from them, and make them fit their needs (p. 549).

As such, logics do not only operate through top-down mechanisms. Nor do logics automatically dictate activities in an organizational field (Binder, 2007 ; Fligstein, 2001 ).

People use their agency to engage with logics; this can foster institutional and/or organizational change (Binder, 2007 ; Coburn, 2016 ; Woulfin, 2016 ). Recent studies consider how people interpret and frame societal and field logics to match their needs (Bridwell-Mitchell & Sherer, 2017 ; Rigby, 2016 ; Woulfin, 2016 ). Turning to the case of SpEd, we point to how educators navigate, question, and hybridize SpEd logics. In the following section, we discuss three logics of SpEd, establishing how equity-oriented SpEd implementation is simultaneously shaped by structures, people, and logics.

Delving into logics of special education

By analyzing policies, research, and other evidence sources, scholars have unearthed logics, or major models, of special education (Lipsky & Gartner, 1997 ; Voulgarides, 2018 ; Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ). We summarize three prominent logics of special education: compliance, intervention, and equity. As Table 1 describes, each logic carries different conceptualizations of disability, the goals of special education, and the “best” ways to serve SWDs. Each logic is upheld by different regulations and resources (Coburn, 2016 ; Russell, 2011 ; Scott et al., 2000 ).

To meet legal demands, including rules from ADA and IDEA, the compliance logic attends to protecting the legalistic relationship between the school system and students/families. With roots in the field of law, the compliance logic revolves around the notion that students with disabilities are entitled equal access to educational opportunities (Osborne & Russo, 2020 ; Yell et al., 2012 ). This logic’s theory of action is: if school systems follow laws regarding SpEd and access for disabled individuals, SWDs will be appropriately served. Importantly, compliance is bolstered by legal structures and funding sources (e.g., districts and parents paying for attorneys) (Voulgarides, 2018 ).

The compliance logic treats district and school administrators as playing roles in structuring and monitoring meetings as well as in analyzing data on programs and outcomes (Voulgarides, 2018 , 2021 ). Voulgarides ( 2021 ) offered insights on how the compliance logic defines SpEd implementation activities as bureaucratic work. There exist weighty administrative burdens associated with the compliance model of SpEd (Klein, 2004 ; Moynihan et al., 2015 ). In addition, the compliance logic positions SpEd teachers as playing roles in carrying out strictures from IEPs and collecting and analyzing evidence on students to ensure systems remain compliant. Across roles and responsibilities, the compliance logic prioritizes legal features of SpEd with less attention to the technical core of serving SWDs in schools or the principles and practices of equity-oriented SpEd.

Intervention

In comparison to compliance, the intervention logic concentrates on the specialized instruction and services provided to SWDs. Reflecting tenets from the medical field, the intervention logic focuses on “treating” students with disabilities with prescribed remedies to improve discrete outcomes (Tomlinson, 2012 ). Oftentimes, this involves providing doses of intervention services (e.g., weeks of dyslexia program instruction, minutes of occupational therapy services) to SWDs. The intervention logic wields the theory of action that if interventions are delivered in particular ways, SWDs’ outcomes will improve.

The intervention logic positions district and school administrators as designers of systems so that interventions are properly delivered to SWDs. For instance, this logic counts on district SpEd directors and principals to precisely manage the logistics of delivering interventions, including hiring service providers and scheduling services to meet the needs of SWDs. In addition, the intervention logic positions SpEd teachers as providers of intervention services to students (Vannest & Hagan-Burke, 2010 ). The intervention logic, however, offers fewer details regarding how to deliver services in an inclusive—and just—manner or how interventions will yield equitable outcomes for students and schools.

In comparison to the intervention and compliance models, the equity model wields an assets-based conception of disability. The equity logic intentionally foregrounds justice for disabled children in both schools and society (Bakken & Okiabor, 2016 ). Leaning on concepts of disability justice (Berne, 2015 ; Connor et al., 2019 ), the equity logic carries conceptualizations regarding how SpEd can dismantle ableist structures and practices. We propose, therefore, the following, justice-oriented, theory of action for the equity logic: if schools remove ableist and racist barriers and create inclusive systems and practices, SWDs will experience more equitable educational and life outcomes (Annamma, 2016 ; Skiba et al., 2008 ).

Importantly, the equity logic moves beyond color-evasive approaches to compliance and/or intervention by sketching out a path for justly serving disabled children, families, and the broader community. At times, however, the equity logic leans on activities of the compliance and intervention models. For instance, mandates and formal organizational actors associated with access to a free appropriate public education (FAPE) (e.g., the Office of Civil Rights of the U.S. Education Department) bolster the equity logic. And disabled students of color might receive high quality services which are delivered in integrated ways and which value assets.

The equity logic places considerable responsibility on district and school administrators to articulate the importance of integrating SWDs and call out ongoing inequities for SWDs with marginalized identities (DeMatthews et al., 2021 ; Theoharis & Causton, 2014 ). Additionally, this logic treats SpEd teachers as key actors who integrate—and justly support—SWDs from diverse backgrounds and with unique assets (Fish, 2019a ). Indeed, teachers’ enactment of inclusion is not solely technical approaches maintaining compliance; it involves acknowledging intersecting identities and working to further disability justice (Berne, 2015 ).

Racialized structures of SpEd

Traditionally, many have viewed the structures and practices of schooling, including the logics of SpEd, in a color-evasive manner. Yet Ray’s ( 2019 ) framework of racialized organizations asserts all organizational structures and practices are racialized over time and across contexts. Thus, racialized organization theory provides lenses for viewing schools as racialized organizations with racialized structures, racist systems and activities, and racist conceptualizations. Turning specifically to SpEd, racialized organization theory assists in understanding racialized organizational components that contribute to pernicious inequities (Annamma et al., 2017 ).

Extending concepts of racialized organization theory (Ray, 2019 ), we treat logics of SpEd as racialized structures carrying definitions, identities, goals, and schemas that color implementation. The logic of compliance is a racialized structure channeling activities to meet regulations of the U.S. legal system; this legal system upholds White supremacy and has been interrogated through Critical Race Theory (Delgado & Stefanic, 2017 ; Khalifa et al., 2013 ). Further, racialized administrative burdens contribute to inequities in SpEd implementation (Ray et al., 2020 ). With linkages to racist and eugenic assessments (Au, 2016 ), the intervention logic also functions as a racialized structure. Some intervention activities aim to ‘fix’ aspects of a disability with little consideration of race, culture, or home language (e.g., Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) for autistic children/youth) (Tincani et al., 2009 ). Finally, with schemas acknowledging the omnipresence of racism and ableism, the equity logic is a racialized structure seeking to dismantle racism as well as ableism. The equity logic confronts ongoing racism and encourages educators to engage in reflection, monitoring, and other activities to confront racism while implementing facets of SpEd (Connor et al., 2019 ; Irby, 2022 ).

Co-existing logics of special education

We delineated the equity, compliance, and intervention logics; yet, on the ground, these logics of SpEd co-exist. Within educational organizations, actors encounter, interpret, and negotiate combinations of the compliance, intervention, and equity logics (Bray & Russell, 2018 ; Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ). Further, using their agency, educators hybridize these logics (Binder, 2007 ; McPherson & Sauder, 2013 ). That is, leaders and teachers meld logics while implementing aspects of SpEd.

As illustrated in the following examples, the hybridization of logics has affordances and tensions:

District leaders hybridize the compliance and intervention logics while determining whether educators are complying with intervention services stipulated in IEPs. Specifically, district leaders conduct monitoring tasks that focus on the when and where of interventions for SWDs.

Some principals hybridize the compliance and equity logics while working to ensure every SWD receives appropriate services. In particular, principals may use an equity lens to analyze the degree to which BIPOC SWDs are receiving specialized services while included in general education settings

Some SpEd teachers hybridize the intervention and equity logics while providing services for SWDs. This could involve teachers using culturally responsive books during intervention activities with SWDs (Cartledge & Kourea, 2008 ).

These illustrations demonstrate how leaders and teachers employ multiple SpEd logics while implementing facets of SpEd—with consequences for SWDs, their families, and schools.

Further, in alignment to other scholarship on the logics perspective (Coburn, 2016 ; Woulfin, 2016 ), educators hold capacity for weaving together ideas from the compliance, intervention, and equity logics. In certain cases, this includes weaving the equity logic with other structures, conceptualizations, and practices. We highlight there exists space within which leaders and teachers can—and should—steer toward equity-oriented SpEd to more justly serve SWDs. However, it is complex for educators to balance multiple conceptualizations of SpEd and multiple pressures in the U.S. education system. This raises vital questions: what conditions enable educators to more consistently promote the equity logic and, in turn, implement practices reflecting this logic? What meso-level factors advance the implementation of the equity model in the Covid-era?

Infrastructure for justly improving special education

Fully animating the equity model to serve SWDs and achieve justice requires changes in systems, routines, and practices. We argue infrastructure can provide such meso-level conditions so leaders and teachers can trigger deep change in the Covid-era. As delineated by Hopkins et al. ( 2013 ), the infrastructure for educational improvement includes working conditions, professional development (PD), and leadership. Further, the coherence and alignment of infrastructure enable deeper degrees of organizational change, including efforts to disrupt macro-forces of racism and ableism (Hopkins et al., 2013 ; Spillane et al., 2018 ; Woulfin & Gabriel, 2020 ). Figure  1 represents the racialized organizational field of special education, which is affected by the macro-forces of racism and ableism and includes multiple logics. The figure also shows how working conditions, PD, and leadership permit elevating the equity logic.

The racialized organizational field of special education

Working conditions

The nature of working conditions matters for the implementation of equity-oriented SpEd. This infrastructural pillar influences SpEd teachers’ use of time and their dispositions towards the profession amongst other outcomes (Bettini et al., 2017 ; Brunsting et al., 2014 ; Johnson et al., 2012 ). A high stress environment contributes to SpEd teacher burnout (Fore et al., 2002 ; Koenen et al., 2019 ). In the COVID-era, working conditions for educators nosedived (Woo & Steiner, 2022 ), so “the state of the teaching profession is in a critical place that is going to require changes to keep teachers in the classroom” (Marshall et al., 2022 ). These challenging working conditions (e.g., teaching in the remote format, gaps in professional learning opportunities, turnover of teachers and leaders) likely constrain educators’ engagement with the equity logic and their implementation of the equity model.

In comparison, positive working conditions for deeply implementing the equity model of SpEd would prioritize educators’ humanity and account for educators’ professional needs (Louis et al., 2016 ). District and school leaders should provide time, space, and other resources so educators can make sense of the equity model and carry out routines aligned with the equity model. Particularly at this phase of pandemic schooling, leaders should reduce the administrative burden of SpEd implementation to improve working conditions for educators (Moynihan et al., 2015 ). Instead of being stymied by paperwork aligning to the compliance model, educators would receive supports so that they can prioritize issues of equity while working with SWDs, caregivers, and other educators. In turn, educators’ work could more frequently reflect the principles and practices of the equity logic.

Professional development

Targeted, contextualized, ongoing PD is a pillar of SpEd infrastructure supporting individual learning and organizational change (Garet et al., 2001 ; Penuel et al., 2007 ). We specifically point to the potential of PD for building the capacity of educators to understand the equity model of SpEd and understand how to engage in activities reflecting the equity logic (e.g., co-teaching culturally responsive writing lessons). We also note the need for tailored PD in the SpEd sphere that grapples with recovery efforts during this stage of the Covid-era.

PD for principals could raise their knowledge and skills to design equitable systems and routines for SpEd in the Covid-era. This PD could guide principals in analyzing systems, such as schedules and collaboration routines, to determine how they match tenets of compliance, intervention, and equity. Through this, principals would assess how existing systems comply with mandates, permit intervention services, and promote inclusion for students with different racial identities and disability diagnoses. Simultaneously, PD would support principals in redesigning systems to better match the equity logic. Additionally, PD could build principals’ capacity to frame SpEd logics to various audiences (Woulfin & Allen, 2022 ). Through such professional learning opportunities, principals would gain skills and strategies for engaging in clear, resonant communication with teachers, staff, and families regarding the equity logic. Moreover, principals would develop their capacity to reframe issues of racism and ableism to drive individual and organizational change.

Second, teacher PD can support change toward equity-oriented SpEd. PD for both SpEd and general education teachers can raise capacity for deeply implementing the equity model of SpEd to yield just outcomes for SWDs. Notably, this PD can foreground the nature of the equity, compliance, and intervention logics to help characterize and clarify the complex mixture of ideas on SpEd (Woulfin & Allen, 2022 ). For instance, PD would unpack the three dominant logics of SpEd. It would then ask teachers to reflect on their beliefs and practices reflecting the compliance, intervention, and equity logics. Next, PD would invite teachers to concretely define what the equity model of SpEd would look, sound, and feel like in their context. Thus, educators would unpack and operationalize how to more justly serve disabled students with intersecting identities. Notably, these professional learning activities would promote collective sensemaking so that teachers—special and general education—formulate shared understandings of equitable approaches to serving SWDs and families. Finally, this PD must build the capacity of teachers to continuously improve SpEd implementation. As such, PD would explicitly address the intersections of racism, ableism, and SpEd and confront barriers for implementing the equity model.

As another pillar of infrastructure, leadership matters for improving SpEd implementation and achieving justice (DeMatthews et al., 2021 ). We highlight leadership activities can elevate key features of the equity logic, contributing to organizational change to encourage the more just implementation of SpEd. First, district and school leaders can frame messages aligning to the equity logic (Coburn, 2004 ; Elfers & Stritikus, 2014 ; Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ). This framing can point to disparities in SpEd diagnosis and inequities in long term life outcomes by race.

Second, district leaders play crucial roles in designing systems that shape working conditions as well as professional development on SpEd (Elfers & Stritikus, 2014 ). Here, we articulate district leaders are responsible for building the infrastructure for equity-oriented SpEd (Hopkins et al., 2013 ). These leaders construct working conditions and professional learning systems. Specifically, district leaders allocate resources that influence working conditions for teachers, leaders, and staff. They also earmark resources for various types of PD, which can address the equity model of SpEd. It is vital, at this moment, for district leaders to ratchet down structures and practices of compliance and intervention to carve out space and re-allocate resources for the equity model.

Turning to the school-level, principals can catalyze the implementation of just approaches to SpEd by boosting the equity logic. In particular, principals can frame the importance of inclusion as well as assets-based, culturally responsive approaches to SpEd. This framing on approaches to SpEd implementation can address students’ intersecting identities. Principals can also frame the purpose of collaboration between general and special education teachers to improve equity-oriented outcomes. Ultimately, principals’ consistent, resonant communication—in concert with working conditions, PD, and other leadership practices—enables the implementation of equity-oriented SpEd to make change dismantling both ableism and racism.

Implications for policy and practice

In light of COVID-exacerbated opportunity chasms and major gaps in SpEd over the phases of the pandemic (Kuhfeld et al., 2020 ; Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ), it is vital to re-set the structures and practices of SpEd (Fullan, 2020 ; Ladson-Billings, 2021 ).

If seeking to deeply change SpEd implementation and achieve justice for SWDs and families, it is currently necessary to dismantle racialized structures, improve organizational structures, and build capacity. We offer suggestions on how federal and state policymakers plus district and school leaders can promote substantive change by grappling with institutional structures and practices of SpEd. Throughout, we emphasize the importance of modifying the infrastructure for equity-oriented special education to improve conditions for educators to amplify the equity logic (see Fig.  1 ). This systems-approach purposefully counters the macro-forces of racism and ableism in the design and implementation of SpEd.

Re-setting special education policy

Policymakers at multiple levels of the U.S. education system must attend to the racialized structures of SpEd to enable substantive change in SpEd implementation. First, they should reflect on the ways racism intersects with the regulations, resources, and conceptualizations of SpEd. For example, to what degree do districts/schools serving a high proportion of BIPOC students have the resources necessary to deliver high-quality, inclusive SpEd services? In this case, decisionmakers would calculate the just distribution of resources for SWDs, and, next, use such evidence to influence future allocations of funds to properly serve BIPOC students and underserved communities.

Second, policymakers should formulate policies that offer guidelines regarding high-quality, responsive compensatory services for BIPOC SWDs whose educational opportunities were disrupted by COVID-19. These policies could address delays and barriers for marginalized students/families at the screening and diagnostic phase due to pandemic conditions (Woulfin & Jones, 2022 ). They may involve culturally responsive communication with families about how to fully support children with intersecting identities. These policies would add guidance and capacity building strategies regarding inclusion to more equitably serve SWDs. In sum, policymakers and other decision makers would ameliorate gaps in SpEd implementation for BIPOC SWDs in the context of pandemic schooling.

Re-setting systems and activities in schools

We also establish how district and school leaders can animate the equity model of SpEd as part of the hard re-set (Klingner et al., 2005 ). To guide decision making on SpEd, district leaders should obtain and analyze multiple forms of evidence on remote and in-person SpEd services (e.g., quantity/quality of services, the nature of family/caregiver involvement) (Safir & Dugan, 2021 ). These analyses should embed questions about racialized structures and practices, including: To what degree did BIPOC students engage in services in different modalities? To what extent did teachers communicate with families of BIPOC students in an asset-based manner? District leaders should also analyze evidence on SpEd teachers’ efforts to adopt inclusive approaches to serve students of color. We note it will be important to consider a range of outcomes in addition to academic achievement, such as attendance, discipline/suspension, and SEL. Next, district leaders should use this evidence to design more just educational experiences for SWDs.

We encourage district leaders to develop ongoing, contextualized PD reflecting the equity logic and promoting inclusive, anti-racist approaches to SpEd (Desimone & Pak, 2017 ; Garet et al., 2001 ). This could include adopting coaching that offers tailored learning opportunities which support and motivate teachers’ implementation of the equity model. To promote substantive change, SpEd coaches could observe for specific features of inclusive instruction, including the engagement and instructional opportunities provided to Black and Brown students. SpEd coaches could also facilitate ongoing collaboration between special and general education teachers to promote equitable experiences and outcomes. These coaching activities can address discipline disparities as well as barriers for enacting inclusion.

At the school-level, principals can tune up the equity model by prioritizing the inclusion of SWDs. This could entail modifying the use of facilities, student schedules, and teacher collaboration schedules to fortify the infrastructure for equity-oriented SpEd. Within this, principals must consider the intersection of students’ race and disability status. Additionally, principals should create positive working conditions that enable teachers to serve diverse SWDs in an inclusive, equitable manner. Marshall et al. ( 2022 ) articulated that “school leaders must have some grace with teachers and provide appropriate resources to support students within the classroom.” We declare, at this phase of pandemic schooling, providing such grace remains vital. We also assert principals should engage in advocacy with district leaders and other constituents for needed resources to justly serve SWDs and improve working conditions for teachers and staff (Johnson et al., 2012 ). This type of advocacy might assist in designating larger amounts of ESSER funding towards equity-oriented SpEd.

Finally, teachers can take strides to extend their enactment of the equity model. For instance, SpEd teachers should engage in routines reflecting the equity logic while collaborating with general education teachers to (Kilanowski-Press et al., 2010 ). SpEd teachers could engage in courageous conversations with teachers, staff, and leaders on the intersection of racism, ableism, and the experiences and outcomes for SWDs in their district (Annamma et al., 2014 ; Singleton, 2014 ). These discussions would permit educators to craft coherent understandings of how and why to justly serve SWDs. Finally, SpEd teachers should advocate to educational administrators and policymakers about the necessary resources to meet the needs of diverse SWDs and achieve justice after multiple years of pandemic schooling. This advocacy could offer ideas on how to improve working conditions for SpEd teachers in a manner enabling the implementation of equity-oriented SpEd.

The exogenous shock of the COVID-19 pandemic disrupted structures and activities of SpEd. Recuperating from the pandemic and conducting a hard re-set of SpEd (Ladson-Billings, 2021 ) necessitates that leaders and teachers draw on resources, interpret ideas, and change elements of their work in significant ways. Applying the lenses of institutional logics and racialized organizations, this essay depicts a trajectory for moving forward to justly implement SpEd. We foreground the role of leaders and teachers in advancing the equity model of SpEd. In addition, we emphasize the SpEd infrastructure must be altered to enable leaders and teachers to deeply institute the equity model. Thus, we shine light on the power of the meso-level for enabling more just approaches to SpEd.

This essay portrayed how varied logics of SpEd play roles in structuring policies, educational organizations, leaders, and teachers. Further, it demonstrated how educators engage with multiple logics of SpEd. Educators can no longer isolate issues of SpEd, nor can they isolate issues of anti-racist teaching and leadership. In contrast, educators should elevate conceptualizations on equity-oriented SpEd across contexts and activities. Notably, this essay explained how infrastructural elements, including working conditions, PD, and leadership, support efforts to implement the equity model (see Fig.  1 ). Finally, we offered insights on how to design systems and conduct work to more justly implement SpEd at this phase of the pandemic. These efforts entail shifts in policies, resources, roles, and routines.

Rather than leaving behind SWDs and special educators, the hard re-set of schooling in the U.S. must embrace multiple assets of SWDs and fortify the infrastructure for SpEd implementation. These efforts should be critical of previous approaches, use multiple forms of evidence to accurately diagnose issues, and, ultimately, craft innovative solutions to justly improve SpEd implementation (Safir & Dugan, 2021 ). While engaging in these efforts, policymakers, leaders, and teachers must confront students’ overlapping challenges which existed before, during, and after the pandemic: from healthcare challenges and food insecurity to evictions and lack of internet access (Garfield et al., 2020 ; Klingner et al., 2005 ; Shelly, 2020 ). Aiming to confront racism and ableism, enacting our model (see Fig.  1 ) would involve leaders and teachers activating the equity logic to motivate substantive changes in the structures and practices of SpEd.

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Woulfin, S.L., Jones, B. Re-setting special education for justice: An essay on the logics and infrastructure enabling deep change in the COVID-19-era. J Educ Change (2023). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10833-023-09483-9

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Opinion What we have learned about the Supreme Court’s right-wingers

Supreme Court observers frequently refer to its right-wing majority of six as a single bloc. However, differences among those six have become more apparent over time. Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr.’s and Clarence Thomas’s extreme judicial activism, partisan screeds and ethics controversies put them in a category unto themselves. Meanwhile, Justice Amy Coney Barrett has demonstrated surprising independence.

Watch Justice Barrett.

Not all Republican-appointed judges are the same. In Trump v. Anderson (concerning disqualification under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment of four-times-indicted former president Donald Trump), for example, Barrett, along with Justices Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson and Sonia Sotomayor, criticized the maximalist majority opinion, which held that not only could state courts not determine disqualification but that Congress had to act before any candidate could be disqualified from federal office.

Like the so-called liberal justices, Barrett was disinclined to address “the complicated question whether federal legislation is the exclusive vehicle through which Section 3 can be enforced.” The court decided too much, she agreed. Her complaint with the so-called liberal justices was primarily tonal. (“This is not the time to amplify disagreement with stridency.”)

Likewise, in United States v. Texas (considering the stay on enforcement of Texas’s S.B. 4 immigration law ), Barrett, along with Justice Brett M. Kavanaugh, offered the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit an opening to take up the case promptly, which it did, rather than wade into a procedural fight over a stay in a case concerning Texas’s constitutionally suspect law.

As Supreme Court expert Steve Vladeck put it , “The Barrett/Kavanaugh concurrence went out of its way to nudge the Fifth Circuit — noting not only that the Fifth Circuit should be able to rule on the stay pending appeal ‘promptly,’ but that, ‘If a decision does not issue soon, the applicants may return to this Court.’” In essence, Barrett said the Supreme Court would not meddle in a circuit’s administrative business. But if the 5th Circuit actually allowed this constitutional monstrosity to proceed, she would have a different view.

And in Moore v. Harper (the independent state legislature doctrine), Barrett joined in the chief justice’s majority opinion, along with the three Democratic-appointed justices, to bat down the radical notion that state courts have no role in determining alleged violations of state election laws (provided they did “not transgress the ordinary bounds of judicial review”).

Beyond her opinions in high-profile cases, Barrett also sought to repair the court’s reputation damaged by right-wing partisanship. She has started appearing alongside Sotomayor publicly to insist that the court’s ideological combatants are more collegial than they might appear. Perhaps she is.

Barrett is no Sandra Day O’Connor (a true swing justice). Barrett was just as extreme on Roe v. Wade as the other right-wingers. Nevertheless, her efforts to carve an independent niche on the court should not be ignored.

On the other hand, there is no limit to what Justices Alito and Thomas will do.

In contrast to Barrett, no right-wing theory or activist invitation is too wacky for Alito and Thomas to entertain.

During oral argument on Danco Laboratories v. Alliance for Hippocratic Medicine (considering the Food and Drug Administration’s approval of mifepristone), Alito and Thomas took up the right-wing infatuation with the Comstock Act , passed in 1873. Alito, alone among the justices, seemed anxious to speed past the very real “standing” issue to ruminate about a means of banning abortion nationwide.

The Comstock law, which has not been enforced in about a century, bans sending “every article, instrument, substance, drug, medicine, or thing which is advertised or described in a manner calculated to lead another to use or apply it for producing abortion .” (Also, certainly unconstitutionally, it bans a large category of vaguely defined pornography.) Thomas and Alito seem ready and willing to deploy the law in a way it has never been applied: namely, to states where abortion is otherwise legal, thereby threatening the availability of medical abortions nationwide.

The Post reported , “Some experts and Biden officials fear Alito and Thomas are planning to write a separate opinion focused solely on the Comstock Act, arguing that the law remains viable and providing legal cover to a future administration that seeks to invoke it.” Even if Alito and Thomas do not carry the day, the Hill reported , “access to abortion pills could still very much be at risk if Alito and Thomas succeed in soliciting a Comstock-focused challenge in the future,” abortion rights defenders fear. A future Republican administration might well start trying to employ the law to throw abortion providers in jail.

Fishing for a hook to extrapolate the Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization ruling into a nationwide ban on medical abortions epitomizes these justices’ radical disregard for precedent and brazen judicial activism. Indeed, Alito and Thomas increasingly seem like stalking horses for the far-right agenda, be it on guns, abortion or voting.

The Supreme Court’s credibility

Numerous polls show the court’s approval has cratered , likely a function of its ethics scandals, partisan rhetoric and aggressive reversal of precedent. In other words, judicial imperialism and disdain for ethical rules that apply even to members of Congress are unpopular with voters.

Increasingly partisan Thomas and Alito no longer bother to conceal their contempt for ethical restrictions , congressional oversight or judicial temperament . They have repeatedly failed to disclose luxurious gifts (with no sign of remorse) and remain adamant that they will accept no outside oversight.

After a firestorm of protest over financial disclosure lapses, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. released ethical guidelines so weak that they lack an enforcement mechanism. Worse, the guidelines are so porous that they posed no barrier to Thomas sitting on cases involving attempts to overturn the 2020 election that his wife supported.

Unless the rest of the court decides to restrain Thomas and Alito, concerns about ethical lapses and misalignment with contemporary American values will deepen, heightening demands for congressional responses (e.g., mandatory ethics, term limits, court expansion). If that happens, Alito and Thomas will be largely responsible.

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Don’t Overlook the Power of the Civil Cases Against Donald Trump

By David Lat and Zachary B. Shemtob

Mr. Lat writes about the legal profession. Mr. Shemtob is a lawyer.

For months now, the country has been riveted by the four criminal cases against Donald Trump: the New York state case involving hush-money payments to an adult film star, the federal case involving classified documents, the Georgia election-interference case and the federal election-interference case. But some have been postponed or had important deadlines delayed. The only case with a realistic shot of producing a verdict before the election, the New York case, involves relatively minor charges of falsifying business records that are unlikely to result in any significant prison time . None of the other three are likely to be resolved before November.

It’s only the civil courts that have rendered judgments on Mr. Trump. In the first two months of 2024, Mr. Trump was hit with more than half a billion dollars in judgments in civil cases — around $450 million in the civil fraud case brought by the New York attorney general, Letitia James, and $83.3 million in the defamation case brought by the writer E. Jean Carroll.

For Trump opponents who want to see him behind bars, even a half-billion-dollar hit to his wallet might not carry the same satisfaction. But if, as Jonathan Mahler suggested in 2020, “visions of Donald Trump in an orange jumpsuit” turn out to be “more fantasy than reality,” civil justice has already shown itself to be a valuable tool for keeping him in check — and it may ultimately prove more successful in the long run at reining him in.

The legal system is not a monolith but a collection of different, interrelated systems. Although not as heralded as the criminal cases against Mr. Trump, civil suits have proved effective in imposing some measure of accountability on him, in situations where criminal prosecution might be too delayed, divisive or damaging to the law.

To understand why the civil system has been so successful against Mr. Trump, it’s important to understand some differences between civil and criminal justice. Civil actions have a lower standard of proof than criminal ones. In the civil fraud case, Justice Arthur Engoron applied a “ preponderance of the evidence ” standard, which required the attorney general to prove that it was more likely than not that Mr. Trump committed fraud. (Criminal cases require a jury or judge to decide beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed a crime, a far higher standard.) As a result, it is much easier for those suing Mr. Trump in civil court to obtain favorable judgments.

These judgments can help — and already are helping — curb Mr. Trump’s behavior. Since Justice Engoron’s judgment in the civil fraud case, the monitor assigned to watch over the Trump Organization, the former federal judge Barbara Jones, has already identified deficiencies in the company’s financial reporting. After the second jury verdict in Ms. Carroll’s favor, Mr. Trump did not immediately return to attacking her, as he did in the past. (He remained relatively silent about her for several weeks before lashing out again in March.)

Returning to the White House will not insulate Mr. Trump from the consequences of civil litigation. As president, he could direct his attorney general to dismiss federal criminal charges against him or even attempt to pardon himself if convicted. He cannot do either with civil cases, which can proceed even against presidents. (In Clinton v. Jones , the Supreme Court held that a sitting president has no immunity from civil litigation for acts done before taking office and unrelated to the office. And as recently as December, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made clear that even if the challenged acts took place during his presidency, when the president “acts in an unofficial, private capacity, he is subject to civil suits like any private citizen.”)

It may also be difficult for Mr. Trump to avoid the most serious penalties in a civil case. To appeal both recent civil judgments, Mr. Trump must come up with hundreds of millions of dollars in cash or secure a bond from an outside company. Although he managed to post a $91.6 million bond in the Carroll case, he initially encountered what his lawyers described as “ insurmountable difficulties ” in securing the half-billion-dollar bond he was originally ordered to post in the civil fraud case. An appeals court order last week cut that bond to $175 million — but if Mr. Trump cannot post this bond, Ms. James can start enforcing her judgment by seizing his beloved real estate or freezing his bank accounts. And even though it appears that he will be able to post the reduced bond, the damage done to his cash position and liquidity poses a significant threat to and limitation on his business operations.

Furthermore, through civil litigation, we could one day learn more about the inner workings of the Trump empire. Civil cases allow for broader discovery than criminal cases do. Ms. James, for instance, was able to investigate Mr. Trump’s businesses for almost three years before filing suit. And in the Carroll cases, Mr. Trump had to sit for depositions — an experience he seemed not to enjoy, according to Ms. Carroll’s attorney. There is no equivalent pretrial process in the criminal context, where defendants enjoy greater protections — most notably, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.

Finally, civil cases generally have fewer externalities or unintended consequences. There are typically not as many constitutional issues to navigate and less risk of the prosecution appearing political. As a result, civil cases may be less divisive for the nation. Considering the extreme political polarization in the United States right now, which the presidential election will probably only exacerbate, this advantage should not be underestimated.

David Lat ( @DavidLat ), a former federal law clerk and prosecutor, writes Original Jurisdiction , a newsletter about law and the legal profession. Zachary B. Shemtob is a former federal law clerk and practicing lawyer.

The Times is committed to publishing a diversity of letters to the editor. We’d like to hear what you think about this or any of our articles. Here are some tips . And here’s our email: [email protected] .

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An earlier version of this article misstated Arthur Engoron’s title. He is a justice on the New York State Supreme Court, not a judge.

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I Served on the Florida Supreme Court. What the New Majority Just Did Is Indefensible.

On April 1, the Florida Supreme Court, in a 6–1 ruling, overturned decades of decisions beginning in 1989 that recognized a woman’s right to choose—that is, whether to have an abortion—up to the time of viability.

Anchored in Florida’s own constitutional right to privacy, this critical individual right to abortion had been repeatedly affirmed by the state Supreme Court, which consistently struck down conflicting laws passed by the Legislature.

As explained first in 1989:

Florida’s privacy provision is clearly implicated in a woman’s decision of whether or not to continue her pregnancy. We can conceive of few more personal or private decisions concerning one’s body in the course of a lifetime.

Tellingly, the justices at the time acknowledged that their decision was based not only on U.S. Supreme Court precedent but also on Florida’s own privacy amendment.

I served on the Supreme Court of Florida beginning in 1998 and retired, based on our mandatory retirement requirement, a little more than two decades later. Whether Florida’s Constitution provided a right to privacy that encompassed abortion was never questioned, even by those who would have been deemed the most conservative justices—almost all white men back in 1989!

And strikingly, one of the conservative justices at that time stated: “If the United States Supreme Court were to subsequently recede from Roe v. Wade , this would not diminish the abortion rights now provided by the privacy amendment of the Florida Constitution.” Wow!

In 2017 I authored an opinion holding unconstitutional an additional 24-hour waiting period after a woman chooses to terminate her pregnancy. Pointing out that other medical procedures did not have such requirements, the majority opinion noted, “Women may take as long as they need to make this deeply personal decision,” adding that the additional 24 hours stipulated that the patient make a second, medically unnecessary trip, incurring additional costs and delays. The court applied what is known in constitutional law as a “strict scrutiny” test for fundamental rights.

Interestingly, Justice Charles Canady, who is still on the Florida Supreme Court and who participated in the evisceration of Florida’s privacy amendment last week, did not challenge the central point that abortion is included in an individual’s right to privacy. He dissented, not on substantive grounds but on technical grounds.

So what can explain this 180-degree turn by the current Florida Supreme Court? If I said “politics,” that answer would be insufficient, overly simplistic. Unfortunately, with this court, precedent is precedent until it is not. Perhaps each of the six justices is individually, morally or religiously, opposed to abortion.

Yet, all the same, by a 4–3 majority, the justices—three of whom participated in overturning precedent—voted to allow the proposed constitutional amendment on abortion to be placed on the November ballot. (The dissenters: the three female members of the Supreme Court.) That proposed constitutional amendment:

Amendment to Limit Government Interference With Abortion: No law shall prohibit, penalize, delay, or restrict abortion before viability or when necessary to protect the patient’s health, as determined by the patient’s healthcare provider. This amendment does not change the Legislature’s constitutional authority to require notification to a parent or guardian before a minor has an abortion. 

For the proposed amendment to pass and become enshrined in the state constitution, 60 percent of Florida voters must vote yes.

In approving the amendment to be placed on the ballot at the same time that it upheld Florida’s abortion bans, the court angered those who support a woman’s right to choose as well as those who are opposed to abortion. Most likely the latter groups embrace the notion that fetuses are human beings and have rights that deserve to be protected. Indeed, Chief Justice Carlos Muñiz, during oral argument on the abortion amendment case, queried the state attorney general on precisely that issue, asking if the constitutional language that defends the rights of all natural persons extends to an unborn child at any stage of pregnancy.

In fact, and most troubling, it was the three recently elevated Gov. Ron DeSantis appointees—all women—who expressed their views that the voters should not be allowed to vote on the amendment because it could affect the rights of the unborn child. Justice Jamie Grosshans, joined by Justice Meredith Sasso, expressed that the amendment was defective because it failed to disclose the potential effect on the rights of the unborn child. Justice Renatha Francis was even more direct, writing in her dissent:

The exercise of a “right” to an abortion literally results in a devastating infringement on the right of another person: the right to live. And our Florida Constitution recognizes that “life” is a “basic right” for “[a]ll natural persons.” One must recognize the unborn’s competing right to life and the State’s moral duty to protect that life.

In other words, the three dissenting justices would recognize that fetuses are included in who is a “natural person” under Florida’s Constitution.

What should be top of mind days after the dueling decisions? Grave concern for the women of our state who will be in limbo because, following the court’s ruling, a six-week abortion ban—at a time before many women even know they are pregnant—will be allowed to go into effect. We know that these restrictions will disproportionately affect low-income women and those who live in rural communities.

But interestingly, there is a provision in the six-week abortion ban statute that allows for an abortion before viability in cases of medical necessity: if two physicians certify that the pregnant patient is at risk of death or that the “fetus has a fatal fetal abnormality.”

The challenge will be finding physicians willing to put their professional reputations on the line in a state bent on cruelly impeding access to needed medical care when it comes to abortion.

Yet, this is the time that individuals and organizations dedicated to women’s health, as well as like-minded politicians, will be crucial in coordinating efforts to ensure that abortions, when needed, are performed safely and without delay. This is the time to celebrate and support organizations, such as Planned Parenthood and Emergency Medical Assistance , as well as our own RBG Fund , which provides patients necessary resources and information. Floridians should also take full advantage of the Repro Legal Helpline .

We all have a role in this—women and men alike. Let’s get out, speak out, shout out, coordinate our efforts, and, most importantly, vote . Working together, we can make a difference.